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ABSTRACT
AMERICAN UNDERSTANDINGS OF U.S. ECONOMIC INEQUALITY:
REDISTRIBUTION AND RESISTANCE
SEPTEMBER 2021
JACKLYN A. STEIN, B.A., WILLIAMS COLLEGE
M.P.H., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Naomi Gerstel
Why has economic inequality in the U.S. continued to grow despite widespread and
strong public opinion in favor of reducing it? In this dissertation, I argue that Americans
are upset by current levels of economic inequality and support downward redistribution
as a means to reduce it. At the same time, many have hesitations about or resistance to
the mechanisms through which such redistribution might be carried out. This resistance, I
found, varied across respondents’ class and race (and, to some extent, gender). Across
groups, respondents’ desires for change were stymied by a social and political context of
differential visibility that serves the interests of the already powerful—including cues
about class, racial and gendered inequality, the lives of the rich or the poor, the work of
the government, policies themselves, and respondents’ own relative privilege and
disadvantage. Although elite commentators often focus on (mis)perceptions about
economic inequality among less powerful groups, the (mis)perceptions among the more
powerful groups in my project were equally, if not more, striking, especially given their
relatively greater political power. I approached this dissertation as a re-visit to Jennifer
Hochschild’s 1981 project (What’s Fair?), returning to her site, engaging with similar
questions, and using an interview approach modeled after hers. Hochschild limited her
investigation to low- and high-income Whites. I added Black respondents in both income
groups and extended the analysis to take into account race and gender in addition to class.
In-depth interviews allowed me to explore people’s reasoning in the context of their lives.
I conducted 122 hours of interviews with 42 respondents who were high- and lowincome, White and Black, women and men. My findings reinforce the suggestion among
policy feedback scholars that understanding American opinions about economic
inequality requires attention not only to the ways public opinion shapes policy, but also
to the ways those opinions are shaped by policy. Thus, questions about why the American
public does not take action in their own best interests must also engage with questions
about the forces that keep U.S. systems from responding to a widespread public desire for
greater economic equality.
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Introduction

INTRODUCTION
The current moment
The coronavirus pandemic thrust into public view the economic divides that have
been widening in American society for a long time. Long before the pandemic, economic
inequality had translated into gaps in access to health care, food, transportation, housing,
and education, which, in turn, had translated into gaps not just in quality of life, but
quantity as well. In some regions of the U.S. people in wealthier—and Whiter—
neighborhoods are expected to live decades longer than those in poorer or more minority
neighborhoods (Health Resources & Services Administration 2019). The speed of the
virus’ spread and its repercussions have accelerated the pace of this translation, creating a
convergence in time where the ongoing advantages of some and disadvantages of
others—forces that, in non-pandemic times, have been such a continuous hum that many
had ignored them as background noise—have suddenly become compressed into a
critical moment. All at once, millions of Americans who had been just scraping by or
falling ever farther into debt were pushed past the breaking point. Their otherwiseinvisible hardships were suddenly and forcefully spotlighted by their sheer synchronous
volume, dramatically exemplified by charts of record-breaking spikes in unemployment
claims.
Low-income workers, many of whom were already living precariously from
paycheck to paycheck, have become the first to lose their incomes (and any health
insurance that might have come with it). And those who have continued working—
because they have no paid leave or because their jobs have been deemed essential and
they cannot afford to stop—face some of the highest exposure to the virus because they
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cannot practice social distancing (Tomaskovic-Devey, Dominguez-Villegas, and Hoyt
2020). One report estimates that 57% of nursing home workers, 69% of grocery store
workers and 74% of cleaning employees are low-wage workers (Tomaskovic-Devey et
al. 2020). People of color, who are over-represented among low-wage workers, have been
hit disproportionately hard both economically and physically (Eligon et al. 2020).
Meanwhile, many higher-income Americans were more able to work at home—
with internet access and jobs that can be done remotely—protecting both their incomes
and their physical safety. Even as they scrambled to adapt to a new reality (children out
of school, physical isolation) and cope with mounting fear and anxiety, they stood on the
shoulders of those below them on the economic ladder to make their sheltering at home
possible. As those with the means to do so resisted going to stores, those without such
means picked and packaged food, stocked grocery store shelves, packed and shipped a
surge in online orders, and delivered take-out food, groceries, and medicines. Weeks into
their retreats into private spaces, one New York Times opinion writer wrote, “white-collar
workers on lockdown discovered” that they had been “counting on people without health
care to endanger themselves” so that they could stay in the safety of their homes (Bennet
2020).
The spread of this new virus did not create these dramatically unequal
circumstances—economic inequality in the U.S. has been worsening for decades—but
the virus’ spread has been abetted by these circumstances and is exacerbating their
impacts (Tensley 2020). As the life-and-death relevance of economic inequality is once
again thrust into public view, this dissertation explores how Americans understood these
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unequal circumstances—and the policies proposed to address them—in the decade
leading up to the coronavirus pandemic.
This Dissertation
Americans—according to many measures over many years—are worried about
rising economic inequality and want to see it reduced. And yet, as the veneer of a
booming economy has been peeled back by this pandemic, it has revealed an economic
and social chasm that has continued to grow despite consistent and widespread popular
sentiment in favor of its reduction. What are we missing about how Americans
understand economic inequality that might help to explain this puzzle of simultaneous
distress and apparent complacency?
With this puzzle in mind, I began this project with the goal of understanding how
Americans make sense of the growing economic inequality in the U.S. and how they
translated their understandings into opinions about policy. These are questions that have
been asked and explored for a long time. Thus, as I waded into a rich and vibrant field of
existing research, I tried to take a different tack. In an era of big data, I went small—
going deep rather than broad—to probe at the areas that previous research suggested
might help us answer these questions. I sat with people from high- and low-income
households and talked with them at length—asking a set of questions, but also allowing
them to muse and think aloud, discover and reflect on their own uncertainties and
contradictions, and to contextualize their responses in their own lived experiences. Forty
years ago, Jennifer Hochschild (1981) probed at similar questions in a similar way, and I
modeled my study as a revisit to hers—to see what new insights could be gained now that
decades marked by dramatic increases in economic inequality had passed.
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I didn’t find all the answers. But I did find evidence that suggests promising
avenues for action and further investigation. Some of my findings lend support to existing
arguments based primarily on survey and polling data. For example, I found that, as
Spencer Piston (2018) has argued, people think a lot about class when they think about
inequality. And their views of the rich and the poor tip them distinctly in favor of
redistribution. Also, as Leslie McCall has argued (e.g., 2013, 2016), respondents
prioritized equity of opportunity over equality of outcomes, but understood inequity in
outcomes (especially as they were passed intergenerationally) as undercutting equity of
opportunity.
Through in-depth interviewing, I also uncovered some patterns that had been less
visible in research based on those broader-rather-than-deeper approaches. In particular, I
learned some things about when and in what ways economic inequality was visible to
people, who they saw as the winners and losers in the current system, and what they
understood as the mechanisms through which these inequalities were sustained or
worsened. The people I spoke with saw economic inequality counteracting, and
contradicting, American notions of meritocracy—rewarding those already born into
circumstances that helped them thrive and punishing those who already had the
disadvantage of being born without economic or social resources.
Despite their frustration with existing inequalities, respondents found reasons to
resist redistribution and morally justify inaction. The insights I gained into the character
and sources of resistance to traditionally redistributive policy provide particularly useful
material for informing future, nationally representative research. Resistance manifested in
distinct ways between high- and low-income households—both of which supported
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redistribution—based on divergent experiences in lives socially and spatially segregated
by class and race. Respondents’ judgements and legitimations—of themselves and of
others—were influenced by what was visible to them in these separate spaces. Some
policies and their impacts were more visible to one or the other group. Likewise,
respondents had differential access and exposure to the lives of the rich and poor and
relationships between the two. These different experiences shaped respondents’ moral
judgements and legitimations of themselves and of others—and, in turn, shaped their
views of what should be done and who should be held responsible.
Public trust in government has been at historic lows, and distrust among lowincome Americans has been particularly scrutinized (and, sometimes, disparaged), but
my research suggests it deserves a closer, more empathetic look. To many of the lowincome Americans I spoke with, their most salient encounters with government were
negative. Many recounted direct and indirect experiences with highly visible, meanstested social welfare programs that were widely regarded not only as insufficient, but as
controlling, punitive, degrading, or discriminatory. They were frustrated by the welldocumented social stigma attached to these programs (e.g., Edin and Lein 1997; HalpernMeekin et al. 2015; Lens 2008; Piven and Cloward 2012; Rank 1994), which they
repudiated with evidence of their own moral worth. These programs—which respondents
correctly perceived as designed by legislators overwhelmingly drawn from among the
wealthy (Carnes 2013) and unresponsive to the opinions of the poor (Bartels 2016; Gilens
2012; Gilens and Page 2014)—required applications, follow-up appointments, and often,
visits to several different offices. In contrast, redistributive policy mechanisms that are
buried in the tax code (e.g., the Earned Income Tax Credit) require those who qualify
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only to file their taxes—something associated with work and therefore, less stigmatized
(Halpern-Meekin et al. 2015) and less visible. Among low-income respondents, this kind
of downwardly-redistributive policy went completely unmentioned, despite a widespread
frustration with taxation in general (also something whose costs were more visible to low
income respondents than the benefits). In general, low-income respondents distrusted
government because they felt it was unresponsive to their interests, run by those whose
self-interest conflicted with their own, and otherwise beholden to the interests of the rich.
High-income Americans’ resistance to redistribution also deserves a closer look.
This group has received less attention from scholars who have sought to understand
sources of political inaction to counteract economic inequality (but see Reeves 2018), but
because of their high rates of political participation, their resistance is particularly
consequential. Few high-income respondents in my project were overtly opposed to
traditional redistributive policy—and, in fact, most were overtly in favor—but some had
mixed feelings, and most either did not feel implicated in the creation or upholding of
inequitable economic systems or they felt they had little power to change those systems.
As with low-income respondents, issues of visibility and self-perceptions of moral worth
were key. Although their relative privilege compared to the poor was visible to nearly all
high-income respondents, linkages between their own advantages and the disadvantages
of the poor were much less so. The visibility of these connections was complicated by the
“submerged” nature of many upwardly redistributive policies in the tax code (Mettler
2011; Reeves 2018) but also by respondents’ own self-protective desires to uphold their
sense of moral worth. Many characterized themselves as part of the solution—willing to
make sacrifices to create more equity—but not as part of the problem. Many contributed
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to local efforts and initiatives to improve the lives of the poor, but ultimately, most
acquiesced to the policy status quo, both their economically privileged positions and
sense of moral worth intact.
Class, race, and gender
Class comparison provides the key frame for this analysis, with an understanding
that class is deeply entangled with race and with gender (Collins 2002; Glenn 1999). I
recruited respondents who varied by class (high-income/low-income), race
(White/Black), and gender (women/men)—as described in more detail below. In my
small sample, as in much larger samples, patterns across these groups were messy and
variable. Nevertheless, as my analysis progressed, respondents’ class positions emerged
as a clear dividing line in the ways they perceived economic inequality and thought about
ways to address it. High- and low-income respondents lived materially different—and
often spatially and socially segregated—lives that provided different vantage points from
which to view the lives of the rich and the poor and the mechanisms and consequences of
economic inequality. What was visible to respondents contributed to shaping their moral
perceptions of themselves and others, which in turn shaped their perceptions of inequality
and policy designed to address it.
These class divisions often overlapped with differences in perspective by
respondents’ race in expected ways, given the established findings that American views
on poverty—and consequently views on redistribution—are intertwined with race and
views on race (e.g., DiTomaso 2013; Fox 2004; Gilens 1999; Quadagno 1994; Winter
2008). First, because of historical, structural, and systemic racism and White supremacy,
race is entangled with class. High-income Black respondents’ lives were less class
segregated from their low-income racial peers than were the lives of their high-income
7
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White counterparts. Every high-income Black respondent I spoke with had either grown
up poor themselves or with close relatives or peers who were poor. In contrast, although
some high-income White respondents had cross-class connections (as co-workers,
patients, children’s classmates), only one recounted growing up poor or with poor family
or friends. Secondly, and related, White and Black respondents viewed the connection
between racial oppression (current and past) and current economic inequalities in
different ways. Black respondents expressed views of this connection that were more
specific, systems-focused, and historically-situated than those expressed by White
respondents.
Gender dynamics, too, infused respondents’ experiences of economic inequality,
however their analyses of the primary forces shaping economic inequality did not center
around gender to the same degree that they did around class and race. The literature
offers some evidence of gendered differences in American opinions about extreme
incomes (e.g., Burak 2013), but in my analysis, gender neither featured as a key factor
differentiating opinions about economic inequality nor a key focus of respondents as they
explained economic inequality.
This is not to say that manifestations of inequality in respondents’ everyday lives
were not often refracted through the lens of gendered systems and structures (Fording,
Soss, and Schram 2011), because they often were. For example, the gendered and raced
image of the welfare queen was an upspoken backdrop for defending or impugning the
morality of the poor (Hancock 2004). The rich were often described in both gendered and
raced terms (i.e., White men). Also, low-income respondents’ interactions with state
institutions were often gender segregated—with women predominantly interacting with
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and receiving means-tested social assistance while men’s interactions with the state more
commonly involved carceral and employment institutions (Haney 2004). Among highincome respondents, gender and race together shaped women’s experiences of
economically consequential discrimination in realms dominated by White masculine
norms and power.
The extent to which respondents attended to gendered economic inequalities in
their analyses varied across their own gender and class positions. Women were far more
likely to talk unprompted about these inequalities than were men. More than half of
women respondents described gendered economic inequalities unprompted by my
specific questions on the topic (including two-thirds of high-income women and half of
low-income women) while only 4 of 23 men did so. However, while many women did,
unprompted, raise the topic of gender inequality in the context of economic and/or racial
inequality, only a few really focused there.
There were exceptions, but in general, gendered systems and structures were not
as central to respondents’ discussions of economic inequality as were class and race—and
thus, gender receives less focus in my analysis. This pattern of attention to gendered
inequalities likely reflects my analytical lens, but it might also be a finding that reflects
the relatively lower societal visibility of and discourse about manifestations of gendered
inequalities—particularly those that overlap with economic and racial inequality.

Revisiting Hochschild
In the late 1970s, seeking to understand why the majority of Americans failed to
vote “itself out of its economic disadvantage” (Hochschild 1981:2), Jennifer Hochschild
turned to in-depth interviewing. Rather than asking people to choose from a fixed set of
9

Introduction

policy options or opinion metrics, she asked them to talk about and rationalize their ideas
of fairness. What norms of distributive justice do wealthy and poor Americans hold, she
asked, and what do those norms imply for their beliefs about the redistribution of wealth?
I approached this dissertation as a re-visit to Hochschild’s project, returning to her
site, engaging with similar questions, and using an interview approach modeled after
hers. This kind of re-engagement with qualitative work is unusual and offered a unique
opportunity to explore if and how opinions have changed as the economic context has
changed dramatically. Hochschild limited her investigation to low- and high-income
White respondents in New Haven, Connecticut. In my revisit I went back to New Haven
but added Black respondents in both income groups and extended the analysis of
inequality to take into account race and gender in addition to class.
Setting the stage for my analysis, the decades since Hochschild conducted her
study have seen soaring increases in economic inequality in the U.S. There is much
written about this, but one measure of this change is in the share of national income going
to the top 1% of income earners compared to the bottom 50% of income earners. In 1980,
the top 1% received about 10% of national income while the bottom 50% received about
20% (Saez and Zucman 2019). By 2018, the top 1% (2.4 million adults) received 20% of
national income, while the bottom 50% (122 million adults) received only 12% (ibid). In
other words, in the time since Hochschild’s study, Americans in the bottom half of the
income distribution went from collectively having twice as much income as the top 1% to
collectively having about half as much income as the top 1%, despite having 50 times
more people than that top group. Although it is not clear how aware most Americans are
of the magnitude of this change (e.g., Norton and Ariely 2011), it is clear that the idea of
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the top 1% has become a pervasive concept in public discourse and a popular target of
public dissatisfaction (Keister 2014).
Given these dramatic changes in inequality, my findings were remarkably similar
to Hochschild’s—although the differences are important—reinforcing the argument made
by some that opinions about economic inequality are generally decoupled from the
magnitude of inequality itself (McCall 2013) and suggesting the durability of the patterns
Hochschild uncovered. Like Hochschild’s respondents, the people I spoke with were
conflicted, pulled “in equal, but opposite, directions” (Hochschild 1981:186) by their
dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs and their hesitations about existing forms
of redistribution. Hochschild argued, “most respondents certainly do not support the
redistribution of wealth, but they also do not exactly oppose it. They do both and
therefore neither” (Hochschild 1981:186). In contrast, I argue that, for the most part, the
people I spoke with did support redistribution, but they also had hesitations about it. The
end result was the same—frustration and discouragement among the low income and
ambivalence and acquiescence among the high income—but this subtle distinction has
important implications for policy. Following Spencer Piston (2018) and Leslie McCall
(2013), I argue that Americans’ underlying support for redistribution may be undermined
by political communication about redistributive policy that fails to transparently lay out
the mechanisms and the groups that reap the benefits and pay the costs.
In 1981, 90% of New Haven residents were either Black (31%) or White (58%;
U.S. Census Bureau 1981). By 2019, Black New-Haveners were still 32% of the
population, but the percentage of White residents had fallen to 30% and another 30%
were Latinx. Hochschild deliberately limited her sample to White respondents “to keep
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the focus on economic and social, not racial, differences” (Hochschild 1981:316). Neither
race nor gender was prominent in her analysis. Like Hochschild, I focused my analysis on
economic difference among respondents, but unlike Hochschild, I structured my study to
include Black as well as White respondents to better understand how race intersected
with class and gender in shaping opinions about economic inequality (as noted above).
Methods/Data
I designed this project to re-engage Hochschild’s findings, revisiting her study
site, and adapting her methodology. Hochschild interviewed 28 White respondents
divided into 16 low-income respondents and 12 high-income respondents—half women
and men in each group. She interviewed each respondent for six hours (three sessions of
2 hours each). I reduced the number of interview sessions to two so that I could interview
more people and draw a more racially diverse sample. I used Hochschild’s interview
questions (published in the back of her book) as a baseline and adapted them to
incorporate current topics.
Over the course of a year and a half, I conducted 122 hours of interviews with 42
people, most of whom lived in New Haven (a few lived in the immediately neighboring
towns). I interviewed people who were low and high income, White and Black, women
and men. My goal, with in-depth interviews, was to capture not just opinions, but also
understandings and interpretations that were embedded in the context of people’s
experiences—something difficult to do in polling or surveys (Walsh 2009; Williamson
2017). I asked open-ended questions and probed for clarification and detail.
Opening the door to the experiential context of people’s opinions provides an
opportunity to access depth but can also contribute analytical and emotional complexity.
Social life is incredibly messy, and I sometimes struggled to fit people’s thoughts and
12
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lives into tidy categories without feeling that I was oversimplifying or being intellectually
dishonest. I dealt with this tension by presenting my analysis primarily in the form of a
small number of elaborated cases in each chapter—attempting to keep respondents’
thoughts connected to their context. The patterns I outline in this dissertation represent
my best attempt to accurately represent the people who shared their time and thoughts
with me. Of course, to present these stories, complexity had to be simplified, messiness
was tidied, and many people and many variations and topics have had to be left out.
Recruitment and Sampling
I constructed my sample to include similar numbers of participants across income,
gender, and race categories as a way of deliberately gathering opinions from people in an
array of social positions. I sought high-income respondents with annual household
incomes above $100,000 and low-income respondents with annual household incomes
below $40,000. Among the 19 high-income respondents, there were five Black women
(hereafter, HIBW), four White women (HIWW), five Black men (HIBM), and five White
men (HIWM). Among the 23 low-income respondents, there were five Black women
(LIBW), five White women (LIWW), seven Black men (LIBM), and six White men
(LIWM). With such small numbers, I do not extrapolate from the distribution of opinions
across these categories of respondents to the broader population. Instead, my goal is to
use the depth and context that these interviews provide to generate insights and
hypotheses based on the patterns I found among this small group.
I recruited participants through a mix of snowball sampling and direct recruitment
by mail and phone call (based on a registered voter list with household income
estimates). At first, I tried to recruit all participants by mailing letters to households in
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high and low-income neighborhoods (as Hochschild had done). I quickly realized that
many letters to low income households were returned and phone numbers listed in voter
registration rolls for these households were inaccurate or out of date. I continued to use
letters to recruit higher-income participants (followed by snowball sampling) but turned
to snowball sampling as my main strategy for finding lower-income individuals.
To recruit high income participants, I mailed 190 letters and was able to recruit 10
respondents through those letters or follow up calls. I found seven others through
snowball sampling. I found the final two high income respondents through targeted
outreach based on demographic characteristics. Most people I contacted did not respond.
Of those who did (or those who answered their phones when I called) many said they
didn’t have the time to participate. Even for those who did agree to an interview, time
was an ever-present challenge and something I learned to present carefully when trying to
recruit. For example, it quickly became clear that four hours (the targeted amount of time
and the time I generally spent with low-income respondents) was more than most highincome respondents would agree to. I started proposing 2 hours of interview time
(divided into two 1-hour interviews) and had more success. A handful of respondents
deviated from this pattern. One respondent agreed to only a single 1-hour interview, one
joined me for a single 2-hour interview, and one agreed to a second interview that never
came to fruition (I gave up after many failed attempts to schedule and re-schedule).
Because of the difficulty in convincing high-income respondents to join me for
interviews and what I assumed would be social sensitivity around disclosing income to a
stranger, I didn’t ask about respondents’ incomes before the interviews. I eventually
excluded two interviewees whose household incomes were well below $100,000 a year.

14

Introduction

Recruiting low-income respondents was somewhat easier than recruiting highincome respondents, but also had its own challenges. Through a grant from the National
Science Foundation, I was able to offer financial incentives to low-income participants
($25 per hour of interview, up to 4 hours) that I had not offered to high-income
participants and this helped with recruitment. Nearly everyone I reached out to agreed to
participate. I started my snowball sampling for low-income participants with two leads—
one was a referral from a colleague and one was a friend-of-a-friend. I struggled the most
to find low-income white men to interview, perhaps in part because of demographics—in
2017, 70% of New Haven’s population was non-white (Abraham et al. 2019)—and in
part because of segregated social networks.
Categorizing Income, Race, and Gender
In this project, I sought the perspectives of people who lived high and low—rather
than near the middle—in the income distribution. I hoped to capture opinions from those
whose economic experiences might be as different as possible, to understand how those
different experiences might shape their perspectives. Like Hochschild, I use respondents’
self-reported household incomes and occupations to differentiate between “high-income”
and “low-income” respondents. I also asked respondents to self-describe their class status
and will return to this later in the chapter. Beyond this, I do not attempt to operationalize
social class in this analysis, nor to make claims theorizing or defining class. This is not to
say that class is not relevant to this analysis, but rather that, in this analysis, I am setting
aside discussions of how to capture and measure class and focusing instead on differences
across income groups.
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The median household income in New Haven in 2017 was about $39,000, while
the median household income in the Greater New Haven (GNH) area (which includes
New Haven and 13 surrounding towns) was about $70,000 (Abraham et al. 2019). About
30% of New Haven households had incomes between $50,000 - $100,000, with about
40% below that range and 30% above. The household incomes of the people I
interviewed fell almost entirely outside of that middle range—either below $50,000 or
above $100,000.
All 19 of the “high-income” respondents I interviewed had household incomes
near or above $100,000 (in the top 20% of households in GNH, by income) and six had
incomes at or above $200,000. Of the 23 “low-income” respondents, all but three lived in
households with incomes below New Haven’s $39,000 median (some well below). Two
of the remaining three lived in households with incomes below $50,000 and one had a
variable income (based on how much work he could find) that fluctuated above and
below $50,000.
I expanded on Hochschild’s all-White sample by including respondents who were
Black or African American. 1 I selected for these groups through snowball sampling and
using a voter list that included demographic characteristics to target recruitment letters. In
the interviews, I asked respondents to self-identify their race and nearly all identified as
either Black/African American or White. Three low-income respondents identified as
mixed race, (Black/Native American, White/Native American, and White/”Hispanic”)
and I categorized them according to their Black/White identities.

1. Many respondents indicated that they had no preference between “Black” or “African American.” Of
those who did indicate a preference, most chose “Black” and that is what I will use throughout this
dissertation.
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I did not ask respondents to self-identify their gender or pronouns but instead
categorized them binarily based on their gender presentation.
Respondent’s household characteristics
Low- and high-income respondents as groups generally lived in different kinds of
circumstances.
Of the high-income respondents, all but one was married and the majority lived in
two-income households. Most (again, all but one) owned their homes and two also
mentioned income from rental property. 2 Unfortunately, I did not ask about household
wealth or assets. High income respondents’ average age was 50 and all but one had
children (most had at least one child living with them).
Low-income respondents were generally younger—41 years old on average. In
general, income and age tend to be correlated in the U.S.; people between ages 45-65
have higher average incomes than people between ages 18-45 (Semega et al. 2019).
Although the youngest high-income respondent was 42, eight low-income respondents
were less than 40-years-old, five were young men in their 20s, three of whom lived with
their parents (two were community-college students and one worked part time) and this
group brought down the average age among low-income respondents.3
Patterns of housing and family structure were more varied for low-income
respondents compared to high-income respondents. The majority were single or

2. I did not ask whether respondents owned their homes outright or were still in the process of paying off
mortgages or loans. Thus, I was unable to distinguish between those who might have owned their homes
debt free and those, like Sandra, who, when I asked if she owned her home, said this: “Well, the bank owns
it {laughs}, but we're paying the bank. Yes, we're buying our property. {laughs} I always tell my son (he
says, we own a house) ‘Babe, we don't own nothing yet, we're in debt, No, we don't own it, let's be clear,
the bank owns it, we're paying the bank.’”
3. These age differences between high- and low-income groups mean that some of what I capture as class
differences might instead reflect cohort differences that I cannot assess with the sample I have.

17

Introduction

separated. Among the six that lived with partners, none had two stable incomes.
Precarious employment was common and, in some cases, public assistance was the entire
income of one or both partners. About half (11) of the low-income respondents had
children living with them. Those included all six respondents who were living with
partners (two of whom were married to each other, although I interviewed them
separately), another four who were single parents (all women—one had some support
from her children’s father) and one, a LIBM, who shared parenting with a separate-living
partner. Only two (the married couple) owned their home, but they were trying to sell it
because they couldn’t afford the mortgage. Most rented. Six received some sort of
housing subsidy—either through the state or (in one case) through an employer. The three
youngest interviewees (men in their early 20s) lived with their parents—one contributed
to rent and household expenses. Three others had unstable housing—one was couch
surfing, one was in and out of homelessness, and a third lived in a hotel with her son and
her brother because she couldn’t afford the up-front costs of renting an apartment.
About the interviews
With most interviewees (35), I broke the interview into two sessions—which gave
me and the interviewee time to reflect on our first conversation and bring those
reflections into our second conversation. In some cases, I wasn’t able to schedule a
second interview (e.g., the person was too busy—often among the high-income) and in
other cases, we exhausted the interview questions in the first session (more common
among the low-income). As noted earlier, I offered an incentive to low-income
respondents ($25/hour for up to 4 hours of time, funded by a National Science
Foundation grant), but not to high-income respondents. Based on my experiences with
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recruitment (noted above) I generally proposed shorter interviews to potential higher
income respondents (two 1-hour interviews whereas I proposed two 2-hour interviews to
low-income respondents). As a result, my total interview time per high income
respondent averaged close to two hours, while total interview time for low-income
respondents averaged closer to three and a half hours. I asked the same key questions of
both groups.
Unlike Hochschild, who interviewed most of her respondents in their homes, I
met very few respondents in their homes (two high income women, two low-income
women, and one low-income man). Through an acquaintance (to whom I am deeply
grateful), I was able to use a small meeting room in a downtown community-oriented
startup business to conduct interviews. Thus, I had a space that was both private and
quiet, but also within a more public, staffed space that made both me and respondents
more comfortable. It had bathrooms and a kitchenette, so I could offer interviewees
coffee or water while we talked. Furthermore, it was downtown, which meant it was
relatively convenient to access through either public transportation or driving. Although I
offered to meet people in other places, including their homes, most chose to meet me at
this downtown space. This meant that I got less of a glimpse into the lives of interviewees
than Hochschild did, besides what they told me during the interviews, but I also believe it
made most more comfortable than inviting me into their homes.
I met roughly two-thirds of the interviewees in that small, unassuming meeting
room. Of the one-third I interviewed elsewhere, most were professionals from the highincome group who had their own offices (e.g., lawyers, counselors, principals, managers,
small business owners) and this is where we conducted those interviews. In one home
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interview, a high-income woman asked me to follow her around her kitchen and dining
room while she “puttered” on a weekend morning, decorating and preparing for winter
holidays. In a few cases, I interviewed low-income respondents outside of the downtown
space - at work, at the local public library, at home, or—in one case—at the home of a
friend (who, unlike the respondent, still had power because she had paid her electricity
bill).
About New Haven
New Haven is good place to study inequality. The city is the lowest-income town
in a region with wide income disparities but hosts Yale, an elite private university, and
provides many high-wage jobs to people who live in the surrounding towns (Abraham et
al. 2019).4 Disparities abound both within New Haven and between New Haven and the
surrounding towns. For example, New Haven’s median household income in 2017 was
$39,000 while that of an abutting town, Woodbridge, was three and a half times as much
($138,000).
Racial and economic disparities are closely intertwined in the region, as in the
country. New Haven is much more racially diverse than its surrounding towns, with a
population that is 30 percent White, 32 percent Black, 30 percent Latinx and 8 percent
other races. More than half of the region’s Black and Latino residents live in New Haven.
A comparison based on historic redlining maps showed that areas that had received the
lowest redlining grades still have the lowest homeownership levels and that the those

4. Nearly all the data reported here come from the Greater New Haven Community Index 2019, published
by DataHaven (a New Haven Based non-profit whose mission is to collect, interpret, and share public data
about the region “for effective decision-making” [datahaven.org]).
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with the highest redlining grades were still predominantly White. The Greater New
Haven Community Index reported:
In New Haven County, the probability of a low-income white child growing up to
be within the top 20 percent of households by income (19 percent) is almost twice
that of a high-income Black child (12 percent), and nearly five times that of a
low-income Black child (4 percent) (Abraham et al. 2019:56).
Schools in the Greater New Haven region show gaps in graduation rates, standardized
test performance, and rates of suspension by race, eligibility for free or reduced-price
meals, and special education and ELL status (ibid). School segregation, especially across
towns—but also within—is extreme. In the 14 public school districts in the Greater New
Haven area, 20% of the students are Black, 46% are White and 27% are Latino. In New
Haven itself, Black and Latino students are over-represented in the public schools while
White students are under-represented. Thirty-seven percent of K-12 public school
students are Black, 13% are White, and 46% are Latino. The New Haven school district
alone – the lowest-median-income town in the region – educates 68% of the region’s
Black students.
Since 1980, when Hochschild conducted her interviews, an increasing proportion
of Greater New Haven residents live in neighborhoods at the ends of the income
spectrum (in 1980, 60% lived in middle-income neighborhoods compared to 47% in
2017).5 Costs in the region have outpaced people’s ability to keep up. In New Haven in
2017, 48% of residents were low-income (their incomes were less than 200% of the
federal poverty line). That same year, the median New Haven renter’s household income
fell $17,000 short of the minimum income needed to afford 2-bedroom housing,

5. Middle Income was defined as 0.75x to 1.24x the Average Family Income (Abraham et al. 2019:42).
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according to HUD affordability guidelines. 6 In 2018, 41% of New Haven adults reported
that they were just getting by or finding it difficult to manage financially.

Self-perceptions of social class
For sampling and comparisons in analysis, I operationalized class in terms of
respondents’ occupations and self-reported incomes, but I also expected that respondents’
perceptions of class—their own and others—might influence their thoughts about
economic inequality and redistributive policy (as Piston, 2018, has argued). I asked each
respondent at some point in the interview to describe or label their own class status. Their
responses reflected perceptions of themselves and others as losers, winners, or neutral
bystanders in a game almost universally perceived as rigged by someone else. They also
reflected—and reinforced—the class or income categories I had placed them in, with
pretty clear differences between the self-depictions of people I had categorized as low
income and high income. In my analysis, I found that respondents’ perceptions of the rich
and the poor and their own status relative to those groups shaped their views of economic
inequality—its causes and consequences, who was to blame, and what might be done
about it. As a prelude to that analysis, I summarize some of these self-perceptions here.
I asked respondents to describe their own social class status, typically, somewhere
in the middle of the interview, after we had already been talking about economic
inequality, and—in many cases—about the rich and the poor. The question often took
some form of me asking respondents, if they had to pick a class or social class status to
describe their household, what would they pick? I deliberately did not provide options—

6. The HUD guidelines say housing costs should total no more than 30% of household income.
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leaving it open ended— and some respondents expressed confusion about what their
options were.
Unfortunately, I did not ask about wealth or net worth, which is even more
unequally distributed than income, and likely influenced respondents’ decisions about
their class identifications. I also did not directly ask about the kinds of material and
immaterial resources provided by respondents’ families that contribute to
intergenerational transmission of class status, to the “stickiness” at the top and the bottom
of the income and wealth distributions (Chetty et al. 2014; Pfeffer and Killewald 2015;
Reeves 2018), and especially to enduring racial disparities in wealth and opportunity
(Oliver and Shapiro 2006).
I did ask about half of respondents whether they felt they were economically
better or worse off than their parents—thinking that this might influence their perceptions
of their current status. In general, low-income respondents felt they were worse off than
their parents had been, and high-income respondents felt they were better off than their
parents had been. The one exception to this pattern was high-income White men: those I
asked (3 of 5) felt they were slightly worse off than their parents, either in terms of
income or in terms of what their incomes could buy (e.g., a house or a “more comfortable
lifestyle”).
Respondents’ opinions about their own class status largely diverged by income
group, although there was variation within each group (notably by race). Most highincome respondents claimed some version of middle-class status while most low-income
respondents described themselves as poor or near poor.
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Perceptions of class status were influenced by the visibility of “rich” and “poor”
people in respondents’ social environments. Most respondents had social networks
segregated by class and race (as is generally well-documented in the U.S.). Members of
both income groups referenced the poor and the rich as well as the middle class as they
framed their assessments of their own status. Both high- and low-income groups
referenced the “middle class,” but—despite the longstanding popularity of claiming that
status (e.g., Hout 2008)—only higher-income respondents claimed it. Lower income
respondents referred to the middle class primarily to draw a contrast to their current
lives—to highlight their lack of access to something often portrayed as nearly universal.
Both high-income respondents’ claims to middle-class status and low-income
respondents’ disavowal of it reflect arguments that the centrality of middle-class identity
disguises real divisions (e.g., Demott 1990; Ehrenreich 2020; Shenker-Osorio 2013).
Interestingly, sometimes both high- and low-income respondents used the idea of being
“comfortable” seemingly as a stand in for middle class status—with high-income
respondents describing their positions as such and low-income respondents aspiring to be
“comfortable.”
High-income class identity
Despite household incomes that placed them in the top 20% of households in New
Haven, about a third of high-income respondents identified as either middle or lowermiddle class. A similar proportion identified as some version of “upper middle class.”
Many respondents used these actual terms, but others linked their income and class status
to an imagined “middle” in other ways, for example, referring to their income as “above
the median” or “above average.” Rachel Sherman (2017) has written about her wealthy
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respondents as striving to frame themselves in the “symbolic middle”—describing their
lives as “ordinary” as a way of distancing themselves from widely depicted and critiqued
portrayals of extravagance. Although my high-income respondents generally had much
less income and wealth than did Sherman’s, their self-perceptions felt similar, framing
themselves as “ordinary” and their consumption as reasonable rather than excessive.
High-income respondents who saw themselves to be in the middle or lowermiddle class often referenced rich and poor and saw themselves in between. For example,
one respondent described herself as, “in between” because, she said “I'm not poor poor,
I'm not rich rich.” In contrast, respondents who claimed some form of upper middle-class
status framed their positions as between the middle and the rich. For example, one
respondent (Tom, HIWM) said, “we're not the richest people,” contrasting himself to “the
superrich” elsewhere in New Haven, “but I mean we're in the nicest neighborhood of the
city, probably.” Like many respondents, he positions himself below “the superrich” while
acknowledging that his situation was better than many. Thus, he responded to my
question about his class status by saying “What's after upper-middle class—rich? … I'll
say, I guess, upper-middle class.”
A couple of respondents claimed upper middle-class status reluctantly—arguing
that “the economists” or “government standards” would place them in that category, but
that their feelings of economic struggle made them feel that the label didn’t fit.
Respondents’ backgrounds, unsurprisingly, seemed to influence their
perspectives. For example, Carla (HIBW) was raised by a single mom (“I was conceived
in college”) who eventually not only graduated from college, but “got three degrees.”
Carla also graduated from college and also went on to earn “two, three other degrees.”

25

Introduction

Her household income was around $300,000 a year and, of this, Carla said “I do fine.”
But she explained that she felt that the “government standards” that placed her in the
“upper middle class “didn’t feel right because, “It comes in, but it goes out. I don't think
I'm extravagant with it, but it still goes out.” Despite doing “fine” she seems to feel that
her life does not match what she would expect an “upper middle class” life to feel like
and therefore, contests what she considered the government standard of placing her in an
“upper” income category.
In contrast, Curtis (HIBM), whose household income was similar to Carla’s
(about $300,000 a year) characterized his current circumstances as “upper middle class”
because “I don’t want for anything.” Curtis characterized his family growing up as
“working poor”—describing experiences as a child when there wasn’t food in the house
or there was no heat because they had run out of oil and couldn’t afford more. “Now, my
children don't have to deal with that kind of stuff,” he said. Curtis anchors his claim to
upper middle-class status on his experiences with poverty growing up. His claim on that
class status is one he makes with a sense of pride—especially as he describes hardships
he faced that his children do not have to face.
Only one respondent suggested that the term “rich” might apply to her. In our
interview, Sandra (HIBW) expressed discomfort in correcting her son’s claim that her
family was “middle class,” saying “I actually think we're probably like upper middle
class.” But then later, as she recounted her household income ($275,000), she recalled
saying to her husband, “we’re rich.” Still later, when I asked her to name her class status,
she said “We're upper-middle class. Rich, probably” and then laughed (it seemed, in
surprise at hearing herself say that.)
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Two high-income respondents gave answers that did not make reference to the
middle: one (the highest-income respondent) indicated that his household income put him
in “the top 2% of American earnings” and another (the lowest-income of the high-income
respondents) said he saw himself as “working class” because “I am poor with financial
management.”
There was a loose association between reported household income and class
identification: all of the respondents with household incomes close to or above $200k per
year put themselves in the “upper-middle” or above-the-middle categories, while the
majority of respondents whose annual household incomes were between $100k and
$175k categorized themselves as either middle class or lower-middle class. Race
complicated these self-perceptions. Three high-income White respondents who had
household incomes between $125–$160k per year also included themselves among the
upper-middle class. Black respondents with similar—and in one case, higher—incomes
than those three respondents categorized themselves as middle class or lower middle
class, suggesting—as many respondents indicated, that money and race together
influence access to societal resources. Of the four high-income respondents who
identified as lower-middle class, all were Black with household incomes between
$97,000 and $170,000. The highest income of those respondents, in another part of the
interview, responded to a question about societal treatment of the poor by including
herself among that group:
I was going to say I consider myself to be part of the poor, if you look at the big
picture. … I might be part of that poor … even though I don't thankfully need
welfare at this time.
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Low-income class identity
Most of the low-income people I spoke with considered themselves to be poor or
in poverty or just a step above that status, in contrast to popular conceptions of the nearuniversality of middle class identity in the U.S. Like high-income respondents, lowincome respondents placed themselves in between two other groups. They were not on
the very bottom (which, for most people, was symbolized by homelessness), but they
were also not middle class.
Not quite poor
Many low-income respondents saw themselves near the bottom of the economic
ladder—but not quite at the bottom. This characterization might have been part of a selfprotective mechanism to keep from feeling that they were in “last place” (Kuziemko et al.
2014) or it might have been something that emerged based on what was visible to them in
their everyday lives.
The lives of people better off than themselves were constantly visible to lowincome respondents but primarily through the media, and these were often the people
they discussed when talking about the rich. Typically, they described people whose lives
they had seen depicted on television, in newspapers, or the internet, and often named
specific individuals including politicians, celebrities, famous business executives, or
sports figures. A few had social connections to people who had much more income or
wealth than they themselves did, but this was a minority. 7

7. This was in contrast to high-income respondents who were less likely to name specific individuals when
identifying the rich and more likely to name categories of people, largely by occupation. One particularly
notable difference between high- and low-income respondents was the near absence, among low income
respondents of financial-sector occupations that were commonly named by high-income respondents as
being among the rich (e.g., “Wall Street people,” hedge fund managers, bankers, money managers, “realestate tycoons,” “investment people”).
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Every low-income respondent also had a reference point for someone at the
bottom, which served to both anchor their sympathy and boost their sense of relative
position. The visibility of this group to low-income respondents was much more up-close
than was the visibility of the rich. For many respondents, this reference point was the
highly-visible homeless population of New Haven that could be seen in the city’s central
park or along the streets as people passed through downtown. Most respondents who
framed their social class status as one step above the bottom implicitly or explicitly
referenced this population. For example, Jeremy (LIWM)—who worked as a laborer in
landscaping, lived with his girlfriend and her young child, supported two teenaged
children, and had a household income of about $35,000— said,
We're poor, don't get me wrong, I'm poor. I understand that part, but as long as I
have the ability to try to make my life better, I'm going to try to make my life
better. There's people that are poorer than me. Every time I want to get on my pity
pot, I could just drive down the street. Someone has it worst off. You know?
Jeremy explains how he uses the visibility of people who are homeless to shore up his
sense of his own position in both moral and material terms. He is able to argue that,
despite his hardships, he is not in “last place” either materially (because he is housed) or
morally (because he is “try[ing] to make my life better”). Like most low-income
respondents, Jeremy’s efforts to improve his own situation are a central part of his moral
identity.8 Elsewhere in the interview, when I had asked him to describe his social class
status, Jeremy had characterized himself as “hard working class” (his emphasis) and he
carried forward this effort-grounded identity into our conversation about “the poor,”
where he seamlessly both includes and differentiates himself from that group.

8. A similar example was Lauren (LIWW), who said she was “broke” but not “poor” because poor meant
“you stop trying.”
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Angela (LIBW) was married with two kids and was unemployed due to a
disability. Her household income was about $17,500 a year plus a housing subsidy. She
referred to the homeless as the truly poor. Her own class status, she described this way,
“I'm not poor but I'm not middle class either so I guess I would be like in the middle.” “I
don’t have it in my pocket right now,” she said, but that was different from someone who
“has to sleep under a bridge or a person that has to go in the shelter and can't watch TV
because they don't have $3 to pay for a bed.” People in those circumstances, subject to
the curfews and regulations of the shelters, she said “that’s poor.”
Katie’s (LIWW) reference point was a little different, but nevertheless she
characterized herself as “a step above really poor.” She worked as a teacher’s aide, was
married with three children and had a household income about $45,000.
If there's like a step above really poor? That would be me. We scrape by. So, I'm
not middle class. But I don't think I'm at the bottom of poor. I'm kind of like at the
top of poor, honestly. [laughs] Because we do struggle so much. It's not like we
just pay our bills and “oh we can't get steak this week.” It's more like “can I get
what I need this week?” So, if I make up my own tiers, I would say like upperlevel poor? [laughs uncomfortably] It's not funny. I'm just laughing that I don't
know how to describe it.
Although she didn’t name the homeless explicitly as her downward reference, Katie
seems to be making the same kind of upward-downward comparison that other lowincome respondents made. Although she felt she was not “at the bottom of poor,” looking
upward, her feelings of “struggle” and that she “scraped by” made her feel that she was
also “not middle class.”
Not middle class
Most references to the middle-class among this group were made to distinguish
what they felt their own position was not. It was more common among the low-income
respondents who were White to reflect on a childhood that was closer to middle-class or
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at least more economically comfortable. A common theme among these respondents was
that things used to be better: a middle-class or at least a middle-class-like existence, they
argued, used to be accessible and had somehow become less so. These perspectives were
less common among low-income Black respondents, who were more likely to have
grown up in circumstances similar to what they currently experienced. Often, these
respondents used their descriptions of middle-class life as depictions of aspiration and as
contrasts to their own experiences.
The White respondents who reflected back on what had felt to them to be their
own middle class (or middle-class-like) upbringing, focused their depictions on
sufficiency—carefully balanced between scarcity and excess. For example, Katie
(LIWW)—who had described herself as “a step above really poor”—started her
description of her middle-class childhood noting that her father had “a decent-paying
job,” then went on,
We had a house. Each of my parents had a car. We took one vacation a year.… I
wasn't spoiled, but I didn't really go without what I needed, and I got a lot of what
I wanted. To me … that is like textbook middle class. … You can pay your bills
and not be completely stressed out.
Unlike Katie, Emily (LIWW) said her family growing up was “considered poor” but she
said, “we never felt poor. … If you were to look at us, you would have thought we were
middle class.” And her description shared a lot in common with Katie’s:
We didn't have brand new things like everyone else in the neighborhood, but we
still had color TV. We still had cable. My brothers shared one room, we shared
another. My parents had their own room. We never went hungry.
Emily contrasted her own current living situation (she was living in a hotel with her
teenaged son and brother while she tried to save up for a deposit on an apartment) to the
middle-class feel of her upbringing:
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I think, to me, middle class looks like, at 50 I should probably have a house and a
reliable—more than a reliable car that I share with my brother. You know, the
dining room … I just feel that those are the only things … that I really need. I
don't need the vacation—although the vacations are nice.
Both Katie and Emily talked about the presences (house, car, TV, vacation) and the
absences (stress, hunger) that they felt characterized middle-class life. Those things
served as markers of the kind of economic security Ryan (LIWM) directly described as
part of his view of what it meant to be middle class.
You're financially pretty secure and if something bad happens, you could
withstand it pretty easily, whereas, if you're in poverty, you can't, because it's
such a struggle every day. You know, anything bad is just another bad thing,
rather than like a catastrophic one-time event. I think that's one way to look at
middle class.
Low-income respondents’ visions of middle-class life reflected their perceptions that this
moderate state of economic well-being had become unreasonably inaccessible. Between
the perceived elevated costs of this middle-class life and the decreased availability of jobs
that paid enough to meet those costs, many respondents felt that the declining
accessibility of middle-classness was one of the tangible indicators of inequality.
Chapters and arguments
I started this project with the goal of understanding how Americans make sense of
the growing economic inequality in the U.S. and how they translated their understandings
into opinions about policy. In Chapters 1–3, I demonstrate three critical aspects of that
sense-making. First, in Chapter 1, I argue that respondents saw current economic
inequalities as the results of an American economic system that distributed rewards and
benefits unjustly. They felt that individuals’ economic trajectories were unduly shaped by
the circumstances people inherited or were born into rather than by their own efforts or
merit. Furthermore, many respondents felt that current economic and social systems in
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the US magnified rather than reduced the inequality of people’s starting circumstances,
compounding inherited advantages and disadvantages. Surprisingly, this baseline
conception of a non-meritocratic system was widely shared across respondents.
This perception—that American economic systems failed to reward people fairly
for their efforts—was intertwined with respondents’ moral judgements of the rich and the
poor and the relationship between those groups, as I describe in Chapter 2. Respondents
were particularly upset by the suffering of the poor and many were frustrated or angry
that this suffering of some co-existed with the wealth and excesses of others. They felt
that neither the luxury of the rich nor the hardship of the poor were entirely the results of
those individuals’ efforts or merit. Thus, questioning the meritocratic origins of gaps in
material circumstances, respondents pushed back against stereotypes impugning the
morals of the poor and raised questions about the morality of the rich. Many portrayed
the poor in a morally favorable light, as those who had been born into unlucky
circumstances, people who worked hard but did not reap economic rewards. In contrast,
most respondents offered negative moral judgements of the rich. They saw rich people as
disproportionate holders of societal power who perpetuated their own gains by rigging
societal rules in their own favor. At the same time, respondents had mixed feelings about
both groups—sometimes blaming the poor for bad decisions or a lack of self-reliance and
sometimes holding up the rich for admiration or sympathizing with their resistance to
give up some of their holdings.
In Chapter 3, I illustrate some of the ways racialized experiences and
understandings of race influenced and were embedded in respondents’ understandings of
economic inequality. These patterns were messy and often varied by the individual’s
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particular background and exposure. I argue that variations in respondents’ ways of
understanding current patterns of racialized economic inequality reflect silences in
widespread American narratives about economic inequality. These leave many Americans
with a limited set of tools to draw upon when thinking about the ways racial inequality is
linked to economic inequality. These omissions support divergent understandings that
ultimately serve to uphold economic inequality.
How did respondents’ understandings of economic inequality translate into policy
opinions? This is where I turn in Chapters 4 and 5. Despite hesitations, most respondents,
both- high and low-income supported some form of downward redistribution. They all,
generally, felt that some people had resources to spare and should give up some of those
resources so that those who did not have enough to meet their basic needs could do so.
These sentiments reflect what both Piston (2018) and McCall (2016) have argued: that
Americans are interested in redistribution that is clearly targeted in terms of who will pay
and who will benefit. Although there were some notable exceptions (e.g., one HIWM
strongly in favor of a universal basic income), most respondents favored redistribution
focused on increasing equity of access to a set of basic needs (and they largely agreed on
the categories of these: education, housing, healthcare, and employment) rather than
direct redistribution of income, something McCall characterizes as “opportunityenhancing” strategies (McCall 2016:432). McCall (2016) argues that even though these
types of policy might seem “commonsensical,” they are rare.
Where high- and low-income respondents diverged was in the forms of their
resistance to redistribution. In Chapter 4, I argue that low-income respondents resisted
redistribution because their experiences with government-funded programs led them to a
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profound distrust of government. They felt that the government was controlled by the rich
and worked to keep people like themselves down. This made any policy solution feel
implausible if not impossible. Furthermore, experiences of scarcity—combined with
negative encounters with government mandates, and perhaps unfamiliarity with the lives
of the rich—seemed to make low-income respondents reluctant to demand contributions
from that group, despite their overwhelming sentiment that such contributions would be
the morally just thing to do.
I turn to high-income respondents in Chapter 5 and argue that their resistance to
redistribution was less overt than among low-income respondents—hidden, it seemed,
even from themselves. Focused on the power of the rich, most high-income respondents
saw themselves as beneficiaries of an unjust system that they did not feel implicated in
creating or upholding and that they did not feel empowered to change.
In the conclusion, I reflect on these findings in the current context and suggest
some implications of this work for future research.
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CHAPTER 1
ILLEGITIMACY OF INEQUALITY: MERITOCRACY AS MYTH
When I asked my interviewees about their thoughts on the fairness of the
American economy, they often explained that, although they believed in—and even
valued—income differentiation, they nevertheless felt that current inequalities between
the rich and the poor—in experiences, opportunities, and outcomes—were both
illegitimate and unjust.
For most respondents, the heart of their dissatisfaction was their perception that
American economic systems failed to reward people fairly for their efforts. Individuals’
economic trajectories seemed to be unfairly decoupled from hard work or skill. Although
most agreed that hard work and effort are important factors in economic success, they
argued that effort and skill were not the primary determining forces of an individual’s
economic well-being as American “bootstrap” narratives had led them to believe. Many
commented or provided examples of people (including themselves) who appeared to
work very hard and yet continued to struggle financially and also of people who appeared
to not work hard at all and yet reaped enormous financial rewards.
Instead of reflecting merit or hard work, most respondents argued that economic
rewards depended heavily on the circumstances into which individuals were born—their
inherited circumstances including race, gender, and social class. Thus, to many, the
income and wealth differences between the rich and the poor were not the “just desserts”
of a system that fairly rewarded varied levels of effort, ability and talent. Rather, these
gaps in income and wealth, they argued, were the outcomes of an unfair system in which
only some were lucky enough to be born into circumstances where they had access to
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education, connections, and resources and many were left out, regardless of their efforts.
By arguing that a person’s economic position depended more heavily on one’s
circumstances at birth than on their merit, most respondents pushed back against
American narratives of meritocracy and suggested that both the wealth of the rich and the
poverty of the poor were the undeserved outcomes of an unjust system.
Furthermore, many respondents blamed current economic and social systems in
the U.S. for magnifying rather than reducing the inequality of people’s starting
circumstances, and therefore compounding the impacts of inherited advantages and
disadvantages. Instead of providing a system of equal opportunities that would mitigate
inequalities in starting positions, respondents argued that American systems distributed
economic opportunities in a way that rewarded those who already had advantages and
punished those who were already disadvantaged.
Surprisingly, this general pattern of belief held for most respondents, across
gender, race, and income, although there were important differences between groups that
I will explore later. This chapter attempts to trace the outlines of that broad, shared
sentiment while also beginning to surface some of those differences. The majority of the
chapter is made up of the cases of a few respondents (Julie, a low-income White woman,
LIWW; Sam, a low-income Black man, LIBM; and Patrick, a high-income White man,
HIWM) that I selected to illustrate both the similarities and differences across groups. I
also selected these respondents because they articulated these core ideas more
explicitly—and sometimes in greater detail and at greater length—than other respondents
who made similar arguments but often in less-direct ways. I have noted the ways in

37

Chapter 1

which these respondents demonstrate a broader pattern and ways in which they were
relatively unique.
Compounding advantage and disadvantage – Julie (LIWW)
Like many respondents, Julie felt that the current state of economic inequality in
the U.S. was unjustified because the processes by which Americans become rich or poor
seemed to her unmeritocratic. Instead of being the outcomes of individual effort, Julie felt
that both affluence and poverty were often much more determined by “structural and
familial advantages” and disadvantages that were the inherited circumstances of
individuals’ lives. This was a common theme among my respondents, and Julie was
particularly keyed into these ideas. She saw herself as both unfairly hindered by her
inherited economic disadvantages and unfairly helped by her inherited social advantages.
“Working poor” with “cultural advantages” – Julie’s Background
Julie was in her early 40s when we spoke and worked for a local non-profit,
making about $30,000 a year and living on her own. Her parents had not gone to college;
her mother had made it through high school and her father had dropped out but gotten a
GED while serving in the military. She recalled that, on a single income (her father’s) her
family had been able to own a home (“not the best house in town”), have medical care,
and have “two cars in the garage.” Throughout our interviews, she alluded to (but didn’t
specify) a medical condition she dealt with that seemed to have been both difficult and
expensive to treat. Her experience trying to access and afford care for this condition
shaped her views about economic inequality. She described her politics as “hard left” and
mentioned positively some of Bernie Sanders’ positions (our interviews took place in
February of 2016). Julie had gone to college as a “first-generation, Pell-Grant” student,
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but the medical condition (for which she had no “family support or insurance coverage”)
wiped out her savings and derailed her studies and she did not graduate.
Julie described herself as “working poor,” based on “economics” including “what
I'm making and what sort of things I can afford in terms of healthcare or transportation or
education.” At the same time, she described herself as having “certain cultural
advantages” based on her race, body type, education, and socialization that she said made
her more socially and economically mobile compared to others with a similar income.
Julie’s particular concern with economic inequality—and that of many
respondents—was that she felt people could work hard and follow the social rules of
being “a responsible person” and yet be unable to have “a certain quality of life that’s not
undignified.” What fueled her sense of injustice was the condition of people “at the
bottom” in a “society with a lot of resources floating around.” For example, she told the
story of a coworker who had previously been working for a major national retail chain
where they kept her hours below 35 each week so that she was not eligible to enroll in the
benefits that would be available to her if she were full time. According to Julie, the
coworker had explained to her employer that she wanted to increase her hours in order to
get health insurance for her young son. Instead, Julie said, the employer suggested that
the worker enroll her child in Husky, the state Medicaid health insurance.
They just told her to go on to State programs and she wanted - she wanted to do
what everybody tells and shames poor people into doing, which is, well, if the
government program isn't filling your needs, then you have to get a real job. So,
here she gets a real job and she's working, working, working - even with an
underage child that she probably was arranging childcare for. She literally
couldn't earn her way into this attainable thing that she was supposed to be able to
get if she ‘just worked hard enough’ and ‘had different cultural values.’”
This kind of story was a touchpoint for Julie—living proof that hard work was not the
ticket to economic mobility that it was promised to be. Many respondents had stories like
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these about people who worked hard but still struggled to meet what many considered
their basic needs. Among low-income respondents like Julie, these were stories of their
own lives or those of people relatively close to them.
Inherited disadvantages
Julie’s educational experiences had been another key source of disillusionment
about meritocratic class mobility and economic opportunity. Revealing her hopes for
what college could have been, she said, “It’s not this classless third liminal space where
suddenly if I just go, I suddenly have all the resources and advantages of the middle- to
upper-middle class person.” Instead, Julie said, her experience emphasized to her the
differences in “preparation and expectations, and also resources … between me and
other, more-traditional middle-class classmates.” Those differences included everything
from having access to “summer enrichment programs” to “knowing that you can take
more risk because you know that you can - even if it’s as simple as you can go home to
mom and dad. As opposed to, if this doesn't work, I could literally end up living in a car
and that’s assuming that I have a car.”
Julie argued that these differences in social and economic resources between
people born into differently-resourced families undercut meritocracy and instead
perpetuated the inequality of inherited advantages and disadvantages. “You can be in the
same lecture hall and getting A plusses and the C student next to you knows a VP at Time
Warner and so they're … [laughs].” She trails off, implying that the less academicallyprepared student with better connections is more likely to land a job or an internship than
the higher-scoring but less well-connected student. Notably, she implies but does not
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state that she was the “higher-scoring” student in that scenario—a nod to her own unrewarded merit.
Julie argued that “structural and familial advantages” like those held by her
college classmates “feel to people like, ‘look my hard work was rewarded.’” But, she
insisted, that perspective ignores many taken-for-granted inherited advantages,
like well, but you were able to not take a job during college, or you were able to
take a free [unpaid] internship for a year in Manhattan, or you could go to the
doctor when you were sick or … even things like you had parents who weren't
working three jobs and were able to be around for you to help you with
homework. Those are all things that really do add up.
She didn’t discount hard work but felt that inherited economic circumstances—that
provided advantages and opportunity for some—made a significant difference in
individuals’ economic trajectories and often went unacknowledged.
Educational access was a key example for Julie, one of several she gave to argue
that disparities in familial economic resources translated into intergenerational
transmission of inequitable access to economic opportunity and security. Families that
had access to resources could shore up the fortunes of the next generation while those
families without resources to share had little buffer against economic misfortune. While
some were “getting resources from mom,” Julie said, others were “sending money back
… to help mom.” When I asked Julie how, in general, she thought people became rich or
poor, she responded by talking about these kinds of differential inheritances:
Both interest and debt compound, right? … I know people who, for their
weddings, they got a down payment on a house, right? And so that's a much
different position to be in than people who are spending 10 years trying to scrape
that together, along with student loans that they have that other people don't have.
… When somebody can swing 5 or 6 figures for you in the case of an emergency
or a lifestyle boost, that's a much different scenario - even the difference between
having somebody who says, you know, you were just in the hospital, so here's
$8,000. That's just a much different scenario than people who are living from
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paycheck to paycheck and their family social networks are all living paycheck to
paycheck.
These examples illustrate Julie’s argument that inherited economic circumstances
“roll-over … generation after generation,” “compounding” like “interest and debt” and
resulting in an unequal opportunity structure that stretches backward and forward in time.
“Some families in some strata and, on an aggregate, some races have been able to do
that” while “other people just have never had access.” The difference between being in a
group that has access to opportunities such as buying property or saving for an
emergency and being in a group that “never had access” was something many
respondents focused on when discussing the inherited advantages and disadvantages that
shaped economic outcomes.
Inherited advantages
Julie also made her argument about the over-importance of inherited
circumstances for people’s economic trajectories from the other side—that of inherited
advantage. Although she considered herself to be among those who lack inherited
economic access in many ways, she also felt that she was the beneficiary of some
inherited advantages that allowed her to be more “socially mobile” than others with
similar incomes but who were born and raised in different circumstances. She expressed
some ambivalence about this inheritance, but nevertheless acknowledged the ways that
“external markers” related to her race, gender, and “socialization” gave her
“advantages”—that she implied were un-earned—in accessing some opportunities and
resources. It was relatively uncommon for other low-income respondents to talk about
their advantages in this way—in part because Julie was rare among that group in her
experience of being able to “pass culturally” as middle class.
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At the heart of Julie’s argument was the idea that she was able to “appear and
seem and get treated as if I am middle class,” which resulted in access to opportunities
that were not available to others. For example, she said, despite the fact that she had not
finished an undergraduate college degree,
I had people who assume that I have graduate and professional degrees that I don't
have … because the way I dress and talk ... and they'll assume that other
employees aren’t college graduates when they actually are college graduates. And
it’s just—it's a decision they’ve made based on external markers that have no
bearing.
Julie recognized that, even though she didn’t have economic resources, she benefited
from cultural capital (Bordieu 1986), embodied in the way she looked and acted, that
translated into favorable assumptions about her class and academic status. She went on to
talk about how these assumptions—which she noted were not related to her merit (“made
based on external markers that have no bearing”)—paid real dividends in terms of giving
her better access to opportunity than someone who did not have those forms of embodied
cultural capital.
There are assumptions made about me just based on my vocabulary and
appearance that other employees who are of different races or education levels
just don't get. So, even though … I certainly feel trapped in certain ways, I know
that, you know, I own 20 more lottery tickets than they do, right? So, my lottery
ticket is more likely to come up. Like if some magical miracle occurs, it's more
likely to happen to like a smiley, thin, white lady who knows how to use big
words than it is for an overweight person of color in their 50s who’s a single
parent and isn't dressing or talking a certain way. Even though we may have the
same intellectual capacity and even the same backstory, but I would have to get
lucky and they would have to get lucky, but they would have to get so much
luckier than I would in most situations. So, we're both screwed, but if a miracle
happened, the miracle would most likely come to me because I'm one of those
quote-unquote “people like us.”
Using the tropes of luck and miracles allows Julie to minimize her sense of feeling
systematically privileged and reinforces her identity as economically disadvantaged. She
is not as direct here in talking about the unearned nature of her advantages as she was
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when she made her argument about her disadvantages. Nevertheless, she made the point
that she did have advantages compared to others and that those advantages were based on
“assumptions” or “external markers” in implied contrast to effort or merit.
Doing Class
Even as Julie argued that her treatment by the powerful as “people like us” is tied
to “external markers” over which she had no control (such as race), she also emphasized
the importance of a sort of class performance that involved certain expectations about
how to “dress and talk.” She noted her awareness of these rules and her efforts to abide
by them. For example, she said she was “really obsessive…about dental care” despite not
having dental insurance.
I know that that's a huge thing - is to not be missing any teeth. And so, I'm just
crazy about preventative dental care and brushing and all this stuff. Because I
know, just from knowing people, that the minute you lose a tooth, even if you're
White, you just don't pass in certain ways anymore with people with certain
biases because they're looking for certain class markers.
Here, Julie lays out three factors that she sees as linked to her “cultural” advantages and
that she returned to throughout the interview: the “biases” of the powerful, her efforts to
perform “certain class markers,” and the impact of her race on how that performance was
received. She reveals her understanding of the mechanisms of class mobility by
explaining her awareness of her own precarious grasp on some kinds of class privilege.
As someone who saw herself on both sides of an equation of unjust resource
distribution, Julie navigated a constant tension between acknowledging her unearned
advantages, illustrating her unearned disadvantages, and maintaining her identity as
someone who “was bright” and worked hard. This tension was present throughout Julie’s
interview, but is particularly well illustrated in an instance when Julie had been talking
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about how she knew people who were struggling economically and who blamed
themselves for those struggles instead of blaming a “rigged system.” What should they be
blaming? I asked. As Julie tried to explain the factors that make up someone’s inherited
circumstances, she used her own life as an example—talking about forces outside of her
control, but also slipping in a note about her own merit:
It’s pervasive. It’s a million little things … You can’t just say, well this person …
doesn’t get routed towards college. It’s everything … from … my father dropped
out of high school and my mother just got a [high school] education, but my dad
would read to me every single night and so … I was reading before I was enrolled
in school, so I already had a leg up. It was because I was bright, as well, but it
would not have happened if I had not had a dad who'd get home in time to be
there by the time I went to bed and who knew enough to know this was an
important ritual to do, and it wasn't just about watching TV with me … and it's
not because my dad is just smarter or more sophisticated than your average person
living in the ghetto somewhere, it's a million different things that you're exposed
to.
Julie tried to make sense of her social advantages in the context of her disadvantaged
class background and identity. Here, as throughout the interview, she swings back and
forth between noting forces outside of her control that contributed to her current
advantages (a father who had had early access to reading who then passed that on to her)
or to her disadvantages (her parents’ education), but also tries to make sense of the role of
individual merit (“I was bright as well” and a father who “knew enough to know this was
… important”). She diverges from and pushes back against common meritocratic
narratives, but also finds herself struggling to explain the “million little things” that make
up the forces that she sees as having aligned in her favor.
Compounding: race and entitlement
These “million little things,” Julie suggested, often added up to her gaining access
to opportunity or resources because she was seen by the powerful as “people like us.”
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This access, in turn, compounded her advantage, Julie explained, by giving her a “very
basic middle-class sense of entitlement” that led her to feel justified in demanding even
better access.
To explain, Julie gave an example comparing her own attempts to access limited
resources allocated to helping the poor with those of her economic peers. Unlike some of
her economic peers, she said, this sense of entitlement made her more likely to push back
against acts of exclusion commonly experienced by people seeking help from social
safety net systems. When trying to “access what little we have in terms of publiclyfunded resources, like energy assistance, or going to the public health clinic or whatever,”
Julie said, the poor are often “treated just terribly.” She went on to explain the difference
between her “self-righteous” and “aspirationally middle class” response and that of her
peers who didn’t have that same sense of entitlement.
They don't have that very basic middle-class sense of entitlement to say, “you
can't treat me that way” or “no, that's not what the paperwork says. I filled out the
paperwork the right way. I will get a public interest lawyer if you do this.” …
They don't have to just say, “well this is just the way always things are” or, “I
must have screwed up.” As opposed to saying, “well no, maybe these people
screwed up and if they screwed up then that's wrong and I should have some sort
of recourse even if it means I have to get legal representation” or whatever. And
part of that is because, so what kind of legal representation is available to poor
people, right? [laughs]
What kept her peers from making these kinds of demands, Julie argued, was a sense of
“internalized shame” born of false meritocratic narratives that say, “if you just work hard
enough and are smart enough and are resourceful enough,” you won’t be left “emptyhanded.” In contrast, Julie suggested, her experience of positive social reception and
related sense of entitlement buffered her against this internalized shame. It allowed her to
interpret her own poverty, she said, as “something [that] went wrong,” something
“structural” to which she could respond, “I know this isn’t me.”
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Hers was “that good sort of entitlement,” Julie said, one that embraced an
expectation that “if I work hard, like maybe I won't be a millionaire living in a fancy
suburb, but I shouldn't be living like this.” It facilitated a self-perception of her own
value, she suggested, and thus led to further access, compounding the initial advantage of
being seen as “people like us.”
Importantly, Julie noted that even a sense of entitlement like hers runs up against
the hard reality of the limited availability of the resources themselves (“what kind of legal
representation is available to poor people…?”). In “many cases … people don't imagine
using resources that realistically, they've never seen anybody use because they're not
really there.” Given these limited resources, Julie argued, people who look and speak like
her—even if they are poor—have better access both because of external perceptions and
their own self perceptions of deservingness.
Race is a key factor in both sets of perceptions, according to Julie. It was
something she brought up throughout our interview as an aspect of unearned advantage
that shaped her access to economic opportunity and mobility. Her reflections on the
impact of race in her own life and in the lives of her economic peers reinforced her
conviction that inequalities in economic outcomes are non-meritocratic and therefore
unjust.
For example, despite growing up in a family with fewer resources than those of
her middle-class college classmates, Julie argued that race was an important factor in her
ability to be treated as middle class and feel entitled to such treatment. “White … people,
even if you’re poor… can still be aspirationally middle class,” she said, because of
societal messages (presumably from other White people) about “what you deserve and
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what to expect if you’re putting in work.” Such entitlement might also come from
watching “what your teachers at your much better public schools are doing” as a
racialized model of middle-class success.9
Julie also talked about how her Whiteness contributed to her ability to gain access
and “pass” in certain spaces—spaces that she implies (but does not state) are controlled
by powerful White people.
If you're very poor and you're White and you can figure out how to pass culturally
and you can sort of ‘win the lotto’ in these ways, you can eventually get to a point
where you're not dealing with sort-of micro-second discrimination, right? Like it
takes longer before people— maybe you're already in the door before they realize
that maybe there are differences.”
Again, Julie invoked luck (“win the lotto”)—as do many White and/or high-income
respondents when talking about privilege—which suggested her acknowledgement of the
un-earned nature of these advantages while also distancing herself from the ways they are
systematic and intentional.
At the same time, she acknowledged the advantages she gained due to her race,
however uncomfortable she was discussing them directly. When talking about her
advantages during the interview, Julie repeatedly made unprompted direct or implied
comparisons to the experiences of her colleagues or friends who are people of color.
Here’s a typical example, where she notes race among a litany of other factors in her
ability to do what she calls “cultural class-passing.”
The advantages that I see above others— At the most basic level, if you put me up
against somebody else who makes what I make, the reality is that I'm going to be
more mobile in lots of situations because I have been socialized a certain way, I
don't have a certain kind of accent, I look a certain way when I wear a dress, I've
been taught what fork to use. You know, so I can pass culturally - there's sort of
9. In 2015/16, 80% of public elementary and secondary school teachers were White while only 49% of
students in public elementary and secondary schools were White. (National Center for Education Statistics
2019b, 2019a)
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that cultural class-passing where I have that advantage that, say, our custodian at
work doesn't have. So, I can go places that she can't because she's an African
American woman of a certain age who just was socialized differently, but is
incredibly intelligent and a great resource on the job. As much as I don't benefit
from certain types of things, I do benefit from the type of privilege that's just the
sort of ‘one of us’ type stuff.
Here, Julie returns to cultural capital—reiterating the idea that she can pass as “one of us”
among an unnamed (and racially unspecified) group of opportunity gatekeepers. In this
case, as in others, she nods to race as one of several factors—including her performance
of class—that allows her to “pass culturally.” In this instance, she doesn’t explicitly name
her race, but notes it by commenting on the race of the person to whom she compares
herself—a common pattern of speech among White Americans when talking about race
(e.g., Bonilla-Silva 2009).
Directly and indirectly, Julie argues that her social and material inheritance
allowed her to “appear and seem and get treated as if I am middle class,” giving her
access to spaces and opportunities that were not available to others. Throughout our
discussion, Julie suggested that these inherited advantages were just as unearned as her
inherited disadvantages, although she never quite comes out and says it. Among this
inheritance, Julie suggested, is a learned ability to perform the language of dominant
culture—and to therefore be treated as “one of us.” And she argued that her race is a
major factor contributing to the acceptance of that performance among those who hold
power. Furthermore, Julie argued, these kinds of social and material inheritances serve as
a mechanism by which advantage and disadvantage are compounded over time. Thus,
according to Julie, these patterns of access are not simply part of her own and her peers’
experiences but are also part of an un-earned and inequitable legacy that is passed along
and magnified across generations.
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Left empty-handed
Julie started out our interview stating that she felt that the economy was
“absolutely not” fair, despite the fact that “I could parade all sorts of people in here from
the upper tiers who could tell you it's a meritocracy.” It might feel to those people that
“[their] hard work was rewarded,” but Julie argued that unacknowledged “structural and
familial advantages … really do add up” in a way that the economic opportunities
available to people depend heavily on inherited circumstances over which they had no
control—not just on their effort.
To Julie and to many other respondents, the linkage between access to
opportunity and inherited circumstances was too tight, while that between individual
effort and economic outcomes seemed far too loose. Together, these perceptions made
current economic disparities seem unfair and unjustified. The same amount of effort or
skill, Julie argued, would pay off in very different ways depending on an individual’s
social and economic inheritance. Furthermore, people who had access based on their own
inherited circumstances could also more easily share access with their own children, and
so on, such that “every form of wealth, whether it's social or monetary or property or
whatever, or educational, it compounds interest just like debt does.” Dominant societal
narratives suggested that only those unwilling to work hard would be “left emptyhanded,” but Julie felt that her own experience and the experiences of those around her
belied that story.

“It's set up for the rich to get richer and the poor to stay poor” – Sam (LIBM)
Sam viewed the current state of economic inequality as illegitimate because he
felt that the system was rigged in favor of the rich, creating unequal opportunities for
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economic advancement that were not linked to merit or hard work but to birth
circumstances—particularly race and class. Like Julie, Sam thought that inherited
advantages and disadvantages not only led to unequal economic opportunities, but that
this inequality of opportunity was magnified or compounded by social rules that
rewarded the already advantaged and punished the already disadvantaged.
Sam’s background
Sam was in his early 40s when I interviewed him, working in a temporary
seasonal job as a metal worker making $18/hour (he thought he should be making $30).
He had been raised by a single, working mother “in the projects.” Sam had attended
college for a year and decided it wasn’t a good fit for him, but he had pursued and
acquired training and certification in a variety of trades. He had four children, two of
whom lived with him, and two (one a teen starting college and one “older”) whom he
continued to support when he could. He rented a condo (which he dreamed of buying)
with a long-term girlfriend (who was likely the mother of his two younger children,
although he never stated this and I didn’t ask). She was the one, he said, who managed all
their household finances.
When I asked Sam to tell me his household income, he said, “I couldn't even tell
you. … I just pass the checks over. She does the finances, so I don't really know what's
going on with the money.” When I asked him to estimate, he guessed that his girlfriend
made maybe $40,000 from several different jobs including being a hairstylist and running
a bar. Sam’s own income fluctuated throughout the year, depending on his employment,
which was highly variable. He guessed that he made maybe $26,000. 10 He expressed

10. I was unsure what to make of Sam’s estimates of his and his girlfriend’s income. Although his own
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constant concern about the insufficiency of his wages, the precarity of his employment,
and the unaffordability of some of the “basics” like healthcare. He described himself as
financially “struggling” and “living check to check.”
Inherited advantage and disadvantage lead to unequal economic opportunities
Like Julie and others, Sam felt that economic opportunity was not distributed
equitably or meritocratically—that one’s chances of achieving economic success were
too dependent on one’s position at birth and too independent of how hard one worked. He
questioned the idea that the rich had earned their positions based on effort or merit.
Someone who ends up as a “super-rich billionaire,” he said, had not likely worked their
way up “from the bottom.” Instead, “most likely somebody in their family already had
the money.” Closer to the other end of the economic spectrum, Sam argued that people
like him who work hard and “hustle” continue to just scrape by. “Why am I struggling?
I'm going to work 40 hours a week, I'm busting my tail, and I'm still kind of living from
check to check.” He questioned both the morals and the merit of an imagined executive
who is “not doing a thing, making billions of dollars, hand over fist” while someone
working for that company was “gonna go home with this roody-poo check, can barely get
by. Living check to check, can’t pay [their] bills.” We’ll hear more about Sam’s moral
judgements of the rich and the poor in Chapter 2.
Sam also talked about the ways he saw existing systems magnifying or
compounding economic advantage and disadvantage across generations, noting, like Julie
and most other respondents, the interdependence between race and class (gender is also

hourly wage—and the mismatch between that and what he thought he should be paid—was something he
paid attention to, he did seem to be genuinely unaware of the bigger picture of his household income. One
exception was that he commented several times that his girlfriend made more money than he did—
something he seemed unhappy about.
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present throughout, implicitly, but Sam never explicitly comments on it until I ask). As a
Black man born into a poor family and raised by a single, working mother, Sam felt that
the economic deck had been stacked against him from birth. He gave the example of
credit scores:
You gonna need that [good credit score] in the future, especially with the Blacks,
because we're coming out with a 430, born. Then the white kids coming out with
a 760. That's just facts.11
Black Americans’ economic disadvantage from the get-go, Sam argued, was magnified
by unequal access to critical financial education (something I also heard from other lowincome Black respondents). For example, he recalled receiving some advice, maybe in
his late 20s, to “save your money, get an account, get some credit cards going on.” That,
Sam said, was information he could have used at a younger age but had not been
available to him.
Yeah, I wasn't informed. It wasn't what they told us in school back then. They
didn't really give us that. As far as economics and how to save money, I mean,
they told you how to write a check and something like that. But they wasn't giving
us no information in the inner-city schools like that. Like, listen, you need to
know what's going on with your credit score because you ain't gonna be ready to
get a loan for anything, a home, or business, or anything. They didn't teach us that
then.
Sam argued that being born poor and Black was an inherited disadvantage that was only
magnified by a system of unequal education that meant schools like his “inner-city”
school provided less economic information to its students. If he had received that
education earlier, he said, he would be in a much better financial situation. “If I knew that
before, the way I hustle and hold down, I'd have been golden right now.”

11. A growing literature supports Sam’s claim—finding that credit scores differ significantly by race (with
people who are Black or Latinx having significantly lower scores), even when income is taken into account
and that, even for a given credit score, credit outcomes differ significantly by race (see, for example Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2007; Nelson 2010).
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A rigged system controlled by a wealthy elite
Sam saw himself as a hard worker, someone with “hustle.” His struggles to find a
stable, well-paying job—in addition to the stories of friends and neighbors—convinced
him that plenty of people in the American economic system were putting in hard work
that was not met with the economic rewards that are the promise of the American Dream.
I'm 41 years old, I'm working this seasonal position. I have all sorts of trades out
there. I done went to school for everything just so I could make myself more
marketable in the work field … everything that you can do in trade I've pretty
much done put my hands on … And I'm trying and I still can't really find a job.
As for many respondents, Sam took issue with economic inequality because he felt that
differences in individuals’ economic positions were not the reflections of merit or skill
that mainstream American narratives portray. His ongoing struggle to find gainful
employment, despite his efforts, reinforced the disconnect he saw between merit and
economic reward.
Unlike Julie (much of whose commentary implied but did not directly name
opportunity gatekeepers), Sam characterized the non-meritocratic nature of American
economic systems as the fault of a particular group that hoarded benefits and resources
for themselves. As we’ll see in later chapters, he, like other low-income respondents,
blamed the rich, corporations, and the government as a sort of unholy alliance that kept
people like him down. To Sam, the economic system was rigged not just against some
and for others, but by the already rich and powerful for their own benefit.
Multiplying advantage and disadvantage
Like Julie and others, Sam argued that current societal systems and structures
multiplied—rather than mitigated—the power of inherited advantages and disadvantages.
He used carceral systems as a key example (as did many Black respondents, as we’ll see
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in Chapter 3). Like others, Sam talked about how those with more money received better
treatment in these systems—which functioned non-meritocratically, driven by profitseeking rather than justice.
Money, the government, these corporate people come in town on their jets just
going, “Hey, listen … jails are not full. We are not getting the money that we
need. We need to get more people, bottoms in here. So, we need to speed this
process up.”
Contrary to meritocratic myths, Sam argued that structures like the carceral system
rewarded existing power and resources with more of the same, meanwhile circumscribing
the opportunities of people like himself—regardless of their merits—who did not have
existing racial and economic advantage.
You know the rich is gonna get away with murder. They get away with so much
stuff here that a poor person would never get away with. You know, poor people
are expendable to America.
Differential treatment of the rich and the poor convinced Sam that money and the power
that came with it determined outcomes and opportunities in American society, regardless
of merit. In such a skewed system, Sam explained, people like himself were strongly
encouraged to take “offers” of jail time when accused of a crime, rather than defend their
innocence. Even when “you know you didn’t do it,” he said, there was little interest
among those in the system in “trying to figure out if I’m guilty or not” because “they [the
prison] gonna get, what, $50–60,000 they get, whatever, a year for” each incarceration.
Just as in his job search, here Sam argues that people’s outcomes were more tightly
linked to the circumstances they had been born into than to their own efforts or actions.
Sam, like Julie, argued that this unjust system builds on itself—continually
magnifying the differences between those with divergent inherited circumstances. Sam
explained, when people are incarcerated, “They didn't give you no education. They didn't

55

Chapter 1

give you any type of training. They didn't help you with your drug addiction.” They “kick
you back out [with] nothing. You starting all over with the shoes you got on your feet.”
But starting over without inherited advantages, Sam argued, is nearly impossible in the
current system.
You're going home. Now, your people's already in a struggle with what's going on
with them. Now, you're home. You need clothes, you need food, you need this.
“You know what, we don't got it.” What you do? Go back out on the street again.
You know what happen. You get locked back up again. Another $40–50,000,
whatever they get. So on, and so forth.
The picture Sam paints is of a system in which those who have historically benefited
economically have the power to control the rules and the lives of those who have not, and
where the losses to those already excluded by that system serve to further magnify the
gains of those already at the top.
“This is what it is”
Despite Sam’s resistance to internalizing widespread stereotypes about people
like himself, he nevertheless seemed frustrated and exhausted by the constant evidence he
saw of his own relative disadvantage in a system of unjust inequality. He felt constantly
reminded of his own position in America’s social and economic hierarchy. For example,
he described driving to his neighborhood where “your street’s getting plowed last” and
being stopped by police on his way home from a job where he made less money than he
would have liked.
And plenty of times I was like, “Fuck, I want a better life.” I mean, this is crazy. I
can't even drive down the street. I'm getting stopped, I'm getting harassed. I mean,
I live here, I have no choice but to come down this street, because I live right
there. It's like, “Let me get right there. Wait up, officer.” Come on man. I'm trying
to go home, man. I'm already pissed I only made 80 bucks all day working this
job. I'm trying to stay away from you. I got the kids' mother, she's yelling … give
a guy a break here, man. And then they don't want to give you no money. Then
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the girl's upset, she can't get what she want. The kids can't get what they want.
You're feeling less than. That's crazy.
Many of the pieces of economic inequality that Sam described intersect in this depiction.
Despite his efforts and training, he is paid less than what he thinks would be fair, which
strains his relationship and his sense of self—and all of this is going on in the background
as he is then racially profiled in his own neighborhood.
Sam’s daily existence sometimes felt so far from American meritocratic stories
about the quality of life that could come from anyone’s hard work that it was hard for
him not to feel hopeless. For Sam, as for many Black respondents (as we’ll see in Chapter
3), racialized inequalities, in particular, gave lie to those stories. “This is their country,”
Sam said (meaning, White people’s).
We've been treated like second-class citizens since this country was founded.
Even third-class, fuck second. ... Wouldn't even call us humans at one point. So
that was only like a hundred and something years ago, man. Racism, everything,
is still so strong here.
To protect his own well-being (physical, mental, and emotional) Sam made a deliberate
choice to try to “learn how to play the game,” knowing that the rules had been rigged
against him. It was a survival tactic to try to “move on” from his feelings of frustration.
He described this choice as he talked about giving advice to his children about being
cautious in mimicking the behaviors of their White friends.
You don't know how to play the game you won't get nothing. And that's just what
it is, I don't hate on any situation. I have biracial kids. So, I'm like, this is what it
is, and I tell them, “Listen, you can't do what this one does.” Most likely this is
gonna happen for them, this [something else] is gonna happen to you. You gotta
know how to deal with it and move on. Don't rub people the wrong way.
Sam is giving survival advice as he warns his children to not “rub people the wrong
way.” The situation may not be fair, but it “is what it is,” and the way to make it through
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is to understand the rules—even if they are unjust and rigged against you—and “move
on.”
Concluding thoughts about Sam
Sam’s response to my initial question about his perception of the fairness of the
American economy—”Absolutely not. … The way it's set up, it's set up for the rich to get
richer and the poor to stay poor”—succinctly captures his view of the illegitimacy of
economic inequalities in the U.S. Not only does hard work not lead to the kinds of end
someone like Sam wants—a stable, well-paid job; health insurance for him and his
family; enough money to support his children—but people born into economically and
socially advantaged positions seemed to Sam to be constantly accruing and consolidating
power, simultaneously compounding their advantages at the expense of people like him.
“The scales were tipped in my favor long before I was born by generations of family
being lucky” – Patrick (HIWM)
Patrick’s background
Patrick was in his late 40s and working as a partner in a software development
startup business when we spoke. His household income the previous year had been
$160,000. He and his wife owned a single-family home, where they lived with their two
early-elementary-aged children. His wife worked at Yale and had a steady income.
Patrick described the income he received from his business as “really unpredictable,” but
said he thought the current year was looking “good” and that he might have a similar
household income this year.
Inherited privilege - safety nets and access to opportunity
Although, Patrick noted, “my family has never been … what I would call rich,”
he nevertheless felt that he had been “the beneficiary of unfair advantage and non-
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meritocratic advantage” that had given him better access to economic opportunities than
many. He argued that access to economic opportunity in the U.S. was based on “unfair
rules” that perpetuated “privileges that are inherited” rather than rewarding hard work or
skill. He considered himself to be among those who had inherited such privileges. As he
put it, “the scales were tipped in my favor long before I was born by generations of
family being lucky.”
Like Julie, Patrick invoked “luck” when talking about his advantages, as did many
respondents who discussed ways they had experienced advantaged access to opportunity.
In Patrick’s case, talking about “generations of family being lucky” seems to minimize
the extent to which his family’s status was gained through a systematic and deliberately
inequitable distribution of resources. Nevertheless, Patrick also consistently argued that
he had been born with “benefits” that gave him more access and allowed him more
“chances” than he would have had if he had been born to a poorer family or had not been
White. Among those benefits, Patrick noted, were parents who had the social and
economic means to “groom” their children for similar “success” to their own. His parents
had both been professors—beneficiaries of a racially-segregated “20th century … focus
on education as a means to advancement,” and they went “out of their way to make sure
their children [got] those same opportunities.” For example, Patrick said, “going to
college was just unquestioned” for him. In fact, Patrick attended Yale, and commented
that his admission to the elite Ivy League school was “made…easier” by the fact that his
father and grandfather had both attended that university and that his grandfather was “a
very active alumnus.” He worked to disentangle this inherited advantage from his own
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merit, noting that if “[an]other kid had the exact same credentials as me but didn't have
that association, that kid didn't get into Yale and I did.”
In addition to providing access to opportunity that was not available to others,
Patrick argued that his inherited circumstances also provided a type of safety net,
protecting him from some of the economic and social costs that other people faced.
Despite making “lots of mistakes,” Patrick said he was given “a lot of second chances”
based on how he looked and spoke and who his parents were. As a result, those mistakes
“didn't hurt me the way I think if I'd been … poor and Black or Hispanic [they] might
well have.” As an example, Patrick compared his own experience to that of an intern at
his company (“a terrific computer programmer”) who was Latinx. Patrick didn’t provide
much detail, but said he thought the intern might have been “thrown out of Yale.” In
contrast, Patrick said, “I should have been thrown out of Yale for some of the things I
did, but I wasn’t.” Patrick speculated that someone like this intern was likely treated more
harshly because of his race. He might have “[come] across as just a little angrier or just
appeared angrier because of skin color,” and Patrick noted that he, himself, “might well
have fared a lot worse” had he not been White.
Doing class
In more “subtle” ways, too, Patrick argued that his inherited circumstances
opened economic doors for him that might remain shut for others. Just as Julie argued
that she had learned or inherited manners of self-presentation that allowed her to be seen
as “one of us,” Patrick, too, referenced the benefits of his unearned cultural capital—
ways he had learned to do class—including “manners of speech” that had given him
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access to information or opportunity by making him seem “more acceptable” to
opportunity gatekeepers.
My parents were academics and English professors, and so one learns to speak a
certain way in a certain context that makes one more acceptable or seem more,
and it happens automatically. When you get nervous, you start speaking more
formally or whatever. Those kinds of very subtle skills make enormous
differences in outcomes, I have to imagine.
Patrick highlighted advantages he had received that were about perceptions or
connections, suggesting, as he does here, that the interpretation of a behavior as a positive
attribute (i.e., “subtle skills”) depended on what might “seem more” acceptable to
gatekeepers (my emphasis). This is similar to his interpretation that a Black or Brown
person who had similar behaviors to his own in college might have “appeared angrier” to
a set of unnamed gatekeepers “because of skin color.”
Thus, Patrick suggested, from the beginning of his life, his access to opportunity
was shaped by a set of rules that operated to unfairly privilege people born into
circumstances like his own, regardless of their effort or innate talents. Just as Julie had
argued that “a million little things” all added up to create advantage and disadvantage, the
skewed opportunity structure Patrick described is based not only on wealth, but also on
privileging those who have ascriptive traits, inherited connections, or learned behaviors
that have been associated with the gatekeepers of wealth.
Compounding advantage
Patrick also talked about how his birth advantages built upon themselves, leading
to further advantages. The benefits of Patrick’s admission to Yale and his opportunity to
complete his degree without being “thrown out” (despite behaviors that he suggested

61

Chapter 1

might have resulted in that outcome) were multiplied by the assumptions that were then
made about him as a graduate of an elite institution.
I could kind of count on getting a good job, count on being given the benefit of
the doubt when being considered for a job because “oh, he went to Yale so he
must be smart.” It just seems to me that it's probably unknowable what that kind
of advantage does for you. Because, when people react that way to you, you
believe it and you're like, “I must be smart, so of course I can do the job, of course
I'm entitled to be here.” So many very subtle things come with the approbation
that just having that credential gives you.
Patrick described the ways his inherited advantages built on one another—iteratively
resulting in positive assumptions and credentials that gave him increasing access to
opportunity. Part of the compounding process that both he and Julie described is the
sense of entitlement that comes with “approbation” and being “given the benefit of the
doubt” in most situations.
That people were given opportunities based on assumptions rather than actual
merit was a commonly-mentioned theme among respondents, but Patrick and Julie were
unusual in their detailed discussions of the ways they personally benefitted both from the
assumptions and from the associated feelings of entitlement.
“Everybody knows they didn’t earn it”
Although quick to name his own advantages in the American economy, Patrick,
like most respondents, suggested throughout his interview that it was people who had
more economic resources than he did who were both the primary beneficiaries of the
unfair systems he described and those chiefly responsible for holding those systems in
place. A key part of his critique of current economic inequalities was, like those of others,
a challenge to the idea that the rich had gotten into their positions through merit.
You don't see Wall Street fat cats, to use a cliché, pounding on the table saying, “I
earned that,” because everybody knows they didn't earn it. They just got
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themselves into a position where the rules of our society enable them to rechannel the river so that it flows into their bank account. That’s not fair.
Focusing on the culpability of the rich was not unique to high-income respondents like
Patrick but was notable among that group because of their own economically privileged
positions relative to those of low-income respondents.
In fact, both high- and low-income respondents characterized the illegitimacy of
economic inequality in surprisingly similar ways. For example, when I asked Patrick
what he thought about the idea that most people in America who work hard could “get
ahead” or make themselves economically “comfortable,” he argued that hard work had
become decoupled from economic rewards, favoring the already rich. To make his point,
he contrasted the experience of hedge-funder John Paulson12 with a hypothetical hotel
housekeeper:
Some weeks I’m sure [Paulson works] 80 and 90-hour weeks when he’s about to
gain or lose a billion dollars but, for the most part, it's just simply not humanly
possible to work twice as hard as the hotel housekeeper because your body will
break (even if you were sitting at a desk) and your health would break. These
folks don't work that hard. Again, I saw them at my college reunion. They're
chilling and they're drinking their wine and having a good time. The idea that they
are— It's basically a restoration of an aristocracy that the country was founded
against. That's really frustrating to see.
Patrick expresses more first-hand familiarity with the lives of the rich than did lowincome respondents, but here he expresses a similar frustration: with the dominant “idea”
that people who make more money have simply worked harder than others. To Patrick—
and to many respondents—the non-meritocratic distribution of economic opportunity and
rewards was clearly visible (e.g., “it’s simply not humanly possible to work twice as hard

12. According to Wikipedia, John Paulson is “an American investor, hedge fund manager and
philanthropist. He leads Paulson & Co., a New York-based investment management firm he founded in
1994. He has been called ‘one of the most prominent names in high finance’ and ‘a man who made one of
the biggest fortunes in Wall Street history.’”
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as the hotel housekeeper”). People at the bottom of the economic ladder could work very
hard for little economic reward (“I think it's very easy to work extremely hard and get
nowhere in this country or have very little to show for it”) while a similar amount of
effort put forth by people at the top of the economic ladder seemed to lead to enormous
payoffs.
Conclusions about Patrick
Patrick argued that distributions of economic resources and opportunity in the
U.S. were based on “unfair rules” and an “unfair setup of our society” that “tipped” the
“scales” in favor of some—based primarily on inherited resources and circumstances—
while leaving others “to work extremely hard and get nowhere.” He saw himself as a
“beneficiary” of these “skewed” rules and systems—gaining access to an Ivy League
school as a third-generation alumnus, being given the “benefit of the doubt” in terms of
jobs and other opportunities based on his Whiteness and other social class markers—
which distressed him. He acknowledged his advantages, but primarily blamed economic
elites—not people like himself—for the perpetuation of these systems.
Conclusion
I was not surprised to find that the people I interviewed were dissatisfied with the
way economic opportunity and resources are distributed in American society. What I
sought to understand were the details of that dissatisfaction. How did they describe what
they saw as the problem? What were the manifestations and mechanisms of the inequality
they described? How did they make sense of their own lives in this context? Where did
their own experiences fit into the system as they understood it?
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The views of the respondents included in this chapter broadly represent many of
the major themes I heard across my respondents. I chose these cases in part because of
the ways these respondents directly articulated points that other respondents made in less
direct ways. Respondents’ experiences and social positions shaped their views, so I
sought variation by class, race, and gender. But my project is not a comparative statistical
analysis. So, the selection of cases in each chapter is not so much intended as a
representative sampling as it is a mosaic of lives and opinions that, when viewed
together, sketches a composite portrait of a larger whole.
The broad strokes of respondents’ understandings and qualms with current
economic systems (with a few exceptions) were remarkably similar. At the core of most
respondents’ dissatisfaction was a sense that access to economic opportunity—and
therefore economic rewards—was strongly dependent on circumstances that were largely
outside of individual control. Instead of being the outcomes of individual effort or merit,
many respondents felt that both affluence and poverty were often much more determined
by a person’s inherited starting circumstances (including familial economic and social
resources, race, and gender), with the deck stacked in favor of those born into socially or
economically advantaged positions. The same amount of effort or skill, many argued,
would pay off in very different ways depending on an individual’s starting position.
Respondents did not dismiss the value of hard work, but instead suggested that
hard work alone was not enough to create economic mobility or equality. Most
respondents had stories or experiences—personal or otherwise—that contradicted
dominant societal narratives that suggest that only those unwilling to work hard would be
“left empty-handed” (as Julie put it). They described real or imagined individuals
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(including themselves) who worked hard but continued to struggle economically. They
were distressed by the condition of people near the bottom of the income spectrum,
especially, for some, when contrasted to what they perceived to be the excesses of people
at the top. Most respondents felt that the lives of the poor were unnecessarily difficult,
complicated by circumstances outside of their control that left them with limited
opportunities.
Furthermore, most respondents felt that inherited or unearned advantages or
disadvantages accumulated or “compounded,” both within and across generations,
leaving those who had started ahead farther ahead and those who started behind farther
behind. Those who had better access based on their own inherited circumstances
(including themselves) often had more social and material resources to create similar
opportunities for their own children. This led many to feel that American economic
systems ultimately functioned to keep people in their places, economically, rather than
supporting the economic mobility that is often considered part of the American Dream.
The advantages respondents described were both economic and social. For
example, family income could help pay for college or medical expenses, make a down
payment on a house, or allow someone to take an unpaid professional development
opportunity. Family social networks or customs might help gain access to elite
institutions, jobs, or information about opportunities. Some respondents noted that forms
of cultural capital (e.g., learned behaviors associated with social class) and racial
privilege combined to enable them to be perceived as insiders by gatekeepers of
economic opportunity, and to feel a sense of entitlement to that perception.
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When thinking about their own advantages or the advantages of others, some
respondents invoked the idea of luck. They sometimes used it to distance themselves
from the systematic nature of their advantages—for example, Patrick’s comments on
“generations of [his] family being lucky” elides the social and legal ways families like his
were privileged over others. But they also used luck, as Frank (2016) suggests, as a
challenge to meritocracy, by acknowledging how much “external chance events and
environmental factors” influence outcomes “independently of people’s virtues or flaws”
(Frank 2016:9). Both Julie’s and Patrick’s use of the idea of luck seemed intended in this
latter way—to suggest that they had done nothing in particular to earn their advantaged
status. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the subtle double work done by this idea—both a
denial and acknowledgement of advantage—particularly for those individuals who use it
as they try to reconcile their own privileges with their sense of moral worth.
Every respondent—to varying degrees, sometimes prompted, sometimes not—
noted that economic advantages and disadvantages were linked to race. In discussion,
most respondents acknowledged race as one of the critical pieces of the inherited
circumstances that influenced one’s access to economic opportunity and resources. Black
respondents were both more likely to mention differences in economic experiences by
race and also tended to discuss these patterns at greater length than White respondents.
However, it was common for White respondents to mention their own advantaged access
to opportunity due to race when prompted and some brought it up repeatedly throughout
the interview. I return to respondents’ understanding of racialized economic inequality in
Chapter 3.
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There was a somewhat different pattern in terms of understandings of gender in
economic inequality. As I mentioned earlier, women were far more likely than men to
talk unprompted about gendered economic inequalities (and high-income women more
than low-income). Many women drew a direct link between their gender and their own
economic circumstances. They talked about facing pay disparities or discrimination in
hiring or promotions, being held back by gendered stereotypes (e.g., the “angry Black
woman”), or just generally having to work harder to navigate a culture and systems
controlled by powerful men.
Despite this relatively widespread recounting among women respondents, most
did not frame gendered struggles for economic access and equity as central to their
arguments about economic inequality. That is, they focused much less on gender than
they did on class or race. For example, Julie’s direct references to gender were few in
comparison to those referencing class or race. Indirectly, she referenced gender
repeatedly, but never did so directly until I asked. She described her childhood in a
household supported by her father’s single income; she noted that her social acceptance
came in part because “I look a certain way when I wear a dress;” she commented that
some people have less advantage because they need to send “money back … to help
mom;” and she primarily gave examples of other women who were her economic peers—
several of whom she noted were single mothers. Her ongoing allusions to unnamed
gatekeepers of power neither included race nor gender markers, although both are
implied. When I asked her directly how she thought gender impacted her economic
trajectory, she was brief.
I think gender has made it more difficult. … I've noticed that, in places where I
feel like I'm taken most seriously, it's usually when I'm surrounded with other
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women, whether they're my age or older. There's less sort of jockeying around
status or things like that.
Julie was in the minority of my women respondents who didn’t discuss gender explicitly
until prompted, but her repeated implicit references to gendered experiences and her
greater focus on class and race were typical.
Very few men said anything about gendered economic inequality until prompted,
and then offered a mixed assessment. About half of the men made brief references to
economic inequalities that disadvantaged women—for example, noting disparities in pay.
A handful of Black men (both low and high income) questioned the role of gender in
economic inequality relative to race, some saying gender wasn’t such “a big deal”
anymore, others arguing that women had particular types of advantages, and some
wondering how race and gender intersected. For example, Aaron (HIBM) responded this
way:
So, I do know that women earn X cents on the dollar which is not the full dollar.
And men earn the full dollar, presumably in these studies. So, I just take it for
granted that I guess I'm a guy, but I think, I'm a black guy, so am I part of that
group that's making the full dollar? I don't know.
Aaron’s confusion about the relative influence of his own race and gender in terms of his
income reflects a literature that shows a complex and changing landscape where race and
gender together have historically been the primary characteristics by which jobs were
allocated (e.g., Acker 2006; Branch 2011) and where racialized and gendered conceptions
of skill continue to shape the distribution of economic access in the labor market (e.g.,
Branch and Hanley 2017).
In this chapter, and throughout this dissertation, I focus on class and race—
reflecting the primary lenses of my respondents, acknowledging the constant
intersections of gender with these other two forces.
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In this chapter, I have captured some of the key ideas I heard from respondents as
they challenged the legitimacy of current economic inequalities in the U.S. Chapter 2
explores another facet of these ideas. There, I show that moral views of the rich and the
poor—a bit of which were captured in this chapter—were anchoring ideas for
respondents as they made sense of economic inequality and their own moral and material
positions within the systems they described.
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CHAPTER 2
MORAL VIEWS OF RICH AND POOR:
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AS MORAL RELATIONSHIP

Introduction
Moral judgements about class groups and the relationships between those groups
were key to respondents’ understandings of economic inequality. Across incomes,
respondents spontaneously talked about class groups—specifically about the rich and the
poor—and they used a moral discourse that framed the rich negatively and the poor
positively. They drew symbolic boundaries between those groups and suggested a
material relationship between them that had moral implications.
The moral language that low- and high-income respondents used to describe the
rich and the poor was similar across respondent incomes. They used the language of
effort and work to portray the poor as morally virtuous hard workers whose efforts were
under-compensated and to question the moral legitimacy of the economic rewards
garnered by the rich. They portrayed the consumption of the poor as reasonable and
therefore morally legitimate—using language invoking basic needs—in contrast with
descriptions of the rich that suggested a morally illegitimate form of consumption—
focused on greed, excess, and indulgence. These tropes echo those that Rachel Sherman
(2017) found among her affluent respondents who sought moral legitimacy by framing
their consumption as reasonable rather than luxurious or excessive. Through these
portrayals, my respondents argued that distributions of economic resources were
misaligned with moral worthiness—what Sayer (2002) describes as “a disjunction
between economic valuation and ethical valuation” (p1). People who were morally
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suspect nevertheless seemed to accrue economic rewards while many people who were
seen as morally virtuous seemed to struggle with economic insufficiency.
Most respondents’ moral portrayals of the rich or the poor were relational rather
than independent. Many respondents suggested that there was a material relationship—in
addition to a moral one—between the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor.
Some explicitly blamed the rich for actions that harmed the poor. Others saw the rich as
taking more than they needed and leaving less for everyone else. Even those who did not
link the rich and the poor in an explicit material relationship did link them in a moral
relationship, portraying the excessive consumption of the rich as a moral transgression
because it was in the context of widespread poverty.
One place where high- and low-income respondents differed in these moral
portrayals was in the ways that they placed themselves into the moral relationships they
depicted between the rich and the poor. Respondents used moral depictions to draw
symbolic boundaries between groups and to assert moral claims about proper relations
between those groups (e.g., Kidder and Martin 2012; Lamont 2000). As I noted in the
introduction to this dissertation, most low-income respondents described themselves as
poor or near poor. Although this identification seemed surprising given popular claims to
middle-class status, it makes sense in the context of the moral discourse among my
respondents that favored positive portrayals of the poor. Thus, for low-income
respondents, portraying the poor in a positive moral light also served to shore up their
own moral identities.
In contrast, high-income respondents, generally, grouped themselves neither with
the poor nor with the rich. Thus, high-income respondents took a different approach than
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did low-income respondents in asserting their own moral worth. They emphasized their
connections to the poor—whether those were material or emotional—and their
differences from the rich. While low-income respondents spoke in fairly binary class
terms, high-income respondents characterized their own position as one in the middle.
They struggled to make sense of their own moral positions—and to hold on to their own
sense of moral worth—in a system that they argued was controlled by a group with more
power and resources than they had and primarily harmed people with less power and
resources than themselves.
High- and low-income respondents’ articulations of moral views about class
groups were thus simultaneously sense-making about others and sense-making about
themselves.
The findings in this chapter contribute to recent scholarship about the role
Americans’ opinions of class groups play in shaping their views of economic inequality,
and particularly speak to—and are informed by—Spencer Piston’s recent work. Piston
(2018) argues that—contrary to what he calls “reigning myths” about public opinion
toward the rich and the poor—the majority of Americans express sympathy toward the
poor and resentment toward the rich. Instead of following the logic of individualism—in
which both groups would be perceived to have “exactly what they deserve”—Piston finds
that majorities of Americans report that the poor have less than they deserve and that the
rich have more than they deserve (Piston 2018:45).13 He argues that these types of
attitudes toward class groups—as opposed to the class identity or position of

13. Although, as Piston notes, substantial proportions reported that each group had “about the right amount
of money” (20-35% in the case of the poor and 30-45% in the case of the rich). Also, he demonstrates that
sentiments about the poor and the rich are linked to American preferences for economic redistribution,
something I will address in Chapters 4 and 5.
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respondents—has received little attention in scholarship focused on public opinion. Like
Piston, my research contributes to filling in this gap. I find that respondents
spontaneously talked about the rich and the poor as I asked questions about economic
inequality. My data corroborate his findings about positive sentiments toward the poor
and negative sentiments toward the rich. I also extend the insights of Piston’s analysis by
adding the kind of depth that comes with qualitative research—illuminating the moral
logic respondents use to justify these sentiments about class groups.
My findings also speak to some of the areas Piston suggests should receive closer
attention—in particular, the relationship between attitudes toward the rich and the poor
and attitudes toward economic inequality. Piston argues that these two sets of attitudes
are often treated as “interchangeable, but they have different properties” (Piston
2018:151). For example, he notes that Americans mention the rich and the poor far more
frequently than they mention inequality (or related terms) when they are talking about
what they like or dislike about political parties. I find that respondents’ discussions of the
rich and the poor were part of the moral discourse they used to talk about economic
inequality. Inequality was an abstract concept that most respondents made sense of by
talking about the groups they saw implicated in that relationship.
This separation between opinions about inequality itself and the groups involved
was another thing Piston argued could use closer examination—and a place where my
research offers some insight. He notes, “some people who express tolerance for income
inequality in principle also report that poor people have less than they deserve or that rich
people have more” (Piston 2018:151). My respondents generally supported the idea of
income differentiation and their tolerance for the magnitude of that differentiation was
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related to their views of the moral legitimacy of those at the high and low ends of the
economic spectrum. They interpreted the size of the economic gap between the rich and
the poor through a moral lens that included judgements of “deservingness” based on
effort or merit and patterns of consumption considered to be legitimate or illegitimate.
Thus, for many, the size of the gap was a concern insofar as it was seen as reflecting
economic rewards to a group seen as morally undeserving and a lack of those rewards to
a group seen as morally deserving. For example, Katie (LIWW), whom we’ll meet later
in this chapter, explained, “I could care less [sic] if someone gets fricking 70 million
dollars to sell their shoes if I could feed my family and make my car payment and not
stress on my rent.” Just as Rachel Sherman (2017) found among her respondents, my
respondents contrasted the moral legitimacy of consumption linked to basic or universal
needs with the moral illegitimacy of consumption considered excessive or extravagant.
Respondents prioritized or foregrounded these perceptions of moral legitimacy based on
merit and consumption and used this as a lens through which to look at economic
inequality more broadly.
Katie’s example also illustrates one of the ways my findings complicate Piston’s.
He argues that sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich appear to be independent
of one another in terms of statistical correlations between the two. My qualitative data
didn’t allow me to measure these types of correlations, but they did suggest a connection
between the ways respondents perceived these two groups. My respondents described the
moral positions of the rich and the poor relationally—the material position of the former
was seen as morally untenable, in part because of the contrasting material position of the
latter. If, as Katie suggested, those at the bottom could meet their basic needs (portrayed
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as morally legitimate) then the excesses of the rich might be seen as less of a moral
transgression. Many respondents went further than Katie to suggest that the material
hardship of the poor was caused by the pursuit of excess among the rich—arguing that
the relationship between the two groups was not simply a moral contrast, but a material
one.
This chapter explores these arguments in two sections: the first focuses on lowincome respondents’ views and the second on high-income respondents’ views. I selected
respondents to illustrate the similarities and differences in moral discourse within and
across these income groups—and each section includes White and Black respondents,
women and men.

Low-income views of rich and poor
Low-income respondents, like most respondents, saw the lives of the rich and the
poor as linked in material ways that had moral implications. They used a discourse that
contrasted the consumption of the rich and the poor in ways that emphasized moral
corruption among the former and moral virtue among the latter. Many argued that the
rich and corporations took more than was necessary and, by doing so, created
insufficiency and hardship for people like themselves who struggled to meet basic needs.
Thus, they saw economic inequality as reflecting a non-meritocratic material and moral
relationship with the rich and the poor on opposite sides of a moral spectrum. They
framed the poor in a morally positive light—as hard workers, people struggling against
hardships not of their own making—and included themselves among this group. The rich
they saw as morally corrupt: taking more than their fair share of resources and leaving
little for others—profiting off of the suffering of the poor.
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“Exploiting the poorer folks to get ahead” – Barbara (LIBW)
Like most respondents, Barbara used moral language around effort and
consumption to frame the rich negatively and the poor positively. She talked about poor
people working hard just to “maintain” a life with basic dignities. In contrast she
portrayed the rich as having more than they needed—resources, furthermore, “not
necessarily” gained through effort or work. She was among the respondents who framed
her moral judgements in an argument about a direct material relationship between the
rich and the poor—arguing that companies and CEOs used their unearned power to take
even more for themselves, making unnecessary profit by overcharging poor people who
were barely making ends meet. In her framing, the poor have the moral high ground—
working and struggling—while the rich are engaged in behaviors that she judged to be
morally questionable. This was a common framing among low-income respondents.
In her late fifties when we spoke, Barbara (LIBW) was recently divorced and
struggling with a dramatically reduced income. Her three sons lived with her (ranging in
age from 16 to 20) in a three-bedroom apartment.14 She estimated her part-time salary as
a building maintenance person at about $9,000 a year and characterized her income this
way; “Dismal. Awful. Disastrous. Stress. If I drank, I'd be drunk now.” Earlier in her life,
Barbara had taken courses toward an associate degree, but had not completed it. She had
had some part-time jobs in the past, but her former husband’s salary had been enough to
support their lifestyle and she had primarily focused on raising her children. Barbara
expressed a lot of sympathy for the poor, in part, it seemed, because of her own financial

14. It sounded like she was likely getting some help from the children’s father, who worked as an
administrator at a local college, but we didn’t discuss the details. It seemed that divorce negotiations were
still going on when we spoke.
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hardships. Although she said that before the divorce she had “a little twinge of being
middle class,” she described her current social class status as “down in the dumps. Low
income.”
Barbara described the poor in language that reinforced their position as morally
deserving—implicitly pushing back against common narratives to the contrary. When I
asked her a question I asked most respondents—if she felt that poor people had worked
less hard than others—Barbara’s answer was a definitive “No.” She followed up: “Some
are working four or five jobs [just] to maintain.” When I asked her if she felt that,
generally, people end up where they deserve to be economically, she also responded in
the negative, describing people who worked hard but still struggled to make ends meet.
I don't think they end up where they deserve to be. You take a job to survive. …
people work 20 years and they hate their job, but they have to pay their mortgage.
… They’re stuck. You have to get a job no matter what and pay these bills.
Barbara depicts the poor in a morally positive light—they are hard workers, doing what
they need to do to survive in difficult circumstances. “They’re stuck” despite their hard
work, she argued, not because of their lack of it.
On the other hand, when I asked about the work effort of the rich compared to
others, Barbara questioned their moral desert, saying that the rich had “not necessarily”
worked harder than others. Like other respondents, she invoked inheritance as a moral
contrast to work among the rich: “A lot of it is off of grand-pop's money that they
inherited or whatever or luck ... it doesn't necessarily have to be you worked your way
through.”
Barbara further questioned the moral position of the rich by accusing them of
enriching themselves by hurting others—something I heard from many respondents. Not
only had the rich potentially worked less hard than the poor to get into their positions,
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Barbara argued, they used those positions to increase their own gains at the expense of
the poor—profiting off of the hardship of people who were already hurting. She gave the
example of the local electric utility (the “UI”): “The people in charge of the UI company”
were “making billions and still nickel-and-diming me to death for $20 over. They’re
going to shut the lights off. It’s ridiculous.” She implies that the company is being
greedy—being inflexible about small costs (“nickel-and-diming”) and threatening
people’s basic needs (“they’re going to shut the lights off”) because they are focused on
maximizing their profits and “making billions.”
To Barbara, the moral transgression was that the company was making more than
it needed (she imagined it “could survive” with much less profit), and yet it was “still
squeezing your little poor people,” including her.
You have to pay these extravagant prices … these big big bills, and they're just
getting richer and you're getting squashed out and stressed out trying to maintain.
The idea of excess is prominent here—key to Barbara and others’ moral judgements of
the rich—reflecting Sherman’s observations about the moral illegitimacy of extravagance
(Sherman 2017). Barbara argued that those who already had economic resources also had
the power to take even more—more than was necessary—”getting richer” by charging
“extravagant prices” that “squashed” people with fewer resources. With such practices,
Barbara argued, companies were “exploiting the poorer folks to get ahead.”
Barbara wasn’t just contrasting moral heroes and villains as she describes these
scenarios, but also linking the economic fates of those two groups—one group was
getting ahead because of the harm they did to the other group. She returned to this point
to specifically target executive salaries:
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You're paying all these $3 million to sign on a CEO … and even this poor woman
is paying $400 a month for utility, $300 for gas, $80 to watch TV, cable—that's
the bare minimum. They really have to make $15 million a year?
There are layers of moral judgement here. By invoking a “bare minimum,” Barbara
defends the moral upstandingness of the poor—who are sometimes attacked for living
luxurious lives on taxpayer “handouts”—and, in contrast, she questions the morals of a
CEO who demands a $3 million signing bonus and a $15 million salary. The moral
infraction, Barbara suggests, is not simply in this contrast between the excess of the
CEO’s pay and the inability of the poor woman to afford the “bare minimum,” but also
because the former seems to come at the expense of the latter.
The moral standing of the rich is further lowered for Barbara and others by what
they portray as the use, by the rich, of those potentially-ill-earned gains to bend social
and political rules in their own favor and against the interests of the poor. For example,
she said, “politician[s] will be influenced by” money from corporations.
Because when you go to ... decide on pork bellies, you gotta let that corporation
build on top of my house because they gave you three million dollars, you know.
And it's going to be hidden somehow.
Barbara makes clear who the winners and losers are in this scenario (“that corporation”
that will “build on top of my house”) and suggests with her language that these
transactions are underhanded and illegitimate (“it’s going to be hidden somehow”).
Nevertheless, she argues that the people who are hurt by these acts—by implication,
morally-upstanding ordinary people—have little recourse against the actions of the
moneyed powerful.
No. It’s not fair. … And you go before some committee in Washington and they
talk to whoever and keep moving on … And they still got their billions and we're
still down here with peanuts and still struggling. So not fair. And is there stop
gaps? What do you do about that? How can you— the old boys are making the
money, so the old boys are not going to vote to say, “we need to be fair.”
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Not only do the rich “exploit” the poor to “get ahead,” Barbara argued, but they use their
money and power to influence the system to benefit people like themselves and harm the
poor. This idea—that the rich have an unfair amount of power and that they use it to
cheat “the system” (especially, to avoid taxation) or bend the rules to their own benefit—
was a common element of moral discourse about the rich that I heard from a lot of
respondents, both high and low income.
Barbara uses moral language to make sense of the inequality in power and
resources she sees between the rich and the poor—and to make sense of her own position
in that relationship. As we spoke, she implicitly grouped herself with the poor—whom
she portrayed as morally righteous—switching between the first person (“nickel-anddiming me to death for $20”; “build on top of my house”), the second person (“you're
getting squashed out”), and third person (“they’re stuck”) as she gave examples of
morally-virtuous poor people hurt by the morally-corrupt rich. Thus, her moral portrayal
served several purposes: drawing symbolic boundaries between the rich and the poor,
asserting a moral and material relationship between those groups, and upholding her own
sense of moral worth by associating herself with the morally righteous poor.
As was the case with many low-income respondents, Barbara’s depiction was
notably binary. Although she nodded to a middle position with her own former “twinge”
of middle-class status, that group was largely absent from the scene. This was, perhaps,
because moral stories tend to revolve around a tension between two moral poles. Lowincome respondents’ depictions of themselves as virtuous and unjustly suffering at the
hands of the rich did not require another party in the story (as did high income
respondents’ stories, as we’ll see later). It might also be an artifact of my questioning,
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which focused on the rich and the poor. But it also likely reflected the social and
economic segregation and differential visibility between high- and low-income
respondents. The lives of high-income respondents (in, say, the top 20% of national
incomes) felt just as out of reach to many low-income respondents as were the lives of
the top one or two percent. And many low-income respondents didn’t have anybody in
their social networks from either group. Furthermore, as Rachel Sherman argues,
widespread American stories about the morally illegitimate extravagant behaviors of the
rich tend to hide or legitimate the material inequalities that are less visible in public
behavior.
The rich “manipulate the system” and the poor “suffer from it” – Jeremy (LIWM)
Throughout our interview, Jeremy portrayed the rich as moral villains who
greedily took more than their fair share and used their ill-gotten power to further skew the
system in their own favor—leaving morally-virtuous hard-working poor people like
Jeremy to “suffer” with broken bodies, hungry families, and constant financial struggles.
Jeremy was in his early 40s when we talked. He had a GED and was working as a
landscaper, making about $35,000 a year. He had two older daughters (who did not live
with him) for whom he still paid child support. He lived with his girlfriend (who was
Black), who had three children of her own, including a young son who lived with them
(“I love him to death”). Earlier in his life, Jeremy said he had spent 10 years in prison. “I
was a screw up,” he said, but that was “the last time I went to prison. I used that to
change my life.”
I briefly introduced Jeremy in the introduction to this dissertation. Recall his
sentiments about being near poor, but not at the bottom:
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We're poor, don't get me wrong, I'm poor. I understand that part, but as long as I
have the ability to try to make my life better, I'm going to try to make my life
better. There's people that are poorer than me. Every time I want to get on my pity
pot, I could just drive down the street. Someone has it worst off. You know?
Although he wasn’t the “worst off,” Jeremy’s financial situation was precarious, and he
was constantly anxious about making ends meet. Without side jobs and “if my girlfriend
wasn't getting assistance, I'd be homeless,” he said (although I didn’t learn the specifics
of how much and what kind of assistance she was receiving).
Jeremy focused much of his attention in our interview vilifying the rich and
corporations for their unjust treatment of people like himself—whom he portrayed as
morally-righteous hard workers. His depiction of the poor was dominated by discussions
of his own experiences and feelings of moral indignation, but he occasionally referred to
others who had also been “beaten to a pulp” by a system run by the rich. For example, he
talked about the ways American legal systems had “different rules for different people,”
allowing the rich to get away with “legalized robbery”—only “getting slapped on the
wrist” for “robbing millions of dollars”—while “a kid who did that in the street, hustled
his way up … he'd get life in jail.” Like other respondents, Jeremy argued that the
“hustles” of the poor and the rich were the “same stuff”—only the rich “know how to
manipulate their situation” to avoid punishment. “Only difference between the rich and
the some of us… we got caught and they didn't.”
The relationship Jeremy depicts is both a moral contrast—the underhanded
“manipulation” by the rich juxtaposed with the morally-virtuous effort narrative of “a
kid” who “hustled his way up”—and a material relationship. When the rich manipulate
the system, he said, “at the end of the day me and you suffer from it.” He spent much of
the interview providing examples of this relationship, in which he consistently framed
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himself in the morally-righteous language of effort, integrity, and scarcity (in contrast to
his framing of the rich as entitled, corrupt, and excessive). For example, recall his
definition of his own social class status as “hard working class” (his emphasis) not just
“working class.” “I earn with my back,” he said, “we give them an honest day’s work for
an honest day’s pay, and that's how we survive.”
Jeremy’s moral framing of himself included two common elements used by many
respondents to talk about the moral worthiness of the poor: hard work and insufficiency.
He invoked both in a story he recounted about a time when he “almost lost” two fingers
at work and was at home on workers’ compensation leave. 15 The compensation was not
enough to get by, he said, indicating this insufficiency by noting, “refrigerator’s empty.”
So, when an old employer called and asked if Jeremy could come shovel snow, he felt he
had “no other choice.” “I went … and I'm out there with one hand and I'm shoveling.”
Jeremy blamed people with power and money for dictating the terms of his
employment such that “I’m getting paid less than what I deserve” while they lived
(morally illegitimate) lives of luxury. “You're worried about keeping your pool going,”
he imagined saying to his boss, meanwhile, “I'm worried about putting food on the table.”
His repeated reference to food invoked a basic need—in contrast to his regular
invocations of the luxury or excess of the rich—which he sometimes combined with
references to another morally-positive frame: family. For example, although he knew his
pay was “not just,” he said, “I just accept it because I gotta feed my kids.”
A defining moral story for Jeremy about the relationship between the rich and the
poor was about his parents’ impoverishment at the end of their lives. He felt that his

15. In Connecticut, worker’s compensation is 75% of the worker’s average weekly wage.
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parents had “worked hard … their whole life” and had followed society’s rules, and yet
he felt they had been betrayed at the end of their lives by the profit-seeking interests of
corporations and the government. 16 He characterized his parents as epitomes of American
economic morality—people who “believed in the American dream: if you work hard you
will achieve something.”
My parents worked hard … paid every bill on time. They paid for social security.
They paid for pensions. They had medical coverage. They paid for everything on
time. They even went without just to put food on the table and make sure their
bills were paid.
Jeremy pitted his parents’ moral virtue—framed in terms of their sacrifices and hewing to
the social rules of self-reliance—against the greed and duplicitousness of those in power.
Both parents worked for the same large corporation “their whole life,” he said, but “when
they got sick, they turned their back on them.”
I watched the system take everything from them. I watched them deplete their
bank sources, and then after that they took the house, and they made sure when
they died … they came here poor, they left poor.
He explained that his parents were in a nursing home when “the state” “kicked them off
their Medicaid.” His resentment of the powerful was clear as he described his meetings
with people from “the state of Connecticut” about that situation:
They weren't interested in— they had their representative, and I was there, and
they used these big words, and all they meant was, “We're taking your stuff.” … I
said “Ma'am you don't have to use these big words. I understand very well what
you're saying. You want to get paid, we don't got it. Where do we go from here?”
Jeremy describes the representatives of “the system” as callous, elite, and greedy. They
“weren’t interested” in the lives of the people they were impacting, they just “want to get
paid.” Focused on money, they were abandoning his parents who, in his mind, had done

16. Like many low-income respondents, Jeremy saw the rich, corporations, and the government as a
collaborative force keeping people like him down (more on this in Chapter 4).
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everything right according to the American social contract and now could not care for
themselves. His comment about people using “these big words” suggests both his sense
that his family was being victimized by elites and his feelings of resentment toward those
elites.
Ultimately, Jeremy’s account included his own feelings of unjust economic
victimization at the hands of the powerful. He recounted coming home from work one
day and finding that his mother—who could not move around on her own and was a
“two-man lift”—had been discharged from the nursing home and dropped off at his “not
handicap accessible” home.
Who had to take care of that? Me. … I couldn't watch my mom that way. … I had
to clean her. I had to take care of her. I was working. They were like, “Oh, go find
somebody, pay them ten dollars an hour to take care of your— “ I can't. At the
time I'm making twelve dollars an hour.
As he recounts this story, Jeremy is filled with moral recrimination—against his parents’
private employer, against the state. In this final moral injustice, he—who is already
struggling at the hands of his own employer who is “getting rich” off his labor while
paying him “less than what I deserve”—is left to do additional work to make up for the
broken promises of the morally-derelict powerful who have “turned their back[s]” on his
deserving parents in their time of need. Meanwhile, he said bitterly, those “guys that's
owning the company, of course they could put their parents in the best of care.”
“I could care less if someone gets fricking 70 million dollars to sell their shoes if I
could feed my family” – Katie (LIWW)
Katie—who, I briefly quoted in the introduction to this chapter—had mixed
feelings about both the rich and the poor. She considered herself to be “a step above
really poor” because “we do struggle so much” but “I'm not destitute.” Like other low-

86

Chapter 2

income respondents, she presented a fairly binary view of American economic
distributions, saying, “there is really no middle class anymore … you're either really rich
or you have nothing.” She considered herself among those who would have been
“working class” or “middle class” were it not for what she and others perceived as the
squashing of the middle at the hands of the rich. This perception was central to Katie’s
moral arguments framing the poor and near-poor as morally-virtuous unjust victims of
the greed of the rich.
I don’t know what happened. … I just feel like the middle-class people, who I feel
like years ago was most of America, just slowly got pushed down and pushed
down and pushed down because the rich people wanted more money.
When we spoke, Katie was in her late 30s working as a teachers’ assistant. She rented a
house (from family) with her husband and three children (including two stepchildren).
Her husband ran his own business (although I didn’t learn what it was), of which Katie
said, “we barely pay the bills to make his business run, let alone make money.” She
estimated that her household income was about $45,000 a year. Katie had completed
“about two and a half years” in college—studying early childhood education—and
wanted to complete her degree, but said, “I cannot afford it.” She and her family received
subsidized health insurance through the state Medicaid program, and her struggles to
navigate that system—as we’ll see in later chapters—underscored her feelings of
economic marginalization.
Like other low-income respondents, Katie used the language of effort and
consumption to frame herself as morally righteous and to draw a symbolic boundary
between people like herself and the morally-questionable rich.
I'll work as much as I can, and I work hard. Like, I don't care what I'm doing,
whatever my job is, I do it. If I'm cleaning a toilet, I'm cleaning that toilet. If I'm
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taking care of your kid, I'm taking care of that child. You know, so— but that
never is reflected in your paycheck, ever. Nowhere I've ever been anyway.
Katie portrayed herself as a morally-virtuous hard worker and argued that economic
rewards were misaligned with moral worthiness (“that never is reflected in your
paycheck”). She implicitly contrasted this portrayal of herself with a common moral
critique of the rich as snobbish by signaling her non-elitism (expressed here in her
willingness to clean a toilet). Her moral self-portrayal included an explicit argument for
her own fair mindedness. She told a story about a coworker who had “the same position,
the same job title” as her own, but whose job required harder work, according to Katie.
“What she does is so hard … she works her butt off. … To me, I'm being extremely fair
because I'm saying she deserves more money than me.”
In contrast to this morally-righteous self-portrayal, Katie questioned the morals of
“people that make too much money” who—in her mind—failed to have the same kind of
fair-minded acknowledgement of others’ deservingness.
I think there's a lot of people that make too much money, for sure. And I feel kind
of hypocritical saying that because they work and they deserve money, but when
there's so much ... economic stress and so many people struggling ... why, really
do you have to make that much? … Scale back … And I feel bad, because that
would change their way of life, but so they can't go out to dinner every night
[sarcastic pity tone]. … Like I feel like I'm almost bitter at this point saying it out
loud. … It's difficult to just be a normal hard-working American. You're in a
hamster wheel. And I feel like these people are not. Whoever they are. Nothing
against them. But, when you make so much money and people may be technically
working harder than you can't even pay their rent, there is definitely something
wrong.
Katie’s commentary is laced with moral judgement and echoes the sentiments of others
who criticized the excesses of the rich in the context of the struggles of the poor. She
invokes that paragon of moral goodness, “a normal hard-working American,” and
implicitly includes herself in that group. She frames this group as morally righteous both
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in terms of their effort and in terms of their consumption (the basic need of “pay[ing]
their rent”). In contrast, she morally impugns the immoderation of anonymous others who
have the luxury to “go out to dinner every night” and hesitantly questions their effort
(“people may be technically worker harder than you”) as she distances herself from them
(“these people… whoever they are”).
Even as she draws these moral contrasts, Katie’s mixed feelings about the rich are
clear. She swings back and forth between feeling they make “too much money,” but then
feeling that “they deserve money,” wanting them to “scale back,” but then “feel[ing] bad,
because that would change their way of life,” being frustrated at feeling “in a hamster
wheel” while they “are not” but then holding “nothing against them.” Katie struggled to
reconcile her feelings of moral injustice (“there is definitely something wrong”) with her
belief in dominant American moral narratives about meritocracy, the sanctity of private
ownership, and independence.
To the extent that she did reconcile these feelings to herself, Katie did so by
arguing that her moral judgements of the rich emerged from her concern for the poor
rather than from envy or particular animus. In other words, unlike some respondents who
argued that it was morally untenable to be extremely rich, regardless of the context (e.g.,
“no one needs that much money”), Katie was like many respondents, who argued that
what made the wealth of the rich morally unacceptable was the co-existing poverty of the
poor.
I could care less [sic] if someone gets fricking 70 million dollars to sell their
shoes if I could feed my family and make my car payment and not stress on my
rent. And I'm not talking about extravagant here. I just want to be able to pay my
bills without having to think. I would love to set up automatic payment on
everything. Just, it's paid it's done. … Do we have something left to do something
fun? Great, awesome. … If everybody can just get on a base to make it, to have
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enough to get what they need, then honestly, I don't care what anybody else does.
Just do whatever. You want to spend ridiculous amounts of money and get your
face done, go ahead. Meanwhile I'm trying to figure out what can I buy for
groceries this week.
Katie’s selection of examples here (selling shoes vs. feeding family; “get your face done”
vs. buying groceries) belies her repeated disavowals of enmity for the rich and reinforces
the moral contrast she draws between herself and that group.
Despite these feelings, Katie was reluctant to explicitly blame the rich for causing
the suffering of the poor the way others—like Barbara and Jeremy—did. Instead, she was
indirect—for example, using passive language about middle-class people getting “pushed
down” not by, but because “the rich people wanted more money.” Even as her language
suggested a direct relationship where one group subjugated another, she denied this
narrative, saying, “I don’t know what happened.” This was possibly part of Katie’s selfportrayal as morally virtuous, perhaps reflecting a feeling that a good person would have
“malice toward none.”17 As we will see in Chapter 3, Katie made this desire for positive
self-portrayal more explicit when we talked about race: “I'm a pretty honest person, so …
it's just killing me … because I feel … like I'm being prejudiced.”
Even Katie, though, did directly blame corporations and CEOs for taking more
than their fair share and leaving others with insufficient resources. She gave the example
of a former job she had as a shift supervisor at a fast-food chain.
I remember working there and it felt like I was making decent money, and now
you look at those places and there's no way … I couldn't survive on what they're
paying now. …
So … where's that money going? To the corporate… and the big CEOs. … Back
then I felt like I could work my way up quicker and get more money. And now I
feel like it's stalled because the companies are just, “oh no no, this is our money

17. From Abraham Lincoln’s second inaugural address, March 4, 1865.
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and we need it, and we'll just give you a little tiny bit more so that we have people
to work.”
Katie’s willingness to critique corporations directly is perhaps not surprising given that
polling research shows that the American public is broadly critical of the power of and
the profits made by major corporations (Pew Research Center 2019). Nevertheless, this
might have been Katie’s most direct statement of the moral and material relationship
between the rich and the poor. The material circumstances (“I couldn’t survive on what
they’re paying now”) of a morally virtuous person (someone who wants to “work my
way up”) are directly impacted by “the corporate … and the big CEOs,” who, she
suggests, hold on to the majority of the profits, sharing only “a little tiny bit.”
Even while she struggled with ambivalence, Katie nevertheless portrayed a moral
divergence between the rich and the poor. Some people have more than they need, which
she argues is a morally questionable position given that others have less than they need.
Although she expressed an uncommon reluctance to explicitly blame the rich for the
hardships of the poor (perhaps in defense of her own moral self-concept), her language
and the examples she chose convey this moral judgement.
“You so greedy” – Sam (LIBM)
Sam (LIBM) spent much of his interview making moral arguments about the rich
and the poor. As we saw in Chapter 1, he painted a picture of American society wherein
the rich are in control, stacking the economic deck in their own favor, pulling the levers
of government, and conspiring to keep everyone else out of their ranks. Meanwhile, he
argued, the poor in this system continue to struggle to meet their basic needs, unable to
find well-paying jobs or afford healthcare for themselves or their children.
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Recall that Sam was in his early 40s when we spoke, working in a temporary
seasonal job as a metal worker making $18/hour. He expressed constant concern over the
precarity of his employment and the insufficiency of his wages—which were not enough,
Sam argued, to afford the “basics.” For example, minutes into our interview, he
commented on how expensive it was to afford “medical for you and your four kids.” He
lived with his girlfriend (who managed the household finances) and two children, and he
also supported his two older children—one a teen in college and one older—when he
could (“I help out when I help out”). Between him and his girlfriend, Sam estimated a
household income of maybe $66,000. He described himself as financially “struggling”
and “kind of living from check to check.”18
Everywhere he looked, Sam said, he saw the rich and corporations making tons of
money and hoarding it rather than sharing it to “make the country a lot more stronger.”
He didn’t fault companies for wanting to make money, but he blamed them for tipping
the scales too much in their own favor—something he saw as both unfair and immoral.
The rich got tax breaks while people like him, Sam argued, had unsustainable amounts of
taxes taken out of their paychecks. Corporate executives have “enough money for ten
generations to survive” while the minimum wage was too low to cover even “basic
things.” “I don't get it,” Sam said, “why these businesses are making so much money
when they can't pay their employees more, or even help them out with a better medical
plan.”

18. See my note in Chapter 1 about estimating Sam’s income.
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As did many respondents, especially the low-income, Sam questioned the moral
virtue of corporations and the rich for having excess and luxury while others suffered in
poverty.
Banks and GM and these people, they’ve got the government backing them. Big
casinos … they should pay people. They’re making billions of dollars a year.
There shouldn't even be no homeless people around. There's too much money out
here for anybody in America to really be struggling.
Many respondents echoed this sentiment: there should be plenty to go around, but,
through corrupt or immoral actions, some end up with more than they need and others
with too little. As we’ll see in Chapter 4, low-income respondents like Sam often
included government among those they blamed for upholding these illegitimate and
immoral inequities—for allowing such situations to continue, or, worse, for supporting
these systems. As Sam argued, “the government let the private enterprise do what they
do.”
Sam was explicit in arguing that the insidiousness he depicted in the actions of the
rich or corporations was deliberate. For example, as we saw in Chapter 1, he targeted the
carceral system for moral recrimination as an example of illegitimate economic
inequality being perpetuated by the rich for their own benefit. He was frustrated with
what he perceived as a system of not simply unjust but intentional inequality. He blamed
the rich, big businesses, and the government for working together to keep the poor from
accessing opportunities and resources to improve their lives.
To Sam, the moral depravity of these deliberate acts of oppression was made
worse by efforts on the part of these groups to hide those acts behind “smokescreens”
designed to distract and obfuscate. To make his point, he alluded to a controversial
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taxpayer-funded sports stadium (also mentioned by others) and sports franchises in
general.
I believe that what they're doing with the sports stadiums, like I told you, was just
a way of controlling— keeping your mind off things, like I said. You don't need
an $80 billion whatever, $80 million football stadium. But they only doing that,
like I said, so they covering up whatever else that they doing. So, while you're
rooting and rahing for your favorite team, man these guys over here making
billions of dollars under your nose.
You worrying about what Lebron James’s doing, they worrying about what
Cheney's doing, or something, what's that guy's name? The Russian dude. [JS:
Putin?] Putin. They're over there dealing with Putin and billions and sending your
kids off to these wars over here. You don't even know what the war is about.
Sam’s moral judgement of the rich was based not only on what he saw as an immoral
excess in the face of suffering but also on his perception that the rich used their extra
money and power to take more and more from those with the least resources. All the
while, he argued, that money and power allowed them to hide their devious behavior
behind popular distractions.
Sam returned to this idea in our second interview to make a moral contrast
between the rich and the poor. He repudiated common stereotypes that accused the poor
of cheating social welfare systems, arguing that those stories were among the distractions
promoted by “big businesses” to turn attention away from their own wrongdoing.
They sell you those smokescreens … to think about the people that share in
poverty with [you] ... “Never mind us, look at them.” And they make you focus
on that, so it'll keep the focus off what they're doing. They’re taking. They're
robbing you blind, but they going, “No, look at this guy, man. He took a few extra
hundred dollars when he didn't deserve it.” And you all pissed off at that guy,
when the billionaire that's sittin' up in the seat over there is taking your grandma's
pension, the 401K, raping her medical benefits. You're not paying attention to
that, 'cause it's all a smokescreen to keep your mind off them, and [on] to your
neighbor, and wondering what your neighbor is doing.
Like others, Sam defended the moral worthiness of the poor through a moral and material
contrast with the rich. Sure, he said, both groups might be taking something they “didn’t
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deserve,” but one is taking “a few extra hundred bucks” and the other is a “billionaire …
taking your grandma’s pension.”
“We get the worst of everything”
As with other low-income respondents, Sam included himself in his positive
moral portrayals of the poor. “I mean, I'm not out here digging through … trash cans, or
nothing like that,” he said, but, “there ain't no middle … I'm not even close to the
middle.” Even though, he said, he drove a nice car (a BMW) and lived “in a nice house”
(that he rented), “I'm still poor, period.”
Although, like most low-income respondents, Sam separated himself from the
poorest of the poor, he portrayed those below him on the economic ladder with sympathy
and in a morally positive light.
They’re struggling and they need help. Not just from the government, but from
people in general. You see your fellow man broke down, you try to help him out.
You don't just step over them.
Some of this sympathy seemed to come from close personal connection. “I know a lot of
friends that I went to school with, and they ended up falling off and using drugs and
homeless.” As we saw in Chapter 1, Sam argued that people often ended up “struggling”
economically despite their efforts or merit—facing challenging inherited circumstances
and ongoing unjust inequities in access to opportunity.
The poor definitely get treated unfairly. That's a definite, you know. They get the
shitty end of the stick, we get the worst food, we get the worst healthcare. We get
the worst of everything. You're the last.
Sam’s inclusion of himself among this group manifests here as he seamlessly shifted
from using “they” to “we” as he described his perception of the unfair treatment of the
poor.
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Sam considered this inequitable treatment of the poor to be immoral, and he
blamed the rich for perpetuating these inequities out of greed. He used an example also
given by a few other low-income respondents, arguing that banks were “so greedy” that
they would allow houses and land to sit empty or abandoned rather than compromising
their profits for the good of the community.
I see land out here for waste, but then I see hundreds of people sleeping on the
Green with nowhere to go. Homes that are empty. Banks ain't making no money
off it, the property value is decreasing. Somebody could be in that home, but you
so greedy, you want so much money that you're not willing just to take a smaller
portion so that family can— Give that home to a family and help the economy
out, or something like that. You don't wanna do that. You'd rather just let that
house just sit there, hope some crack head come in there and burn it up so you can
collect the insurance money off of it.
Again, Sam morally contrasts the excess and greed of the rich with the moral
righteousness of the poor. Like others, he invokes the idea of “family” to frame the poor
in a morally positive light. They have few options (“nowhere to go”), he suggests, while
the rich not only have excess, but use the power linked to that excess in “greedy” and
selfish ways. Instead of “help[ing] the economy” or the community, the rich allow people
to suffer, he argues, because they are unwilling to “take a smaller portion.” He invokes a
“crack head”—someone who might elsewhere be included among the morally
questionable poor—to criticize the rich, linking the greed of the rich not just to the
hardships of the poor, but to broader societal ills. The moral depravity of the rich, Sam
and others argued, went beyond failing to help those who are in need to profiting off the
desperation of the poor.
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High income views of rich and poor
Like low-income respondents, high-income respondents also described economic
inequalities in terms of a moral and material relationship between the rich and the poor.
They used a similar moral discourse to that used by low-income respondents to
negatively frame the rich and positively frame the poor. Also, like low-income
respondents, high-income respondents worked to express their sympathy for and
solidarity with the poor and also their differences and separation from the rich. Indeed,
high-income respondents appeared to use the former to justify the latter.
A common way that high-income respondents asserted their differences from the
rich was to emphasize their sympathy for the poor. Both high- and low-income
respondents’ moral accusations against the rich included neglect or abuse of the poor or
at least a lack of sympathy for their plight. High-income respondents contrasted
themselves with these portrayals by emphasizing their sympathy for the poor. They also
contrasted themselves with the rich by emphasizing their moderate (and non-excessive)
consumption, economic constraint, and their effort. Like low-income respondents, highincome respondents often invoked morally-positive ideas of family when talking about
spending or saving their money.
Unlike low-income respondents, who grouped their own moral and material
position within a morally virtuous portrayal of the poor, high-income respondents framed
themselves in a moral and material middle ground—better off than the poor, but not as
well-off as the rich. Their depictions of economic inequality suggested a moral and
material relationship between the rich and the poor in which they—in the middle—were,
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at worst, neutral bystanders, and at best, morally-positive allies of the poor against the
moral depravity of the rich.

“Everybody knows it's wrong for a CEO to make as much as a thousand of the line
level workers in his or her corporation” – Patrick (HIWM)
Patrick—whom we met in Chapter 1—provides a good example of the ways highincome respondents tended to express some of the same negative moral sentiments about
the rich and positive moral sentiments about the poor as did low-income respondents, but
with different framing of their own position: a morally neutral middle ground, allied with
the poor and distinct from the rich.
As a reminder, Patrick was working as a founding partner in a software
development startup when we spoke. He was in his late 40s and lived with his wife (who
also worked outside the home) and two early-elementary-aged children in a single-family
home they owned. His household income was about $160,000 a year.
Patrick characterized his own social class status as “upper middle class,” although
he self-consciously reflected that he had heard from a history professor friend that
“everybody” is “brought up to think you're middle class in America.” When I asked him
how he decided on this characterization, he compared upward (as did many high-income
respondents), saying he felt he was on “the line between that [upper middle class] and
rich” with the “demarcation point between me and the rich” being “wealth, in the sense of
money that has no particular plans around it.” For the moment, he said, “we're breaking
even. We're putting money away for retirement—but I wouldn't call it wealth—and
college for our daughters.” However, becoming rich was something he could imagine
happening in the future. “My business could take a turn for the worse and I'm back on the
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job market or it could take a turn for the better and I'm building wealth and then I would
have to call myself rich.”
Blaming upward
Although quick to name his own advantages in the American economy, Patrick,
like most respondents, targeted his moral judgement at the rich, suggesting throughout his
interview that it was people who had more economic resources than he did who were
both the primary beneficiaries of the unfair systems he described and those chiefly
responsible for holding those systems in place.
Patrick saw himself as a beneficiary of the skewed systems he described, but he
cast himself as outside of that “elite” group, thus preserving his own moral selfperception. He framed economic inequality as an issue primarily involving groups above
and below him on the economic spectrum, impacting him only collaterally. He blamed
the rich for creating and upholding a system that he felt made life harder for the poor and
even for those he considered to be the middle class.
Patrick walked a fine line, acknowledging the ways he benefitted from a system
of unfair access to economic opportunity while blaming the economic “elite” for
perpetuating that system. Like other high-income respondents, his understanding of his
own position consistently included a perspective that he was better off than some, but not
as well off as those who were rigging the system in their own favor. For example, when
he told me about his family legacy of admission to Yale, he prefaced it with a note about
his family’s non-elite status.
While I'm not from what I'd call an elite family or anything of like the American
aristocracy or anything … nevertheless, my father and his father both went to
Yale so for sure it made it easier for me to get in.

99

Chapter 2

Like many high-income respondents, Patrick’s social network included people with
incomes much higher than his own, which contributed to his own perception of not being
among the economic “elite.” Even at Yale, he saw himself as among a cadre of “middle
class” students who “came from houses where they shared a bedroom with a brother or
sister in a classic American middle-class neighborhood with sidewalks and not much
space between the houses.” In contrast to that group, Patrick said, his classmates also
included “a slightly smaller amount” of students “who were from fancier backgrounds
and went on European ski vacations and lived a life of greater privilege.” Patrick’s
language throughout the interview—as it did here—implied moral judgement of the rich
and also emphasized his moral and material separation from that group.
Moral contrast between rich and poor
Like many respondents, Patrick drew a moral contrast between the rich and the
poor when talking about economic inequality. The concepts he drew upon in making this
contrast were similar to those I heard from other respondents (both high- and lowincome)—in particular, the ideas of effort and basic needs.
I think the experience of being rich is an easy one generally. … The experience of
being poor is a pretty difficult one. … If you are hungry, you need to get food no
matter how you get it, that kind of thing. … It's very easy for a rich person to
seem good … but not necessarily actually be that good.
Like many respondents, Patrick questions the morals of the rich by denigrating their
effort (their experience is “easy”). Furthermore, like Sam, Patrick suggests that the rich
are deceptive (“it’s very easy … to seem good … but not … actually be that good”). In
contrast, Patrick morally elevates the poor, both by invoking reasonable or moderate
consumption through basic needs language (“you need to get food”) and by asserting
their effort in general (“being poor is … pretty difficult”).
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Like Katie and other respondents, Patrick portrayed the position of the rich as
morally untenable not necessarily in absolute terms, but in relational terms—in the
contrasting material resources of the rich and the poor. For example, he said, “everybody
knows it's wrong for a CEO to make as much as a thousand [times] of the line level
workers in his or her corporation.” He argued that people like CEOs “don’t need more,”
and by holding onto those resources, they were keeping money away from “systems that
make life better for everyone in the country.”
Patrick echoed Sam’s implication here, linking the moral turpitude of the rich to
broader societal ills and not only the hardship of the poor. It would be “better for
everyone” if the rich took less for themselves. Patrick accused the rich of a kind of
immoral societal theft, arguing that the profit of private corporations “doesn't belong to
them” because it was built through public investment in “infrastructure and the roads, and
the public education.” In focusing on the harm to a broader “public,” Patrick implied
what Sam made explicit—a greed or selfishness among the rich that came at the expense
of “everyone” else. With this focus, Patrick also included himself among those hurt by
the rich—and thus separated himself from that group.
Like most respondents, Patrick’s moral condemnation of the rich included his
argument that the rich had disproportionate political power and used it selfishly to their
own benefit. “We've allowed corporate America to dictate policy through money, money
in politics.” That influence, he argued, meant corporations could engage in what he called
“legal gambling through Wall Street.” The result was “people getting paid or collecting
absurd, absurd incomes or payouts from obviously absolutely villainous behavior.” His
language when speaking about the rich was often laced with moral recrimination.
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Moral and material separation from the rich
Notably, people in Patrick’s own economic position were largely absent from his
moral depictions—visible only as collateral beneficiaries of a system skewed in favor of
the rich and against the poor. For example, when he made his argument (in Chapter 1)
that “it’s just simply not humanly possible to work twice as hard as the hotel
housekeeper,” he compared that hypothetical housekeeper’s work effort to billionaire
John Paulson rather than to his own effort, despite the fact that his own household income
was more than twice that of a two-income household of hotel housekeepers. 19
When Patrick did include people like himself in the moral equation between the
rich and the poor, it was often to assert the moral neutrality of his own group. He
translated his self-understanding of being in a middle-class position into his moral
depictions of economic relationships between the rich and the poor. For example, as he
talked about his own daily experiences as they related to the rich and the poor, he
commented on his separation from both groups and depicted his own position as
“average.”
The poor, I don't know them very much because I didn't go to college with them,
but my daughter goes to school with some of them and I see them every day on
the street around me … in my neighborhood, which is maybe—zip code-wise—
pretty well off for New Haven, although I think it's very average for America.
Although there are houses like mine that suggest upper-middle-class comfort if
not absolute wealth.
Here, Patrick noted his own separation from the poor, both in terms of social networks (“I
don’t know them very much”) and in terms of material experiences (“upper-middle-class
comfort if not absolute wealth”). But he also separates himself from the rich. Maybe his

19. The average hotel housekeeper annual salary in CT was about $30,000 in 2020 (indeed.com,
salary.com).
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neighborhood is “pretty well-off for New Haven,” but he is careful to note, “it’s very
average for America.”
This is one of a few places where Patrick—like other high-income respondents—
acknowledged the difference between his own life and that of the poor but emphasized
the difference between his own life and that of the rich. For example, just before this
comment about his lack of familiarity with the poor, he had been answering my question
about whom he thought of when he thought of the rich. As he did so, he repeatedly
asserted his separation from that group.
I worked with financiers in New York and again, some of my classmates from
college are those people [the rich]. They have many multiples … exponential
multiples of my own net worth so even though I definitely acknowledge that …
I'm probably in that top seven to ten percent of the American economic scale, I
don't quite think of myself as rich for the reasons that we talked about last week
of amassing value, amassing piles of gold.
I think of people I know in specific and I think in general people who are able—
through their compensation or have already through their family heritage—built
really enormous wealth … of a kind I'm unlikely to see no matter how successful
I am in my lifetime. I don't resent it per se. I don't sit there and go, “oh the rich.” I
just think it's not healthy for a society to allow the distance between them … the
distance between the successful in our culture and in our economy and the rest—
for there to be a gap.
Patrick seems to define the rich almost entirely in terms of the contrast to his own
position, both materially and morally. The rich were people with “exponential multiples
of my own net worth.” They had the kind of “enormous wealth” that “I’m unlikely to see
no matter how successful I am in my lifetime.” Although he saw himself as having plenty
(“I’m probably in that top seven to ten percent of the American economic scale”), he
separates himself from the morally-questionable excess of the rich—drawing an implicit
contrast between his own position (which he described earlier as “breaking even”) and
that of those who were “amassing piles of gold” or holding “really enormous wealth.” He
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asserts his self-perception as being on the right side of the moral equation when he
frames the problem of economic inequality as “a gap” between the rich and “the rest”—
clearly grouping himself with the latter.
Patrick’s tendency to focus on his differences from the rich (a tendency he shared
with other high-income respondents) seemed to reflect the very different and segregated
social networks of high- and low-income respondents: Patrick sees his rich classmates at
his college reunions; his neighbors are people who are “pretty well-off for New Haven;”
and, through his work, he has encountered “financiers in New York.” Meanwhile, he has
almost no personal connections to people who are poor. Thus, it is easier for him to see
the ways his life is different from the lives of those who have more than he does than it is
for him to see the ways his life is different from the lives of those who have less.
Emphasizing his differences from the rich while minimizing his differences from
the poor helped Patrick assert his own moral neutrality. Although he acknowledged his
own position as a “beneficiary of unfair advantage and non-meritocratic advantage” (see
Chapter 1), he repeatedly downplayed these advantages compared to those he linked to
the rich. This was visible in his response to my question about how he felt his life was
impacted by economic inequality.
Not too much, because I'm lucky. I'd probably be taxed more if things were the
way I think they should be. I might have a little more money year in/year out, but I'm
upper middle class. It's nothing like what even my college friends, who are now wealth
managers, benefit from.
When Patrick thought about the impact of inequality on his own life, he nodded to
a distinction between himself and the poor (“I’m lucky”) but again emphasized the
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distinction between himself and the rich. He “might have a little more money” in the
current system than he would if things were “the way I think they should be,” but his own
benefits were “nothing” compared to his rich college friends.
Patrick did worry that these circumstances would change and that, in the long run,
people like him and his children would be more impacted as societal safety nets were
eroded by what he considered the immoral actions of the rich.
How it affects me is that I think I probably have the tiny short-term gain that I
don't care about that much—that I would be happy to kiss goodbye for the sake of
more confidence that our infrastructure and our system, our safety net …
… it's really about capitalism. … Unfettered capitalism is a disaster … and so I
feel like those are the areas in which I get the short benefit and … I'm afraid I'm
getting the shaft long term because I'm not able to participate in a system as well
run as the one my parents grew up under.
Here, again, he emphasized his own morally neutral—or even morally virtuous—position
as someone willing to “kiss goodbye” the “tiny short-term gain” he saw himself receiving
from current inequities, and casting his lot in with the rest of the non-rich as someone
“getting the shaft long term.” Condemning the current system of “unfettered capitalism”
as a “disaster,” Patrick sees himself as someone with a vested interest in change and a
minimal interest in the status quo.
At the same time, Patrick’s time horizon as he thinks about the impacts of
economic inequality on his own life (he worries “especially for my kids”) contrasts with
the immediacy of the concerns expressed by low-income respondents. I almost never had
to ask low-income respondents this question—about how their lives were impacted by
economic inequality—because their interviews were filled with examples of impacts on
their own lives. By noting the minimal material impact in his own current life and
focusing on the more distant impacts on his and his children’s lives, Patrick
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unintentionally underscores this difference between himself and the poor even while he
focuses his attention on the differences between himself and the rich.
“The top one percent needs to keep us fighting over the crumbs, so we'll be blinded
and distracted by the fact that they've got all the money. … It's designed to be this
way” – Renee (HIBW)
Like most respondents, Renee morally separated the rich and the poor—framing
the former in negative terms and the latter in positive ones—and like most high-income
respondents, she placed herself in a middle position. She argued the poor were
“mistreated,” regarded as “expendable” because it served the interests of the rich to “keep
us fighting over the crumbs.” Meanwhile, she portrayed the rich as entitled, aloof, and
uncaring: “You can live your whole life on a cloud,” “buy or take what you want,” and
treat the poor as “disposable.” She accused the rich of treating the poor as if they “don't
matter because you don't have to come in contact with them if you don't want to.”
However, even as she presented these moral critiques, Renee expressed some
mixed feelings about the rich—interspersing her censure of the rich with assertions such
as, “I have no problem with wealthy people.” Like a handful of other respondents, she
empathized with the desire among the rich to pass on their wealth “to their kids.” “Even
though,” she said, they might have made their money “in a horrible way,” nevertheless,
“it's their money” and they can “choose” what “to do with it.”
Renee was in her late 40s when we spoke. She worked as a counselor in a state
job, where, because of unionization, she explained, she was paid a “very livable wage”
compared to what she might make in the private sector. City or state jobs “are the good
jobs in New Haven,” she said, and are coveted by those “of us who think we’re middle
class.” Her husband had a city job, and she estimated their joint annual income at about
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$125,000. Renee and her husband owned their home and had three children, the youngest
of whom was 13. She worried about paying for them to go to college, perhaps because
she still had her own college debt that “I'm going to be paying till my grave.” She had
started a bachelor’s degree before her children were born, then finished 20 years later,
and went on to get a masters. She was also running a private counseling business on the
side, off of which, she said, she was “not getting rich … yet.” But it gave her “personal
satisfaction. … I can work for the money, but then I can come here and do what I love.”
Renee experienced cross-class exposure at an early age. The daughter of a
“teenage mom,” she was adopted and raised by her “middle-class” aunt and uncle. She
regularly went back and forth between the two households. “I knew when I went to visit
my mom, I was going to the housing projects. When I came home, I lived on a regular
street in Anytown, USA. It was a middle-class neighborhood.” “I straddled two worlds,”
she said, and “I had the best of both.” Spending time in her mother’s neighborhood and
watching her mother “struggle,” she said, gave her “compassion” for the poor.
Meanwhile, her exposure to wealthy classmates in private school helped her to imagine
“something different” for her own life. Her “exposure” to these different worlds made it
“so I can talk to anyone, I can fit in anywhere.”
Like other respondents, Renee portrayed the poor in a positive moral light. She
framed the poor as people with merit who were “stuck” with few material resources
because they were denied access to opportunity (often at the hands of the rich). One
example she gave was particularly illustrative—talking about the “talent and skill” of a
kid selling drugs on the street—and is worth quoting at length:
You don't know how smart that kid that's selling cocaine on the corner is. How
mathematically in his head he's doing all these … fractions and all this chemistry
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just to get the drug just right and … you don't know how bright that kid is. That's
a talent and a skill, but they don't have the opportunity to use it in a productive
manner or positive manner. So, if that child was all of a sudden in a competition
for a NASA job … I mean the sky would be limitless.
… And I'm not saying that every poor kid sells drugs, but I'm saying for the one
that does, how smart is he? What kind of businessman is he? What are his
customer service skills? No one looks at that. … He's got a product, which he
manages to break it down so that he can make a profit. … He's [doing] customer
service, customer retention. We could do so much with that. That's raw potential.
You know, but we don't look at that. All we see is, “oh, he's a bad kid.” … Teach
him something. Put him in business school. Let him get that degree. You know,
take that business mind. Work with it. But no, we lock him up.
Renee inverts a common stereotype often upheld for moral condemnation—the drug
dealer. Instead of denouncing a hypothetical “kid that’s selling cocaine on the corner,”
she lauds him as someone filled with socially-valued merit: smart, talented, and business
savvy. What keeps him from using that “raw potential” to contribute to society, she
argues, is not his lack of merit, but rather a lack of “opportunity to use it in a productive
manner.” She further framed this hypothetical poor person as morally virtuous, using the
idea of basic needs to explain why he might be selling drugs in the first place. Maybe, she
suggests,
He learned this as a survival technique because his mom was addicted, so he had
to sell drugs to keep the lights on. He had to sell drugs to feed his siblings. … I
know kids that sell drugs to their own mother just to keep the money in the
household, because if he didn't sell it to her, she was going to get it from
somebody else. And what does that do to the psyche? You know what I'm saying?
Like other respondents, Renee combines moral ideas about reasonable consumption (he
was trying “to keep the lights on”) with ideas of family (“he had … to feed his siblings”)
to defend the moral virtue of the poor. She also drew upon the ideas of self-sacrifice (the
kid doing damage to his own “psyche”) and constraint or lack of choice, similar to the
way Jeremy talked about his parents going “without” in order to feed their families and
pay their bills.
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Beyond this stereotype, Renee generally talked about the poor with similar
sympathy and moral endorsement. For example, she talked about the hardships of people
who “just can't live on what they're being paid.” She gave the example of a friend:
[She] can’t even afford to go to the doctor because she doesn't get enough hours
or make enough money, but she can't afford the copays on her health insurance
and she can't afford to be penalized for not signing up, so it's a catch-22. People
are absolutely stuck.
In contrast to the moral virtue she attributed to the poor and to people like her friend, who
were “absolutely stuck,” Renee portrayed the “people at the top” as immoral, benefitting
from and upholding a system “designed” to keep poor people “out of the race.” “We
should be angry at the people at the top,” she said, for insidiously keeping “us fighting
over the crumbs, so we'll be blinded and distracted by the fact that they've got all the
money.”
This class infighting among the non-rich that benefitted the rich, Renee said, was
exacerbated by racial tension. She blamed “the people up top” for fueling those tensions
with “propaganda” that encouraged “the poor, embittered white person to say, ‘Okay,
they're taking all of our jobs. They're taking all of our benefits.’” Meanwhile, “the people
up top are looking down, ‘Okay, they're doing exactly what we need them to do.’”
Renee depicts the rich as both morally corrupt and coldly calculating—
deliberately increasing their own gains by causing pain for others. She further accused
them of selfishly isolating themselves, so they wouldn’t have to see the people whose
lives they harmed.
Upper class folks … they don't have to be exposed to other people because they
have this little vacuum that they live in with all their wealthy friends, so who
cares.
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According to Renee, people who are “already comfortable” felt that the problems of those
who were not were “somebody else’s problem.” “Those people don't matter because you
don't have to come in contact with them if you don't want to. … You can live your whole
life on a cloud.”
Renee argued that this asymmetrical exposure reflected differential power that
implicated both race and class. The rich could avoid contact with others while everyone
else was always being “thrust into their world” whether they liked it or not. As an
example, she talked about the experience of taking her son to a private school for
admissions testing, where he felt “so isolated.”
No one at the school where he took the test looked like him. But that's our reality.
That's why I tell people, we are constantly thrust into a white world, but they
never have to be thrust into ours. So, you ask about the wealthy? They don't have
to come into our world, but we constantly have to be thrust into their world - if we
want to be successful. And that's where I think the problem really lies. We
shouldn't have to do it that way. Everything should be for everyone. And it's not.
As with most Black respondents, Renee talked about economic and racial inequality as
intertwined phenomena. The people “at the top” were not just rich, they were usually also
White. The consolidation of power among this group undermined an equitable
distribution of social and economic resources: “Everything should be for everyone. And
it’s not.”
Like others, Renee accused the rich of hoarding resources and opportunities for
themselves and restricting access for anyone who might want to share in their fortunes.
She argued that the rich used their power to unfairly secure political and economic
benefits. For example, she argued that private, well-endowed Yale University had been
“in bed with the Mayor” and that meant that the university, “who owns half of New
Haven,” was “allowed to not pay taxes.” Like other respondents, she resented that “the
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rest of us that are working and paying taxes” would “have to pick up the slack” for that
loss of revenue.
Furthermore, Renee said, the rich used their power to immorally evade
punishment for behaviors for which the poor were regularly penalized. Again, her
analysis reflects intertwined race and class inequality (something I discuss in the next
chapter).
If they're smoking crack in the city of New Haven, “oh, he's a crack addict, he's a
bum!” … Now, you have little rich kids doing the same thing—all partying hard
… we think that's cute, but when it's our kids doing it in the city, “oh no, they're
problem kids, they're troublemakers! they're druggies and alcoholics” you know,
so, yeah, they're treated differently, and they're viewed differently. Propaganda
again, propaganda. When they do it, it's cute. When our folks do it, ugh, it's
disgusting.
The rich, Renee argued, controlled messaging or “propaganda,” and thus could frame the
terms of debate such that “rich kids doing the same thing” as “our kids … in the city”
were both “viewed” and “treated” less harshly. Her comments echo those we heard from
Sam in Chapter 1: “the rich is gonna get away with murder. They get away with so much
stuff here that a poor person would never get away with.”
The power of the rich meant that they didn’t have to participate in or abide by
social rules, Renee argued. When I asked her my question about whether American
society treated rich people fairly, she rejected the premise of the question. The rich could
buy whatever treatment they wanted.
Do we treat them fairly? … When you have, you don't have to be treated any way,
because you go and buy or take what you want. So, it's not a matter of like how
we treat them. When you have money… it changes things. … If they want
something, they go and buy it. If they need something, they get it. Whatever
service they want, if you don't give it to them, they'll go to the next person and get
the service. You know? So, it's not about how they've been treated.
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Renee’s tone suggests her moral recrimination of the rich. Their ability to get what they
want was not something she admired but rather something to be derided. The
implication—although not explicitly stated here—is that others are harmed by this ability
of the rich to “buy or take what [they] want.”
Differentiating from the rich, solidarity with the poor
Renee’s comments about the rich emphasize her moral judgement of that group
and also her own feelings of separation from them. Like other high-income respondents,
Renee often framed her own position as a moral middle ground, different from both rich
and poor, but also tended to focus more on her moral and material differences from the
rich than on noting her differences from the poor. At one point, when thinking about her
own political power, Renee grouped herself directly with the poor:
I really don't think my vote matters all that much and I'm realizing that that's some
baggage that I carry with me from being— seeing the poor and seeing how things
don't really work for us. Even though I straddled two worlds, it's like the votes
never really seem to go in our favor. The politicians all lie until they get into
office and then it's all the same bullshit. “Oh, I'll work for the people” and they're
never really for the people.
Renee is in a fairly unique position of feeling both very much part of the poor community
of her mother’s household and of the “middle class” community of the aunt and uncle
who raised her. We can see this as she shifts her language from “being” to “seeing” as
she comments on her exposure to the poor, then finishes her sentence speaking in the first
person (“things don’t really work for us”).
In another instance, her emphasis on difference from the rich and solidarity with
the poor is even more explicit. She was talking about the importance of access to
educational opportunities, something that nearly every respondent agreed was very
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important for economic equality. It would be great, she said, if everyone could have
access to free, “or at least affordable,” higher education, but “America is not that way.”
They would never want poor children to have the same access as rich children,
because then it would change the game. … Because if we both went to Harvard
and we both got great educations, then we'd be competing for the same jobs. …
So, if every college is on the same line and every college is free, then, we don't
need an Ivy League. You know what I'm saying? What do we need that for? What
is this elitist thing we're doing? It wouldn't be necessary.
Again, after framing the issue as differential access between “poor children” and “rich
children,” Renee uses the first-person point of view to pose the hypothetical scenario, “if
we both went to Harvard.” She explicitly frames herself on the side of the “poor
children,” and in contrast to an “elitist” group that, she suggests, blocks access to
education in order to hold onto opportunities for themselves. As in her earlier examples,
her “we” implicitly invokes both race and class, as I discuss later.
Elitism is a common moral critique of the rich (e.g., Sherman 2017). Renee, like
other high-income respondents, framed herself in direct contrast to this—holding up her
familiarity with and sympathy for the poor as evidence of her non-elitism and, therefore,
her moral difference from the rich. She repeatedly distained the rich for snobby behavior,
including avoiding contact with the poor (as we saw earlier). She also accused the rich of
thinking of themselves as “better than” other people. “I believe that when you come from
a place of money, you don't always feel like people are equal to you or as good as you.”
In contrast, Renee talked about the way she navigated “two worlds” growing up and said
she “didn’t really make much of” class differences.
I had friends and they would come stay with me at my mom's house in the
projects, but they were from Cheshire. 20 I could remember one friend in particular
and her house had those, remember Hart to Hart from the 80s or whatever that
show was? … The gates opened up and they had the monogrammed letters on the
20. A predominantly White, high-income town in the Greater New Haven area.
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gates. She had a house like that. I didn't think anything of it. We were just friends.
That's what I instill in my children. There's no such thing as this one's better or
that.
Renee emphasizes her indifference to class here, even as she remembers this particular
friend’s house decades after the fact.
Like other high-income Black respondents, Renee also described experiences of
social and racial exclusion that reinforced her own perception of her differences from the
rich and her solidarity with the poor. She talked about these experiences in terms of “fair
treatment,” which, she said, “we don’t have.” To her, “fair treatment” meant “to stop
making assumptions about people” and instead “treating everyone as if they're worthy of
whatever service or whatever respect you have.” Renee felt that her higher-income Black
family was constantly subject to such “assumptions” that are about “race, but it's also
class.” Her feeling of solidarity with the poor, it seemed, came in part from her
experience that her material means did not translate into full social access. For example,
on vacation, she said, they might stop into a restaurant and “it will be all Caucasians.”
The looks on people's faces. … It's almost like, “What are you doing here?” And
so, it's like, well my money's green, so let's just make it work. … If I have the
money to walk into your establishment, what's the problem?
In another vacation example, she recounted taking her kids to an “expensive water park”
that she had to “scrape and save” to afford—implying differences in her material position
from both the rich (for whom it might be easy to afford) and the poor (for whom such a
thing might be unattainable). Because of the size of their family, she said, they didn’t stay
in “the regular rooms” but rented a space on the side that was “more expensive.”
You could see on that side of the world, people were kind of like, “Hmmm.”
There was a question of “Are they rooming over here?” As opposed to if we were
on the regular side with the regular hotel. Those little things, because those are
more expensive, people automatically look at you like, “What are they doing
here?” or assuming that we probably can't afford to be there.
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She said she regularly encountered assumptions about her family’s class status because of
their race. “Maybe people are thinking, ‘Can they really afford this?’… just because I'm
black or because we're a black family.”
These experiences were not isolated incidents. In yet another instance, Renee
recounted an experience where her son, who attended a predominantly-White school in
another town (through an “open choice program”) had repeatedly visited a White friend’s
house, but, she said, the friend’s parents kept “making excuses” about why the friend
couldn’t visit her son at her home. After refusing to let her son go “back to his house until
he comes to ours,” she said, “finally the kid's like, ‘oh my dad said he has to do a drivethrough of the neighborhood.’” Renee argued that people in the town where her son went
to school assumed that the kids bussed in from New Haven “are poor, their parents are
probably uneducated.”
Like they're doing us a favor by letting our kid go to school in this district with
more money. And that's not the reality at all. You know, his parents are educated,
we own our home, we don't live in the ghetto. But those are … preconceived
notions that they want to believe.
In this recounting, Renee differentiated herself from the poverty of the poor (“his parents
are educated, we own our own home, we don’t live in the ghetto”) and from the elitism of
the rich whom she accuses of looking down on people they feel they are doing “a favor”
by not excluding them from their “district with more money.” She added a note to soften
her assertion of difference from the poor and reinforce her difference from the rich.
If we did live in the ghetto, I wouldn't let anything happen to your son before I let
it happen to mine, so even if I was poor and we did have a bad neighborhood that
we lived in, you wouldn't trust me with your child, but I can trust you with mine?
Who knows what all the molestation, god knows what else, goes on out there in
your suburb? But you've made all these judgements about me without even
knowing where we live or how we live or who we are.
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With these stories, Renee asserts her difference from what she depicts as the elitist,
snobby, racist assumptions of the rich in two ways. First, she portrays herself as subjected
to those assumptions. Second, she emphasizes her own distance from those assumptions
by depicting her own empathy with the poor (even “if we did live in the ghetto, I
wouldn’t let anything happen to your son”). Notably, she retaliates in kind—deploying
stereotypes about the suburbs—against what she feels are unjust stereotypes about people
who live in the city.
Empathy for the rich
Despite Renee’s actively negative portrayals of the rich as selfish, elitist,
uncaring, and corrupt, there was one area in which she described herself as having
common interest with the rich: in defending their ability to pass their fortunes onto their
children. “I'm thinking if their family worked for it or earned it, even though they did it in
a horrible way, it's their money.” She was a rare respondent to explicitly argue that, even
if their means of acquiring money was morally questionable (“they did it in a horrible
way”), they should be able to pass their wealth on to the next generation. “Wealth to me
is generational. Dang, somebody did something right, or wrong, to get it, but they got it,
you know, so, why not?” She justified this belief by invoking the morally righteous idea
of family: arguing for the universality of the desire to make one’s own children’s lives
more economically comfortable.
I would love it if my kids could live off the interest of my money as opposed to
having to break their backs or kill themselves the way I do or did. Go to school
late in life and have to struggle with raising a family and going to school. … I
would love if my children get their degrees straight through instead of realizing
20 years later, “I should've finished school.” I'm a mother, that's what life is, you
just want your children to do better than you did.
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Thinking about her own children, she said, “Did they work for it? Did they earn it? No.
Do they deserve it? Yes, because we worked for it.” Given her negative portrayals of
“people at the top,” it was surprising that Renee did not try to differentiate between the
moral legitimacy of her own desire to pass on wealth compared to those she described as
making money in a potentially “horrible way.” In fact, she explicitly argued that whether
somebody “did something right or wrong to get” their wealth, they should be able to pass
it on. Throughout my interviews, respondents—both high- and low-income—invoked
their children as moral justifications for their behaviors. For high-income respondents
like Renee, children were often used to justify holding onto more of their income.
At the same time, Renee’s defense of inherited wealth was embedded in and
extrapolated from her own experience. Her defense of the rich seemed to emerge from a
feeling of scarcity: a desire to avoid having something upon which she felt only a tenuous
grasp taken from her.
Renee’s defense of the rich here aligned with her general tendency to critique the
rich for behaviors or attitudes rather than for distributional inequities (a distinction
emphasized by Sherman, 2017). She did not argue, as others did, that there was anything
wrong with people having large amounts of money. Instead, she critiqued the social
closure that she argued was enacted by the rich, and she did not seem to see the act of
passing wealth down across generations as part of this social closure—or perhaps she
made an exception because of her own vested interest in the act. She did think of
inheritance as a primary source of wealth.
A lot of people who have gotten to be rich didn't get to be rich, they were born
that way. … A lot of times it's the money, the homes are passed down, it's
generational. Then you do have people who maybe go to school and then they
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come get great jobs on Wall Street … but how often does that really happen? You
know, there's not a whole lot of stories like that.
However, rather than contesting this mechanism through which others argued wealth
remained concentrated in the hands of a few, Renee defended it. She felt that her
struggles to carve out a “middle-class” life for her family were sufficient justification for
her to “build wealth for [her] children.”
Renee did not discuss the impact of race and racism in her desire to ease her
children’s economic trajectories, but recent research suggests that this would be a
justifiable concern. A study using data from “nearly the entire U.S. population from
1989–2015” found that, even controlling for parental income, wealth, education, and
neighborhood, Black boys—even those born to parents in the top 1 percent—have
substantially higher rates of downward mobility than White boys across generations.
Indeed, a black child born to parents in the top quintile is roughly as likely to fall
to the bottom family income quintile as he or she is to remain in the top quintile;
in contrast, white children are nearly five times as likely to remain in the top
quintile as they are to fall to the bottom quintile. (Chetty et al. 2019:3)
Interpreted in light of these findings, Renee was perhaps arguing that, through a variety
of mechanisms, White Americans have long been able to pass down wealth across
generations and she did not see this generational transfer as problematic as long as she
was allowed to do the same.
A few years after I interviewed Renee, Ashton Lattimore, a Harvard graduate (and
a Black woman) wrote something that seemed to echo, in some ways, Renee’s
sentiments. Lattimore argued that ending so-called “legacy” admissions to elite colleges
was best for the “collective good” and a “fairer world,” but nevertheless “adds one more
thing to the pile of privileges that people of color can't pass down to our children as easily
as untold generations of whites have done.” “It’s frustrating,” she wrote, “but not entirely
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surprising that legacy admissions stand to be eliminated just as people of color might
begin to reap the benefits.”
For underrepresented black, Latino and Native American alumni, the prospect of
our children finally being able to lay claim to the legacy advantage after hundreds
of years of being shut out feels hard-won and precious. (Lattimore 2018)
I can imagine Renee saying something similar about her desire to leave wealth to her
children—that ability felt “hard-won and precious” and is something “untold generations
of whites have done.” She wasn’t even sure if she would be able to “build wealth for
[her] children … in [her] lifetime,” but she wanted a chance to do so, and her moral
views of the rich seemed shaped by this desire. 21
“I feel like I'm carrying these people. … Where are all the rich people, why aren't
they carrying them?” – Chad (HIWM)
Chad (HIWM) framed the moral juxtaposition he saw between the rich and the
poor in a slightly different way than did other respondents. Like others, he saw the rich as
immoral—in part because he accused them of making the lives of the poor unsustainable
by taking too much and sharing too little. But unlike others, he framed his anger at the
rich less in terms of the harm done to the poor and more in terms of the harm done to
people like himself (the “middle class”). Most high-income respondents framed
themselves as morally-neutral collateral beneficiaries of a system rigged by the rich in
their own favor and against the poor. Chad, too, exempted himself from blame in the
moral relationship between the rich and poor and took a step further—elevating his own
moral status by framing himself as part of a morally-virtuous group who was collaterally
harmed by the actions of the rich against the poor.

21. I delve deeper into respondents’ views of the intersection of racial and economic inequality in the next
chapter.
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In his early 50s when we spoke, Chad worked as a manager in a branch of city
services. He had a master’s degree and was married with two children. He and his wife
owned their home and had a combined household income of about $175,000 a year. His
children attended private school, which Chad noted was financially sustainable only
because “we’re being helped” by family. “We could do it” without that help, he said, “but
… we wouldn't have the same quality of life.” At the same time, Chad expressed a sense
of financial security, identifying as “solidly middle class” and saying, “we travel, we
have money, we own a house. We basically don’t have money issues. I’m not sweating
… money at all.”
Talking about his income, Chad positioned himself in a moral middle ground,
noting his differences from those who were paid less than he was but dwelling on his
sense of relative deprivation compared to his better-paid peers and acquaintances. Despite
his sense of financial security, “I make less than I deserve,” he said, and was
“embarrassed” by how little he made in comparison to his peers. “There are lots of people
I know … that make more than they deserve.” Like other respondents, he blamed
political corruption for these inequities in pay, arguing that many of the jobs he
considered to be overpaid came through “political patronage.” Even as he bemoaned his
own salary relative to those who made more, he also noted that many people who made
less than he did were “grossly underpaid.” However, rather than focusing on his own
better circumstances compared to that latter group, Chad positioned himself as among
those harmed by their underpayment. City residents like him, he argued, were harmed
because low wages meant “we don't have enough teachers and we don't have enough
paraprofessionals and we don't have enough nurses.” Thus, Chad morally positioned
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himself in solidarity with those who are underpaid and in juxtaposition to people in better
financial positions than his own.
Chad felt that the American story of being able to work one’s way to financial
success regardless of starting position was “bullshit,” and instead he framed the rich as
people who had been “extremely lucky” rather than meritorious.
I think mostly people that make it are—they fall into a spot and they get
extremely lucky. … The only way to make money is … if you’re given money. …
You’re not going to save and save—I mean, yeah, you could live under your
means … spend your entire life like saving… but I don’t think that someone in
today’s world … with going to school … it would a take a lifetime. It would take
a lifetime to pay for your school debt … [for] someone that has nothing. … I
mean, rents are too high, food is too high, you know, our taxes in the city are
outrageous.
Here, Chad frames the rich and the poor in morally relative terms that echo the
sentiments of other respondents—both high and low income. He invokes luck as a
challenge to meritocracy, suggesting that the economic position of the rich is unearned.
People who “make it” have been “extremely lucky” or have been “given money.” In
contrast, he frames “someone who has nothing” in a morally positive light, suggesting
that the economic position of the poor—or at least the non-rich—is not a reflection of a
lack of merit. Although he doesn’t use the trope of hard work here, he does use another
socially valued behavior—saving—to dispute the idea that “someone that has nothing”
could rise up economically simply through merit.
Chad doesn’t include himself in this portrayal—contrasting those who have
“made it” with someone who “has nothing”—suggesting that he does not see himself
fitting into this moral picture. This is particularly notable because the things he lists—
being “given money” and paying for “school debt”—are among the things he mentioned
as features of his own life. “My family was extremely fortunate,” he said, when he
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discussed the familial financial assistance he received to help fund his children’s private
education and how he had “no debt coming out of college.”
Later, Chad made it clear that the relationship he saw between the rich and the
poor was both moral and material. Like other high-income respondents, he expressed
frustration and anger with the rich and corporations for creating hardship among the poor.
But he diverged from other high-income respondents in framing “middle-class” people
like himself as bearing the brunt of the moral negligence of the rich.
Massive corporations like Amazon and Walmart … are like shirking their— like
they have part-time workers and then don't offer them— the rest of us that are
paying taxes have to pay for their health care. So, I'd rather see like people that
[work] part-time get like prorated health care so that … those corporations pay for
that health care …
… And I feel like I'm carrying these people. Like I'm middle class and I'm
supposed to be carrying all these people and where are all the rich people, why
aren't they carrying them? Why the hell should I be paying tax for Jeff Bezos
because he's got all these people part-time like working, or he's paying them all
crappy wages, you know?
And so then … like all the problems that they create because they're, you know,
poor and whatever. So yeah, I feel like the people on top are just not paying their
fair share … And like why should a CEO make 45 times more than his workers,
or her workers, you know? What are they possibly doing that's worth that kind of
money?
Chad blames the rich and corporations for creating hardships for the poor (paying
“crappy wages” and not providing health insurance) and links those hardships to morallynegative excesses among “the people on top.” He echoes many respondents when he
asks, about CEOs, “What are they possibly doing that's worth that kind of money?” But,
unlike other high-income respondents, who were generally sympathetic to the poor, Chad
uniquely frames the poor as a social burden (“all the problems that they create”), and
more specifically, as a burden on taxpayers like himself. Thus, although he joined his
fellow high-income respondents in accusing the rich of “shirking their” social
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responsibilities or obligations, he diverged from them in how he felt his own life was
impacted by this moral transgression.
Although Chad, like other respondents, frames himself in a middle position
between the rich and the poor, unlike other respondents, Chad elevates his own position
in the moral order, comparing himself favorably to both the poor and the rich.
I get really … sad about where I live because I feel like I'm trying really hard and
like even when like I buy cheese in the store and I'm thinking shit, I have to buy
cheese where other people can go and just get free cheese … And like so the poor
people get like free cheese, which god bless 'em, you know, but … you start to
kind of get— You know, I'm just trying to hang on to what I have I guess, too.
Everybody's trying to hang on to what they have and like rich people are … better
able to hang on to what they have. They're like not really part of the game.
Looking both above and below him on the economic ladder, Chad depicts groups that are
less morally deserving than people like himself who are “trying really hard.” His
comments echo what Kidder and Martin (2012) found in their interview-based research
about “tax talk.” They argue that respondents talked about tax policy in moral terms,
“drawing moral boundaries between groups and asserting a moral claim about the proper
relations between those groups” (Kidder and Martin 2012:124). Specifically, like Chad,
their “respondents saw themselves as morally deserving and hard-working people,
squeezed between the undeserving poor and the undeserving rich” (Kidder and Martin
2012:138).
Chad was unlike other high-income respondents I spoke with in the way he
positioned himself morally above both the poor and the rich. In this commentary, he
moved from separating himself from the poor (“I have to buy cheese where other people
can go and just get free cheese”) to expressing a sense of solidarity with that group
against the rich (“I’m just trying to hang on to what I have I guess, too…and like rich
people are… better able to hang on to what they have”). His expression invoking
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economic precarity (“just trying to hang on to what I have”) was a surprising
juxtaposition given his earlier commentary about “not sweating money at all.”
This seeming contradiction between Chad’s economic comfort and his feeling of
precarity reflects a tendency among many high-income respondents, as we’ve seen, to
compare upward when thinking about their own economic positions—a tendency that
seemed to reflect the class segregation of their social networks. In fact, Chad mentioned
during our interview that he had only recently come to think of his income as inadequate
because of conversations with his acquaintances and economic peers. Why did he think
his income was inadequate? I asked. His response was vague:
I think based on like quality of life and like … the amount of education I have and
– and what I do. Yeah. That's a good question. Because I also think we could run
these kind of situations [his particular public service] with volunteers if we had to,
so. But it's mostly probably based on other people.
Here, Chad suggests that his social network, more than his sense of his own merit, is
what leads him to think he ought to be paid more. “A lot of people have left recently and
they're like telling me … I guess I didn't realize like how much people were really
making in like the suburbs.”
The fact that both low- and high-income respondents both tended to look upward
when placing blame for economic inequality—combined with social and physical
segregation by class—created a way for high-income respondents like Chad to ignore
their own relative privilege and instead frame themselves as suffering alongside the poor
at the hands of the rich. In such a situation, Chad could say,
I’ve never been so disconnected with my bill paying. Everything is on auto-pay
… completely on auto pilot, you know? … I hardly ever check. … I haven't
checked my bills in months, you know?
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without being aware that someone like Katie dreamed of being “able to pay my bills
without having to think. I would love to set up automatic payment on everything.” The
difference between Katie and Chad’s economic circumstances translate into different
material consequences of economic inequality on their lives, but similar opinions about
the rich. Both feel, as Chad put it, that the rich are “better able to hang on to what they
have.”
“Nobody gets that far in business without being a mean cruel somebody” – Shawn
(HIBM)
Shawn (HIBM) morally separated himself from both the rich and the poor,
placing himself in a moral middle position. He described his own economic position as
“comfortable,” which he used to separate himself from what he characterized as the
excesses of the rich and the hardships, and sometimes failures, of the poor. He discussed
his own economic position in meritocratic terms and accused both the rich and the poor
of moral corruption in their behaviors.
Shawn (HIBM) was 72 when we spoke. He was the pastor of a church—where we
met for our interviews—in a neighborhood where more than half of the residents were
Black (56%, compared to 31% in New Haven) or low-income (54%, compared to 48% in
New Haven). He had several advanced degrees: a PhD in religious studies, a Master of
Divinity, and a Doctor of Ministry. He was married, owned a home, and had three grown
children who lived elsewhere. He described his income as “over $100,000 a year”
including “housing allowance and my salary,” and said this was his total household
income. He referred to an earlier period in his life when he had less money, telling a story
of giving his kids “a button-up sweater” one Christmas, “because I couldn’t afford
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anything else,” and how he had “cried like a baby, because I felt bad” relative to friends
whose kids received “a multitude of toys.”
Moral condemnation of the rich
Shawn judged the rich for what he considered immoral behavior. He suggested
that, to become and stay rich, people had to “manipulate” others, “stomp on people,” be
“mean” or “cruel,” or “forget” everyone else and refuse to “share.” These condemnations
of the rich were predominantly relational—focused on how the rich treated others in such
a way that maximized their own gain at the expense of everyone else.
Immoral and selfish behavior among the rich was a driving force sustaining
economic inequality, according to Shawn. This reasoning is evident in his response to my
first question—about how he viewed the fairness of the American economy.
Is it fair? No. No, it isn't fair. And it's not fair because the rich get richer and the
poor get poorer. It's not fair because, on all levels of the spectrum, the unions
fight for $50 an hour for an auto worker, but won't fight for $15 an hour for a fastfood worker at McDonalds. … Not fair because people, once they get, they have a
tendency to forget those coming behind them. … You know, “I've got mine, let
them get theirs.” … We just get for ourselves and once we get it, we have a
tendency to go off into the sunset and forget about everybody else. So, it is not
fair. Business makes billions of dollars a year. They don't turn around and share
corporate profit with the workers. Very few. … That's extremely, extremely,
extremely, extremely rare. … So, no it's not fair.
Shawn’s explanation for the common observation, “the rich get richer and the poor get
poorer,” is that people are selfish—pursuing their own gains and “forget[ting] about
everyone else.” As we talked more, I asked, “So you're saying people are getting
excessive profits?” Shawn said,
Absolutely. There is no wealth sharing. Capitalistic system is based on: he who
has, gets. And it's his responsibility to either get more— but if he shares his
wealth and distributes it out evenly across the board, he is not going to have it.
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As here, where he takes issue with the rich primarily for their failure to “share” with
others, he often framed his moral judgements of the rich in relation to the poor. For
example, he drew a repeated parallel between the rich and the poor in terms of the
common narrative—typically directed only at the poor—of people who “take advantage
of” or “abuse the system.”
The Bible says the poor— we're always gonna have with us, so there's always
gonna be hustlers, always gonna be people who will abuse the system. Madoff.
That guy made billions of dollars, but he abused the system. Is there any
difference between him and the woman on welfare who is milking the system?
None whatsoever. You look at Madoff from a whole different perspective than
you do this woman here.
I think Donald Trump is a hustler. Okay? He is a businessman—I give him
credit—but nobody gets that far in business without being a mean cruel
somebody, cuz you gotta cut throats, you gotta stomp on some people, you have
to hurt some people so that people will fear you and won't go against you.
Absolute fact. So, is he any different than a kid out here on the corner who's
hustling, selling drugs? Only thing is, what he does is legal. What the kid does,
it's not legal.
Reframing the “welfare queen” trope, Shawn turns a common moral critique of the poor
against the rich—invoking famous rich people (Bernard Madoff and Donald Trump) and
accusing them of “abus[ing] the system” and causing societal harm. 22 He goes further to
suggest that being or becoming rich might require morally corrupt behavior (“nobody
gets that far in business without being a mean cruel somebody”). He also implies
something I heard from other respondents: that these immoral behaviors among the rich
go unpunished because that group has undue influence on the levers of power that
determine what is or is not “legal.”

22. Bernard Madoff was convicted in 2009 of defrauding investors through an elaborate multi-billion-dollar
Ponzi scheme.
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This same implication—of potentially nefarious influence by the rich over
systems that allow them to benefit at others’ expense—was visible when Shawn
questioned the role of meritocracy in U.S. economic systems. Although his moral critique
of the rich was more about behavior than about a failure of meritocracy, he did make a
handful of references to people who “didn't work for it but got it” and others who worked
hard “and never make it.” Donald Trump was a favorite target. When I asked if there
were some people whom he felt made more or less money than they deserved, he said,
“Probably so, but that's only because of the system, the way it's set up.” For example:
Donald Trump is worth $8 billion. His son has never had to work a day in his life.
He is set for life. Does he deserve that? Did he work for that? Not deserve it - did
he work for that? Or was it given to him? Donald Trump got started because his
father gave him $1 million. And he was astute enough, smart enough, that he
invested it. And he was - whether it's scrupulous or unscrupulous enough to make
deals. Boom, he's where he's at now. Did he deserve that?
Shawn often took this tack—of asking rhetorical questions that implied his opinions,
rather than stating them. In this example, his framing of someone who “has never had to
work a day in his life” references a common trope and suggests condemnation even as he
waffles between conflating and separating deservingness and work. This is the closest
Shawn came to condemning the rich on meritocratic terms rather than on behavioral
terms—and even here, the potentially “unscrupulous” behavior is front and center.
Through these rhetorical questions, Shawn indirectly explains his moral view of the
rich—they may have merit (“astute enough, smart enough”), but they might also have
been “given” some of what they have, and they might have had to be “unscrupulous” to
get into their positions.
Notably, Shawn also expressed some mixed feelings about the rich—commenting
that those who benefit from the ways “our system is set up” might simply be doing what
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is allowed. Furthermore, he seemed to suggest, those systems are upheld by everybody
else who is “silly enough” to engage in them despite getting “no benefit from it.” For
example, at one point, we were talking about funding programs to support the poor and
he again drew his parallel between rich and poor people who “take advantage” of various
systems:
Again, you're gonna have people down here on the lower level who're gonna take
advantage … you gotta weed them out, you gotta straighten them out; you also
got people up here on the upper level who're gonna do the same thing, you gotta
weed them out, take them out.
But then, he went on, thinking about those people “on the upper level,”
It's like … does a CEO need to make $50 million a year? Is it fair to give a
basketball player a $50 million contract for 5 years, or 3 years, or an 8-year $120
million contract? What is he gonna do with that money? So, then he goes, he
buys a huge house. It's like Prince. … This guy's got a compound … People don't
know … he's giving, he’s throwing block parties. At various times he's given stuff
to people, he’s running [zooming?] across the country to help people, he just don't
want nobody to know about it. Say he got a $10 million mansion on … an island
… Do I knock the brother for having that? No. Knock yourself out. Even if I don't
know that he gave anything to anybody, I don't knock him for it, cuz our system is
set up, that says, if you do this, you can make this, if you earn this, you can do
this, and we're silly enough to buy all their records, and scream and holler for
them, and we get no benefit from it.
Shawn starts out suggesting that the people who take advantage of the system, whether
they are rich or poor, need to be “weed[ed] … out.” When he then turned to talk about the
multi-million-dollar contracts for CEOs and basketball players, it seemed that he was
continuing this thought, especially as he suggested that a basketball player might take the
money and buy “a huge house.” So, it was a bit surprising when he turned to talk about
Prince and his “$10 million mansion,” saying he did not “knock” Prince for having such a
luxury, even if the performer hadn’t given “anything to anybody.” I’m not sure what to
make of this. Perhaps Shawn is saying that this system is not fair, but the people who
benefit from it are playing by the rules that exist and those who “get no benefit from it”
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uphold it by continuing to participate. He went on to note his own refusal to participate,
saying he would go to a professional basketball game if someone gave him a free ticket,
but “I'm not paying you a hundred some odd dollars to go see you throw a hoop up, no
way.” As we’ll see, this was one of many examples Shawn gave that served to separate
himself from both the rich and the poor.
Sympathy for the poor
Embedded in many of Shawn’s responses about the rich is his sympathetic
framing of the poor relative to that group. For example, in his initial response—about the
rich getting richer and the poor poorer—he frames the poor as underpaid workers left
behind by people who have made their fortunes and then gone “off into the sunset” and
forgotten “about everybody else.” Shawn generally framed the poor in a positive moral
light, arguing that their poverty was primarily a societal failure to provide sufficient
support to help people “do what they need to do” rather than a reflection of individual
shortcomings.
People fall behind because they don't have the help, they don't know where to go
to get the help, and it brings about discouragement and despondency and despair.
And then they settle for whatever.
Here, Shawn alluded to a common accusation against the poor—individual complacency
(“they settle for whatever”)—but suggests that the root of that behavior is external to the
individual. He emphasized that a person’s economic success—and not just their
hardships—depended on circumstances beyond the individual. “We get ahead because
there are people around us who help us to achieve—who support us.”
At the same time, Shawn called upon individualistic meritocratic tropes about the
poor more than other high-income respondents did. For example, he immediately
followed the above statement about people who “settle for whatever” with this:
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They've gotta have a resolve in them to say, I'm not gonna accept it, so they gotta
keep on searching, gotta keep on looking, gotta keep on striving. And once they
do that, then it will either come to them, they will find it, it will happen.
Although Shawn invokes this idea of individual “striving” here in a way that might seem
to blame the poor for not having enough “resolve” to find their way out of poverty, I took
this comment in the context of something he said in our first interview, suggesting that he
traced back these individual “mindset” issues to societal messaging. We were talking
about where he might start if he could make societal changes, and he suggested that “we
have to look at why” a person might fail to “strive.” In his response, he suggested that
what “we do as a society” influences those behaviors.
We have to look at why is it that a person would go off and drink all day long and
not work? What happened to that person, that individual, that man, that woman as
a child that instilled the characteristics in them that they now have become an
habitual drug user or an habitual alcoholic? Or an habitual abuser? What causes
people to live in sheer poverty? Why is it that someone will have a home, and
won't have lights in there, but have a 55-inch TV? What's kicking in their mind?
What did we do as a society to instill in them the morals the values of what is or
what isn't, and then so they could build on it? Whom have we told that you can
make it?
Shawn runs through a list of common judgements against the poor—things he seemed to
disapprove of—but ultimately suggests that these behaviors that he considers to be
socially unproductive might be rooted in a larger collective responsibility.
To explain, Shawn went on to answer his own question—”whom have we told
that you can make it?”—by recounting a story of being told by a high school counselor
that he “wasn’t smart enough to go to college.” He implied that, as a young Black man,
his behavior of “sitting in class bored half to death” and neglecting his homework was
interpreted as a lack of smarts rather than the boredom of a smart kid. He “bought into”
this interpretation and didn’t head off to college, only to discover “when I got out there”
that there were “people who were not as smart as I was but had achieved some things in
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life.” With this new perspective, he said, he decided to go “back to school” and “spent
20-some years going to school.”
My bachelors, my masters, my DVid., Ph.D. religious studies. And went on.
Because something clicked inside my brain that said that I can. But just think that
if we told every kid, you can do this.
In telling this story, Shawn simultaneously advances his own moral position as someone
who has worked hard and defends the moral standing of the poor. Even as he repeats
common stereotypes about the poor, there is a clear contrast between the sympathy in his
framing of the poor as people who are discouraged and desperate and the moral critique
in his framing of the rich who “cut throats” and “stomp on people.”
Separating from rich and poor: the comfortable moral middle
Like other high-income respondents, Shawn portrayed his own economic position
in a positive moral light relative to both the rich and the poor. He framed his own
circumstances as being in the middle—invoking the idea of being “comfortable” as a way
of signaling that he was better-off than those living in poverty, but not as excessive and
luxurious as the rich.
Shawn started our interview characterizing his own position this way: “I've been
blessed. I'm not a rich man by any means, but I am comfortable in my living.” Later,
when I asked him if he felt that anybody born into any situation “can work hard and get
ahead,” he was one of the few respondents who answered in the affirmative. As he
explained, he returned to this idea of being comfortable.
I'm going to have to say, “yes, you can”, but the question comes in on that
“ahead.” What does that mean? I worked hard, so I've achieved some things. But
I've risen to the level, to the point where I'm probably going to be at, so does that
equate me as not being successful as a guy like, say Donald Trump, where he's
worth billions and I'm not even worth millions? … I feel like I'm perhaps more
successful than he is, because I'm comfortable with who I am and where I am. I
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don't have to wheel and deal and manipulate to get anything in life because I've
been blessed.
As Shawn explains his belief in meritocracy, he uses the idea of the morally corrupt rich
to elevate his own moral position by contrast. Not only had he come to his economic
position because he had “worked hard,” he argued, but his own moral standing was
further elevated by his willingness to stop at “comfortable” rather than pursuing the kind
of excess that required the rich to “wheel and deal and manipulate.”
Like other high-income respondents, Shawn was focused on separating himself
from the rich and defending his own relative moral virtue. As he answered my question
about meritocracy—which was about “anybody born in any situation”—he, like other
high-income respondents, looked upward on the economic ladder, comparing himself
favorably to the rich. Given Shawn’s sympathy for the poor and his concern for the
community he and his church served, I might have expected him to talk about the
struggles of people born into poverty. But this exchange came on the heels of Shawn
talking about the lack of “wealth sharing” and profit-at-all-cost incentives within the
“capitalistic system,” so he had the rich on his mind. Nevertheless, he went on to frame
his—morally virtuous—choice to be “comfortable” in terms that invoked both the rich
and the poor:
Because for me to be anything more, I would have to have a mega-church …
people literally bring in hundreds of thousands of dollars … a month. … Pay me a
salary that would equate to me riding around in a Bentley or having on diamonds
and jewelry or having a house with a gated— So, and then it's what do I do with
that wealth once I attain it? Not even me attain it - what do I do with the wealth
that the church attains? Do I take it and put in on my back? Do I take it and make
sure that I'm compensated? I took ours and we have a development corp, to make
sure this place is kept up A1. So, again, I've achieved, I've done. But again, does
that relate to where the Kennedys are or the Rockefellers—who are getting money
by virtue of a trust that's set up because their forefathers made millions of dollars
that equated into billions of dollars in today's time?
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Again, Shawn invokes the rich to create a contrast to his own moral virtue, but he seemed
to wrestle with the competing social messages that frame wealth as a sign of success
(“does that relate to where the Kennedys are”) versus as a sign of moral corruption (and
frugality as the indicator of moral virtue). He implicitly contrasts what he has “achieved”
by “work[ing] hard” with famously wealthy families “who are getting money by virtue of
a trust.”
His discussion of his own choices to eschew the excesses of others in his position
(“riding around in a Bentley or having on diamonds”) is a clear condemnation of the
behaviors of the rich and an elevation of his own resistance to that temptation. Instead of
“tak[ing]” as much as he can get and “put[ting] it on my back,” Shawn is proud to note
the re-investment he has made in his community—setting up a “development corp” that
will “make sure this place is kept up A1.” Elsewhere in the interview, he described how
this “development corp” built housing and sold it to people in the community:
At a rate where they can afford it, and then put people in their own homes. Take
'em out of the projects, take 'em away from renting, put 'em in their own homes,
and let them understand what the American dream is.
As Shawn described his investments in the church and the surrounding community, he
continually emphasized the ways these investments separated him from the morallycorrupt behavior of the rich. Although he seemed proud of these investments (e.g., he
described in detail specific improvements to the church building, including several
spacious offices for his use), he was concerned that some people saw them as
extravagant: “Everybody looks at that like ‘[the Pastor] is rolling in dough.’” Shawn was
eager to counter these perceptions. He argued that he had not been extravagant and
invoked his own sacrifices by noting that had been able to make the investments in the
building because he had chosen not to pay himself more.
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I could have gotten more and not have done this building, packed the people in
there and been satisfied and would have been able to get more. But again, who
would I have helped? When I die, what am I going to do with it? I got it set up so
I have enough insurance so, if something happens to me, my wife is comfortable
for the rest of her life. We're able to survive on a daily basis. … I’m not a greedy
person, so it doesn't take much to make me happy. … I don't do things to impress
people and I'm not impressed by the fact that you can go out here and get this that
or the other. Never have been. Because you have to pay for that. I don't.
Shawn’s moral self-positioning repeatedly references common moral critiques of the
rich—extravagance, greed, showiness—in contrast to being “comfortable” and not doing
“things to impress people.” The poor are implicitly present as those who lose at the
expense of the extravagance of the rich—and those who are “helped” when those with
money decline the extravagances Shawn declaims.
To Shawn, choosing to remain in his “comfortable” economic position allowed
him to “help” the poor (placing both him and the poor in a morally positive position)
while separating himself from the rich (placing him in a morally positive position relative
to the morally corrupt rich). He characterized this moral middle position perhaps most
directly in his response to a question I asked about his thoughts on regulating the incomes
of the rich through taxation or caps.
Take it from the top and go back down. I think you have the right to earn
whatever you want to earn, but I think you ought to be taxed more. … I think you
ought to pay more … in order to make sure that that money … goes into a process
where it helps out those less fortunate. Either you are taxed more, or that you
automatically give into something that takes care of the people less fortunate than
you.
He added,
The opposite side of it is, those that are helped have to be in a position where they
are showing that they are striving to pull themselves out of the barrel. ‘Cause I
don't want someone sitting in the barrel, eating shrimp and steak, and I'm up here
in the middle, and I can't buy a piece of filet mignon, or afford a house, but
because you got food stamps you can walk in and buy [that].
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From “up here in the middle,” Shawn criticizes the rich for failing to help “people less
fortunate” than themselves—in contrast to his own self-depiction as someone who invests
in his community. But he also invokes a common—and stereotypical—criticism of the
poor: as people who may not be “striving” to improve their lives. He presents this as a
contrast to his meritocratic portrayal of his own achievements. Thus, he defines his own
position as distinct from both groups: a moral middle ground.
Reconciling moral worth and moral obligation – Deborah (HIWW)
Deborah (HIWW), like many respondents, was sympathetic to the poor and
critical of the rich—and she framed both of these sentiments in moral terms. She
struggled with her own moral self-perception, arguing that differences between the
opportunities she had and those available to others were not primarily based on merit or
effort, but more on luck and circumstance. However, she was unsure of what to do with
these arguments—particularly how to reconcile them with a sense of moral worthiness.
Deborah was 48 when we spoke, working as a surgeon at a local large hospital
that was a major employer in the city. She was married with two teenaged children and
living in a single-family home in one of New Haven’s higher-income neighborhoods. Her
annual household income was over $400,000.23
Morally contrasting rich and poor
Like others, Deborah morally contrasted the rich and the poor—making a
relational argument that was critical of the former and sympathetic to the latter. As a
healthcare provider, Deborah had many intimate encounters with people whose incomes

23. This is an estimate based on contextual details Deborah provided during our interview. Unlike with
other respondents, I did not get Deborah’s self-reported salary in our first interview and I was unsuccessful
at trying to schedule a second interview with her. This estimate aligns with data on average surgeon salaries
listed on various websites like ziprecruiter.com and salary.com.
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were much lower than hers—people who were her patients or her colleagues and
sometimes both—and this gave her a particularly sympathetic perspective toward the
poor. During our interview, she talked about several patients who were paid so little that
they had to have second jobs and therefore did not have time or energy to take care of
their health. Among these patients were people who worked at the same hospital as she
did, making the connection between their insufficient wages and their health problems
particularly visible to her. One patient, she said,
works two jobs because one of his jobs is in a Central Supply orderly position and
it's not sufficient. So, he has to work a second job, which makes him tired all the
time, so he actually doesn't exercise. And as I've known him and tried to prepare
him for [an operation he needs], he keeps gaining weight and I say [it’s not going
to be possible] if you keep gaining weight. And then he says, “But I'm too tired to
exercise after I finish my two jobs.” … Is it his fault that his job pays him so little
that he has to have a second one? No. It's not his fault. The pay is too low.
This patient’s health problems, Deborah argues, are not because of some individual
failure on his part, but because of something outside of his control—he is being paid too
little. She emphasizes his moral virtue as a worker and implicitly pushes back against
common stereotypes that suggest that the health problems more common among the poor
are the result of individual choices and laziness.
Deborah drew a moral contrast between people in the situation of this patient and
people like the hospital CEO. Like many respondents, she questioned whether economic
resources were distributed meritocratically and argued that there was a disconnect
between an individual’s level of effort or merit and their economic circumstances. To
make her point, Deborah drew a contrast between what she saw as the excessive pay of
the hospital CEO and that of the bottom-level workers.
I just don't know why CEOs should get so much money. I feel like, do they really
do that much work? What is their value to the corporation that they are CEO to?
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How is that significantly more important than, I guess, the main worker bees?...
Look at the hospital CEO … you know she makes over $2.5 million a year. …
And then you have, literally, a person in central supply who is critical to the flow
of even an operating room. … Why is his job less important in terms of running a
hospital? What about the housekeeper who has to clean up the bathroom that
someone threw up in? Why is he not really valued, because if you don't keep an
environment clean the hospital is going to have higher infection rates and worse
scores for Medicare? … He should really be given a lot of money to clean up
someone's throw up. … And it's one of the least valued jobs in the hospital. …
And you know those people are like the poorest people in New Haven who are
doing those jobs.
Looking around her workplace (“that's what I know and what I see”) as a way of making
sense of broader societal inequalities, Deborah questions the moral standing of the CEO
(“do they really do that much work?”) and bolsters that of the lowest paid workers (“he
should be given a lot of money to clean up someone’s throw up”) by juxtaposing their
effort and pay. It seemed immoral to her for someone to “get so much money” for work
of questionable “value” while others whose work she considered “critical” were in the
lowest-paid and “least valued jobs.”
Reflecting on self: reconciling moral worth and moral obligation
Within this moral relationship between the overpaid CEO and her underpaid
coworkers, Deborah struggled to reconcile her own moral and material position. She
described her own salary as “inflated” but didn’t seem to link it to the situation of her
impoverished coworkers in the same way as she had with the CEO’s salary. She seemed
to shield herself from this consideration by noting that despite her “huge salary,” “we
have trouble living on it”—like other respondents, acknowledging her privilege but
focusing on her struggles. “But,” she pivots back, those struggles, “that’s our own fault,”
she said, revealing her conflicted feelings about her own economic position.
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[Having trouble living on your salary is] not your own fault if you make $40,000
a year. It's your own fault if you make $450,000. … Maybe we're not careful. But
we're pretty careful. But maybe we could be more careful.
In this moment—having moved from focusing on the salary of the CEO and now,
instead, making an explicit contrast between her salary and that of someone in the
position of one of her colleagues or patients—she does what many of the high-income
respondents do: she briefly acknowledges her own relative privilege compared to
someone who makes a tenth of her income—and expresses her sympathy for that
person’s struggle (“it’s not your own fault…”)—but then she turns to focus on the limits
of her own resources. Focusing on her need to be “careful” with her money, Deborah
turns the lens away from the difference between her salary and that of an orderly at her
hospital and suggests that she, too, faces constraint. Her assertion that her family is
“pretty careful” additionally serves to position her as morally worthy of her income (the
implicit contrast is with the extravagance of the rich). Deborah’s comments reflect
Rachel Sherman’s argument that framing their own expenditures as “reasonable
consumption” is one of the ways that the wealthy make claims on being “morally worthy
of their wealth” (Sherman 2017:56–57).
Like many high-income respondents, Deborah struggled to reconcile her moral
elevation of the poor—and her questioning of the meritocracy of their positions—with
her own feelings of deservingness. This tension is evident in her response to my question
about comparing her own economic path to those of others. I asked, had her path been
harder or easier?
I think it's been easier because I had a lot of opportunity. I grew up in an upper
middle-class family. I'm the daughter of an internist [a physician] and, um, you
know, we didn't have a lot compared to the guys in finance where I grew up, but
we had a lot of resources. I went to a really good high school. I went to a really
good college and I went to a really good medical school. So, I'm really lucky. So
139

Chapter 2

then naturally, as I worked hard through each of those things, it just—you know,
not that I never worked hard— but that I was there and there was opportunity
from that.
So that's all I can say is that, you know it's like you go to a really good high
school, you get into a really good college, and so I can tell you maybe someone
else worked just as hard in New Haven (didn't live where I lived) and didn't have
that opportunity. Maybe they got the same exact grades as I did, but they didn't go
to my college, maybe they never even heard about it. Maybe their guidance
counselor didn't tell them about it. I don't know. How is that fair?
At first, Deborah repeats a pattern I saw among many high-income respondents
(especially White respondents)—acknowledging her “easier” path, her access to
opportunity, and her “luck,” but also carefully noting her hard work and her family’s
relative position as having less than some others (“we didn’t have a lot compared to the
guys in finance”). She thus positions herself in the moral and material middle: better off
than some, worse off than others, her moral virtue reflected in having “worked hard.”
Each comment about a potentially unfair advantage is matched by a comment defending
her moral worth.
Then, Deborah seemed to shift her perspective from defending her own moral
position to maybe a structural or a systemic view. This shift seemed to allow her the
space to question the fairness of the situation wherein “someone else” who might have
“worked just as hard” and even “got[ten] the same grades” might not have had the same
opportunities as her for a variety of reasons outside of their control. Looking from this
perspective at the larger system, Deborah finds a way to acknowledge an injustice that
has benefitted her without necessarily implicating her own moral standing. It is another
version of the moral middle. Like other high-income respondents (although perhaps more
implicitly than others), Deborah depicts herself as a collateral beneficiary of an unfair
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system rather than as a participant. This allows her to feel moral outrage over a system
she thinks is unjust without feeling a sense of moral obligation to change it.
Conclusions
As we saw in Chapter 1, respondents argued that economic inequalities were
illegitimate because they were based in non-meritocratic systems of inherited opportunity
resources. In this chapter, I show that respondents explained these systems in moral
terms—arguing that these “rigged” systems were upheld by the morally corrupt rich and
hurt the morally-upstanding poor. Across incomes, respondents used moral discourses
about the rich and the poor, and the relationship between them, both to make sense of
economic inequality and to understand and rationalize their own moral and material
position within the relationships they described.
High- and low-income respondents drew upon similar discourses to one another
as they framed the rich in negative moral terms and the poor in positive ones. They often
criticized the behaviors and attitudes of the rich—especially excessive consumption,
greed, or selfishness. They portrayed the poor as hard working, unfairly treated, and
struggling to meet basic needs. Some used meritocratic arguments to contrast the moral
virtue of the rich and the poor in terms of effort and—as we saw in Chapter 1—to argue
that economic position was less a reflection of moral righteousness than of inherited
circumstances.
However, to assert their own moral worth relative to that of the rich and the poor,
the two groups used somewhat different tactics. Having framed the rich in negative moral
terms, both groups emphasized their separation from that group. Low-income
respondents asserted their moral worth by grouping themselves within their positive
moral portrayals of the poor, invoking their effort, hardships, and reasonable
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consumption. In contrast, high-income respondents often acknowledged their “comfort”
relative to the poor but focused their claims to moral worth on their differences from the
rich. Indeed, many seemed to emphasize their sympathy for the poor as one of the key
differences between themselves and the immoral rich. When forced to face their own
economically privileged their position, they minimized their sense of privilege by
emphasizing their personal hardships and hard work (Phillips and Lowery 2020). Thus,
high-income respondents characterized their moral and material positions as being in the
middle—bystanders who sometimes benefitted and sometimes were harmed by what they
characterized as a charged struggle taking place primarily between groups above and
below them on the economic spectrum.
A moral and material relationship between the rich and the poor was central to
most respondents’ conceptualizations of economic inequality. They described the actions,
advantages or disadvantages, and resources of the rich and poor explicitly or implicitly
relative to one another. Despite these widely-held relational understandings of economic
inequalities, we will see in the next chapter that, in conversations about the role of race in
those inequalities, White respondents abandoned these relational descriptions. When
thinking about the rich and the poor, nearly all respondents found ways to morally or
materially separate themselves from the morally-villainized rich, but such separation was
more difficult for White respondents when talking about racialized economic inequality.
***
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CHAPTER 3
RECONCILING RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
“White Americans have long known that in a country where black people have been kept
disproportionately poor and prevented from building wealth, rules and policies involving
money can be nearly as effective for maintaining the color line as legal segregation. You
do not have to have laws forcing segregated housing and schools if white Americans,
using their generational wealth and higher incomes, can simply buy their way into
expensive enclaves with exclusive public schools that are out of the price range of most
black Americans.”
Nikole Hannah-Jones (2020)
Introduction
Racial inequality is a defining and enduring feature of economic inequality in the
U.S. Income and wealth disparities between Black and White households today are about
the same as they were in the 1950s (Kuhn, Schularick, and Steins 2018). As noted in
Chapter 2, even among children born to parents in the top income quintile, a Black child
is equally as likely to end up in the bottom income quintile as to stay in the top while a
White child is five times as likely to stay in the top quintile as they are to fall to the
bottom (Chetty et al. 2020).
Every respondent, either when directly asked or somewhere else during the
interview, asserted or acknowledged that a person’s perceived race impacted their
economic trajectory in some way. But the ways and the extent to which respondents
included race when thinking about economic inequality varied considerably across
respondents’ class and race.
Black respondents were much more likely to talk about inequalities related to race
throughout our discussion about inequalities related to income or wealth. For most Black
respondents, these topics were very much part of the same conversation. For example, as
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we saw in Chapter 2, Black respondents often talked about the rich as either implicitly or
explicitly White.
White respondents, in contrast, often mentioned racial inequality when talking
about economic inequality—even when I had not prompted them to do so—but many
treated racial inequality as a separate conversation that was linked, but not integral, to
economic inequality more generally.
One manifestation of the difference in how Black and White respondents
separated or integrated these two conversations—about racial and economic inequality—
is the difference between whether and how these two groups used a relational lens as they
described who is harmed and who benefits from these systems of inequality. As we saw
in Chapter 2, nearly all respondents suggested a relationship between the rich and the
poor—whether moral or material. Some argued that the rich gained at the expense of the
poor. Others argued that the excess of the rich was morally questionable in the context of
the insufficiency of the poor. Still others blamed the rich for their exclusion of the poor.
When talking about racialized economic inequality, most Black respondents
carried forward that same relational analysis—depicting a system where some benefit
through harm done to others—but White respondents (especially the high income) started
leaving out one side of that relational equation. While many Black respondents, high and
low income, described racialized economic inequality in terms of both what was and is
denied to Blacks as well as what was and is gained by Whites through that denial, White
respondents focused almost exclusively on the former, leaving unspoken or unexamined
the beneficiaries and perpetrators of these systems (including themselves).
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This omission of the powerful when talking about the role of race in economic
inequality was particularly notable among high-income White respondents—and in sharp
contrast to their focus during discussions of the relationship between the rich and the
poor. In Chapter 2, we saw high-income respondents, regardless of race, target the
powerful for moral recrimination in part as a way to separate themselves, morally, from
the rich. They framed themselves in the moral middle—better off than the poor, but
without the power or resources of the rich. White respondents talked about power
differentials between themselves and people with greater economic resources, but often
described those people entirely in economic rather than racial terms. However, when it
came to analyzing racial economic inequality, it was harder for White respondents to
frame themselves as separate from the perpetrators of racial injustice while also looking
through a relational lens. Both high- and low-income respondents struggled to deny the
benefits of the racial position they shared with many of the rich. Low-income White
respondents focused on their own subjugation and lack of power. High-income White
respondents focused on the hardships suffered by Black Americans while often glossing
over—or leaving out entirely—an analysis of those who benefit from those hardships.
I argue that these differences between White and Black respondents in their
relational analysis of racialized economic inequality reflect several forces—including, but
going beyond, a motivation to preserve their own self-concept as morally worthy. Black
and White respondents also expressed very different knowledge or awareness of specific
mechanisms of racialized economic inequality—both past and present—and these
differences influenced their understanding of current inequalities. White respondents’
descriptions of current and past racialized economic inequality were vague and generic.
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Black respondents’ descriptions were specific and grounded in both personal and
historical accounts. These differences between White and Black respondents seemed to
emerge from two sources: 1) the racial and class segregation of their social networks, and
2) the critical omissions and inaccuracies in mainstream American narratives about
current and historical racial oppression. Thus, White respondents struggled to see or
understand the ways they benefit from racial economic inequality in part because they
were psychologically better off not seeing it, in part because of the racial and economic
segregation of their lives, and in part because of missing or inaccurate information in
societal narratives about American racial history and racial economic inequality.
Widespread narratives about economic inequality that are silent or misleading
with regard to race leave many Americans with a limited set of analyses to draw upon
when thinking about the ways racial inequality is linked to economic inequality. These
variations in respondents’ ways of understanding current and historical patterns of
racialized economic inequality, I argue, reveal a systemic collective negligence that
serves to uphold existing systems of power.
Methodological notes and chapter organization
In What’s Fair?, Jennifer Hochschild made a deliberate choice to interview only
White respondents, “in order to minimize communication barriers between the
respondents and myself and to keep the focus on economic and social, not racial,
differences” (Hochschild 1981:316). She limited her sample by race, it seems, not
because she did not think race mattered to people’s opinions about economic inequality,
but precisely because she thought it mattered quite a bit—as evidenced by her subsequent
decades-long engagement with race and class differences in experiences and expectations
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related to social and economic mobility. As I revisit What’s Fair?, I extend its findings
by including both Black and White respondents in my sample and comparing their
opinions in this analysis.
I will not attempt to synthesize Hochschild’s body of work subsequent to What’s
Fair? except to note two things: 1) What’s Fair? was unique in its use of in-depth,
qualitative methodology to engage with these issues, and 2) Hochschild’s subsequent
work suggests that racial differences within and across class—both in experiences and
opinions—are integral to understanding Americans’ opinions of economic inequality.
Black and White, high- and low-income respondents have many consequential
differences of opinion regarding their own and others’ economic mobility.
This chapter captures some of the variation among respondents by race and class
(and sometimes gender) in their views of racialized economic inequality. I have
organized the sections into approximate race and class groupings (low-income Black
respondents, low-income White respondents, High-income Black respondents, and highincome White respondents). The patterns I outline are sometimes messy and there was
considerable variation associated with individuals’ backgrounds and cross-race and crossclass exposure. I occasionally include someone from a different race or class grouping to
make my point by providing that contrast.
One particular challenge in presenting the data in this chapter is the challenge of
presenting an absence or silence. Black respondents often talked about topics or made
arguments that were simply absent in my interviews with White respondents and this is a
difficult thing to illustrate with interview data. There were exceptions—for example,
where White respondents offered a relational analysis of racialized economic harm and
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benefit—and I include these as indicators of the kinds of statements I did not hear other
White respondents making.
Black respondents: the power of Whiteness/Relational understandings of Power
“I learned as a child that to be ‘safe’, it was important to recognize the power of
whiteness, even to fear it, and to avoid encounter” (hooks 2005:23)
When talking about economic inequality, Black respondents (especially lowincome) often spoke about the power of the rich and the “power of whiteness” as
inextricably intertwined. For many, the entanglements between whiteness, wealth, and
power were so obvious that, although they sometimes stated this explicitly, more often
these entanglements showed up as implicit assumptions rather than explicit statements.
These references, even when implicit, pointed to the power of whiteness within a
racialized economic power structure. As we will see, this was very different from the
silence, obscuring, or lack of acknowledgement among White respondents about the
beneficiaries or maintainers of that power structure.
This section captures two related themes I heard from Black respondents about
social and economic power concentrated in the hands of White people: 1) economic
power, and 2) the power to define societal priorities. Not only did each of these themes
receive far more attention from Black than White respondents (if they were brought up at
all by White respondents), but also the ways that Black respondents talked about these
issues was markedly different from how most White respondents spoke about race and
economic inequality. Black respondents regularly integrated conversations about race,
power, and economic inequality, whereas White respondents (as we will see in
subsequent sections) tended to treat conversations about racial inequality in a more
compartmentalized way. Black respondents also spoke about power with a more
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relational analysis than did White respondents—linking the denial of power for some to
the concentration or consolidation of power for others. In contrast, White respondents
tended to focus more on social treatment than on power when talking about race (as
opposed to when they spoke about class)—often leaving the gatekeepers of power and
the gains of those gatekeepers unnamed and unexamined. In other words, while White
respondents often noted some of their own racialized advantages, they usually neglected
a larger analysis of the ways racialized oppression was both in service of and enabled by
the “power of whiteness.”
White Economic Power
Darrell24 (LIBM) explained that economic inequality meant that “the power is not
even. People with money have the most power.” Instead of using that power to “bring
up” the broader “community,” he argued that “everyone’s out for themselves.” In his
examples, it becomes clear that he identifies the powerful as both rich and White. In one
example, he said, “the way power is distributed,” a “white person that owns a business” is
“going to put what they feel is right for their people into their stores.” Maybe that would
mean “organic foods, maybe it’ll be at higher prices, it would be fancier stores, things
like that.” In contrast, “you're not going to find many organic foods in black-owned
stores nowadays.”
Now, is this where the money comes into play? I don't know, I don't own a store.
But, as far as the economy and what I see, if a white person owns Gourmet [a
local natural foods store], he has unlimited amount of money. He has all the fancy
foods, organics, but they're higher priced, so now you're not only deterring the
black, the lesser communities away because they don't have the money to actually
pay. … You're going to turn those people away from that, so it's like, alright, how

24. Darrell was 20 when we spoke. He had a high-school education. He was in and out of homelessness.
After a series of temporary jobs, he was unemployed and doing volunteer work at a local communityoriented business.
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can I put this? You're not being fair. Knowing that everyone doesn't have the
same income or whatever the case is. … It's too expensive.
Darrell’s example illustrates the way he saw the entanglement between racial and
economic inequality. His discussion of “fancy foods” seemed to reference both the luxury
of the powerful and the basic needs of the poor. This became especially clear when he
later expressed his concerns about the health effects of eating the more widely available
options from “big food businesses” who “are not actually telling you what’s in your
food.” Like other respondents who referenced the imperative to “feed their families” as a
basic need, Darrell references food as something fundamental, suggesting that the
concentration of money and power among Whites affects even the most basic aspects of
people’s lives.25
In another example, Darrell argued again that White people used their social and
economic power to shape society in their own interest. In this case, he used the example
of educational curriculum.
Even with schools, the money you put into schools— [you should] open up a
class to where each ethnicity can learn about their ethnicity. Not just the European
culture, not just what you want them to learn. It is things like that that really
bother me as far as the economy and the way money and power is divided and
what it's used for. … If the black kid's born here, let him learn where he come
from. It’s the same. That's equal to me. That has nothing to do with money, but
that's the way the money is being used. … We're using their money, so we're
learning what they want us to learn.
It seems self-evident to Darrell to whom he referred when he said, “we’re using
their money,” especially as he suggests that “European culture” is “what they want us to
learn.” When he says, “that has nothing to do with money,” he seems to be expressing

25. Food insecurity is strongly correlated with race. One analysis suggests that Black and Latinx
households were twice as likely to experience food insecurity compared to White households. Public health
research links structural racism to health behaviors and outcomes, including food insecurity (e.g., Burke et
al. 2018; Odoms-Young 2018).

150

Chapter 3

frustration with the way money and power and race overlap in American society. He
seems to mean it shouldn’t have anything to do with money, but, as he said, “that’s the
way the money is being used.” This was one of several examples Darrell gave that
demonstrated his frustration with what he felt was White people’s control over the
economy.
Other low-income Black respondents had similar understandings of White
economic power, despite differences in their particular circumstances. For example, Sam
(LIBM), whom we met in Chapter 1, was different from Darrell in that he was 20-years
older, had a higher income, a stable living situation, and he was a father. But the two men
expressed remarkably similar views. Like Darrell, Sam argued that people are selfinterested. Thus, because White people had power, Sam suggested, they were likely to
give opportunities to other White people. Illustrating the way he saw the linkages
between race, power, and economic success, in response to one of my generic questions
that did not specifically reference race—do people born in different circumstances have
equal opportunities to succeed in the U.S.?—Sam answered with an analogy to a parent
choosing between helping their own child or someone else’s:
Nah. … I’ve got some friends that's very successful, white, black, all of that. But,
when I think about it, I'm just gonna put— This is their country. Let's say if you
had a kid and its friend was over … and it was the last piece of chicken or
something … Who do you think you're going to give it to? I mean, your kid's
hungry, that kid's hungry. You're gonna be like … I mean, you could be a good
person and split it … but most likely you're gonna give that opportunity to your
kid. … The other person, we'll get to you later, but right now— And that's what
they're doing, they're protecting [their own].
As with Darrell, Sam does not feel the need to specify whom he means when he
says, “this is their country.” Also note the relational nature of his comment. His analogy
includes someone being excluded (your kid’s friend), but primarily focuses on those who
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control the terms of inclusion and resource distribution: the implicit “they.” Darrell had
said something remarkably similar: “white people made jobs. But most white people
made jobs for themselves.” Surprisingly, Sam’s portrayal is sympathetic to those in
power (a parent wanting to feed their child) even as it is critical (“you could be a good
person and split it with your friend, but …” [my emphasis]).
Many other low-income Black respondents expressed similar sentiments about the
economic power of whiteness and White people, often focusing on ownership or control
of resources. For example, Gloria26 (LIBF) made clear that she felt that “the white man”
controlled the economy.
You don't see— nobody own no black companies, real black companies, light,
gas, anything. … They may work in the building, may be part of the CEO, but
they don’t own nothing. … It’s just facts.27
Like Sam and Darrell, Gloria saw the American economy dominated by White people’s
control over resources. She went on, elaborating her point and adding a gendered
analysis. Even if you “own your own business. … Heck, you could start your own
company,” she said, but that loan you got from the bank? “The main head of the bank …
that you went to is a white man, you get what I’m saying?” No matter what, she said,
“you’re still getting your money from the White man … and you’re going to pay your
money to the White man.”

26. Gloria was 45 when we spoke. She was a single mom with three kids (a 29-year-old autistic son and
two elementary-school-aged daughters). She couldn’t work because she had had a back injury and a stroke,
so her income came entirely from government assistance programs. She had been “fighting for Social
Security for the longest” to try to get disability benefits but said, “they haven't even gave me a chance.” She
continued to be denied benefits on the ground that she was “eligible” to work. Her household income was
about $15,600 a year.
27. In the conclusion to this chapter, I comment on Black respondents’ use of variations of the phrase, “it’s
just facts.”
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Gloria joined Darrell and Sam in arguing that the problem with this racialized
concentration of power is that Whites used it to promote their own interests at the
expense of others.
We are trying to do things, what white people have done and … when we try to
do it, it's not working. And whenever we do try to know what they do, they try to
make sure that we don't do it to get ahead.
Many Black respondents made this type of argument: that racially-concentrated
power led to “protecting” that power (in Sam’s words), through the exclusion or
oppression of others. Sam took Gloria’s argument a step further, asserting that the
powerful not only “make sure that we don’t … get ahead” (as Gloria said) but that they
also disguise this oppression by promoting narratives of undeservingness. For example,
when I asked Sam about what influenced the perspective he was sharing about economic
inequality, he recounted learning about “the Black Wall Street28 situation” and said, it
“really opened my eyes.”
Once they saw that the blacks had started their own little town and their own
economic structure, had their banks and business. … Once they seen them making
it, they got afraid and went over there and burned it down. … It was crazy. So
anytime the Blacks or the poor or whoever try to build something up, it's like they
come and then break it down, and then sell it back to the masses as, “Look, you
see these people are lazy,” or, “This is why they don't deserve this.” But every
time they try to pick theyself up to do something, you took it away from them,
and then made it seem like they weren't fit to have the things that they have.
As we have heard from Sam in earlier chapters, he directly takes on widespread
racialized narratives of meritocracy here. He depicts a system rigged by the powerful in
their own favor not only through the direct denial of opportunity and resources (“you

28. Referring to the prosperous predominantly-Black Greenwood district in Tulsa, OK where, in 1921,
hundreds of residents were murdered and buildings burned by White mobs (Fain 2017). “The Black Wall
Street Massacre happened in 1921 and was one of the worst race riots in the history of the United States
where more than 35 square blocks of a predominantly black neighborhood were destroyed in two days of
rioting leaving between 150-300 people dead” (Huddleston Jr 2020). Fresh attention was drawn to this
event when President Trump held a rally in Tulsa in 2020 (Davidson 2020).
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took it away from them”), but also through narratives that insidiously attribute current
racial and economic power inequalities to the supposed shortcomings of those harmed by
the system. Sam suggested, here and elsewhere, that the power to control these narratives
and “sell” them “back to the masses” is also concentrated in the same White hands that
had the power to perpetuate the oppression in the first place—something I also heard
from other Black respondents, as we’ll see in the next section.
To many low-income Black respondents, the economic oppression or exclusion of
people like themselves was both in service of and enabled by the economic power of
Whites. In contrast, as we shall see, although most White respondents acknowledged that
they benefitted from assumptions made about them because of their race, few explained
their racial advantage as something enabled by White control over economic resources.
Nor did they suggest—as many Black respondents did—that this control of economic
resources enabled further consolidation of that monopolistic power.
Power to control social and economic priorities
Several Black respondents (mostly low-income women) saw White social and
economic power in the ability to define which societal issues deserved attention—which
should be considered normal, and which were a crisis. Specifically, these respondents
argued that violence, drug addiction, and poverty had created considerable problems for
Black communities, but had not been considered major problems by those in power
(whom respondents implied were White) until White people were impacted.
Kelly29 (LIBF), for example, argued that poverty didn’t seem to be a concern of
the American government or broader society until it appeared to impact large numbers of

29. Kelly was in her late thirties when we spoke, working as a research assistant at Yale and was trying to
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White people. At this point in our conversation, she had been talking about her own
struggles and those of others living in poverty. Those kinds of struggles, she said,
didn’t seem to be that important until white people really started being affected by
some of the things that black people have always been affected with money. …
Until they started living in public housing, I didn’t see policies for changes. It was
fine with Blacks and minorities but, “Oh, what? Mr. Peters lives next door now?
Oh no, we're going to fix that.”
Kelly’s final note of sarcasm emphasizes her frustration at feeling like a societal
afterthought. Although she doesn’t name those with the power to define what is
“important,”—her clear implication is that it is White people. Furthermore, as Sam and
Darrell did, Kelly argues that this group of the powerful wields that power primarily in
their own interest. She came back to this topic later in our interview, making her point
even more explicitly.
Yeah, we were selling crack to each other. Crack. We were all cracked out. Until
meth started getting to them White neighborhoods. They was blowing up they
houses. Now, there's a really big task force.
That's how I feel. Like, we could kill ourselves. We're doing their jobs, but when
it affects their home life, all these policy makers, their niece, their cousin, their
aunt, their uncle, their such and such and such and such. You know, when
somebody has to move in with them because this that and the third … now
they're like “hmm. too close to home, let's do something.”
As she emphasizes here, Kelly feels like it is not just her quality of life, but her life itself
that is disregarded by those in power (“we could kill ourselves”). This is despite the fact,
she implies, that she and other people of color do much of the work that supports the lives
of the White and powerful (“we’re doing their jobs”). She articulates a feeling of being
doubly powerless: she doesn’t have the social or economic resources to change her own

complete a bachelor’s degree part-time. She made about $36,000 a year, but her hours had recently been
cut back, costing her $220 a month. She was a single mom of three children (two in elementary school and
one daughter in her 20s), and she was constantly struggling to pay her bills.
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situation and she feels that those who do have the power and resources do not care about
people like her.
Kelly’s feelings of being disregarded were exacerbated by the racial and
economic segregation of her life (Massey and Denton 1993; Quillian 2012). When she
talked about the struggles of poverty, she said, “I'm only talking about minorities …
because that's all I know.”
I mean it’s not to say for White America … I never lived side by side by them.
They always seem to have the best advantages you know. So, I can't speak for
them. I'm just speaking for Black Americans, then maybe Hispanics.
The segregation in Kelly’s life left her feeling literally cast aside by a society uninterested
in improving the lives of people like her.
Angela30 (LIBF) made comments similar to Kelly’s, arguing that problems of
poverty that disproportionately affect people of color go largely unaddressed as long as
White people are unaffected. Like other Black respondents, Angela explicitly linked race
and economic power. At the same time, the Whiteness of those in power seemed so
obvious to her and other Black respondents that many references remained implicit.
Nevertheless, even implicit references among Black respondents to the race of the
powerful contrast markedly with the near total lack of acknowledgement of the powerful
at all among White respondents (as we’ll see) during our exchanges about race.
Housing and neighborhood safety were concerns for Angela, who lived in “a nice
neighborhood” (one of the towns bordering New Haven) but had grown up “in the

30. Angela was in her late 40s. She worked in retail until a few years earlier when she hurt her back in a car
accident and became unable to work at that kind of job. Subsequently, her income came entirely from
government housing, food, and cash assistance. She was married and had two “grown” children. She noted
that she had been offered a scholarship to college but didn’t go because she had her two children before
graduating high school. She dreamed of helping her grandchildren attend college. Her annual household
income was $17,500.
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projects.” Reflecting back, she described the economic and racial segregation she saw
while living in one of those housing systems: “The economic system even then … put all
the Blacks in all these high rises. I can’t even tell you one white family that lived in the
high-rises.” She argued that “a lot of people have no other choice but to live” in these
settings (which she called “the ghetto”) and that those neighborhoods were neglected by
the police because of their racial makeup.
If you notice, in the ghetto there's a package [liquor] store on every corner. Drug
dealers. The cops don't come until— and I’m not racist so don’t understand me
wrong— the cops don’t come until a White person gets busted or White person
gets shot. “Let them kill theirselves” … and then they're trying to be “ghetto
fabulous.” You live in the projects with a Lexus parked outside? Well, who's not
going to know you're a drug dealer? But the cops think that's okay.
Like Kelly, Angela implied that those who have the power to determine who “gets
busted” and what is “okay” are White—or at least only care about those who are White.
Also like Kelly, Angela feels that the lives of poor people of color who live in these
neighborhoods are treated by those in power as less valuable, even expendable (“let them
kill theirselves”). She argued that the primary concern of those in power was to keep
these groups out of the wealthy, mostly-White suburbs, commenting sarcastically, “Don’t
let them come out here to Woodbridge!”
To Angela, this derision and dismissal of poor people of color was particularly
unjust because, she argued, the wealth and power of those who now excluded and
oppressed had been generated by exploiting the labor of those very groups who were now
excluded. For example, as we discussed popular critiques of government support for the
poor as “handouts,” she said,
I don't think it's a handout what they're giving. … If you want to get history right
America was built on the sweat of black people's brows. … So, the government is
not really giving; they're giving back what was taken because we didn't give it to
them. They took it.
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Like Kelly’s “we’re doing their jobs,” Angela’s analysis is relational: White people
gained power by exploiting the labor of Blacks and others and now used that power to
further subjugate those groups.
This type of analysis was primarily offered by low-income Black women, but one
of the higher-income Black men voiced a very similar opinion, arguing that the current
national focus on opioid addiction reflected a prioritization of concerns that affect White
people. Aaron (HIBM) described how “substance abuse issues” had become a “huge
issue in Connecticut right now.” They had become “more noteworthy,” he argued,
“primarily … because of where it's occurring: in more suburban areas.”
You know, people have been dying from smoking crack on the streets or whatever
for a long time, and well that was a particular population. The population - the
demographics of the population has changed and now - whoo it's a national issue.
We're going to throw some money at it! [sarcastic tone]
I mean, you know, Chicago … what's going on in Chicago by way of gun
violence is unprecedented, this year, maybe last year. It's ridiculous! Sandy Hook.
Sandy Hook got a lo-o-o-o-t of money. Not that it wasn't warranted, because that
was a tragic situation … it's tragic to see all these young kids die, but you see my
point.
Throughout this comment, Aaron makes implicit references to class and race,
arguing, like Kelly and Angela, that the lives of people who are poor and non-White are
considered less valuable by American society. 31 Only when White people are affected
(those who live in “more suburban areas” like “Sandy Hook” compared to the “particular
population” associated with “smoking crack on the streets” or dying of “gun violence” in

31. “Crack” (or smokable) cocaine users are more likely to be poor (Palamar et al. 2015). The majority of
people arrested for crack possession are Black and there is a significant sentencing disparity between crack
and powdered cocaine (two forms of the same substance) of 18:1 (American Civil Liberties Union n.d.).
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Chicago), do these problems become “more noteworthy,” become “a national issue,” and
get more money.32
Kelly, Angela, and Aaron argue that predominantly-Black communities where
poverty is concentrated are socially and economically harmed by the willful neglect of
those in power (who are understood to be White) to define these hardships as major
concerns. Like Sam, Darrell, and Gloria, these respondents depict a relational
understanding of race and inequality—one where the economic and social power of
Whites is protected (while the lives of people who are Black and poor are harmed)
through these acts of neglect and alternative prioritization.
Low-Income White Respondents: Grappling with economic hardship and racial
privilege
In contrast to the integrated and relational ways Black respondents talked about
race, power, and economic inequality, White respondents generally compartmentalized
racial economic inequality from economic inequality more broadly. They also shifted
from the relational depictions they presented when talking about inequalities between
rich and poor Americans to a focus that largely ignored those who gained from systems
of racialized economic oppression. This section captures a pattern among low-income
White respondents in particular where their experiences of economic hardship made it
difficult for them to see the structural advantages they shared with the White powerful.
I’ll discuss the patterns I saw among high-income White respondents later in this chapter.

32. This has become a more common narrative both in academic and public discourse (e.g., Mitchell and
Bromfield 2019).
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Early in our interview Andrea (LIWF) framed her perspective for me in terms of
class, gender, and race.33 In response to my initial question about the fairness of
American economic systems, she said, “I would say that the economic system is biased in
a very classist, gender-specific way.” Although she specified only gender and class in
that initial statement, she went on to describe her background and experience that
included race. She had grown up, she said, in a neighborhood with “super mixed races,” a
“working economic, blue collar neighborhood” where she had exposure to “both ends” of
the economic spectrum. “I've been friends with the richest kid in the school and the
poorest kid in the school.” Although she “sort of fell towards … the poorest kid in the
school demographic,” she said, “people made assumptions about me because I'm white
and well spoken.” Those assumptions gave her access to “friends who grew up with
silver spoons.”
With these well-heeled friends as anchors, Andrea’s self-perception seemed much
more shaped by her experience of economic hardship and class and gender discrimination
than by her experience of racial privilege. She felt constantly judged and dismissed as
“less than” because of her class and gender—overlooked and underemployed.
Andrea mentioned race again, unprompted, several times during our interview—
although each time was just a mention and carried little reflection on her own racial
position. For example, she argued that “the gap” or “spreading of whatever used to be in

33. Andrea was in her early 40s and single. Her income was about $20,000/year. She worked as an artist
and educator. Her employment seemed precarious and she felt constantly financially “unstable.” She
described her education as “lots of college, no paper.” She alluded to a recent move from a “poor”
neighborhood where she had lived for over a decade and that she described as “ideal” and “wonderful” to
her current neighborhood where people had higher incomes. There, most people had “at least one degree,
nice cars” and [scornfully] “it was never too saucy with non-white flavor.” Although she had a “beautiful
large apartment” in her new neighborhood, “people are wary of neighbors and it's this sort of nose-up ten
degrees kind of thing.” She didn’t explain her move and expressed disdain for the luxury and snobbery of
her neighbors.
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the middle … to the further ends … creates this tension” that “sort of seeps its way into
gender bias and definitely socioeconomic class issues. Race issues.” And when she
described what she imagined as fair, she said, “there would be, regardless of race, gender,
or whatever … you have opportunities.” She talked about having “never finished school”
because she saw it as “one more construct by the rich white man.”
We had our most in-depth exchange about race when I brought it up explicitly,
and then, it became clear that Andrea’s feelings of economic hardship made it hard for
her to see her own racial advantages. How, if at all, I asked, did she think her race might
have impacted her economic trajectory? Her response acknowledged her potential
advantages, but was vague:
I feel like I've probably been … I'm probably given more opportunities than if I
was a black woman or a Hispanic woman. I've seen my girlfriends, who are of
other races, their struggle. If they're poor, their struggles are a little bit different
than mine.
Up until this point of the conversation, Andrea has primarily focused on her own
hardship and this is a bit of a turn for her to acknowledge that her situation might be even
slightly better than someone else’s. Because of her vague response, I probed, asking, “In
what way?”
Just hearing about the things that— If I have had a shitty boss situation as a white
woman and their shitty boss situation as a black woman or a Puerto Rican
woman—little different. Little different. So, I feel that like, well, if you wanna see
who struggles the hardest? Mixed-race black and Latino [sic] woman working in a
service job. That right there [taps table] is the biggest struggle. [laughs]
So, I'm like, okay, I'm like, alright, I've got some white on my side, there's a
couple doors there, there's a couple white doors that people don't want to talk
about the race thing. I'm like, oh I'll talk about it. Because I could— I could see
the pain that— you know these are my sisters! I see your pain, girl. That's terrible.
Like, okay, but I don't feel that has really opened any doors. I just think that there
have been people who felt like my color could make them identify with me over
someone who looked like a different color. That's it.
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Andrea claims to understand that her race might give her an advantage over other lowincome women, but she seems reluctant and/or unprepared to engage that conversation.
Once I raise the topic, she seems to feel a social pressure to acknowledge that “a couple”
proverbial “doors” might exist for her because of her race that might not be there for
others, but she almost immediately notes that those doors have not been open to her. She
repeatedly notes, non-specifically, that her experience is “different” from that of women
of a different race, but rather than pointing to how that difference might be in her favor,
Andrea, like other White respondents, focuses instead on how that difference results in
hardship for people of color. She notes that Black and Brown women in service
occupations have “the biggest struggle” while minimizing any benefits she might gain (“I
don’t think it’s put a penny in my pocket”). Even as she approached the idea of her own
gain (“I’ve got some white on my side”), she pivots to turn it into a positive statement
about her own empathy and willingness to discuss race (“oh, I’ll talk about it. … I see
your pain”).
Her response suggested that she has had some conversations on the topic, but she
might not want to engage or might not understand the mechanisms through which her
race might have led her to have had better economic opportunities. For example, she
describes one mechanism—being positively racially profiled (“there have been people
who felt like my color could make them identify with me over someone who looked like
a different color”)—but seems either unaware or unwilling to think about the ways that
such profiling might lead to better opportunities (e.g., in housing, hiring, or avoiding
incarceration) that would impact her economic situation.
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What was most visible to Andrea—even in terms of race—was her own hardships
rather than her advantages. This was reinforced a few minutes later, when Andrea
brought up race again as we talked about her experience applying for public assistance.
Different times I've had to get heating assistance, so they match payments or
something, because I couldn't afford to heat my house. …But, as a kid… We grew
up on assistance. It was terrible, going through all those lines. Or even trying to
get medical assistance, oh my god, it's so demeaning. That's a place where being
white does not come to your white advantage.
JS: [Tell me more.]
Oh my god, twice I went to apply for heating assistance in New Haven over the
last four years. First person there, last person to be seen. Only white person.
Really? Are you kidding me? Oh, this isn't related, I'm sure. [sarcastically]
Because I've had an appointment for three weeks. Really? Oh. And all the tra la
las come in, don't have an appointment, la la la, make nice nice with the
receptionist. “Go right in. Go right in.” Oh. Okay. Lost my paperwork twice. You
make assumptions about me. Okay, that's cool [again, sarcastically].
Like nearly every person I spoke with who had received public assistance, Andrea’s
experience applying for benefits was frustrating and demeaning. These kinds of
experiences, it seems, tended to make those applying for benefits feel like they were
competing with one another for a meager but well-guarded prize. Andrea is no exception,
and here she expressed her bitterness over the difficulty of this experience. She sees
herself as the only White person and feels that she has been racially discriminated against
(such perceptions of anti-White bias are increasingly common, e.g., Earle and Hodson
2020; Kolber 2017; Norton and Sommers 2011). But she doesn’t translate this experience
into an understanding of how Black and Brown people might feel in her own everyday
world, where other White people “felt like my color could make them identify with me
over someone who looked like a different color.” When her race has given her
advantages, she dismisses it. When she feels that her race has given her a disadvantage, it
makes her angry.
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Katie (LIWW), whom we met in Chapter 2, provides a different perspective on
this same pattern of struggling to reconcile her own experience of economic hardship
with her awareness of prejudice and discrimination against people of color. 34 Unlike
Andrea, who didn’t really discuss race until I explicitly brought it up, Katie started our
interview talking about her feelings of experiencing racial discrimination in applying for
public assistance. In response to my first question—was the economy fair?—Katie said,
“No.” When I asked for more detail, she squirmed, then said,
It's funny because the consent form said there's some of it might be
uncomfortable. Because I don't want to make the wrong impression on you, but I
feel like a lot of people don't get help that need it. And a lot of the times it has to
do with the color of their skin [grimaces, laughs uncomfortably].
After I explained that my job was to listen to what she had to say, she went on:
I'm so not, in any way, that, like you know, I don't judge people, I'm not racist,
whatever, it's just things I've seen. Especially because we're— my family and I
are struggling. And I see other people who, maybe don't need as much help. And
it's like, why do they get it?
Katie’s apparent answer to her rhetorical “why do they get it?” question is that there are
racial quotas in place because, she said, “so many people of different colors have been
treated unfairly.” Thus, she argued, benefits offices “have to have a certain amount of
people of this race have that and this and this. And I feel like that's what it's more focused
on than, ‘Okay who really needs the help?’”
Unlike Andrea, who was unapologetically angry at what she seemed to see as
anti-White bias, Katie’s tone throughout the interview is apologetic and confessional. She
says she feels “horrible” about expressing these views but doesn’t see an alternative

34. Recall, from Chapter 2: Katie was in her late 30s working as a teachers’ assistant. She rented a house
(from family) with her husband and three children (including two step-children). She estimated that her
household income was about $45,000 a year. Katie had completed a couple years of college but couldn’t
afford to finish her degree.
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interpretation of “things I’ve seen.” She was caught up in her family’s own economic
hardship and struggled to see beyond it. When she thought about the people of color who
seemed to be receiving help ahead of her, she imagined they had an easier time getting
benefits. But she didn’t blame them. “It’s not their fault” she said. Instead, she blamed a
history of racism and discrimination: “I think it's just all the people who've ever treated
anybody other than a white person like crap and they're trying to make up for it.”
Notably, her use of “all the people” suggests an individualistic lens, as if the history of
racial oppression in the U.S. is about particular individuals who treat others poorly. Katie
exempts herself from this group by focusing on individuals and by declaring herself “not
racist.” Such an individual focus also allows Katie, like Andrea and other White
respondents, to focus on the harm done (being “treated … like crap”) and exclude
relational considerations of whatever benefits might be gained by those perpetrating said
harm.
Katie does note that her race may have benefitted her economically, but only
when I ask her directly if there are any ways she felt she ever received any special
benefits, privileges, or things that made her path easier.
The job I have now, I feel— I'm not saying it's why I got the job. I'm saying if I
was a different color, maybe not. Just because of the town I work in, it doesn't
have many other people other than white, honestly. So, if I had to say something
like that, I could check on that as an example, because one of my really good
friends, who is— I don't know what the right term is anymore— She's African
American? She works there. She has a degree. But she feels— … Like she never
says she's treated unfairly because of her color, but the stories she tells me— … It
always makes me think like, I wonder if I was her if I would have even gotten this
position. Without my degree and whatnot. But still being the same person inside,
but I still wonder, maybe that was one of the considerations that I would “fit in.”
I'm just being honest.
Here, Katie seemed willing to consider the possibility that being White helped her get her
current job because of the way she might have been seen to “fit in.” However, from the
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beginning, she insists that, if race were in play, the mechanism was not her advantage
(“I’m not saying it’s why I got the job”) but someone else’s disadvantage (“if I was a
different color, maybe not”). Her lack of a college degree (she’s completed some courses
but cannot afford to finish) had been an ongoing frustration for her and she repeatedly
mentioned that this had hindered her professional advancement. As she tried to make
sense of how her race might factor into her economic trajectory, she seemed to stumble
upon the realization that her race might have helped her get a job without that credential
while her Black peer may have needed the credential to gain the same kind of
employment. (I heard this idea—that a Black person would have to work twice as hard to
be in the same position as a White person—from several Black respondents.)
In this context, Katie’s defensive comment, “I’m just being honest,” suggests that
she felt like talking about racial advantage or disadvantage, or perhaps race itself, at all—
as opposed to saying particular things—might be considered inappropriate. She seemed
just as defensive here, talking about potential discrimination against people of color as
she did earlier, when she was talking about potential discrimination against Whites. Her
discomfort in knowing how to reference the race of one of her “really good friends” also
suggests her concern that race is a loaded—and socially taboo—topic. Katie drew on
several common tropes used by Whites as evidence of their non-racist views, including
color-blindness and friendships or closeness with Black people (Bonilla-Silva 2009).
In our second interview, Katie acknowledged that White people might benefit
from racism. We had been talking about the rich and the poor, and I asked if she thought
some groups were more likely to be rich or more likely to be poor in American society.
She independently brought up race.
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Unfortunately, yes because— I feel like racism is a huge part of that, and … there
are stereotypes. I’ve even said it in here and I've felt bad, but— I feel like white
people have a better chance of getting jobs strictly because of stereotypes.
Here, again, Katie said she feels “bad” naming benefits gained by White people—
although it is not clear whether her “bad” feelings come from being among the
beneficiaries of this system or from naming something she feels is a taboo topic. She
acknowledged a relational dynamic—noting the “better chance” White people have
“because of stereotypes” about people of color—but continued to separate her discussion
of harms to some and benefits to others. Here, as Katie acknowledged benefits to Whites,
she mentioned “stereotypes” and “racism” but not the people harmed by those forces.
“White people have a better chance” than whom? Then, when she went on to talk about
this latter group—who she referred to here only as “they”—she switched and doesn’t
mention those who are benefitting.
In general, I feel like race plays a big part in a lot of it. I know I said in the past
that I feel like they get more help, but I also feel like they— they get more
trouble, I don't know how— or they get less opportunities maybe I should say.
Just as earlier, Katie again made a relative statement (“they get less opportunities”) and
again omits the comparison group. “[L]ess opportunities” than whom? Even as she
seemed to try to acknowledge a relational dynamic, Katie can’t seem to bring herself to
state it outright.
Katie isn’t sure what to make of her experiences. She seemed to genuinely believe
that people of color have faced discrimination and continue to “get less opportunities.”
And yet, as a White person, she felt frustrated and mistreated by government benefit
systems. For that, she was not sure whom to blame, but the most immediately visible
options are the people with whom she felt she was competing for those benefits (and
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those widely available in popular narratives, Gilens 1999)—those whom she felt “get
more help.”
Katie is likely drawing upon a broader societal narrative that suggests that people
of color are less deserving of the kinds of public assistance she is trying to get. She is also
expressing a frustration I heard from almost every respondent who had applied for public
assistance, regardless of race—a sense that one was not seen as a whole person by those
systems. It seems possible that if Katie had felt that her own needs were being met, then
she might not have felt in competition with her economic peers and thus might have
relied less on social narratives blaming racial others for taking her share of the pie.
Instead, her experience applying for public assistance was demeaning, discouraging, and
frustrating, and the most readily available narratives to help her understand these
experiences led her to feel that she was competing with—and losing to—people of color.
Katie and Andrea’s views of racialized economic inequality are refracted through
the gendered experience of seeking support from government safety net programs
(gendered because of the way those programs are structured). We’ll hear more from Katie
about this experience in Chapter 4, but it is worth noting here that many of my
conversations with low-income women, both White and Black, included sections where
they talked about their experiences applying for—or using—this kind of assistance and
feeling shamed, degraded, punished, and disrespected in the process. While Katie and
Andrea look to their other-race economic peers as having an easier time or “cutting in
line” (as Arlie Hochschild 2016, describes it), I also heard from low-income Black
women who accused their economic peers—usually without mentioning race—of taking
benefits they seemed not to need (e.g., Kelly, whom we’ll also hear from in Chapter 4).
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These situations recall Renee’s comments from Chapter 2, when she argued that
“the people at the top” kept “us fighting over the crumbs, so we'll be blinded and
distracted by the fact that they've got all the money.” In particular, she argued that those
“at the top” encouraged racial tensions because they kept poor people “out of the race.”
Rather than looking to who has “all the money,” she said, those tensions encouraged “the
poor, embittered white person to say, ‘Okay, they're taking all of our jobs. They're taking
all of our benefits.’”
Race is “involved in a lot of stuff”
Jeremy (LIWM), whom we met in Chapter 2, offers a differently-gendered
illustration of the pattern we saw with Katie and Andrea: a low-income White respondent
focused on, and perhaps overwhelmed by, his own economic hardships in a way that
seemed to lead him to ignore his racial advantages. 35 He also demonstrates a second
pattern I found among White respondents—that of compartmentalizing or separating
conversations about racial inequality from economic inequality rather than treating the
two as manifestations of linked systems (as Black respondents did).
Jeremy’s commentary about racialized economic inequality in some ways
exemplified the compartmentalization of race in White respondents’ conversations about
economic inequality. Race was not woven throughout Jeremy’s understanding of
economic inequality. Although he was the low-income White man respondent with the
most to say about race and racism, nearly all of his commentary on the subject was

35. Recall from Chapter 2: Jeremy was in his early 40s. He had a GED and was working as a landscaper
(“busting my hump” and “not getting paid what I'm worth”), making about $35,000 a year. Earlier in his
life, he spent 10 years in prison. He had two older daughters (who did not live with him) for whom he still
paid child support. He lived with his girlfriend (who was Black), who had three children of her own,
including a young son who lived with them. His girlfriend received some form of state “assistance,”
without which, Jeremy said, they would “be homeless.”
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contained within a single six-minute section of our interview—one that followed me
asking explicitly about race and economic inequality. This was despite the fact that he
was in an interracial relationship with a Black woman and that he felt that his “skin
color” had helped him get or keep certain jobs—both of which he mentioned for the first
time during this six-minute time span (after nearly three hours of conversation).
About an hour into our second 2-hour interview session (three-quarters of the way
through our overall interview time), I asked if Jeremy if he had any thoughts about
whether gender or race affects people’s economic trajectories in the U.S. At that point, he
noted that race is “involved in a lot of stuff” and launched into six minutes of
commentary about race. It was as if he switched into a special gear or opened a
conversational compartment where he kept his thoughts about race—whether or not they
were specifically related to economic inequality. He talked about racism in general (for
example, commenting that “race plays a big issue in a lot of things”) and about racism in
his own life (for example saying, “I've experienced racism from the Black and the White
side” when talking about how his interracial relationship is perceived). Throughout, he
attempted to assert a positive moral identity as non-racist. It seemed that he thought race
was important (or at least he thought he should say that race was important), but he didn’t
know how to explain or hadn’t thought about the particular ways in which it might be
linked to income and wealth inequality.
He drew on some of the standard “colorblind” tropes (Bonilla-Silva 2009), for
example noting that he grew up in a “diverse” neighborhood.
I wasn't raised racist. I was raised that we're all equal. My mother taught me that
at a young age. She sat us down, fed us all off the same spoon. My godparents are
Spanish. Some people that I'm close to, we're brothers. My girlfriend, she's black.
So, I'm not raised that way. I don’t see color.
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Notably, after describing his girlfriend as black, he concludes, “I don't see color.”
Despite his use of these standard tropes, Jeremy seemed less uncomfortable
talking about race than did other White respondents. In fact, there was a quality to the
way he talked in this section that made it sound like this was not the first time he was
telling these stories or expressing these opinions. This might be a result of Jeremy’s
relatively greater contact with people of color compared to his White, male, low-income
peers (including being in an interracial relationship).
As Jeremy tried to explain the ways he imagined race playing a role in people’s
economic opportunities and outcomes, stereotypes were among the first things that came
to his mind—something I also observed among other White respondents. However,
Jeremy struggled to trace the economic consequences of these racial stereotypes. Instead,
he recounted racial stereotypes related to economics and then tried to dispute them based
on his own experience.
A lot of people think a lot of black people, they love being on Welfare. That's not
true. The lawns that I cut, on the side, all my customers are black. They own
houses, they work for a living, know what I mean?
Jeremy implies the harm done by racialized stereotypes about welfare dependency, but he
doesn’t trace out their consequences. It is not clear here to what degree his disputation of
these stereotypes is simply him recounting his experience and to what degree he is still
working to establish his positive moral identity with regard to race.
Given Jeremy’s apparent struggle to understand the economic consequences of
racial inequality, I was surprised when—right in the middle of our brief discussion about
race—he provided an example of such a consequence—and moreover, one linked to his
own economic experience.
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Even with the construction jobs, not just black people, even some Hispanics, they
get held back. The white operator gets the job, but the black or Hispanic guy
could do it, you know what I mean? I seen it. I probably got a job a few times
because of my skin color [over a] black guy, you know what I mean?
I had a job at a landscaping company and the Black guy was training me, and he
got fired 'cause they said he had a record, right? But my record is just as long as
his. I'm just saying, I'm just keeping it honest with you. … That's just my
experience.
Here, Jeremy was suddenly not only describing a situation where he felt racial
discrimination impacted people’s economic trajectories, but he also went a step further to
point out how his Whiteness had likely given him an opportunity that somebody else did
not get. He volunteered this information without me really probing, although, as I have
noted, it was strangely late in the interview and only in the context of him answering my
explicit question about racial inequality.
This was a striking moment where Jeremy acknowledged some advantage he
might have had because, throughout the rest of the interview, Jeremy consistently framed
himself as among those being held down. For example, in our first interview, I had asked
him if he felt that, compared to other people, it had been easier or harder for him to have
economic opportunity. Unhesitatingly, he had answered, “I think it's been the story of my
life, everything's been hard. Basically, it's been harder.” His identity was tied to this
struggle and, unprompted, he did not think of the economic advantages he might have,
only the disadvantages.
As he recounted an instance of his own potentially racialized advantage, Jeremy
sounded defensive. His “I’m just keeping it honest with you” echoed Katie’s nearly
identical comment (“I’m just being honest”) as she told a similar story of her own
racialized advantage. These two low-income White respondents seemed to have adopted
the “colorblind” idea that talking about race at all—even acknowledging one’s own
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advantages—is socially unacceptable. Perhaps they also were trying to disavow the
implications of having potentially gained access unfairly. Either way, their claims to
honesty appeared to be attempts to re-assert their moral standing.
After briefly commenting on his racial advantage, Jeremy pivots away from this
uncomfortable topic and back to talking about stereotypes and making the case for his
own lack of racism. He then went on to talk about experiencing “racism from the Black
and the White side” as people judged his interracial relationship. In Jeremy’s final
thoughts in our conversation about race, he returns to his own family’s disadvantage,
closing out this conversation by returning to his own narrative of hardship.
Jeremy felt his economic hardship as all-consuming. Being a hard-working
laborer was central to his identity. Our interview was dominated by stories of the
economic misdeeds of others that came at his or his family’s expense—bosses who paid
too little; fellow laborers who “milk the clock sometimes;” employers who “turned their
back” on loyal workers when they got sick. So, it was not surprising that, as a White man,
race and racism were not key elements of his understanding of economic inequality,
despite the fact that he seemed to have more social contact with people who had
experienced racial discrimination than some of his White, low-income, male peers. With
his identity so tied to being the one facing hardship, he did not, unprompted, think of the
economic advantages he might have, only the disadvantages.
Concluding thoughts:
Racist and meritocratic narratives that blame the poor for failing to work their
way out of their hardships and create racialized stigma around social safety net use
seemed to push low-income White respondents away from what might otherwise have
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been a more relational analysis of racialized economic inequality. Andrea, Katie, and
Jeremy all saw themselves as facing unjust hardship at the hands of a powerful elite. But
to these low-income White respondents, racializing that group of the powerful as White
seemed to pose a risk of further stigmatizing themselves: if they had a racial advantage,
that might provide yet another excuse for them to be blamed for their own continued
hardship. They seemed to see no other way to reject this narrative than to insist that their
Whiteness gave them little advantage. These respondents did note the hardships of their
Black and Brown economic peers, but they did so typically only when prompted,
suggesting little real engagement on their part and perhaps only social desirability bias.
Black (High-Income) Respondents: Power of Whiteness to control criminalization
and incarceration
Think about that for a second. What’s the education system do for innercity black kids? Why is it that always, there's always some kind of
deficiency in the programming in inner-city black schools—or schools for
predominantly black people? Why is that always that way? Isn't that kind
of ironic to you? Seriously. … Isn't it kind of ironic that the population of
the prison system is predominantly black people and we're only 12% of the
population of America? Isn't that kind of ironic to you? [laughs] Seriously.
(Curtis, HIBM)
Several Black respondents, both high- and low-income, pointed to the
disproportionate incarceration of Black men as a key manifestation of the entanglement
of race, gender, power, and economic inequality described by many Black respondents.
These opinions reflect a larger, national trend wherein Black Americans are more likely
than White Americans to say, 1) that the criminal justice system treats Blacks less fairly
than Whites and, 2) that the criminal justice system’s treatment of minorities is a serious
problem (Dunn 2020).36

36. After protests in the summer of 2020, the partisan gap in opinions about the criminal justice system was
much larger than the racial gap. According to a June 2020 Pew Research Center poll: overall, 41% of
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For example, within a few minutes of beginning our interview, and in response to
my initial question about whether or not American economic systems were fair, Renee
(HIBW whom we met in Chapter 2) talked about reading Michelle Alexander’s “really
awesome” bestselling book, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness, and said, “So you see how the drug laws have been designed to kind of
keep certain people oppressed.”37 She went on to give the example of Connecticut’s DUI
laws, which, she said, “allows for people with … first or second DUIs to go home doing
half their time on a bracelet.”
And oddly enough the majority of the people who go through the program are
Caucasian. So, it's very interesting that we have an overcrowded prison system
with mostly petty drug offenses. People of color who— most of their offenses are
not life threatening, you know they're petty drug crimes, little petty criminals. So,
then you take the person who has a DUI, who could possibly have killed someone
with their vehicle, and by the time they get incarcerated it's not their first DUI. So,
we want to free these people and leave everybody else with all these, you know,
huge sentences incarcerated, unnecessarily clogging up our legal system,
financially, our prisons are overcrowded, everything. So, it's just, you know, like I
said, by design. … It's the people who are making the laws.
Although Renee didn’t specify the race of “the people who are making the laws,” she
made clear that the people who are protected by those laws are White and those who are
punished by them are “people of color.” She highlights the injustice she sees by
contrasting the offense of a hypothetical, White DUI defendant who “could possibly have
killed someone” but is allowed to go “free” with “little petty criminals” who are people
of color and whose “offenses are not life threatening” but who are nevertheless given
“huge sentences.” She argued against the idea that the system is somehow

White and 85% of Black respondents said the criminal justice system’s treatment of minorities is a very big
problem. When broken down by partisanship: about 16% of Whites who lean Republican agreed. Of
Democratic-leaning respondents: 74% of Whites agreed and 89% of Blacks (Dunn 2020).
37. Recall that Renee was in her late 40s, had a master’s degree, worked a “state job” as a counselor, was
married with three children, owned a home, and had a household income of $125,000.
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malfunctioning, asserting instead that it has been “designed” to enact the kind of racial
injustice she describes. “And it works. It works to keep those who are in power in power,
it works to keep those who are already wealthy, wealthy.”
Similarly, Shawn (HIBM), whom we also met in Chapter 2, argued that the
incarceration of poor Black and Brown men was part of a deliberate and systematic effort
to maintain the existing racial and economic power structure. 38 He explained, using the
example of what he called “the so-called war on drugs.” “There never was a war on
drugs,” he said, “it was a joke.” It seemed totally improbable to him that
we can drop a bomb from 35,000 feet in the air and watch it go all the way down
to the ground to hit its target, but we can't find out where the drugs are coming
from in this country.
”Really,” he said sarcastically, “I'm that stupid.” Instead, Shawn argued,
The war on drugs is to keep certain classified people into imprisonment or under
the ladder so that now the minority can still maintain their goal on a level. I'm not
a racist, I'm a realist, but white males in this country are scared to death.
Shawn’s argument is relational: keeping some people down allows others to “maintain”
their own positions. However, he said, demographic changes threaten those power
arrangements. “It's going to be more black and brown in this country than it is white
males,” and those groups “are going to emerge out and in power.” To Shawn, racial
inequities in criminalization and incarceration were systemic mechanisms to forestall that
future and to maintain the current power structure. He gave an example to illustrate his
point, recounting a time when he went to court to hear the sentencing for a young Black
man he knew.

38. Recall that Shawn was 72, a church pastor in a neighborhood where more than half of the residents
were Black or low-income. He had several advanced degrees, was married, owned a home, and had three
grown children who lived elsewhere. He described his household income as “a little better” than $100,000
a year.
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I sat in the courts once, and watched a young kid come in, a white kid come in,
this is his fifth arrest and violation for buying and selling drugs. He gets a halfway house. Young black kid comes up, who I went there for, who it's his first
time before the judge, he gets 3-5 years. And I almost lost it in the courtroom cuz
I wanted to stand up and say, “excuse me, what planet are we on? Is it Mars, or
what did we do to offend you that bad?” … I walked out of there shaking my
head. … The system's geared to do that. Reagan's war on drugs. There's no war on
drugs; that was to get the black male off the street. Get him out of the way, so that
he cannot achieve or accelerate.
Frustrated by many such stories, from his own experience and heard from others, Shawn
argued that American criminalization and justice systems are deliberately “geared” to
limit what Black males, in particular, can “achieve” in order to reduce competition for
scarce resources with a White “minority.” He was not alone in this opinion. I heard
similar stories from other Black respondents (both high and low income) and many, like
Shawn, interpreted the disproportionate incarceration of Black and Brown men as
manifestations of a system structured to maintain power for some by withholding it from
others.
The relational nature of the inequalities Shawn described was particularly visible
as he talked about the profits made by prisons and affiliated systems and the contrasting
poverty of prisoners. Like others, he felt that racial inequities in criminalization and
imprisonment were held in place or motivated by a drive for profit. Racial and economic
inequality were linked, in other words, not only because systemic racism denied Black
Americans economic opportunity (which many White respondents acknowledged), but
also because the oppression or suppression of Black Americans was profitable
(something that wasn’t mentioned by most White respondents). Rich White people
gained when poor Black people lost.
Prison is a business. It is one of the most profitable businesses in America. … Put
a guy in jail, you have free labor. He works for pennies a day. So, he produces
your license plates, he produces a lot of materials that come out of there, that go
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to other businesses, that sell 'em and make a profit off it. … and they charge the
state and the government to maintain that individual in a system, in a 6x9 cell, for
what? For having 5 ounces of cocaine on them. 12 ounces of marijuana on 'em.
So, he goes through a system and a judge looks at him and says, “you're black,
you're a problem, you gotta go to jail.”
To Shawn, as for many Black respondents, economic and racial inequality intertwine
visibly in the prison system, where the powerful can serve their own profit interests by
defining who and what is “a problem,” allowing them to make money off of someone
else’s nearly “free labor” while also “get[ting] him out of the way” as someone who
might compete for power and resources.
Sam’s (LIBM) comments about the prison system (some of which were captured
in Chapter 1) were similar to Shawn and Renee’s, but his position as both poor and Black
left him feeling particularly targeted by the systems they described. Although highincome Black respondents expressed a sense of being personally affected by racialized
economic inequality (as we’ll see in the next section) —including regular experiences
with profiling and discrimination—only low-income Black respondents described feeling
that their own lives were of little value to those in power.
For example, recall Sam’s comments in Chapter 1 about how “poor people are
expendable to America.” He went on,
We're cattle. We got more jails in America than they got anywhere in the country
[sic] man. … And little, small Connecticut, we're stockpiling African Americans
and Latinos … and they're like cattle, wasn't giving them no chance.
Sam’s comments about being treated as sub-human, “expendable” “cattle” echo the ways
Kelly and Angela talked about the lives of poor Black people like themselves being
disregarded by those in power (“we could kill ourselves” and “cops don’t come until a …
White person gets shot”).
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This argument is also relational, linking the “stockpiling” of people of color to the
profits of the already powerful. Recall, from Chapter 1, Sam’s comments about the profit
made by corporations off of incarceration (“these corporate people come in town on their
jets just going, ‘Hey, listen … jails are not full. We are not getting the money that we
need. We need to get more people, bottoms in here’”). He argued that people like him
(low income and Black), when accused of a crime, were strongly encouraged to take
“offers” of jail time rather than defend their innocence. Even when “you know you didn’t
do it,” he said, nobody seemed interested in “trying to figure out if I’m guilty or not”
because “they [the prison] gonna get, what, $50–60,000 they get, whatever, a year for”
each incarceration.
Furthermore, Sam argued, the hardship of those incarcerated also translates into
gains for the powerful through laws and social conventions that make it hard for people
who have been incarcerated to find paid work once they get out.
You got guys that's working for the prison system. … And you're paying these
guys a dollar or something a day to mop, clean, do their thing, you give them all
seven bucks a week, or eight bucks a week or whatever the case may be. But
when they get home, they apply for that same type of job and you tell them “no.”
Why would you tell them no for a job that, okay because you're locked up, we'll
pay you seven bucks and when you get out here the job is worth $20 now. No,
you can't have it, you can't work for the state because you got a criminal record.
But you didn't have a problem with me when I was locked up.
… They're saving so much money doing this because they don't got to hire people
from the outside to do these things. They got the inmates to do it. … But when
they come out [and] say, “Listen, I did all these programs, what do I need to do to
make money, to get back out and be productive?” And you go, “No, because you
got a criminal record.” I don't get that.
Sam paints a clear picture of a system that impoverishes some while benefitting others—
a system driven by profit-maximization rather than justice. Like others, he argues that the
already-powerful set the rules in their own favor—defining a person as employable in
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certain circumstances (when it benefits them) and not in others. Like Shawn, Sam argues
that fear of losing power among Whites upholds this system.
America’s getting so diverse. … A lot of Europeans and Americans are afraid of
that. That they're gonna lose control, and that privilege. And they don't wanna
lose that privilege. They want to always have that privilege over everyone else. …
They're terrified of that. God forbid they gotta share. No way.
These types of relational arguments depicted the hardships of poor people of color as a
direct result of profits and gains for a powerful White minority. Respondents like Sam
framed the forces maintaining that system in terms of a fear of loss of power rather than
an active desire to do harm. This framing implicates White people, broadly, as the
beneficiaries of a system that bestows social and economic power regardless of
malevolent intent or “racist” beliefs. Few White respondents made this kind of relational
argument, especially in terms of power and not just in terms of individualized social
treatment.
High-income White and Black respondents:
encounters with poverty and grappling with history
Black respondents’ integrated engagement with race when talking about
economic inequality and White respondents’ compartmentalization of those
conversations cut across class. I saw similar patterns whether I was talking with high- or
low-income respondents. Similarly, across class, Black respondents expressed a more
relational analysis of racialized economic inequality than did White respondents.
However, a couple patterns were unique to my conversations with high-income
respondents. First, high-income Black respondents tended to live and move in less classand race-segregated spaces than did high-income White respondents—and these
differences seemed to shape each group’s views about racialized economic inequality.
Second, while both White and Black high-income respondents linked current racialized
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economic inequalities to American racial history, the ways they did this were distinct. In
particular, Black respondents were much more specific while White respondents seemed
to lack knowledge about laws and practices that did and do uphold racial inequality—
especially in the years between the end of the Civil War and the present day. These
differences in experience and knowledge seemed to leave high-income White
respondents particularly hamstrung as they tried to articulate an understanding of
racialized economic inequality and make sense of their own role in it.
As we saw in Chapter 2, high-income respondents, in general, discussed
economic inequality in ways that reflected their sympathy for the poor and their social
and economic distance from the rich. Since Black respondents integrated considerations
of race when talking about economic inequality, those who were high-income often noted
the Whiteness of the rich as an additional factor separating themselves from that group.
White high-income respondents, on the other hand, also worked to separate themselves
from the rich, but in their case, they avoided racialization of the rich as a way to
emphasize this separation and avoid self-implication.
Racial differences in encounters with poverty: high-income White and Black
respondents
High-income Black respondents, in general, had much more cross-race and crossclass contact than any of the other respondent groups—which was both a factor of and
drew their attention to the overlaps between racial inequality and economic inequality.
They could see—and were constantly being reminded through personal interactions and
public incidents—that their combination of race and class status was considered
anomalous. Furthermore—and also a factor of present and past racialized economic
inequality—many had personal ties to people living in poverty. Those relationships
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underscored to these respondents both their own luck at escaping the same fate and the
ways that their impoverished race peers were economically trapped by structural and
systemic forces beyond their individual control.
The sharpest contrast to the more race- and class-integrated lives of high-income
Black respondents was the relative race and class isolation of high-income White
respondents. These contrasts highlight the way race correlates with very different social
and economic inheritances even for people currently in similar economic circumstances.
A good example of this difference between high-income Black respondents and
high-income White respondents is the contrast between Gene (HIBM) and Josh (HIWM).
Josh came from a family of inherited wealth—where every generation (back to the
1600s) ”had property to leave to the next generation.” “We had more money than
probably most of the people in the town that I grew up in,” he said, and, in that town, he
“saw people … living the lives that they chose” rather than lives dictated by necessity.
Gene likely saw similar things in his immediate surroundings growing up. His
parents both had graduate degrees, his dad was an executive, and he grew up in the
suburbs: “a majority area, where most of my friends were white and Jewish.” But as a
Black man, he was only one degree removed from a very different reality. Gene’s parents
had moved from the city to the suburbs, where Gene was “away from my cousins and
that kind of stuff.” While Gene thrived in a place where he was supported in acting on his
parents’ values of “you do well in school, you're going to take some risk and challenge …
you'll get ahead,” he was very aware of his cousins, back in the city, who “were getting
into fights” while his uncle “got into drugs.” With “no safety net,” Gene said, these
family members “end[ed] up suffering.”
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Gene was like many high-income respondents in his expressions of concern for
the poor and distress about economic inequality, more broadly. He expressed a more
personal commitment than many to sacrifice some of his income to address issues of
economic inequality. However, he was unlike many high-income White respondents in
the way he described his motivation as stemming from feeling directly affected by
inequality because of poverty in his own family.
[Inequality] affects me directly because … there's poor people in my family. …
So, I see the impact, I live the impact of what it means to be poor and not want to
be poor. To oversimplify it. Right? Things happen. You turn to drugs, you know.
You turn to crime. You give up. And you just become less healthy. …
And not only that, it's happening to really good people who come from good
families with great values. So, it's not this sort of, these biases … or prejudice that
kind of creeps up where we'll say, you know, Black people steal. [laughs] You
know, or they're just that way. I mean these are happening to good people that are
close relatives that just didn't have some of the opportunities that I did. So,
because of that, I feel it. I can't hide from it. It's in my face.
Despite describing his own social class status as “probably like the top 2% of American
earnings,” Gene also says he “live[s] the impact of what it means to be poor and not want
to be poor.” This kind of statement of the personal impact of poverty was not something I
generally heard from high-income White respondents.
In contrast, poverty and economic inequality were visible to Josh (HIWM) all
around the city (as they were to many New Haveners), but residential segregation by race
and income made it so that poverty was something adjacent to Josh’s life and not
something he felt “confronted with.”
Josh expressed both sympathy and distress about the conditions of the poor—and,
like Gene, argued that poverty had structural rather than individual roots—but he also
commented that his exposure to people living in poverty was “mostly indirectly.” How
did economic inequality impact his life? I asked.
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I mean, beyond just like driving through New Haven? I mean, I see it … when I
drive home, I see, you know, elderly people with bags of groceries walking, you
know, across Whalley Avenue and you know, they had to … go to the grocery
store and they're on foot. They don't have a car, so yes, that's poverty.
And I … consider some kids in my kids' classrooms that have, you know,
behavioral problems … that I think are related to their … economic circumstances
because it adds stress to their parents and you know, maybe there’s … more
volatility in their households. … So, I guess it's mostly indirectly but … like
many people, I'm surrounded by fairly like-minded … people among the same
incomes so just in my … actual living, you know, I don’t— I'm not confronted
with it. It's just … I live in New Haven, so I'm next to it.
Although he doesn’t mention race explicitly here, Josh mentioned later on that when he
thought about people who are poor, “it's mainly racially segregated poverty in New
Haven” that came to his mind. Thus, despite living near—and even sharing a public
school with—people who differ from him in class and race, Josh expressed a much less
personal connection to poverty than did Gene.
Gene was pained by his family’s suffering in a personal way that seemed to
motivate his desire for change. He seemed to be thinking of his uncle when he explained
that he thought there was currently a “lost generation” of people—particularly Black
people—who had been denied the opportunity to build wealth and the knowledge to
navigate in the economy. As he explained his argument that the government had a
responsibility to “back” people in that situation “until [they] learn how to do it on [their]
own,” his language turns personal.
And the government should do that. That's really what affirmative action's about,
right? I'm going to back you until you— and that's where the civil rights
movement kind of failed us. We weren't really ready to back ourselves.
JS: [and when you say we…?]
I mean black people. … Yeah, I still say “we” [laughs].
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Gene indicates his personalization of the issue by including himself—using the
first-person plural—among the group who wasn’t “really ready to back ourselves.” As an
economically successful entrepreneur who described his income as “real money,” Gene is
clearly not referring to his own household’s economic circumstances. Nevertheless, his
racialized experience links him to people across class lines—both through his own family
and through his common experiences of racism. I heard this use of “we” and “us” from
several high-income Black men as they discussed the problems facing Black people
living in poverty. Gene’s personal experience helps him argue against widespread
societal narratives suggesting that poverty—and specifically racialized poverty—is about
individual failure rather than structural limitations.
Part of what the contrast between Gene and Josh highlights is the way race
correlates with very different social and economic inheritances even for people in similar
current economic circumstances (in fact, Gene’s current income was several times that of
Josh’s). These inheritances included the outcomes of past and present policies as well as
practices that promote access to wealth (e.g., via home ownership) and economic
opportunity (e.g., via jobs or loans) among White people while denying it to Black
people.
“I'm being treated as if I'm black and poor. … I’m black, but I’m not poor.”
Sandra (HIBW) offers another example of the ways Black respondents recounted
being “confronted with” racialized economic inequality that were outside the experiences
of most White respondents. Sandra was born into “a poor family” and recounted being
“treated unfairly” in school because “there was this idea of what it meant for us to be
black and poor.” She could also see the constraints on her relatives’ economic lives both
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in terms of how they had been racially “tracked” in school (“they weren't gonna be in
advanced classes”) and in terms of how their economic opportunities were shaped by
things “out of their control” including inherited circumstances (e.g., their parents’
education and employment) and economically and racially segregated lives. Sandra saw
herself as “one of the lucky ones” who, thorough the “fate and chance and happenstance”
of her particular circumstances, “made it.” Because of this, she continued to think of her
friends and relatives who had not had her “exceptional story” and argued that a path like
hers should be but was not “available to everybody.”
Even in Sandra’s current life—where she was a professor, married, and had a
household income of $275,000—she regularly encountered reminders of poverty and
racial economic inequality through personal experiences of discrimination. For example,
in her response to my question about whether she thought American society treated poor
people fairly, she turned to her own encounters being treated as if she was poor because
she is Black. There’s not “such a clear line between … the poor and not poor,” she said.
“A lot of the ways in which poor people are treated in this country … it can happen to
somebody in the middle class.” As she continued her thought, it became clear that the
“somebody in the middle class” she was referring to is likely a Black person. She gave an
example of her experience:
If I’m in a grocery store and shop … people assume that I’m black and poor, and
that I’m going to steal something, but … I’m black but I’m not poor … but I’m
being treated as if I’m black and poor, and it’s not fair, and not that a poor black
person should be treated that way.
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Sandra’s experience of being “treated as if I’m black and poor” is a common one.39 Race
is often treated as a proxy for class such that even a high-income Black person like
Sandra is assumed to be poor. She does not want to be treated as if she is “going to steal
something” and, in reflecting on her feelings about being treated that way, she adds that
she doesn’t think “that a poor black person should be treated that way” either. She
examines how poor people are treated, in part because of her own impoverished
background, but also because—even in her current life—she personally encounters that
treatment.40
White respondents did not offer accounts of encountering the kind of treatment
that would encourage such examination. Generally, the opposite was true, as we will see
in the next section.
(Mis)understanding racialized economic inequality: “collective willful ignorance”
“One is astonished in the study of history at the recurrence of the idea that evil must be
forgotten, distorted, skimmed over. We must not remember that Daniel Webster got drunk
and only remember that he was a splendid constitutional lawyer. We must forget that
George Washington was a slave owner, or that Thomas Jefferson had mulatto children, or
that Alexander Hamilton had Negro blood, and simply remember the things we regard as
creditable and inspiring. The difficulty, of course, with this philosophy is that history
loses its value as an incentive and example; it paints perfect men and noble nations, but it
does not tell the truth.” W.E.B. Du Bois - The Propaganda of History (1998)
“An important, often overlooked, facet of economic inequality in the United States is that
it is a product of historical and present-day forms of racism—labor, housing, and other
policies and practices—that have systematically disadvantaged racial/ethnic minorities
in their pursuit of economic opportunities.” (Kraus, Rucker, and Richeson 2017:10329)

39. Numerous stories like Sandra’s have been in public media (e.g., Holmes 2020). Also, other respondents
recounted similar experiences.
40. As we’ll see later, Sandra framed this example in a relational way—thinking about both those on the
sending and the receiving ends of the treatment she described.
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A key factor in White respondents’ struggles to explain the ways race has and
does factor into Americans’ economic outcomes seemed to be what Kraus et al. have
termed a “collective willful ignorance” about America’s racial history and current state of
racial economic inequality (Kraus et al. 2019). In general, Americans overestimate racial
economic equality, demonstrating “a systematic tendency to perceive greater progress
toward racial economic equality than has actually been achieved” (Kraus et al.
2017:10329). High-income White Americans’ overestimates are particularly far from the
truth—more inaccurate than those of lower-income White Americans and those of Black
Americans of all incomes (Kraus et al. 2017). Kraus and colleagues argue that these
misperceptions reflect Americans’ “unyielding belief in a specific, optimistic narrative
regarding racial progress” (2019:900).
Among my high-income White respondents in particular, this dominant narrative
was anchored in omission. Many expressed little to no understanding of the history of
racialized oppression between emancipation and the present. They seemed to have no
readily-available narratives to draw upon that illuminated the mechanisms of current
racial economic inequality nor that linked current inequalities to the racially-unequal
systems and structures of the past. They also didn’t express an awareness of their own
lack of information on these fronts—and seemed unlikely to seek it out.
These gaps in knowledge and awareness among high-income White respondents
seemed to be further reinforced by the relatively high levels of race and class segregation
in their lives. Together, these factors left high-income White respondents particularly illequipped to act on their concerns about racial economic inequality. Instead, some clung
to what Kraus et al. (2019) call “overly optimistic and unfounded” narratives of racial
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progress and/or they turned away from structural explanations of racial economic
inequality and toward more individualistic or culture-blaming arguments.
Seeing and not seeing race
Patrick (HIWM), whom we have heard from several times, provides a good
example of these patterns. He both attended to and minimized the importance of race as
he expressed his concerns about economic inequality. In his response to my opening
question about the fairness of the American economic system (with no mention of race),
he independently brought up the idea of racialized economic inequality. After starting out
describing himself as “someone on the upside of the unfair scale,” he explained, “I think
there are a lot of unfairnesses built into it, skin color being one of them, but I hope that
that's diminished slightly as a barrier—simple skin color.” Here, Patrick seems to raise
the issue of the impact of race on economic outcomes and minimize it in the same breath.
He went on for a few minutes, describing how he felt that “the experiences a person has
are incredibly powerful in determining … economic outcome,” and returned to his own
racial advantage a few times during that initial monologue. These included his comments,
noted in Chapter 1, about making “lots of mistakes” but getting “a lot of second chances”
in part because of his race.
Throughout the interview, Patrick wrestles with the importance of race as a factor
in Americans’ economic outcomes—alternately expressing optimism that American
society had “continued to improve,” and concern about “backsliding” under the
administration of President Donald Trump. Patrick offers little evidence to support his
hope or optimism about the declining impact of racism, leaving those sentiments feeling a
bit like wishful thinking on the part of someone who acknowledges—but is
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uncomfortable with—his own racial privilege. Kraus et al. (2017) suggests that these
kinds of wishful sentiments, drawing from “prevailing narratives of societal racial
progress … are likely to play a causal role in maintaining a collective, systemic blindness
to vast racial disparities in many domains of contemporary American life” including
income and wealth (2017:10330).
Indeed, Patrick demonstrated an interesting lack of attention to racialized
economic inequality as he described his choices about educational options for his
daughters. His older daughter attended (and his younger daughter “will attend”) public
elementary school that he described as racially- and class-mixed. He said that he and his
wife “wrestle” with deciding to keep their kids in public school (“a commitment we
make”) while “we see neighbors constantly, who are friends of ours, who share our
values to a point, pulling their kids out at one point or another.” As if to explain the pros
and cons of these educational choices, Patrick said, “it's different for boys at the school”
and described the school’s population in terms of race and income:
Fifty-fifty low income, upper middle income, I'd say and pretty much that is
highly correlated with ethnicity; Caucasian and African American, very small
Hispanic population and the income and the ethnic correlations are high, very
high.
He implied, but did not state, that this demography itself was a reason that parents might
pull their children out. But, Patrick continued, “our older daughter has a wonderful cohort
of girls from the upper-middle, college-educated, white side” of the neighborhood that
feeds the school:
They're all high achieving, lots of enrichment in the family and the summers and
the vacations and family trips, college educated, blah, blah, blah. … A lot of
people with graduate degrees. My wife and I are probably the least educated
among the parent cohort, least credentialed. It's easy for us right now because she
has that cohort … so we try not to be judgmental when people pull their kid out of
the school and put them in private school.
190

Chapter 3

Patrick was so focused here on whether or not to pass judgement on his economic peers
who make the choice to send their children to private school that he seemed to miss the
opportunity to reflect on the fact that what made the decision “easy” for him at the
moment was that his daughter’s group of friends was relatively racially and economically
homogeneous. He didn’t express regret that his daughter did not have a more diverse set
of friends given the diversity of her school. In fact, he seemed to suggest that, if her set of
friends were more diverse, it might have been harder for him to make the decision to
keep her in her school. He also didn’t express an awareness of the greater range of
options he had—by virtue of his income—compared with the parents of some of his
daughter’s classmates.
These omissions are particularly notable when Patrick later mentions that
something he “values” about living where he does is his lack of being “sheltered” from
seeing these class and race differences. He mentioned this in the context of answering my
question about whom he thought of when he thought of the very rich or the very poor.
[Living in] New Haven means you're not sheltered from seeing the poor and in
New Haven, again it's the correlation with being of color—whatever the correct
term is—is high although it's by no means absolute. There are a lot of Caucasian
poor. They're right in front of me all day ... not all day long, but a lot, in my
neighborhood, which is maybe zip code-wise, pretty well off for New Haven.
Although I think it's very average for America. Although there are houses like
mine that suggest upper middle-class comfort if not absolute wealth. People walk
through. People walk by the house who are clearly— people come through the
park. So, I feel like that's something I value about New Haven is that you don't
feel completely sheltered the way you might if you lived in a quieter part of
Woodbridge or something. 41
Patrick mentions race here, unprompted, and seemed to want to suggest his awareness of
the connection between racial and economic inequality. But he sounds unfamiliar with

41. We saw part of this quote in Chapter 2. Woodbridge—which Angela (LIBW) also referenced earlier—
is known for being predominantly White and high income.
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this territory, and perhaps nervous about saying the “wrong” thing about a charged topic.
Rather than talking about the connection between racial and economic inequality—as he
seemed to want to do—instead Patrick finds himself racially stereotyping the poor
(although he catches himself and notes, “there are a lot of Caucasian poor.”) Right before
this, Patrick had described the rich without mentioning race at all—they were
“financiers,” “classmates from college,” and people “amassing piles of gold.” It is only
when he turns to the poor, whom he admits he doesn’t “know very much” that he
references “the correlation with being of color.”
Patrick seemed to be trying to differentiate himself, morally, from rich White
people who might isolate themselves from race and class diversity by describing his own
willingness to live without being “sheltered from seeing the poor.” But his struggle to
articulate his point suggested that his life was more “sheltered” than he would have liked
to admit.
Despite this struggle, Patrick—like many high-income White respondents—
seemed willing, if ill equipped, to consider and engage in conversations about racial
economic inequality. This was especially the case—for Patrick and others—when his
personal and familial well-being were not implicated. For example, when we talked about
government support to the poor, he pushed back against the common argument that
money was being “wasted” on people who didn’t need help.
In general ... I think so much of that language can be code for basically racism,
like ‘shiftless people of color don't want to work and paying them not to work just
supports that tendency’ and that's racism. It's not true. It's obviously not true.
When questions of his own position were not in consideration, Patrick seemed more
comfortable talking about race. Here, he seemed to feel that he was on the morally right
side of this situation. Kraus et al. (2017) suggest that self-protective motivations
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influenced different perceptions about racial economic inequality, depending on the
context of the conversation. They found that when high-income White Americans were
cued to think about a Black individual or family who was similar to them “in terms of
goals, talents, attributes and skills,” they were more likely to overestimate White-Black
economic equality (i.e., to be excessively optimistic) because acknowledging economic
gaps by race in that scenario would be “especially threatening to the perception” that their
own position was fair or just. However, when they were cued to think about racial
discrimination, potentially tempering their misplaced optimism, White Americans were
more likely to make more accurate estimates of actual racial economic inequality.
These psychological motivations toward self-preservation are likely further
exacerbated by social structural factors—particularly, segregation by race and class in
schools, neighborhoods and social networks. High-income White respondents were the
most isolated by race and class of any of the income and race groups in my sample. Kraus
et al. (2017) argue that people learn accurate information about the mechanisms and
magnitude of racial economic inequality in part through “a meaningful amount of
intergroup contact or exposure.”
In other words, Patrick and other high income White respondents likely struggled
to see or understand racial economic inequality in part because they were psychologically
better off not seeing it, in part because their lives were racially and economically
segregated, and in part because of missing information in our broader societal
conversation about racial economic inequality.
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Miss(ing) Information: Omissions in White understandings of racial economic
inequality
The pattern of missing information was particularly visible in the striking
differences in specificity when high-income White and Black respondents talked about
the historical legacy of slavery and systemic racism in relationship to current racial
economic inequality. In particular, high-income White respondents acknowledged,
generally, historical racism as linked to current racial economic inequality, but largely
struggled to describe, or left unexamined, the specific mechanisms (especially the
structural and systemic mechanisms like laws and policies) linking past racial inequality
to current racial economic inequality. As in the previous case (using Patrick as an
example) of acknowledging racial economic inequality more generally, this pattern
seemed to reflect both the desire to avoid self-implication, but also a straightforward lack
of knowledge.
Two patterns are notable here. First, high-income White respondents, while often
acknowledging the economic legacy of slavery and subsequent legalized oppression of
Black people, were often vague—compared to high-income Black respondents—in
describing the mechanisms of this legacy. Second, most high-income White respondents,
when they did discuss this history, focused primarily on the people hurt by these systems
and rarely mentioned those who benefitted.
Here, I use the examples of Tom and Keith (both HIWM), who had quite different
understandings of and sentiments toward economic inequality, but whose descriptions of
the historical roots of racialized economic inequality were remarkably similar. Their
vague and non-relational analyses of the historical roots, despite their different
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orientations to economic inequality itself, further illustrate a broader pattern of missing
information in mainstream American discourses about racialized economic inequality.
Tom (HIWM) was a rare respondent who said, initially, that he thought the
American economic system was generally fair. 42 “There are adequate opportunities for all
to get a job or a living.” Nevertheless, he said, “I do believe that there is income
inequality,” but he was “not sure” whether or not it was a problem. He characterized
himself as a “math science guy” and someone who “just think[s] about things more
clearly” than his peers. As such, although economic inequality seemed “negative” to him,
he reserved his judgement, feeling that a “deeper analysis” into the “contributing factors”
was necessary.
Tom raised the issue of racialized economic inequality only later, when I reflected
back to him my understanding of his initially-expressed opinion. I summarized his earlier
opinion this way: “all different types of people in the U.S. have fairly equal opportunities
economically.” Hearing this, he said, “I might hedge on that a little.”
In general, I think your average or typical American has opportunities, but I
recognize that different ethnicities or races or population centers have different
levels of opportunity compared to others. I mean it's pretty obvious, white males
probably have the greatest level of opportunity compared to every other possible
group, and certainly blacks or other poor populations have less opportunity, I
recognize that.
He went on to explain that he felt there were “many” mechanisms behind these
differences in opportunity, but one that was “a big contributor … maybe more than many
others” was “lack of education or awareness.” He alluded to factors beyond an
individual’s control, blaming a dearth of “good guidance.” At the same time, he noted,

42. Tom was in his late 40s, he had a master’s degree and worked as an IT project manager. He owned a
home, where he lived with his wife and young daughter. Their household income was about $190,000.

195

Chapter 3

“I'm aware of the other barriers: discrimination, prejudice, those kind of things,” but said
he thought “those are harder problems to solve.”
Tom didn’t raise the idea of a historical legacy behind these inequalities until our
second interview, when I asked him specifically whether or not he thought race was
connected to income and wealth differences in the U.S.
For sure, historically, I mean going back to slavery … that's probably a direct
explanation of why blacks have always been behind, y'know, economically in this
country. That they've just never been able to break free of those roots and/or the
impressions that non-blacks have had of them in order to give them the
opportunity and that's why they've been held back. So, for sure. Or it’s that history
there that explains it. And for sure even today I mean there's still ongoing
prejudice and discrimination.
… I would certainly agree that um your race has a [small laugh] direct
relationship to y'know your income state.
Tom acknowledges a “history” wherein Black Americans were “held back” and not given
“opportunity.” He feels that current racialized economic inequalities can “probably” be
explained by looking back to this history. The mechanisms he names (“prejudice and
discrimination,” “impressions”) suggest a fairly vague and simultaneously individualistic
lens. The only perpetrators mentioned are “non-blacks” who hold presumably-unfair
“impressions” and therefore fail to “give … opportunity.” Indicating only a vague
process (“going back to slavery”) he seems unaware of—or is unable to name—the
systematic linkages between historical racial oppression and current economic
inequalities (e.g., laws and policies that denied Black people all sorts of economic
opportunities from education to home ownership to jobs to business loans).
These are not part of a widely-available narrative in the U.S. In fact, as many
argue, the opposite is true: national discourse is dominated by “narratives highlighting
America’s path toward, if not achievement of, racial equality” (Kraus et al. 2019; see also
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Hannah-Jones 2020; Loewen 2018; Reeves 2018). In this context and without this
understanding, Tom, like other respondents, turns to individualistic arguments about
culture—explanations that seem to place the blame on Black people themselves for not
being “able to break free of those roots and/or the impressions that non-blacks have had
of them.” As Unzueta and Lowery (2008) argue, individualized conceptions of racism
avoid awareness of White privilege and therefore allow Whites to protect a positive selfimage.
Indeed, when Tom had earlier described his own economic opportunities
compared with those of others, he struggled to reconcile his positive self-image as “a
hard worker” with his acknowledgement of his racialized advantage:
I'm a white male, so right off the bat, I recognize life it's probably been easier for
me than many other classes in society. I do think I've been a hard worker through
my life, I mean my parents pushed me when I was young and that's stuck with
me, and I think the specific choices I made or were encouraged to make along the
way helped.
Like other White respondents, he acknowledged and immediately turned away from his
unearned advantages linked to race and gender to focus on his own merit.
Despite his focus on individual merit, Tom suggested that he did not blame Black
people themselves for the disproportionate and concentrated poverty they face.
Nevertheless, he struggled to be more specific about what he did think the causal forces
were.
I guess if you start out poor [uncomfortable laugh] it's easier to stay poor. But
even … I perceive that, as a remnant of slavery, where slaves were kind of, they
lived one place and others lived another place, this idea of … blacks living in
concentrated segregated areas has persisted. … Maybe that’s the cultural part, so
it’s not just “they started poor now they're still poor,” it’s that it’s been tough to
integrate and I guess on that point current or past prejudice is probably the biggest
factor there.
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Tom could see the racialized segregation in his city, but as he tried to explain it, he found
himself back again with no more specific an argument than “current or past prejudice.”
The barriers, Tom suggested, are erected by unspecified others, including segregation that
made it “tough to integrate” and “has persisted.” His language here, as before, is
passive—those who made it “tough to integrate” or those who perpetuate ongoing
“prejudice and discrimination” remain un-named and unexamined. He notes that “blacks
have always been behind” but makes no mention of who has always been ahead. Even
when he did briefly mention “non-blacks” and their “impressions,” they were not really
the actors, but more like an obstacle to be overcome. Throughout our interviews, Tom,
like many White respondents, depicts no relationship in which someone or some group is
benefitting from the hardships he describes.
It is not surprising, given his one-sided telling, that Tom is at a loss to name more
systemic forces—laws and policies—pieces of history that both led to and continue to
perpetuate the kind of legalized residential segregation visible in places like New Haven.
This struggle is notable for a respondent like Tom, who talked about himself as a fairly
informed citizen. He had a master’s degree and made many references to being a critical
consumer of news. Tom’s lack of a narrative around mechanisms linking past racial
inequality to present racial economic inequality, like Patrick’s, point to critical absences
in broader societal narratives and understandings of past and present racial economic
inequality. Of course, like Patrick and other high-income White respondents, Tom was
also likely motivated by self-perception. To acknowledge and understand the legacy and
mechanisms of historical racial inequality, he would be forced to draw into question the
moral legitimacy of his own economic position.
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Compared to Tom’s “math science guy” orientation and “moderate” political
leanings, Keith (also a HIWM) presented himself as much more emotionally driven and
solidly “a Democrat”.43 Keith was also almost 20-years older than Tom and recounted
being somewhat “radical” “back in the ‘60s,” including reckoning with racial and
economic inequality as a “white guy” Peace Corps volunteer in a country where the
population was primarily Black. In contrast to Tom’s uncertainty about whether or not
economic inequality was a problem, Keith seemed genuinely troubled by it. When I
asked him if he thought income differences were a problem for society, he said, “Well, I
think it’s probably the problem. I do” (his emphasis).
These differences from Tom, along with Keith’s expressions of deep concern
about racialized economic inequality, led me to expect that Keith would articulate a
clearer understanding of the linkages between past and present racialized economic
inequality. It was striking then that his explanations reflected a similar lack of knowledge
and narrative as did Tom’s. Despite their differences in perspective, Keith’s struggle to
explain the history of racialized economic inequality was remarkably similar to Tom’s in
his vague references to slavery and use of language that seemed to blame individuals for
their own poverty.
Keith and I had a few exchanges during our first interview when he (like most
respondents) readily acknowledged the existence of racialized economic inequality, often
unprompted by me.44 It wasn’t until our second interview, when I asked him explicitly to

43. Keith worked as a psychologist. He was 67 when we spoke. He lived with his wife and they had two
grown children who lived elsewhere. His annual household income was about $125,000. During our
interview he said, “I don’t own a house.” Although it is common to use the language “own a house” even
while paying a mortgage, it was not clear to me if he meant he was renting a place to live or if he meant he
had not paid off a home mortgage.
44. For example, early in our interview, he singled out “slavery” as one place to lay blame for current
economic inequalities and the problems they cause. “We have suffered the consequences of that … as a
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tell me how, if at all, he thought race was connected to income and wealth differences,
that he attempted to trace historical linkages. At that point, his answers were remarkably
similar to Tom’s.
Well, I suppose, first, they're linked historically, in ways that we've just never
been able to uncouple [small laugh], so that, so that black people in America just
started with the most terrible disadvantages that anyone can imagine, having come
over as slaves and being reviled for their color, and that has, has set the stage for
something that's been very very difficult to ... to overcome.
Even though Keith’s expressions are more emotive than were Tom’s (“the most terrible
disadvantages than anyone can imagine,” “reviled for their color”) his depiction is,
nevertheless, remarkably like Tom’s in its lack of specificity and its focus entirely on the
people who had the “disadvantages” without any mention of those who created the
disadvantages and the barriers.
Like other White respondents, Keith seemed uncomfortable talking about racial
inequality. He lost his train of thought, rambled and meandered in his answers. When I
probed about his previous response, asking “Are there current things that maintain that
difference, or is it primarily about a situation that happened in the past?” Keith struggled
to compose a coherent answer. “I think it’s probably both,” he said. “I don’t think there's
anything inherent that makes black people more lazy or more willing to accept a dole or
something like that.” Having asserted his belief that racial inequality was not about
inherent problems with Black people themselves, he seemed to search for an alternative
explanation, but did not seem to have one readily available.
There's got to be some reason, you're the sociologist, you know more about this
than I do, there's got to be some reason why Italians and Irish and Poles and
Russians and Asians come to the United States and may indeed struggle in
nation for so long.” Later in that same interview, when I asked if he felt that there were “any groups in
society that are more likely to be rich than others,” he said “Well, obviously white people.” “There are
more minority people who are poor than white people who are poor. … I think those things matter.”
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poverty for a long time, a generation, two, but it gets better and better, and indeed
it has no doubt for blacks as well, it's gotten better, but still, here’s where our
biggest problem is. I can only point to color, to people's feelings about that, to the
difference that that makes out in the world for black people. I just— just sort of
keep coming, coming back to that.
I think it's very powerful in America. It's probably very powerful in the world …
and it's gotten to be so unspoken because it's so politically incorrect, but I think
it's just so much at work … so yeah, things are better, but it's still at work in ways
that I think have great cost for people.
Keith struggles to think of a mechanism other than discrimination, and even that he
struggles to name, talking about people’s feelings about “color” and “the difference that
that makes out in the world for black people.” He feels that the way race works in
America has “great cost for people,” but doesn’t seem to know how to explain it. In fact,
despite his earlier commentary that “black people in America just started with the most
terrible disadvantages that anyone can imagine,” he genuinely seems confused as to why
voluntary immigrants “struggle in poverty for a long time … but it gets better and better”
while people who were forcibly brought to the country in bondage have not had the same
outcomes.
Keith struggled to explain how the history of slavery has “set us on a course that’s
been very hard to alter.” Despite different sentiments toward economic inequality than
Tom, Keith finds himself, like Tom, without language or ideas to explain what he thinks
is currently happening with regard to race.
Compartmentalizing race
“Oh, I think it's a huge problem. It's a huge problem for the people who have barriers.”
Lena (HIWW) provides a useful example of the ways White respondents—and
those who were high-income in particular—compartmentalized rather than integrated
conversations about race and economic inequality. Lena’s only direct mention of race
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came in our second interview, when I asked her if she thought race was tied to income
and wealth differences in the U.S. This was particularly notable because, throughout our
interview, she brought up scenarios that invoked racialized economic inequality without
mentioning race.
Lena thought a lot about inequalities between New Haven’s neighborhoods and
alluded to her own involvement in projects that “bridge some of those areas.” She lived in
East Rock (a neighborhood with one of the highest percentages of White people in New
Haven—62%) and repeatedly made comparisons to Newhalville (the neighborhood with
the lowest percentage of White people—3%). Early in our first interview, she gave an
example—talking about “a huge disparity in home values” between neighborhoods—and
seemed to be approaching a conversation about redlining practices, but without
mentioning race.
Even if you were able to get approval for a mortgage for a more modest, more
affordable neighborhood like, I think the banks are less likely to ... you know, you
might not get such a favorable mortgage because of the history of the
neighborhood or the surrounding properties.
Lena vaguely mentioned the “history of the neighborhood or the surrounding properties”
but doesn’t specify further. Given the context of our conversation in New Haven, it
seemed likely that she was talking about neighborhoods that differed by race and class,
but she didn’t make this explicit. She went on to compare her own situation to someone
in another neighborhood—using Newhalville as her comparison—but again, did not
mention race.
And, you know, we were able to buy into here because, you know, our parents
chipped in a little bit and— nothing extravagant, but we just had that extra, you
know, just a little extra help with that to get us started. I mean, those kind of
opportunities are not equally spread out across the city at all. You know, if you're
growing up in Newhalville and your parents are renting and your family doesn't
have that kind of equity built up and the house next door may be, it may be up for
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sale at a very affordable price, but it— you know, it’s not necessarily— like even
if you were able to invest in there— so people invest in those neighborhoods in
more of an extraction-type scenario where they're absentee landlords and, you
know, they just kind of harvest the rents but don't necessarily create any equity for
the neighborhood.
Lena appeared to be trying to make a point about racial economic inequality—and her
own advantage (which, of course, she is careful to note was “nothing extravagant”)—but
her point is vague and muted because she avoided explicit mentions of race or poverty.
She argued here, and elsewhere, that people in neighborhoods like Newhalville were
stuck in circumstances of exploitation, whether by “predatory landlords,” “failed public
housing”, “divestment in … public infrastructure,” or “policing strategies” that physically
“trap people” where “most shootings happen.” Her examples—especially in the context
of a city that she acknowledged was “so segregated”—continually suggest racialized
economic inequality without explicitly describing it as such.
When I asked about what had influenced her views on the topics we were
discussing, this compartmentalization was even clearer. She talked about a brief time
living in West Oakland (in California’s Bay Area)—a neighborhood with a long history
of African American culture, struggle, and displacement—and said she lived there during
a period of “pretty extreme poverty” and “in the middle of the crack epidemic.” 45 She
said, “that made me feel a lot of compassion towards my neighbors, because I got to
know them,” but again, she made no explicit mention of race. As part of this same
answer—about influences—Lena also talked about traveling internationally, including

45. West Oakland is a neighborhood with a history as a thriving African-American center which was
subsequently one of many such neighborhoods that suffered from racialized destruction and displacement
through freeway building and “urban renewal” projects and the construction of public housing projects that
racially concentrated poverty, and later became a center of Black Panther resistance in the 1960s.
(Anthropological Studies Center n.d.; Murch 2010; Self 2000)
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visiting family in Europe, and being glad to come back to the US, where a history of
“income inequality” isn’t as much “part of the landscape.”
I'm always grateful to come back to the US, actually, because I feel like … you
really can kind of talk to everybody or find some kind of common meeting ground
with anybody, whether it’s a homeless person or like a super-rich person. That is
really possible here and in other places, it’s— you know, even spending time in
Europe where there’s the whole infrastructure of the feudal system that is just part
of the landscape. So, I'm always like, you know, the castles are really— it’s very
beautiful, it’s fun to visit as a tourist, but I'm always kind of glad to come back
here and not always have that reminder of like, the king and the peasants, kind of.
So, it's pretty amazing that we live in a place that doesn’t have that same kind of
history. In terms of income inequality.
It was surprising to hear Lena say this—about “not always” having “that reminder of like,
the king and the peasants”—just a minute or so after talking about her experiences living
in racially- and economically-segregated Oakland and in the context of an interview
where she had talked about the visible inequality in her own city. The American history
of dispossession, slavery, forced labor, and exclusion were so not part of widespread
American narratives that Lena could completely overlook them, even when directly
talking about history and subjugation. Her comments were particularly surprising because
she described herself as aware of current inequalities and said, “It’s something I care
about a lot.” Although current racial and economic inequality “doesn’t affect my personal
safety,” she said,
I feel touched by it just living in New Haven, because you see it as you want your
whole city to be— I mean, you see potential for the whole city. It's a great city
and then it's just frustrating to see these kind of lines. It shouldn't be so
segregated. There shouldn't be like, the kind of poverty that you see. The kind of
violence. You know, kids … being in really bad circumstances and that’s— you
know, it’s maybe a small percentage, but— you don't want to hear about kids
getting shot.
In fact, Lena did seem to “care.” Throughout our interview, she gave many examples of
the kinds of hardships and inequalities she saw children, in particular, suffering that
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suggested that she regularly attended to these issues. Even still, she manages, throughout
the interview, to talk about racial economic inequality without talking about race.
In our second interview session (near the end), I finally asked Lena explicitly
about whether she saw race playing a role in economic inequality. Notably, she didn’t
reference any of the examples she had given earlier (e.g., about neighborhood segregation
or difficulty getting bank loans), but, like other high-income White respondents, she
made vague references to history and treatment.
I mean, I think it’s, you know, just— Historically, that's such a— it’s such a huge
part of our history, like you just have to start out with that. Certain people were
slaves. Certain people came over as agricultural labor. So, their whole ... you
know, how we kind of all grew up together, we all came from really different
places in our collective history. So, yeah, I think that's really— I think people are
treated very different based on their race … and also their culture.
She went on, giving a more specific example:
And I see that in— I mean, I think it starts in school. You know, kids are kind of
disciplined in different ways … I mean, you can see it in the high school, because
the high school is tracked, and so, at the upper level, there's this little pod of
mostly-white or kind of international, but from sort of educated families. And
then, I mean, it's like totally color-coded. So that just tells you, it's systematic.
People— you know, if you're poor and you're a minority, you're more likely to get
stuck into one of the lower tracks in the high school. Maybe you went to a
school— that probably started much earlier, where, maybe you're not prepared to
go into the higher track by the time you get to high school, but I mean, you just
look at stuff like that and it's really— I think it tells you, you know, there's a
problem there.
Lena’s reference to historical racial inequality is similar to Tom’s and Keith’s—vague
and non-relational. She argues that it is a “huge part of our history,” but then has very
little to say about it. She mentions slavery and “different” treatment based on race, but
makes no mention of those doing the treating or owning the slaves. She is able to be more
specific as she moves into her example about present-day racial inequality—and her
commentary about the “little pod of mostly-white” students is an interesting echo of
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Patrick’s description of his children’s school. Her involvement with her children’s school
and her attention to inequality helps her see that “there’s a problem there” and even to
describe it as “systematic” and “color-coded,” but she trails off as she tries to describe
how those systems work—like the others, seeming to lack either the language or the
information to make a clearer argument.
Specific, but still not relational
Josh (HIWM), whom we met earlier in this chapter, expressed a more specific
understanding of a racially-particular economic inheritance. Even still, Josh, like most
other White respondents, neglects a relational analysis, primarily focusing on the harm
done to Blacks rather than the benefits accruing to Whites. He argued that current
racialized economic inequalities can be traced back over generations:
Blacks had— they had no wealth, and you know, with them being enslaved and
then any gains they made during reconstruction were rolled back. And then we
had civil— you know, so that people finally woke up in the 50s, that blacks do not
have the same opportunity and so there were laws. And now we're waking up to
the fact that we've just arrested all these poor black men.
… It's just kind of this generational— it's just compounded over generations …
because of our economic— our social system that … didn't give the same
opportunities … for African Americans. … They didn't have the same access to
loans for housing … they didn't have access to the same kind of government jobs
earlier in the century. And so, you can say that it’s more fair now, and it really is,
but that doesn't escape the fact that for 350, 400 years of our history here, you
know, they were treated very unfairly.
Josh is more specific than most other White respondents in naming systemic mechanisms
through which the legacy of slavery and reconstruction translated into racialized
economic inequalities that “compounded over generations.” However, although he is
clearly more comfortable discussing the mechanisms and consequences of racial
inequality than were Tom, Keith, or Lena, Josh, like the others, focuses on the harm done
to Black Americans and leaves those who perpetuate and benefit from that harm vague or
206

Chapter 3

unnamed. Specifically, while he uses the first-person plural possessive in a couple places
when mentioning the perpetuators of harm (“we’ve just arrested all these poor Black
men” or “our social system”), for the most part he uses passive voice to describe the
harms sustained by Black folks (they “had no wealth”, “didn’t have access”, “were
treated very unfairly”, gains “were rolled back”) leaving the perpetuators generally
unidentified. Also, as I noted earlier, Josh expressed an overly optimistic perspective
about current racial inequalities (“you can say that it’s more fair now, and it really is”).
The tendency toward a non-relational perspective among high-income White
respondents was recently captured succinctly by Chana Joffe-Walt in a 2020 podcast
examining the power of White parents in the history of school segregation after Brown v.
Board of Education.
When we look to diagnose the problems of our public schools, we look at what is
in front of us right now. We look forward. Nobody looks backwards to history.
And so, the question is not how do we stop white families from hoarding all the
resources. Instead, the question is, what’s going on with the Black kids? (Nice
White Parents podcast, Episode 3)
Similarly, my high-income White respondents seemed to be asking the wrong question,
in part because they failed to look closely at history. Instead of asking how to stop White
people “from hoarding all the resources,” these respondents ask, “what’s going on with”
Black people.
Black Respondents: specific and relational
As we have seen throughout this chapter, Black respondents’ discussions of
economic inequality regularly integrated discussions of racial inequality, and they talked
about current and past racial inequality in different ways than did White respondents.
Discussions of the historical roots of current racialized economic inequality—although
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only brought up by some respondents—were a place of particularly sharp contrast
between White and Black respondents, highlighting major gaps in knowledge and
awareness among White respondents. Here, I use the examples of Gene and Curtis (both
HIBM) to illustrate the contrast between their specificity and relational analysis when
talking about the historical backdrop of current racialized economic inequality compared
to the vague and non-relational analysis of the high-income White respondents presented
above.
Gene (HIBM) is very specific about the way the legacy of slavery translates into
economic inequalities. For example, he traced current economic and racial inequalities in
the U.S. back to an original “land grab” where those who had power “took” things that
“nobody owned” and created laws in their own favor that established that “you could use
those goods as a form of wealth,” and “over generations … laws that say that you can
bequeath those assets to” your heirs, who become the next generation of “beneficiaries of
that particular land grab.”
And then, outside of that sort of system, you have people who were enslaved,
right? Or you had women who had fewer rights because of the norms at that
particular time. That, from the very beginning, never got a chance to participate in
that land grab. And that is a certain agreement that is woven into our Constitution.
It’s not just how people feel about each other, he argues, but laws put in place “from the
very beginning” that excluded some people from “participating” in a basic form of wealth
accumulation while enabling that accumulation for others. Gene does not directly
describe the race of those who participated in the “land grab” he depicts (instead, he talks
about “fore founders” and people who landed “on Plymouth Rock”), but he nevertheless
describes a scenario in which some people were “beneficiaries” while others were denied
the “chance to participate.” Gene’s even cursory reference to laws “woven into our
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Constitution” is both more concrete and more systems-focused than White respondents’
explanations, such as Keith’s “people’s feelings” or Tom’s “current or past prejudice.”
Later, Gene gets even more specific about the legacy of slavery:
I do really think that everybody would agree that there's groups of people that
were brought here against their will and were set up not necessarily to fail but not
to succeed. Those are facts. … A large percentage of people who are black and
brown are descendants of slaves in America. Those slaves, those ancestors going
back multiple generations weren't allowed to have nuclear families, weren't
allowed to own anything, weren't allowed to learn how to read, weren't allowed to
learn how to gather, weren't allowed to walk by themselves or allowed to learn
how to cooperate.
… Not only that, you were promised 40 acres and a mule. They said, ‘you know
what, we changed our mind on that as well.’ Then they wonder why you have a
system outside of a system. You have crime and you have lawlessness and you
have all the poverty. You have all these things that are circumstantial. They want
to ascribe it to the color of their skin, but the truth is that any group brought here
under those conditions would end up in the same place. 46
At first, Gene’s comments are similar to Keith’s reference to the way “black people in
America just started with the most terrible disadvantages,” but Gene adds a level of detail
that I generally didn’t hear from White respondents. He traced the particular inheritance
of slavery and subsequent legalized discrimination to the current economic circumstances
of many Black and Brown Americans. To Gene, the lack of more widespread
understanding of these particular pieces of history—and their relational nature—is
frustrating:
That's the part that quite frankly makes a lot of black people just angry and fed up,
is how can you not agree that, objectively, you got a start that I didn't get? You
were afforded basic rights that I was never afforded. To me, those are facts.

46. Only three respondents (Darrell, Angela, and Gene) referenced this broken promise to emancipated
slaves—commonly known as “40 acres and a mule”—and they were all Black. (For more about “40 acres
and a mule” and links to calls for reparations, see Conley 2002; Darity 2008; Gates Jr 2007, 2013)
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I don’t think that high-income White respondents intended to minimize the impact of the
historical legacy of racial inequality on current economic inequalities, but rather that they
didn’t know or didn’t have the conceptual repertoire to explain more specifically what
they suspected was the case. Among my interviewees, there were few, if any, that I think
would have disputed the factual nature of Gene’s assertions. (Perhaps I had a particularly
liberal and self-selecting group.) Rather than reflecting individual flaws, their omissions
reflect a structural and systemic exclusion of narratives and historical information about
the laws, policies, and practices that created and reinforce racialized economic inequality
(especially during and after reconstruction). Such narratives are less widely available to
people who are not actively seeking them out than are narratives that focus on more
individual acts of prejudice. Gene’s view blamed systems, including laws and social
structures, rather than individuals, whereas many White respondents who did not take this
historical perspective framed their commentary about racialized economic inequality in
terms of individual actions—by those on both the winning and the losing side of the
economic equation.
There were other examples like Gene. Curtis (HIBM) spoke relationally and
specifically about intergenerational racial wealth inequality—giving the example of the
life insurance industry that, he said, “has taken advantage of black folks.” He explained,
“life insurance is a form of wealth creation,” but insurance companies “didn't explain it to
us that way.” Instead, they profited by selling policies to Black families that would pay
for burial and not much else, “perpetuating this whole notion of burial insurance and
calling it life insurance.” While they could have helped Black families start to build
wealth through “education” around the difference between the two types of policies,
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Curtis argued the life insurance industry (“the most lucrative industry in the world”)
instead launched a “very targeted” campaign focused on selling high-margin “burial
policies” to Black communities. “Way back when … they used to call them the nigger
policies.” Companies placed ads on television stations popular among Black people:
“They come on BET, they come on TV1.” “So, an agent used to come around, they used
to collect the premiums and you know, some guys would walk with the money.” “The
life insurance companies have done us a disservice,” Curtis said, “we're dealt with in that
manner by most systems.”
Knowledgeable and relational accounts like Gene’s and Curtis’s contrast with
what I heard, in general, from White respondents (although I will share some exceptions
in the next section). Black respondents talked about racialized oppression in a relational
way—some people’s wealth was built on other people’s “sweat.” It’s not just that some
people were denied opportunity and resources (passive voice—as many Whites describe
it), but somebody “took” those opportunities and resources for themselves.
White exceptions: Material benefits of Whiteness
Some White respondents did talk about racialized economic inequality using
specific detail and in relational ways, but these respondents were exceptions. They help
to illustrate the kinds of narratives that were missing from most White respondents’
comments.
Meg (HIWW) was a rare White respondent who named a material link between
her own economic comfort and the economic hardships faced by Black people. 47 When I

47. Meg was 45 and worked as a social science researcher. She was married and both she and her husband
had PhDs. They owned their home and had two school-aged children living with them. Their household
income was $140,000.
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asked her how she thought her economic trajectory might have been different if she had
been born Black instead of White, wealth was the first thing she mentioned. She said her
parents both came from wealthy families whose wealth was built in industries “predicated
on people in Africa or Blacks in America not having those things.”
Both my parents, kind of the privilege or the wealth that they have comes from
circumstances: one, colonialism, two, slavery, that were— if I had been black it
would have been impossible.
Without that familial wealth, Meg said, she wouldn’t have been able to put a down
payment on her house. She likely wouldn’t have had the kind of educational opportunities
she had had. The intangible impacts were even larger. “I think being white comes with
really deep and often unexamined kind of sense of entitlement and confidence.” (Here,
she echoed Julie’s comments from Chapter 1). When thinking about the entanglement of
racial inequality and economic inequality, Meg emphasized the generational nature of
access to wealth.
When I say material resources, I don't just mean access to money … it's not
income it's wealth, it's not just wealth it's wealth like over generations. … it's not
easy to change just by giving people higher incomes, because they don't have the
wealth, and even if they have the wealth, they don't have five generations of
wealth, which kind of gives you this sense of being able to take risks and this
sense of, “this is my world.”
Even without naming specific pieces of racial history, Meg links current racialized
economic inequalities “over generations” to those of the past, something that was rare
among White respondents.
Meg’s comment—framing her opportunities as “predicated on” Black people
being denied opportunity—was the only comment of its kind that I heard from White
respondents. Many respondents talked about benefits or advantages they had over others,
by virtue of their Whiteness, but the subtle difference there—between acknowledging
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that one had something that others did not and suggesting that one had something
because others did not—was powerful. She makes this unique and potent statement that it
is not just that some people were denied access to opportunity, but that that denial is what
created the opportunities and resources for others like her. The uniqueness of Meg’s
statement helps to illustrate some of what is not being said—what I did not hear from
other White respondents.48
Ryan’s (LIWM) comments were not quite as striking as Meg’s, but in them he
made it clear that he felt that he—as a White man—benefitted while other people were
harmed by the way racism impacted economic opportunities.49 Although (or perhaps
because) he felt he was in a position of relative hardship, he thought “somebody else”
with the same circumstances “but different skin color, would be in a much worse
situation than I am.”
In many of his comments about racialized inequality, Ryan echoed what I heard
from several other White respondents: it is not that the people who economically succeed
have necessarily made better choices, but that the same choices made by people
differently situated in society (“because of their skin color or location”) are rewarded or
punished in very different ways, with powerful economic consequences.
In those earlier comments, Ryan used a passive formulation that was similar to
what I heard from other White respondents, but later—near the end of our interviews—

48. Notably, Meg was not born in the U.S., was in an inter-racial marriage, and had mixed-race children. I
am avoiding more specificity to maintain her anonymity.
49. Ryan was 55. He had a master’s degree. He had a chronic health condition that left him in ongoing pain
and kept him from working for pay (but he did not qualify for Social Security Disability payments because
he had been a graduate student, and not contributing FICA taxes, for the four years before he applied for
Disability). He was a regular volunteer tutor with a program that served New Haven students. He lived in a
shared house with 13 other people (“it’s kind of like a boarding house.”). He was an artist and occasionally
sold a piece of art. Otherwise, his entire income was $900/month in Social Security Income ($10,800/year).
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when I asked him directly about how race or gender had affected his economic trajectory,
he used more active language: “Because of me being a white male, I had more
opportunity.”
I’ve been given things that I know women have to struggle for, people of different
color or different race or ethnicity have to struggle for, just because that's the way
the system was set up.
Although other respondents talked about being “beneficiaries” of advantages, this kind of
formulation—”I’ve been given things that [others] have to struggle for”—was something
I rarely heard from White respondents, although I certainly heard many talk about their
own racial advantages. Our social narratives seem to so denigrate the idea of being
“given” something as opposed to “earning” it that many were hesitant to use such
language.
Conclusions
“Negro poverty is not white poverty. … These differences are not racial differences. They
are solely and simply the consequence of ancient brutality, past injustice and present
prejudice. They are anguishing to observe. For the Negro they are a constant reminder of
oppression. For the white they are a constant reminder of guilt. But they must be faced,
and they must be dealt with, and they must be overcome; if we are ever to reach the time
when the only difference between Negroes and whites is the color of their skin.”
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement speech at Howard University,
June 4, 1965 (1966:637)
Respondents’ perspectives about and attention to racialized economic inequality
varied by race, class, and gender. In general, White respondents compartmentalized
conversations about the intersection of race and economic inequality—many did not
address the topic with more than a mention until I explicitly prompted them. Meanwhile,
Black respondents regularly integrated conversations about race, power, and economic
inequality. Black respondents also spoke about racial inequality with a more relational
analysis than did White respondents—linking the denial of power for some to the
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concentration or consolidation of power for others. In contrast, White respondents tended
to focus more on non-systemic forms of social “treatment” (such as bias and
discrimination) than on systemic differences in power when talking about race (as
opposed to when they spoke about class). In this way, White respondents often left the
gatekeepers of power and the gains of those gatekeepers unnamed and unexamined—and
Whiteness as the “unmarked category against which difference is constructed” (Lipsitz
1995:369). Finally, while both White and Black respondents linked current racial
inequality to historical racial inequality, White respondents did so in ways that were often
halting, cursory, and vague. Many expressed little, if any, understanding of the history of
racial oppression between emancipation and the present. In the moments when they did
acknowledge this history, White respondents often focused almost entirely on the harm
done to Black Americans, with little or no discussion of those who had perpetrated or
benefitted from that harm.
The race and class isolation of respondents’ lives likely played a role in
reinforcing these patterns—especially among the high income. Access to historical
information and narratives about current and past inequality is embedded within social
networks that are notoriously racially segregated. This social segregation is both the
consequence of legal and structural residential segregation and also a self-reinforcing
perpetuator of that “cycle of segregation” (Krysan and Crowder 2017). Without crossracial contact, Kraus et al. 2019 argue, people miss out on “the opportunity to acquire
accurate perceptions of the lived experiences of people who do not share one’s own
status.” Because intergroup contact is so rare, especially for high-income White
Americans, such contact “is often accompanied by significant psychological discomfort
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and difficulties in navigation that further reduce the information sharing essential to
accurate conceptions of the racial patterns of economic inequality” (Kraus et al.
2019:911).
High-income White respondents (especially men) appeared to have some of the
least race- and class-integrated lives. Josh’s description captured the way many highincome White men described their exposure to race and class difference—something he
was “next to” but not “confronted with.” The high-income White women I interviewed
had more intergroup exposure—sometimes through jobs that served low-income New
Haveners, sometimes through engagement with their children’s public schools, and in
two cases (Meg and Robin) through their own inter-racial marriages.
High-income Black respondents seemed to have the most race- and classintegrated lives of any of the groups I spoke with. Patterns of intersecting racial and
economic segregation meant this group, in particular, navigated professional, familial,
and community spaces that cut across race and class (Pattillo 2013). This cross-race and
cross-class contact was both a factor of and drew their attention to the overlaps between
racial inequality and economic inequality. Many had personal ties to people living in
poverty—as a result of present and past racialized economic inequality. As a
consequence, high-income Black respondents seemed to feel more personally impacted
by racialized poverty and economic inequality than did their economic peers who were
White. This heightened awareness was further reinforced by societal conflation of race
and class such that high-income Black people are often profiled in such a way that they
are assumed to be poor. They could see—and were constantly being reminded through
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personal interactions and public incidents—the ways constructions of race and class were
used to exclude some and elevate others.
White respondents, whether high- or low-income, seemed reluctant to discuss the
power wielded by White people. Among the low-income, their everyday economic
hardships seemed to make it harder for them to see and reckon with their racial privilege.
Those hardships demanded their attention while their racial advantage was something
they could largely ignore. Race came to their attention primarily when they perceived that
it caused them hardship rather than benefit. Psychologists have argued that forces that
make life easier (“tailwinds”) are much less salient or visible to people than forces that
make life harder (“headwinds”) (e.g., Davidai and Gilovich 2016). “Barriers and
hindrances command attention because they have to be overcome; benefits and resources
can often be simply enjoyed and largely ignored” (Davidai and Gilovich 2016:835). This
phenomenon was visible throughout my interviews and seemed particularly relevant in
the case of low-income White respondents.
High-income White respondents, whether consciously or unconsciously, avoided
self-implication—both in terms of separating themselves from the powerful and in terms
of minimizing discussion of gains to people like themselves. While they did generally
acknowledge that they had had better opportunities or had received better treatment
because of their race, they seemed more comfortable talking about the harm faced by
communities of color rather than the benefits gained by White people. Or they were more
comfortable speaking generally about racial advantage and disadvantage but not how that
applied to their own lives. It seemed that it felt safer to them to treat racism as if it is done
by others and/or in the past—as suggested by their vague and non-relational references to
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slavery. With these references, high-income White respondents seemed to want to
indicate their awareness of historical racial injustice while also distancing themselves
from it. Instead, they seemed to unwittingly reveal their own lack of awareness and
therefore, their own complicity. These tendencies toward avoiding self-implication were
part of a larger pattern wherein even the higher-income White respondents that I spoke
with did not consider themselves to be really among the “winners” in the U.S. economy.
Someone else was winning, and they saw themselves as only collateral beneficiaries of
that system.
The fact that high-income White respondents had the mental and emotional space
to grapple at all with historical racialized economic inequality might have been, in part, a
reflection of the very benefits they had gained from that system, including the kind of
“comfort” many referenced. Gene (HIBM) argued that people who “make a lot of money
… have the freedom to think,” whereas “poor people in some ways are using all of their
energy to simply survive. … They’re literally just trying to eat and be healthy and take
care of their family.” Indeed, low-income respondents often seemed consumed by their
own struggles—their concerns about economic inequality were so personal—such that
there seemed to be less space in their consciousness to contemplate the hardships of
others.
Moreover, for low-income White Americans, interlocking systems of race,
gender, and class inequality create a “paradox of privilege” (Moss 2003) in the conflict
between their marginal economic status and the hegemonic narratives of Whiteness. They
are the subjects of social scorn, challenging the social and symbolic boundaries of
Whiteness (Wray 2006). Among my respondents, this group’s limited access to the
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“wages of whiteness” (Roediger 2007) seemed to fuel their perceptions of being in direct
competition with their racially-different economic peers. Their feelings of exclusion from
mainstream respectability seemed to lead low-income White respondents to want to
highlight their differences from these peers, turning their attention away from the
oppression they shared and the resulting benefits accruing to the powerful.
Black respondents saw entanglements between Whiteness, wealth, and power as
obvious, but they also understood that these connections were at best ignored and at
worst contested in mainstream White America. Perhaps in response to this, I heard
variations on the phrase “these are facts” from many Black respondents as they talked
explicitly about racialized economic inequality.
White high-income respondents, in general, seemed ill-informed about the kinds
of facts Black respondents discussed—those linking historical and present-day racial
economic inequality. These White respondents talked about this history in general and
vague ways that made it seem that they didn’t have readily available narratives they could
draw upon nor the historical knowledge they would need to make sense of the social
phenomena they were trying to explain. I agree with the many scholars and commentators
who argue that this negligence of or even lying about (to borrow James Loewen’s
language and W.E.B. Du Bois’ implication) American racial history is dangerous and has
“dire implications” (Kraus et al. 2019). Americans vastly under-estimate both current and
past racial wealth gaps—a misperception that is likely to undermine efforts targeted to
closing those gaps (Kraus et al. 2019; Shapiro 2017). It is easy to imagine that this kind
of “willful ignorance of racial economic inequality” (Kraus et al. 2019:913) is connected
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to a similar ignorance of racial history in the U.S. (Nelson, Adams, and Salter 2013;
Strickhouser, Zell, and Harris 2019).
At the same time, it seemed that many of the White respondents I spoke with
might have drawn upon an alternative narrative or a better understanding of history if one
had been readily available to them. Yes, they failed to learn this information that is
widely available to those seeking it, but the history in question should not be specialized
knowledge only available to those motivated and equipped to seek it out. The failure of
this particular group of individuals points to systemic issues. The “gauzy way white
Americans tend to view history, particularly the history of racial inequality” (HannahJones 2020) is at least in part the result of “lies” that are part of both official and
unofficial narratives about American racial history (Loewen 2018).
Acknowledging the absence of mainstream narratives that more accurately
represent this history does not absolve individuals—such as the high-income White
respondents in this study—but focuses on a more collective, and structural, complicity.
This was captured well by Bryan Stevenson as he reflected on the 2015 shooting of nine
Black people in a Charleston, South Carolina church by a “white supremacist”:
The question I ask is not how could this young man be affected by these historic
failures, by this ideology, the question is how could he not? We're all affected by
it. … [N]o one should be shocked that those ideas are in his head when they are
reinforced in countless ways day in and day out in our everyday living, including
in the ways that the positions of power and influence are still largely owned and
occupied disproportionately by people who are white.
Stevenson argued, as have others, that these ideologies are upheld, in part, by “our failure
to deal more honestly with our history of racial injustice” (Johnson 2015).
Gender is an important part of this history—with race and gender operating as
joint systems of economic oppression (Branch and Hanley 2014; Browne 1999; Collins
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2000). Legally and socially, Black women in the U.S. are disproportionately targeted for
criminalization, punishment, and surveillance—and this “convergence of criminal and
civil surveillance regimes creates and maintains the dominant racial, class, and gender
hierarchy” (Crenshaw 2013:25). Labor and citizenship—constructs integrally tied to
economic access—have “been constituted in ways that privilege white men and give
them power over racialized minorities and women” (Glenn 2002:1). Racialized divisions
of labor have and do limit Black women to “devalued work,” while “employers have
benefitted from interracial animosity” encouraged by pitting Black and White women
against each other in competition for jobs (Branch 2011:90; Glenn 1992). Gendered
ideologies have long undergirded racialized violence (e.g., Crenshaw 2013; Equal Justice
Initiative 2017).
Among my respondents, the intersecting history of gender, race, and class
inequality went almost completely unmentioned by men. The respondents who discussed,
or even mentioned, overlapping gender and racial inequality were overwhelmingly
women. Nevertheless, both men and women—in the cases where they described people
with privilege and power in society, including themselves—often referenced both race
and gender (specifically, referencing White men). But only a handful of respondents (four
out of five high-income Black women) spent any time focusing on the economic
implications of intersecting race and gender inequality. These respondents recounted
particular (and painful) experiences facing discrimination, micro-aggressions, or other
forms of exclusion based on their race and gender.
Although it was a focus for only a minority of respondents, gender was present
throughout the interviews—especially in terms of the experiences respondents drew upon
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to inform their opinions. As we have seen in this chapter—and as we’ll see again in the
next section about policy opinions—the topics that respondents brought up, based on
their experiences, were gendered. For example, low-income women (both White and
Black) talked about experiences applying for and receiving state assistance (e.g., WIC,
SNAP, cash assistance, rental assistance, and health insurance), reflecting the gendered
and racialized structure of American welfare policy (Gilens 2009; Orloff 1996; Quadagno
1994). Women (both high- and low-income) talked about the entanglements between
their work to care for their children and their own economic trajectories.
The differences between White and Black respondents in their understanding,
awareness, and knowledge about racialized economic inequality reflect a systemic and
structural collective negligence that undermines efforts to seriously address growing
inequality in wealth and income. At the beginning of this project—and informed by
scholarship demonstrating a clear link between racial attitudes and opinions about
welfare policy (e.g., Gilens 2009)—I suspected that racial attitudes played a key role in
American ambivalence about policy designed to reduce economic inequality. Although I
certainly found differences in racial attitudes among my respondents, what were more
prominent were gaps in knowledge and narrative. These gaps came from a variety of
sources, including social and spatial segregation, formal and informal education, and
media portrayals, each reinforcing the other (Entman and Rojecki 2001; Gilens 2009;
Krysan and Crowder 2017; Loewen 2018; Massey and Denton 1993). It seemed that
White respondents’ social network segregation perpetuated a lack of knowledge that both
emerged from and was fueled by hegemonic historical narratives related to racialized
inequality. These factors combined with societal favoring of “colorblind” narratives and
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avoidance of race in public discourse, contributing to White respondents’ discomfort in
talking about issues of race. Just as Krysan and Crowder (2017) described a selfreinforcing “cycle of segregation” between social segregation and residential segregation,
the patterns among my respondents pointed to a self-reinforcing cycle of social
segregation, lack of knowledge, and discomfort with topics related to race. Breaking this
cycle requires us to “deal honestly with this history” (Bryan Stevenson in Johnson 2015).

***
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INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTERS 4 & 5:
WHAT TO DO? SUPPORT AND RESISTANCE TO REDISTRIBUTION
As we have seen in the previous chapters, my respondents—across class, race,
and gender—expressed concern about economic inequality and a desire to see more
equitable distributions of wealth and income. For the most part, they agreed on an
overarching story that people’s economic outcomes were not necessarily the results of
their merit or effort but were often tied more closely to inherited circumstances. We also
saw some notable differences across class, race, and gender in the ways respondents
made sense of economic and racialized inequality.
When our conversations turned to what to do about economic inequality, two
major patterns emerged. First, support for downward economic redistribution, broadly
conceived, was widespread. Respondents generally wanted to see the rich contribute
more to improving the lives and circumstances of the poor. Second, and at the same time,
most respondents—either explicitly or implicitly—also resisted redistribution, although
the contours of this resistance diverged across class. The following two chapters
(Chapters 4 & 5) illuminate these patterns.
Support for redistribution
All respondents thought more should be done to support the poor—and there was
widespread agreement on what areas needed improvement: access to education, housing,
healthcare and meaningful and gainful employment. Most wanted to see the rich give up
some of their holdings in to support these improvements in the lives of the poor.
Support for redistribution seemed to both emerge from and feed into respondents’
sympathy for the poor and their antipathy for the rich (Piston 2018). As we saw in
Chapter 2, most respondents felt that the rich had more resources than they needed and
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that they thus had a moral obligation to share their wealth in order to improve the lives of
those who are struggling. There was a widespread perception of malfeasance among the
rich—whether that was ill gotten gains made at the expense of the poor, hoarding of
resources, tax evasion, or political manipulation. Even those respondents who thought the
wealthy had a legitimate claim to their holdings—seeing them as having “earned” or
“deserved” what they have—felt that the suffering of those with less than enough cast a
moral shadow and placed a moral obligation on those with more than enough to give up
some of that excess to alleviate the suffering and hardships of those in poverty. Thus,
although some redistributive sentiments were motivated by blaming one group (the rich)
for the hardships of the other (the poor), this belief was not a necessary correlate of
support for redistribution. Many respondents felt that the magnitude of the economic
divide, itself, should justify some form of “giving back” from those with abundant
resources to those who were scraping by.
Resistance to redistribution
Resistance or reluctance to redistribution took different forms among high- and
low-income respondents, shaped by their divergent experiences. Low-income
respondents were more reluctant than high-income respondents to take from the rich.
They had little real exposure to the lives of people in the top 20% of U.S. income or
wealth, but plenty of experiences with scarcity and lack of control in their own economic
lives—leading many to resist the idea of taking from anyone against their will. Adding to
this resistance was their distrust of the government, seeing it as a perpetuator of
inequality. High-income respondents were more willing to take from the rich, in part
because they were more familiar with what they felt was the excess held by that group.
And they generally expressed a willingness to contribute to downward redistribution
225

Introduction to Chapters 4 & 5

themselves, but were either resistant to acknowledging or unable to see their own
complicity in existing systems of inequality and the power they had within those systems
to change them.
For low-income respondents, resistance to taking from the rich overlapped with
their own exposure to that group and was entangled with a distrust of government. Most
felt that government was controlled by the rich and that, together, those entities worked to
keep poor people poor. With this baseline, any policy solution to economic inequality felt
implausible if not impossible to these respondents. Awareness of the durability of their
own position—rather than misplaced optimism about their own economic prospects—
shaped these attitudes. Low-income respondents were painfully aware that their voices
carry less weight in the U.S. political system (which is backed up by data - e.g., Bartels
2016; Gilens 2012; Page and Gilens 2017). They felt keenly the impact of inherited
circumstances on people’s economic positions. Thus, although poor and low-income
interviewees were generally strong supporters of redistribution—expressing a set of
strong and relatively coherent demands—they also felt cynical about government
intervention and thus discouraged about the prospects for change.
High-income Americans’ resistance to redistribution has received less attention
from scholars who have sought to understand sources of political inaction to counteract
economic inequality (but see Reeves 2018), but because of their high rates of political
participation, their resistance is particularly consequential. Few high-income respondents
in my project were overtly opposed to traditional redistributive policy—and, in fact, most
were overtly in favor—but some had mixed feelings, and most either did not feel
implicated in the creation or upholding of inequitable economic systems or they felt they
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had little power to change those systems. Their resistance was implicit—embedded in
their failure to acknowledge—and possibly to even be aware of—their own role in
perpetuating economic inequality, including benefitting from upwardly-redistributive
policy. They tended to frame themselves as willing participants in solutions to economic
inequality—for example, amenable to increases in their own taxes—but not as
contributors to the problems they described.
Despite high-income respondents’ suggestions that greater contributions from
people like themselves might help ameliorate some inequality—they seemed unwilling to
consider that the absence of those contributions might support its perpetuation. Although
all were sympathetic to the poor, few suggested that the lives of the poor might be harder
because of the actions (or inaction) of people like themselves. Instead, high-income
respondents focused their attention on people with greater material resources than their
own and the ways that group benefitted from and upheld systems of inequality. With their
lens focused above them, high-income respondents felt politically disempowered,
neglecting their own relatively greater power compared to that of low-income
respondents. In this way, high-income respondents continued to benefit and even uphold
current systems of inequality while portraying themselves (to themselves as well, it
seemed) as morally righteous in their opposition to the status quo and their willingness to
contribute to change.
Issues of visibility
Both high- and low-income respondents seemed unaware of the benefits they
received through the tax code—what Suzanne Mettler has termed the “submerged state.”
For low-income respondents, the Earned Income Tax Credit was such a benefit. Highincome respondents received an array of benefits through the tax code—including the
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Home Mortgage Interest Deduction and tax-free college savings accounts. In both cases
(high- and low-income) the end result of this unawareness was similar: resistance to
redistribution. Low-income respondents remained untrusting of the government, despite
the significant investment made by that government (through the EITC) towards
improving the well-being of the poor. High-income respondents remained surprisingly
unaware of the ways they were siphoning off the very funds they expressed a willingness
to contribute (in additional taxation) through these benefits buried in the tax code.
In these ways, respondents’ lack of understanding of their own receipt of
government assistance through the tax code—on both ends of the income spectrum—
muted what might have been stronger redistributive sentiments. Low-income respondents
might have seen these policies as positive government actions and high-income
respondents might have seen them as unnecessary supports to their already comfortable
lives.
Visibility also played a second role in shaping the opinions of high- and lowincome respondents—and in this case in divergent ways. Because of their economically
segregated social networks, low-income respondents were much more familiar with other
low-income people and high-income respondents were much more familiar with other
high-income people. In both cases, respondents were critical of people closer to their own
economic status: low-income respondents criticized their economic peers for taking
advantage of the system and high-income respondents were sharply critical of the rich for
hoarding economic resources. Likewise, low-income respondents were more empathetic
to the rich and high-income respondent to the poor. In this case, these sets of segregated
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visibilities led low-income respondents to be more reluctant about redistribution, while it
led high-income respondents to be more supportive of it.
Race
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on differences across class/income groups. But, as we
have seen throughout this dissertation so far, race strongly shaped respondents’
experiences with and exposure to inequality. Wealth and poverty are racialized (and
gendered) experiences in the U.S. and these experiences shaped people’s opinions. The
patterns I described in Chapter 3—of differences in understandings of the entanglement
of racial and economic inequality between White and Black respondents—were also
reflected in respondents’ discussions of policy solutions to economic inequality and their
own power to make change. Racialized experiences were a constant touch point for Black
respondents as they talked about policy, while they were more of an unspoken backdrop
for White respondents. For example, awareness of the American government’s role in
perpetuating racial oppression, combined with current experiences of discrimination,
reinforced low-income Black respondents’ distrust of a government that has been an
active part of their oppression for centuries. For high-income Black respondents,
awareness of the entanglement between racial and economic inequality combined with
social proximity to poverty undergirded their support for redistributive policy—
especially targeted to the Black poor.
Black respondents’ position among the high income—and therefore, their
relationships to and opinions of policy and systems that perpetuate inequality—was
materially and socially different from those of White respondents. Even among the
income group I focus on in Chapter 5—the top half of the income distribution among the
high-income people I interviewed—several Black respondents were just one generation
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removed from poverty while none of the White respondents shared that experience. As
noted in Chapter 2, some recent research has shown that even when raised in highincome families with equivalent incomes and even in the same neighborhoods, Black
men are far less likely to retain their family’s economic status than are White men, and
are far more likely to fall down the economic ladder (Chetty et al. 2020). Thus, high
income Black respondents’ opinions were likely shaped by being closer to poverty in a
network and familial sense than were their White economic peers, and also through an
awareness that downward mobility in their or the next generation was not uncommon.
The cases
In these two chapters, I present respondents in a somewhat more holistic form
than in earlier chapters in order to contextualize their opinions about policy.
Respondents’ policy views are embedded within their understandings of economic
inequality, more generally. Thus, some of what you will see here will echo what we’ve
already seen in earlier chapters. Chapter 4 focuses on low-income respondents and
Chapter 5 focuses on high-income respondents.

***
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CHAPTER 4
VISIBILITY OF INVISIBILITY:
LOW-INCOME RESPONDENTS’ POLICY VIEWS
“In effect, American social policies have reproduced racial hierarchy and the American
welfare state has been an instrument more often of social stratification than of social
equality.” Linda Fae Williams (2003:3)
“The political lesson to be learned about Medicaid and other public assistance programs
(i.e., ‘welfare’) is that they may alienate more than they activate participants.”
Robert Hudson (2015:889)
“There's no need to … tax the big people for they money if you're not going to do right
by it.” Gloria (LIBW)
Introduction
The suffering of the poor was particularly visible to low-income respondents—it
was their own and it was in their communities. In contrast, what they could see and
imagine of the lives of the rich seemed unnecessarily luxurious. Although many held onto
the hope that their own efforts might eventually lead to more economically comfortable
lives, they also believed (as we saw earlier) that wealth and poverty often had a lot more
to do with inherited, rather than earned, circumstances. Many also believed that their own
economic struggles were linked to, if not caused by, the pursuit of economic gains among
the rich.
As we have seen, most respondents felt that economic conditions in the U.S. were
such that some people had far more than they needed, and others had less than what was
required to meet what most considered to be their basic needs. This sentiment—
sometimes fortified by a sense that the greed or malfeasance of the rich contributed to the
poverty of the poor—led many low-income respondents to argue that the rich had a moral
obligation to use some of their holdings to reduce the “economic stress” in the lives of the
poor.
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However, when low-income respondents discussed ways to address economic
inequality, their distrust of government—a feeling that government was controlled by the
rich and worked to keep people down—made any policy solution feel implausible if not
impossible.
Respondents’ perceptions of government action were rooted in their direct and
indirect experiences with highly visible, means-tested social welfare programs that were
widely regarded as controlling, punitive, degrading, and discriminatory. Interactions with
these agencies fueled a perception among low-income respondents that government
support programs focused inflexibly on meeting bureaucratic rules rather than attending
to the real lives of the poor. This led some respondents to argue that government not only
fails to meet the needs of many of those who could use help, but also fosters a system of
skewed incentives that keeps people from improving their own lives. The actions of the
government were seen by many as not only ineffective in terms of poverty reduction, but
even actively oppressive.
The lack of control that low-income respondents felt in their own lives—both
through their experience with government programs and more broadly as socially and
economically marginalized members of society—ironically engendered a kind of
empathy for the rich. Although most low-income respondents felt that the rich had a
moral obligation to give up some of what they had to help the poor, they also hesitated to
support government policy that would force the rich to do so. These sentiments seemed to
emerge from respondents’ own senses of scarcity and feelings of resentment about having
so little control over their own economic lives.
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Distrust of government, empathy for the rich
This chapter makes three primary arguments. One is that low-income respondents
support downward redistribution in principle, but they are pulled away from supporting
redistributive policy in practice by their distrust of government, including their feeling
(shared by the high-income) that the rich wield too much power in that arena. The second
is that low-income respondents’ distrust of government is more reasonable than elite
commentary often makes it out to be. Third, for some low-income respondents, distrust of
government, resentment of being constantly subjected to social control, and experiences
of ongoing scarcity fostered a surprising empathy for the rich (in their resistance to
redistribution), despite low-income respondents’ critical views of that group. Thus,
among low-income respondents, both sympathy and antipathy for the rich seemed to
foster resistance to policies like redistributive taxation, despite their support for
downward redistribution in principle.
Although most low-income respondents would have liked to see the rich share
more of their wealth to improve the lives of the poor, few had any hope that such
redistribution would happen or that—channeled through the government—it would make
any meaningful difference in their lives. Most distrusted the government and the rich in
nearly equal measure. Some respondents hardly distinguished between the two entities—
feeling that both were run by the rich and powerful to serve primarily the interests of
those groups. Even those who did see government and corporations as separate entities
with separate aims nevertheless felt that the rich and powerful who ran corporations had
disproportionate power and representation in government.
Distrust of government by low-income Americans is often dismissed as the result
of ignorance or misunderstanding, but the experiences of respondents I spoke with
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suggest otherwise. The poor feel what research has demonstrated. In fact, government is
less responsive (if not entirely unresponsive) to the needs and interests of the poor
compared to those of the rich (Bartels 2016; Gilens 2012). Government policy has long
been part of the unwelcome regulation and control of the lives of the poor (e.g., Hays
2003; Piven and Cloward 1993). Lawmakers who design and structure programs to assist
the poor are almost entirely drawn from among the wealthy (Carnes 2013), creating a
“vicious cycle” in which the rules of these programs are guided by “negative images of
target groups” and are then “implemented in ways that reinforce negative group outcomes
and reputations” (Fording et al. 2011:1652).
Low-income respondents’ regular interactions—and struggles—with the most
visible government support programs reinforce their feelings that their lives and needs are
not only of minimal concern to policymakers, but also that these very programs are being
used as tools of social stratification (Herd and Moynihan 2019; Soss, Fording, and
Schram 2008; Williams 2003). They argued that government programs offered meager
assistance surrounded by so many restrictions that they felt as if the programs were
designed to keep people in poverty rather than help them out of it. These feelings are
echoed by researchers who describe social welfare program design that “often seems
more focused on excluding the ineligible than on including the eligible” (Herd and
Moynihan 2020:1). A 2018 report by the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities found
that the structure of one of the three major federal poverty-alleviation programs,
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (a cash-assistance program), “exacerbate, rather
than reduce, deep poverty” (Floyd, Burnside, and Schott 2018). Other researchers argue
that the U.S. social safety net for those in poverty only provides about half of the income
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support that would be needed to have everyone able to meet “basic needs” (Jusko 2016).
Furthermore—and as many respondents who received benefits argued—the “fall off”
rules can be so steep that “increased earnings may be associated with less income,
overall” (Jusko 2016:7), perpetuating the poverty of those receiving assistance.
Respondents’ experiences of feeling controlled and surveilled are also echoed
across the literature. Some researchers have described welfare systems as parallel systems
of correctional control, mirroring systems of incarceration, but segregated by gender.
Like their predominantly male counterparts under correctional control, poor
women on welfare are subject to a disciplinary regime where penalties for
noncompliance loom large and resources to counter social and economic
marginality remain difficult to access. (Fording et al. 2011:1649–50)
Low-income respondents’ experiences reflected both the gendered and racialized
nature of these parallel “disciplinary regime[s].” Welfare program rules and structures
meant that, generally—although not exclusively—women were more likely to describe
experiences applying for direct assistance—for childcare, cash assistance, health
insurance, disability, or financial aid—while work and wages took up more airtime
among men, as did experiences with the so-called criminal justice system.
People experiencing “social and economic marginality” also had to contend with
systemic racial profiling and racial stereotypes. As we’ll see, respondents like Darrell—a
low-income black man who had no criminal record—felt he had to specifically address
the assumption that he might have such a record as he tried to find a job. Katie and
Andrea (LIWW)—in response to their own feelings of being disciplined and punished
rather than helped—turned to racial stereotypes to make sense of their circumstances,
arguing that their Whiteness gave them a disadvantage in applying for government
support.
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Visibility, stigma, and the “submerged state”
Direct assistance programs—that required people to apply, demonstrate their need
and deservingness, and submit to sometimes demeaning scrutiny and surveillance—were
far more visible to low-income respondents (and to the general public) than programs of
the “submerged state” (Mettler 2010, 2011) that invisibly offer assistance through the tax
code. Such “submerged state” programs targeted to the low-income (e.g., the Earned
Income Tax Credit, EITC, or the Child Tax Credit, CTC) were doubly invisible—neither
commented on by those who likely received them nor those who did not. 50 Compared to
mean-tested direct assistance programs, receipt of these kinds of benefits come through
the much more universal—and distinctly less stigmatized—process of filing a tax return.
While the non-stigmatized nature of this form of government assistance facilitates
a sense of social inclusion among those who receive it (Sykes et al. 2015), it also makes
such assistance invisible to those who might otherwise advocate for it. For example,
Mettler (2010) cites an Obama-era tax credit, the Making Work Pay Tax Credit, that
“reduced income taxes for 95 percent of all working Americans” but—a year later—was
only correctly recognized by a small minority of the public.
These kinds of misunderstandings of policies hidden in the tax code are
widespread and not limited to low-income Americans. High-income respondents were
equally susceptible to overlooking government actions that worked in their favor. Indeed,
the differential visibility of various government actions is built into the very design of
these policies. On both ends of the income spectrum, among my interviewees,
respondents’ lack of understanding of their own receipt of government assistance through

50. As we’ll see in Chapter 5, such programs targeted to higher-income Americans are equally invisible to
them.
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the tax code muted what might have been stronger redistributive sentiments. Low-income
respondents might have seen these policies as positive government actions and highincome respondents might have seen them as unnecessary supports to their already
comfortable lives.
Setting aside the strengths and weaknesses of programs designed to alleviate
poverty and inequality, the American government has a long history of creating and
reinforcing differential access to income and wealth through the selective inclusion and
exclusion of groups in policies related to housing, incarceration, healthcare, education
and financial institutions (any number of references could be cited here—c.f., Alexander
2012; Glenn 2004; Oliver and Shapiro 2006). In other words, critiques of government by
low-income respondents cannot be dismissed as misunderstandings or simply the
opinions of the uniformed. Low-income Americans—especially low-income people of
color—have valid and evidence-based reasons to distrust government.
Most respondents struck an uneasy balance between this distrust of government
and their desire for the government to do more to tackle economic inequality. Some
research suggests that this pattern—wherein concerns about inequality both undermine
trust in government and increase desire for government action—might also hold more
broadly among the American public. For example, Kuziemko et al. (2015) find that
providing information about the growth of economic inequality in the U.S. and the
impact of redistributive taxation pulls respondents’ views of redistribution in opposing
directions. “It appears to make respondents see more areas of society where government
intervention may be needed but simultaneously make them trust government less”
(Kuziemko et al. 2015:1492). Seeing high levels of economic inequality appears to
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decrease Americans’ already-low trust in government, the researchers suggest, because
they might “blame the government, perhaps thinking that if politicians ‘let things get this
bad’ they cannot be trusted to fix it” (Kuziemko et al. 2015:1481). At the same time, the
same information “significantly moves people toward wanting a more active
government” (Kuziemko et al. 2015:1492). Many low-income respondents were in this
uneasy place and uncertain how to reconcile these sentiments.
The cases
The bulk of this chapter is made up of four cases that I will use to develop my key
arguments about low-income respondents and their thoughts about how to address
economic inequality in the U.S. As I noted in the introduction to this section, these cases
are more biographically holistic than those in earlier chapters in order to better capture
and represent the context of people’s lives that shape their views of policy.
We have met all of these respondents—Darrell (LIBM), Katie (LIWW), Jeremy
(LIWM), and Kelly (LIBW)—in earlier chapters. I selected these four respondents for
two reasons. First, they have a range of experiences and opinions that reflect some of the
common themes I heard from low-income respondents as we discussed economic
inequality in the U.S. Additionally, I chose these cases for their demographic diversity—
specifically their gender and race—which shaped respondents’ experiences with and
opinions about economic inequality and the government programs designed to address it.
There are two women and two men, two Black respondents and two White. Although
these respondents’ experiences and opinions reflect some of the most common themes,
there are many experiences and opinions that are not captured in these four cases—a
necessary act of omission and reduction for the sake of time and space.
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Darrell (LIBM)
Background
Darrell was 24 when we spoke. He had no regular income, and faced an ongoing
struggle to find gainful employment, with the “good jobs … few and far between.” For
the past couple of years, he had been engineering music at a local community-serving
recording studio that he was able to use for free. He came to the studio every day (“I do
not miss a day”) and dreamed of one day “actually making an income” through his music.
When I asked about his social class status, he said “it would definitely be midlower-class. I came from the projects and had nothing really.” He had left home as an
early teenager, as his parents were going through a divorce, and he hadn’t finished high
school. Like many other respondents, he expressed concern about the homeless (and the
poor generally), but his concern was acute, and he let me know—although only part way
through our first interview—that he was, himself, experiencing homelessness.
Darrell’s experience and his concern about his economic peers animated his
criticism of the rich and his desire to see that group contribute to improving the lives of
the poor, but they also fueled his distrust of government-based policy solutions. Pulled in
these opposing directions, Darrell turned to narratives of individual agency—focusing on
effort and attitude, things that felt within his realm of control. He was frustrated with his
own lack of autonomy in a life circumscribed by scarcity and subjugation. He seemed to
translate that frustration into a surprising empathy for the rich in their resistance to
redistribution.
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Mixed feelings about rich and redistribution
“I believe everybody should have at least … somewhere to stay or some sort
of food source. We have plenty of food in the United States to feed the
homeless. We have plenty of food in the United States to feed all of Africa
and we choose not to. That's the real problem. We choose not to when we
can.”
Against this backdrop of hardship, Darrell expressed mixed feelings about the rich
and by extension, about redistribution. As with other respondents, Darrell’s views of the
rich were closely tied to his views about the legitimacy of economic inequality. On the
one hand, Darrell tended to favor societal narratives of meritocracy. Although he was
rarely admiring of the rich, he did refer to them in terms that suggested his belief in their
merit. For example:
People that have money now worked for it. Or their parents worked for it, or
whatever the case is. People that don't have money, their parents were less
fortunate—their parents either didn't have the knowledge or didn't have the work
ethic to produce what they needed for their children to sustain in the next life.
The rich, Darrell suggests here, either worked for it or benefitted from parents who had
cultural capital (“knowledge” or “work ethic”). He suggests that the money of current
generations came through such merit, whether that of the current or of a previous
generation. Unlike other respondents who grappled with inherited resources—and
generally felt that the inherited circumstances of current generations were a basis for
unjustified inequality—Darrell stuck to his meritocratic argument and suggested that
someone in the past must have worked hard for the current generation to be doing well.
Thus, he said, although the resulting inequalities might not be fair to the current
generation, they were inevitable.
It comes from the people that were before you; your parents, your grandparents,
their parents and so back. They put themselves in a position to where their kids
won't ever need … so that's the grind from the generations before you that put you
right. As far as that, I believe there are certain unfairities with the newer
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generations coming up not knowing how their grandparents and those before them
did it. … I mean your parents did something along the line that didn't go as well
for them or they weren't able to save - or less fortunate. And, I'm not saying that's
fair, but it happens.
Darrell navigates a thin line here—seeming to argue that inequalities emerge from
differences in merit, but simultaneously suggesting that current inequalities based on
previous-generations’ actions might not be fair. At the same time, he expressed a kind of
disengagement with the idea of fairness—suggesting that fairness is not necessarily
something one should expect (“I’m not saying that’s fair, but it happens”) or worry over.
Throughout our interview, Darrell returned to this theme—the inevitability of unfairness
and the disutility of focusing on it. For example, elsewhere in the interview, he said, “It's
just not meant for everybody to be at the same level” and—talking about his experiences
with discrimination in hiring— “it is what it is.” These sentiments contributed to his
focus on individual accountability, as we’ll see later.
Frustration with the rich: “People with money are doing very little to help the
people with no money”
Despite his unusually sanguine attitude toward the rich, Darrell was nevertheless
sharply critical of what he saw as a failure to use their resources in a way that was more
downwardly redistributive. In fact, Darrell suggested that this lack of action among the
rich on behalf of the poor contradicted core American values. Thinking about people who
are homeless, Darrell abandons his repeated insistence that a focus on fairness is
misplaced and expresses frustration with “people with money.”
When it comes to the terms of, okay, America is the land of the free, equal rights
and all that—it's not true. It’s not true at all. There is, as it is, millions of homeless
people here. There are millions of people with money here who could actually
make a difference but choose not to. So that's actually a problem that I see now is
that the people with money are doing very little to help the people with no money.
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So, if you want to talk about unfair, that would be unfair to me. Because if you
have it, why not?
Darrell’s seeming equanimity is shaken when he considers the plight of the people who
are homeless, especially in contrast to the imagined lives of those with resources “who
could make a difference but choose not to.” Like all of my respondents, Darrell was
sympathetic toward the poor and aggrieved by the highly-visible suffering of the
homeless. When I asked him what his answer was to his own “why not?” question, he
suggested that people were just being self-interested.
I guess you could say it wouldn’t benefit them. Taking a homeless person off the
street isn't putting money in your pockets. It isn't bringing your kids food. … If
it's not beneficial to them, they won't do it. That basically comes with your morals
and what you believe in.
Darrell questions the morals of people who have “money” and “power,” positioning
himself on the moral high ground by arguing (as did many lower-income respondents)
that, if he had more economic resources, then he would feel a “responsibility to do
something,” in part because “I done been homeless, I done been foodless, I done been
there.”
It’s getting cold. I see people out here without hoodies, without proper shoes,
without anything. Now, me, where my morals come from … I would take into my
own responsibility to do something. If I have an extra coat, I would honestly give
someone the coat off my back if they didn't have it. But it's people's different
morals, different money. The power. Now, the power is not even. People with
money have the most power, especially when it comes to providing and doing.
You have that power. People with businesses have that power to do these things
but they don't.
Like many respondents, Darrell expressed criticism and frustration with the rich for what
he saw as their moral and material failure to alleviate the suffering of the poor, especially
given that he (like others) saw the greater material resources of the rich linked to greater
societal power. Furthermore, although he did not necessarily see the rich as having
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attained their position illegitimately, he did think the lives of the rich were easier and
required less work. “They don't have to struggle or go through anything that the average
person is going through.” To Darrell, this perception of ease in the lives of the rich,
contrasted with the struggles of the poor, added to his frustration about the former’s lack
of action on behalf of the latter.
In defense of millionaires - empathy through scarcity
Darrell’s frustration uneasily coexisted with a defense of or empathy for the rich.
As he imagines their lives:
You could be away from everything; you could be away from all this homeless
stuff. You have a home, you have a big, fancy house. You got five cars in your
garage, family dog, ten bedrooms. … and then you've got to come out day after
day after day and see everyone struggling, see everyone fighting to live … and
you could sit there and witness that and not do nothing about it. That—I don't
think it makes you a bad person, but I feel like if you can, you should.
Despite what are clearly strong feelings, he stops short of demanding that those with
excess resources contribute to improving the lives of those whose resources he feels are
insufficient. His suggestion that someone with the means who chooses to “do nothing” is
not a “bad person” comes as a surprise, given his earlier moralistic tone. He seems torn
here, as do many respondents, wanting the rich to do more to improve the lives of the
poor but not wanting to demand or force them to do so.
It would definitely be nice for the people that have more money to do more, but I
don't expect them to. Because they worked for it. That's their money, you can't
expect them to do something. You can’t expect anyone to do something.
Although he clearly thinks those who can “should” give up some of what they have to
help those with less, in the end, it seems, his belief in the meritocracy of unequal
resources and the sanctity of private property competes with his moral outrage. He
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immediately went on to give an illuminating example to illustrate his point about why we
“can’t expect anyone to do something.”
It's like if you go in to work at Subway [the sandwich shop]. Okay, you get off
work, now your boy or one of your friends [says] “Hey, can I get a couple
dollars?” You know, at the end of the day, you work for minimum wage, like
“Damn, man. I wish I could. But I don't even have it for myself.” A lot of times,
that's what I hear. And that attitude right there—I’m not saying on a grand scale,
because obviously Subway vs. a millionaire—that's the same attitude that
millionaire has. He went out and did this. He made that money. Whatever the case
is. If he don't want to share it, he doesn't have to share it.
In this example, Darrell uses an experience he is familiar with—the life of a minimumwage fast-food worker—to empathize with an experience he is wholly unfamiliar with—
the life of a millionaire. He cannot imagine having so much money that he could easily
share and still have enough for himself. When he thinks of taking “responsibility to do
something,” Darrell imagines giving someone “the coat off my back.” He finds empathy
for millionaires in his own experience of scarcity.
Darrell’s experience of scarcity is not only about material resources, but also
about power and autonomy—and that experience, too, seemed to ironically bolster his
defense of the rich. It was common for low-income respondents to feel a lack of
control—over their employment, their pay, their taxes, their schedules, their purchasing
decisions—and their frustration with this lack of autonomy translated into a strong lossaversion that seemed to give them empathy for anyone who didn’t want to be forced to
give up some of what they had. Darrell was not alone in this combination of feelings: the
desire to see the rich “do more” or “give back” and the hesitancy to “expect” or mandate
this behavior—I heard varieties of these sentiments from several respondents—especially
from low-income respondents.
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Undermining Redistribution: Powerlessness and Defensive Individualism
Popular narratives suggest that empathetic sentiments like Darrell’s (which tended
to lean respondents away from downward redistribution) come from low-income
respondents’ misperception of the reality of their own economic mobility—that they
imagine that they, too, might be rich one day and don’t want to have their wealth taken
from them. What I generally heard from respondents, however, was not a misplaced
optimism about their own economic futures, but a sense of powerlessness—a
powerlessness that is backed by research that shows that U.S. economic and political
systems are far less responsive to the opinions of the poor than they are to the desires of
the wealthy (e.g., Bartels 2016; Gilens 2012). Far from imagining their own wealthy
futures, most low-income respondents were fighting off despair about their own
economic prospects.
Respondents had different reactions to these feelings of powerlessness—ranging
from anger and resentment to disengagement. Darrell turned to tropes of individual
agency. Throughout our interview, he repeatedly expressed his belief in self-reliance and
the importance of individual attitude and mindset. For example, when he pushed back at
my questions about economic fairness, he argued that focusing on fairness led to
“reliance on everyone else instead of looking inward to solve your own problems.” This
individualistic mindset felt like a coping strategy—a grasping at a sense of agency in the
face of feelings of powerlessness against systemic forces of racism and poverty. Such
individualistic narratives are widespread, focusing attention away from structural and
systemic forces. In her study of job-seeking behaviors among low-income young Black
men, Sandra Susan Smith argues that this kind of “defensive individualism” is a common
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response among the Black poor, who find themselves persistently blamed for their own
hardships.
Within the context of poverty, friends, relatives, acquaintances, and institutions in
their social milieu blamed the black poor and jobless for their persistent
joblessness, deploying discourses of joblessness that privileged individual’s moral
shortcomings and stressed personal responsibility and self-sufficiency as a
panacea (Smith 2007:22).
The men Smith interviewed responded to the distrust and “non-cooperation” of their
peers—patterns rooted in racist discourses and structures—by “defensively” embracing
these individualistic discourses and thus, blaming their own individual weaknesses or
failures for their inability to find jobs. This focus on individualism is a double-edged
sword—simultaneously self-defeating and self-protective. By locating accountability in
individuals, people blame themselves for their failures, but also feel a sense of control,
even empowered to change their circumstances.
Darrell, for example, was frustrated and discouraged in his attempts to find steady
work but seemed to find some hope in a combination of individualist tropes—not giving
up in the face of failure and having the right attitude. As he tries to make sense of his
experiences with structural barriers, we can see him turning (defensively) to these
individualistic tropes.
As he described his difficulties in finding gainful employment, Darrell notes the
racism he faced. He explained, “I have no background record. I have no felonies, nothing
like that” (alluding to the economic challenges of disproportionate criminalization faced
by many other Black men). He said, it’s “not that the jobs were hard to get,” but that
racism and discrimination meant that jobs were hard to keep. Darrell gave the example of
a delivery job he had for a few months, working full-time through a temp agency, “going
there every day, busting my ass to work.” At some point, “I guess college had just let out
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for summer break” he said, and, with all the “white kids running around” Darrell recalls,
“I stop being called into work. I stopped getting paid. Nobody was returning my calls. …
I’m stuck out here, like wondering… where’s my next job going to be?” Darrell felt he
was unfairly displaced by “White kids” because that’s “the way the businesses work …
being predominantly White.”
Darrell felt powerless in this system—at the whim of powerful White people who
dictated the rules of economic engagement in ways that he felt were unjust.
They want you to do this, that and the third and be a certain way. Like, I mean,
before I cut my hair, I actually had dreds… and I couldn't get a job because I had
dreds. That's crazy. So, you tell me I got to cut my hair and everything I believe in
to work for you? … And then, to get laid off, you know, that's just like - what did
I do? Now, I don't even have my integrity, you know what I mean, because I cut
my hair to work for you. So, basically, it's just things like that that big
organizations do to minority people that I can't really get behind.
Darrell’s feelings of powerlessness are palpable here—feeling that he had to give up
“everything I believe in” to get a precarious job from which he could easily be dismissed.
As before, when he discussed the power imbalance between rich and poor, Darrell
expresses frustration at the power of corporations that could demand that he “be a certain
way,” with no reciprocal obligation to meet his demands or needs. Adding to his
discouragement, Darrell noted that even after years with the first Black president in the
White House, “it’s the same thing”
You talk about employment is raising, this that and the third, okay. I'm still—I
mean, I'm doing whatever I got to do—still haven't found a job. … So, it's like …
what is really going on here?
Darrell’s response to his “what is really going on here?” question echoes that to his “why
not?” question about the rich who fail to help the poor: “you can’t do nothing about it.”
“The sad truth” Darrell concludes, is that “everyone’s out for themselves.” He has little
hope that government, or politicians, or business leaders will make decisions that will
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improve his life or the lives of the poor. Instead, Darrell seemed to turn to individualism
as a way of feeling some agency amidst his hopelessness. The situation wasn’t going to
change, he said, one just had to have the right attitude and “move on.” “There may be
some places that discriminate,” Darrell said, and “there are going to be people that are
racist,” the only thing you can control, he argued is how you respond. To illustrate his
point, he gave the example of his experience working as a door-to-door canvasser:
There were people that opened the door, called me all types of N words. All types
of unpleasant things. But it's how you move on about that. I can't get mad and
want to fight somebody … But move on, go knock on the next door, you know
what I mean? Keep a smile on your face. Move on. Go knock on the next door.
You're not going get a positive response from everybody. … At some point in
time, you're going to find someone that wants to talk to you.
A focus on systemic racism or unlikely policy solutions is not helpful to Darrell in this
scenario, so instead, he draws upon the hopeful narrative that—despite structural
barriers—if you have the right attitude and you persevere, eventually, you will get a
break.
I don't want to be in this place called homelessness. I want to be able to walk into
my house, greet my dog, have a family - all this that and the third - and I'm not
going to do that by just sitting on my ass.

Distrust and suspicion of government: “I just don’t know the government well
enough to be like ‘I trust you’”
Like many of the respondents I spoke with, and like many of Hochschild’s
respondents, Darrell distrusted the government. Taxes taken, to him, felt disconnected
from the services provided. His proposed solution (if he “had the opportunity to run this
country ... or at least be involved in like politics”) provides some insight into the nature
of his distrust of government intervention for redistribution. The themes he raises—an
inability to see tax dollars at work in his community and a reluctance to take resources
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from people other than through voluntary contributions—were themes I heard from many
low-income respondents.
Darrell proposed a redistributive system that was remarkably like taxation. People
would sign up on a website, he explained, to donate a dollar or two out of every
paycheck. Then, they could vote on how that money would be spent:
Do you want your money to go towards the homeless? Do you want your money
to go towards …healthier food? Do you want your money to go towards - even a
people's bank - like a regular bank for just the people, not run by the government?
Darrell argued that his system would be different from government-based taxation in two
ways: it would be transparent, and it would be voluntary. People who made these
donations, he explained, would be able to go onto the website and see what was being
done with their money. This would make it “legitimate” in a way he felt that current
taxation was not.
Now, for me, this is a legitimate thing that you, as a taxpayer, can look into and
be like, “oh, this is where my money went” okay? … Okay - we built a new
building on Humphrey street … What is this building doing? How much is this
building generating? … What is it doing for your community? Okay, now what
our building is doing is taking homeless people off the streets, okay?
What was visible and meaningful to Darrell was what he could see in his own immediate
surroundings. Like many other low-income respondents, Darrell felt like money was
taken by the government, but he didn’t feel that he could see any government money
improving his life or that of his community. Many low-income people described
abandoned houses, run-down playgrounds, unplowed streets, slow emergency response as
ongoing visible reminders of the lack of government investment in the lives of people
like themselves. Darrell contrasts his proposed system to what he feels is the lack of
transparency in government taxation:
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Okay, they say it's going there, but where's it going? Can you really check on
this? Can you really make sure? They took it out of your check so can you make
sure it goes where you say it's going to go?
In addition to being transparent, Darrell argued, the system had to be voluntary—another
issue he had with redistribution via government taxation. As a poor Black man, he felt he
had little control over his earnings and couldn’t imagine having enough that being
mandated to give some up would seem fair. For example, he recalled working for a temp
agency and having the agency “take half your money.”
Like many low-income respondents, Darrell didn’t often distinguish between
government and corporations. To him, they were part of the same powerful, moneyed
force that limited his options and capitalized on his suffering: “doing nothing but taking
from you.” For example, Darrell was particularly concerned about food quality and this
extended quote traces the conspiratorial connections he saw between government and
corporations.
There's fault for these people doing this, knowing the effects of it, and now these
people are going to capitalize on it, to get more money off you. ... let's just say
atrazine [a commonly used herbicide] gives you cancer. Now, the cancer industry
is going to make money off of you. Now, you have cancer, now you're giving
your money to these people for medicine … it's an industry where they need to
make money off of your sickness. So, they're going to keep you sick rather than
fix you just so they can keep getting that dollar from you. And there's doctors that
know what's wrong with you the exact moment you walk in, but they won't tell
you that. … now you're on four different drugs that you got to pay for. And it's
happening over and over again. Now, you getting Medicare taxed out your
money, you're getting social security, and everything else, I mean, it's being taxed
out of your money when they're doing this to you. So, when will you wake up and
realize that this system ain't doing nothing but taking from you?
Although Darrell expresses a fairly extreme and specific version of conspiracy between
government and corporations, this general sentiment—that corporations and government
worked together to maintain their own power and hold people down—was common
among low-income respondents. Also, Darrell’s concern about medical exploitation in
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particular has resonance with a long history of government-supported medical
experimentation on Black populations and ongoing disparities in access to and treatment
during medical care (e.g., Tuchman 2020; Washington 2006) although he did not
explicitly make this linkage.
Darrell was critical of the rich, but it seemed that his (and other low-income
respondents’) resistance to progressive taxation came from two very different places. On
the one hand, he had a strange empathy for the rich based on his own experience of
scarcity and resenting being forced to give up any of what he felt he had earned. On the
other hand, his view of the power held by corporations and a government controlled by
the rich undercut his support for policies like redistributive taxation because he felt such a
thing could never work: “you can’t do nothing about it.”

Katie (LIWW)
Background
We heard from Katie in earlier chapters. She is a white teacher’s aide in her late
30s. She’s married, has three kids. She and her husband, together, make about $45,000 a
year. As with other low-income respondents, Katie wanted to see more economic
redistribution to “spread out” the resources such that there would not be such extremes of
wealth and poverty. But her experiences struggling for financial stability and seeking
help from the government led her to distrust the government as a redistributor. This
distrust was complicated by her mixed feelings about the rich (which I explored in
Chapter 2). Although she disavowed any antipathy for the rich, generally, she was
unhesitatingly critical of a subset of that group: politicians, whom she saw as enriching
themselves by siphoning off money from hard-working taxpayers like her. Her perception
251

Chapter 4

of the government as run by selfish profit-seekers undercut any hope she had that
government policy would or could ameliorate economic inequality.
Spread out the wealth
Like Darrell, Katie had mixed feelings about the relationship between the rich and
the poor. Recall, from an earlier chapter, her concern about saying that “a lot of people …
make too much money” because perhaps “they work and they deserve money.” At the
same time, Katie wondered, what about the “hard working people” who “can’t even pay
their rent” and might be “maybe, technically, working harder” than someone who can
afford to “go out to dinner every night”? Although she didn’t directly blame the rich for
the hardships of the poor, as did some other respondents, Katie did suspect that “the
middle class … got pushed down … because the rich people wanted more money.” The
end result of this downward push, she suggested, was that people like her, who might
have been working- or middle-class if not for the actions of the rich, were instead “a step
above really poor.”
Although Katie is hesitant to blame the rich for the plight of the poor, she
nevertheless felt that the current contrast in circumstances between the rich and poor was
unjust. Why, she asked, did some people “have to make that much” when there are “so
many people struggling”? When she thought of people who make “too much money,”
Katie named athletes, “certain doctors” (“like plastic surgeons, like things that are not
necessary. Not for people with accidents and stuff like that”), politicians, and the
presidents and CEOs of corporations. She wanted to see political leaders act to “spread
[wealth & income] out more” and “find a way to cap” excessive incomes. Specifically
targeting the incomes of politicians, she said:
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To be like, alright…this is what you guys can make, because we need the rest for
this area. … They're making way more than they need to survive. … “You don't
need to make more than this” … and we'll channel all that money to other places.
She argued that, even with limits on their incomes, people “could still make a good
living,” but there would be more money to put “into other things to help people get jobs
and healthcare and food and [help the] … homeless people in our country.” Here, we can
see Katie, like Darrell, justifying her call for redistribution based on contrasting the
circumstances of those who have “way more than they need to survive” with those who
are struggling to meet more basic needs (housing, food, healthcare, and jobs).
Resistance to redistribution via taxation: Where do those taxes go?
Taxes were less palatable to Katie than were salary caps as a mechanism of
redistribution, but she nevertheless felt that it would be fair for “the people who make
more money” to be “charged more.” At the same time, she didn’t trust the government to
collect and distribute tax money fairly. Like many other low-income respondents, Katie
felt that the government was run by the rich and she, therefore, had little hope that a
government policy to rein in the excesses of the rich would work. Based on what was
visible to her—the coexistence of underfunded public services and people continuing to
live luxurious lives—it seemed that the rich were finding ways to avoid paying what they
owed in taxes (a common sentiment).
From what I know, they say the more money you make, the more taxes you get
taken out. I don't really know how true that is … On paper it seems to be that
way, but it seems not to work that way in the end, somehow. I don't know if they
hide money or if— I really don't know because that's what's supposed to be
happening and it doesn't. … What happens to all that? Where do those taxes go?
So, if they really are getting taxed more, then why isn't it there? … Obviously
they're taxed. Like it's against the law not to, but I don't think all that money is
getting taxed … So, if everything got taxed the proper way, then, yeah, the
people who make more money are getting charged more and I think that's fair.
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She added:
… If people who make a lot of money are taxed like they are supposed to then
they wouldn't have as much as they have. It's like they constantly still just have
what they have. And I just don't know how. … So, yeah it just feels like it's just
not quite right.
In principle, Katie supports the idea of redistribution via taxation (“I think that’s fair”),
but she doesn’t see evidence of it working. She continues to struggle economically and
the “people who make a lot of money… still just have what they have.” Like many
respondents, she suspected the rich of cheating (“I don’t know if they hide money”) but
thought they were too powerful to be held accountable. Her confidence in the
effectiveness of redistributive taxation was further eroded, like Darrell’s was, by what she
saw as a lack of transparency (“what happens to all that? Where do those taxes go? ...
why isn’t it there?”).
Resistance to redistribution: government takes too much and doesn’t use it well
Like most Americans, Katie felt that her own household’s tax burden was too
high, that that of the rich was too low, and that insufficient amounts of tax revenue were
being spent to alleviate the suffering of the poor (Bartels 2016; Piston 2018). Katie
resented the taxation on her husband’s small business because she felt that tax money was
being sponged up by selfish politicians. “There’s money there,” she said, to help those
who can’t afford healthcare or are homeless, but “it’s not being distributed properly.”
I feel like the wrong people get that money. … A lot of politicians seem to make
all this money. Where's that money come from? It comes from our taxes most of
the time. … You don't need to make a million dollars a year to be whatever, a
politician. Why don't you make, $750,000 and then that’s $350,000 [sic] that
could go towards something else?
When Katie thinks about tax money that could be spent to help people like her and those
who are worse off, she immediately thinks of two things. First, taxes on her husband’s
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business feel excessive and unsustainable to her. Second, politicians seem to her to have
tons of money. In Katie’s mind, that adds up to politicians taking too much for
themselves rather than using that money to meet social needs. Like other respondents, she
said that she wouldn’t mind paying the taxes she pays if she didn’t feel like there was a
disconnect between what she pays into the system and what she sees coming out of it.
If we saw results, I would be totally fine with it. You know, it would stink that
your paycheck's smaller, but if your paycheck is smaller and you're getting the
help you need, then it's like... it washes itself out almost. So, yeah … if that
money really proved to help programs which helped people and we saw … a
decrease in unemployment and a decrease in homelessness and an increase in
college graduates and they could tie it right back to “oh this is where the tax
money went”, then that's great. That's fine with me.
But Katie and other low-income respondents don’t feel that they are seeing those kinds of
“results” from tax-funded programs. Instead, what is most visible to them is their sense of
being underserved by government programs—their struggle to receive what felt like
minimal help—while politicians seem to have more than they need and little incentive to
change a system rigged in their favor.
Feeling unseen or ignored by government
Katie’s questions about the efficacy of tax-funded services to support the poor
came from her own experience of applying for and receiving these types of supports.
When she asked “what happens to all that” tax money, she might have been thinking
about her frustration that the eligibility guidelines for government assistance programs
seemed unresponsive to the actual circumstances of her life. Katie explained that, in her
current job, she received a paycheck 10 months out of the year. Her husband ran his own
business and his income fluctuated. Katie was frustrated at the inability (or
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unwillingness) of assistance programs—from financial aid to subsidized health
insurance—to account for what she considered “grey areas” in her household income.
They just tried to cancel [our subsidized health insurance] because … there's no
room to bend. Like, you answer this question and it's like yes or no, but that's not
my answer. You know what I mean, like, how much do you make a year? I tell
them, but they assume I left out something. So, I only work, technically 10
months out of the year, because I work in a school. So, they are taking the number
I give them weekly and timesing it by 52 weeks. It's incorrect. You know what I
mean? It's things like that that get frustrating, so I don't think it's fair.
Katie thought of herself as a deserving recipient of government supports. She and her
husband both worked, and she was seeking help to pay for health insurance for her family
and to get financial aid for school so she could finish her bachelor’s degree. Applying for
benefits was a stigmatizing experience for many, and Katie’s struggles to qualify, despite
what she considered her legitimate need, made her feel like her concerns were invisible to
or ignored by the government.
There's so many grey areas—like I am having a hard time getting any financial
aid because all they see is that my husband owns his own business. They don't
see that he’s barely paying the bills, let alone making money … they don't hear
nothing, and they don't want to change anything, and it's very frustrating … There
needs to be flexibility.
The experience was demoralizing and left Katie feeling invisible to, or worse, persecuted
by the government programs she hoped would help her. Frustrated by this experience,
Katie questions the government’s intentions and ability to improve the circumstances of
people like her.
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Surveillance vs. Support: Bureaucratic disentitlement and reluctance toward
redistribution51
Katie and other low-income respondents’ distrust of government assistance
programs seems to emerge from their experiences of the “penal logics” (Wacquant 2009)
that guide social welfare provision as systems of discipline rather than systems of
support. Interfacing with government assistance programs was nearly universally seen as
frustrating and demeaning—as if applicants were being punished for needing help.
Although all low-income respondents felt that the assistance was dearly needed, they also
felt, generally, that benefits were too meager—providing barely enough for someone to
get by, but too little to actually help them improve their lives. Several argued that
government programs felt like they were designed to keep people in poverty rather than
to lift them out of it. Many complained of regulations that discouraged what respondents
considered to be positive behaviors: saving money, being married, working, or going to
school. As noted earlier, social policy research corroborates these perceptions.
Respondents also complained that, while they felt excessively disciplined and
surveilled by these systems, people with less legitimate needs appeared to receive
assistance with ease. For example, recall Katie’s comment: “my family and I are
struggling. And I see other people who maybe don't need as much help. And it's like, why
do they get it?” These common sentiments led to some apparently contradictory
demands: respondents seemed to want to reduce the level of bureaucracy in welfare
provision (so they could access benefits more easily) but also increase surveillance on

51. The phrase bureaucratic disentitlement comes from Michael Lipsky, who defined it as a process
through which the denial of support is through “largely obscure ‘bureaucratic’ actions and inactions of
public authorities.” (Lipsky 1984:3). The obscurity of these actions and inactions encourages the placement
of blame elsewhere .
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“the few that are lazy” who “take advantage of the help that is out there.” Katie blamed
these lazy few for being “part of the reason that we are still struggling.”
Katie’s comments, as we saw in Chapter 3, were explicitly racialized—arguing
that something like a racial quota system allocated benefits by race instead of by need.
Recall that she opened our interview by talking about how she felt that “a lot of people
don't get help that need it. And a lot of the times it has to do with the color of their skin.”
Katie and other White respondents (recall Andrea, LIWW, from Chapter 3) drew upon
these racialized narratives to explain their struggles in receiving adequate support through
the social safety net, but they were not alone. Many low-income respondents, both Black
and White, expressed their distrust in government welfare systems in stereotypical terms
related to the widespread and racialized narratives of the “undeserving” poor.
Across race, low-income respondents who interacted with these systems
expressed their feelings of being overly surveilled while simultaneously demanding more
surveillance of their less-deserving economic peers. These demands are not as
contradictory as they at first seem. For example, Katie’s complaint that programs refuse
to take into account the actual circumstances of her life—including the “grey areas”—is
essentially the same complaint as when she argues that the lives of people who “don’t
need as much help” receive insufficient attention. Unlike people who are high-income
(and especially those who are White and men), low-income Americans are generally not
treated like individuals with differentiated lives, experiences, and circumstances. Instead,
as Katie and other low-income respondents argued, their individual circumstances—or
even the challenges they shared with their economic peers—were largely ignored by
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government systems built by economic elites and structured around mistaken stereotypes
of the poor.
To Katie and others, eligibility determinations felt simultaneously overbureaucratized and capricious. Low-income respondents often felt at the mercy of the
front-line workers in these government assistance programs. Researchers who have
studied those front-line workers corroborate the perceptions of Katie and others and show
that their concerns are not simply the complaints of a disgruntled group of handoutseekers but rather are among the consequences of policies that charge overloaded
agencies and workers with the dual and conflicting duties of surveillance and support
(e.g., Lens 2008; Watkins-Hayes 2009). For example, in studying instances of sanctions
applied by front line workers, Lens found that rules guiding their work “reinforce[d] and
amplifie[d] negative tendencies to view welfare clients homogeneously … even as the
scheme requires individualized and complex judgments” (Lens 2008:217). “Sanctions are
not individualized but applied broadly” and “workers use bureaucratic shortcuts that
avoid a full assessment of clients’ [circumstances]” (Lens 2008:215–16). Lens argues that
the structure of social welfare systems encourages “an engrained skepticism” of clients
that my respondents felt and resented.
The adoption of this encouraged skepticism among benefits workers might, itself,
be a defensive response to circumstances where they, too, have little control. These
workers, Lens suggests, are possibly daunted or discouraged by “the enormity of the task
of welfare agencies” including the “well documented” “hardships endured by the welfare
poor” and the lack of power and resources the workers realistically have at their disposal
to help. A focus on “eligibility-compliance culture is less complicated than a focus on
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helping clients obtain self-sufficiency” when resources are limited. “Sanctions can be
used to assign blame and to absolve the worker of any responsibility for a client’s failure”
(Lens 2008:216).
When Katie turns to blame her economic peers for contributing to her difficulties
in getting help, she is encouraged to do so by the structure of benefit programs that blame
her for her hardship and pit her against her peers in competing for scarce resources. As
Esping-Andersen argues, “The welfare state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in,
and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of
stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations” (Esping-Andersen
1990:23). Given this system of stratification, it is common for recipients of mean-tested
benefits to feel they have to justify their deservingness of those benefits—distinguishing
themselves from others who are often characterized as lazy or with less acute or
legitimate needs (e.g., Halpern-Meekin et al. 2015; Hays 2003; Sykes et al. 2015;
Watkins-Hayes 2009). The “implicit message” of these systems is “that failure stems
from a client’s unwillingness to work, not from an agency that is not helping” (Lens
2008:201).
Katie relied on government support, but also distrusted it. In her interactions with
government benefit programs, she felt stereotyped and dismissed. Her eligibility for these
supports, it seemed to her, was determined based on rules that were simultaneously overbureaucratized and dependent on the capricious judgement of frontline workers who
failed to see her as an in individual. Even as she wished for more resources to be
available through some form of redistribution, she also worried that government might
not use those resources in way that would actually improve her life. She felt that her own
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struggles and needs went un-acknowledged by government organizations while the
circumstances of her economically disadvantaged peers were under-scrutinized.
Together, this collection of experiences and sentiments aligned with widespread
narratives of government waste and welfare “cheats” in a way that led Katie (and other
low-income respondents) to be reluctant to support government-led redistribution.
Jeremy (LIWM)
Background
Jeremy felt that American economic and political systems were stacked against
“hard working” people like him by everyone above him on the economic ladder—from
his managers to corporate CEOs to his representative in congress. He distrusted
government, corporations, and the rich in equal measure. To him, they were inextricably
entangled through shared moral corruption and selfishness—looking out for their own
interests rather than those of “the people.” He wanted to see people with more economic
resources contribute more in taxes to improve the lives of those with the fewest
resources, but—given his feelings about the power and moral corruption of government
and the rich—he could not imagine a way that such a system would ever work.
We met Jeremy in Chapter 2 as he expressed his frustration and bitterness over
what he felt was the cruel and unjust abandonment of his hard-working parents at the end
of their lives. He worked as a laborer—primarily doing landscaping work. He lived with
his girlfriend (who received some state assistance) and her young son. He also had 2
other “step kids” and two teenaged biological children (for whom he was paying about
$8,000 a year in child support). His salary was about $35,000. He hadn’t finished high
school but had earned a GED. When we spoke, he was just about to start a new
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landscaping job working for the city. “The best thing about this,” he said, “is if I get by
the probation period, I got medical [insurance].”
The impossibility of redistribution: “if you're at a higher pay bracket you should be
able to pay a higher tax rate. … But it won't ever work.”
Like many low-income respondents, Jeremy’s feelings about downwardly
redistributive policy were mixed. He favored ideas that had a direct link between limiting
the rich and helping the poor over ideas where that link was less explicit. For example, he
didn’t believe in putting caps on income, but he felt that there should be some limits on
how people made money such that others were not exploited in the process.
You should be able to make as much money as you want, but the right way. Don't
rob and steal … and all this other stuff and all these Ponzi schemes and all that. If
you're able to make it, you should be able to make it.
At the same time, he thought it was fair to tax those with more resources at a higher rate
in order to spend that money on resources such as “education and job training” for lowincome Americans. However, the few times he talked about such policies he immediately
foreclosed their possibility by talking about how they wouldn’t “ever work” given the
power of corporations to “manipulate the system.”
If you're at a higher pay bracket you should be able to pay a higher tax rate, you
know? But it won't ever work. You know why it doesn't ever work? Because,
especially with these companies, the way they manipulate the system. “Okay, you
tax us high we'll send our jobs out here.” So, they get around it so they don't get
taxed, so they get all these breaks and … this grant and that grant. Then by the
time you know it, this guy’s a multi-millionaire paying zero taxes.
Thus, according to Jeremy and many other low-income respondents, redistribution was a
nice idea, but had little chance of becoming a practical reality. These respondents saw
political, social, and economic power concentrated in the hands of corporations, the
government, and the rich—groups Jeremy and others saw as inextricably entangled.
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These groups had the power to “get around” any rules that might limit their own material
gains.
Distrust of government
Another reason for Jeremy’s distrust and skepticism of redistributive policy was
what he saw as the wasteful spending that was the outgrowth of the disproportionate
influence of the rich and powerful in government. Government officials “wasted”
taxpayer dollars on things that “don’t work” or that seemed to ignore the needs of the
poor Jeremy said, because there was little consequence for their own lives to doing so.
The poor were the ones hurt by this waste of “our money,” while government officials
were “still getting the same [pay]check no matter what.” As examples, Jeremy
commented on two recent and highly visible public expenditures.
The people that are holding our money, our treasurers, our government, our
governor, like, you're just spending it. How about the baseball field they got at
Hartford? They wasted our money. It's still not operational. … I don't know the
exact number … It [the cost] just goes up and it's still not ready and it's supposed
to been ready last year. Waste. It's just, why are you … building a stadium with
our money? Who's gonna go see that team? Nobody. … And it's like, they don't
care. It's not their money. They're still getting the same check no matter what.
In another example, Jeremy complained that the governor had wasted a recent windfall
that came to the state from Volkswagen “for their manipulating the pollution thing” by
spending the money building charging stations for electric cars, something he thought of
as unaffordable to “average” Americans.52
How many people can afford an electric car? I can't afford an electric car. You're
using our tax money and the money you just got to build stuff that the average
American … can't afford. … Wasteful spending.

52. In 2016, Volkswagen paid a major settlement after it was revealed to have installed devices in its cars
sold in the U.S. that “cheated” on emissions tests (e.g., Atiyeh 2019).
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These expenditures seemed wasteful to Jeremy and other low-income respondents
because they imagined their own communities as the alternative recipients of those
dollars. Closer-to-home needs were both highly visible and felt far more urgent to lowincome respondents than expenditures on things that seemed very distant from their lives.
Critique of government redistribution: they don’t understand and “they don’t care”
At the same time, Jeremy and other low-income respondents were also critical of
government expenditures that were taking place in their communities. Many (as we have
and will see in this chapter) were frustrated by programs targeted to the poor that seemed
to them to ignore the circumstances of actual people. I heard from Jeremy, as from others,
a sense that government bureaucracy reduced people to data points, numbers on paper,
leaving them feeling simultaneously invisible and subjugated.
Jeremy explained his perspective using the example of his struggle searching for
gainful employment and his experience with the state-supported job-searching service. In
general, as he looked for work, Jeremy felt that his skill and experience were ignored or
invisible to prospective employers, who preferred someone who said “the right things on
paper” or was more “book smart.” As we learned elsewhere, being a hard worker was a
core part of Jeremy’s identity, and the fact that his hard work was not translating into
financial stability anchored his belief that the American economic system was unjust.
You can stay stuck in a certain financial bracket for a long time. You can try to do
all you can, but [if] nobody gives you an opportunity, then you'll stay stuck. It's
like, for me an example is I got qualifications but just getting the interview is the
hardest part of it all. … A guy might not know as much as me, but be more book
smart than me, and don't actually have the physical training as me, but he'll get—
Like I've been passed over for a foreman job like three or four times.
Jeremy felt that he was not being seen as a whole person, a common sentiment that I
heard from low-income respondents. “I might be qualified for the job. Get to know
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somebody personally before you judge them. You're just seeing me for a piece of paper.”
It was particularly discouraging to Jeremy, then, when he sought help through one of the
state-funded job seeker programs and found himself similarly struggling because “they
only want numbers.” His experience confirmed his suspicion that government didn’t
really care about helping people like him improve their lives.
This is what they're doing. Let's go with the education part. They pump so much
money, grants, whatever, whatever, and they only want numbers. They don't go
for the people that [are] really going to use it. They'll take the numbers first. All
right, we got 100 people, and instead of screening them all, because once they get
the grant money, the grant money is spent. … We want numbers. They consider
numbers success. No, it's not. How many people [who] graduated actually got a
job after you helped them with that?
Frontline bureaucrats only seemed to care about checking off the boxes, Jeremy argued,
not working with people to figure out their needs and how best to help them. Like Katie
and others, Jeremy felt that people like him, who “asked for help” from the government
were not seen as individuals. As a consequence, he said, taxpayer money was being
wasted on people who were “not following through” while people like him who
“show[ed] up every day” didn’t receive the kind of help he thought he needed. The
problem, he and others argued, was that these programs were not set up to look at
people’s actual lives.
You can say whatever you want on paper. Meet me on an individual basis. Get a
feel for me. Talk to me. … Let's not throw this money away. You know what I
mean? … Get to know me. I mean, me and you are having a conversation right
now and you're getting to know me a little better. How long would that take?
This plea, to be seen as an individual, a whole person, came up over and over again
among low-income respondents and was the primary critique of existing forms of
government-based redistribution. To be clear, none of these respondents thought that
government should stop or reduce investments in these programs—and, in fact, many
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thought they should increase. But most felt that current investments were being misspent—simultaneously fostering dependence among those who didn’t need help and
neglecting the needs of those who did. Jeremy’s discussion of welfare supports is a good
example of this. He argued that government “should” help people meet their basic needs
who otherwise could not, but that the government’s lack of attention or concern for
understanding or helping people meant that these kinds of supports ended up “enabling”
dependency and “keeping us down.”
With the welfare and all that stuff. There's people that really need it, don't get me
wrong, they need it. They struggle and they can’t get by, they really need it. But
what about the person that's been up there 20 years? But they [the government]
don't care, they just sign off, sign off. They're not helping, they're not training.
They're not like, you know what? What would you like to do besides sit home and
just collect money? Why ain’t they meeting with somebody every month like
listen, how many job applications you put in?
Jeremy references a popular stereotype: the public assistance beneficiary who does
nothing but “sit home and just collect money,” but in doing so, he critiques the
government as much as the mythologized system-rider. Like his complaint about the jobsearch program that was only concerned with the “numbers” and not with helping people,
Jeremy blames the government’s lack of concern for people’s well-being for “enabling”
behavior that he sees as unproductive. He makes this critique of government more
explicit when I ask him why he thinks the system works the way he describes.
Because it's the system. They need to keep people here [gestures low], so they can
be here [gestures high]. If you don't inspire to be nothing, then you'll be right
here, and everybody else, we can keep pushing our agendas forward. The poor
stay poor as long as you keep keeping me on Welfare because I ain’t gotta worry
about nothing. Tax dollars are paying for it. Not saying that I don't need it, but tax
dollars are paying for it, but I ain’t got no motivation no more, I'm just gonna stay
home. Meanwhile someone over there, guess what? This job is here, this
opportunity is here, we're gonna help you get along and then, they're bringing
your family through the system. They're up here, they're gonna stay up here. But
guess what? I'm gonna keep these people on Welfare to keep them down here. So,
it's another form of, you know, just keeping us down. You know what I mean?
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Just keep 'em down. Oh, we'll give them some Welfare. That's okay. Quiet them
up a little bit.
When Jeremy looks at the social welfare system, he sees a system rigged by those with
power to “keep pushing [their] agendas forward” by holding others down. He argues that
social welfare systems serve this oppressive purpose by sapping the motivation of the
poor, keeping them “quiet” and complacent so they “don’t inspire to be nothing.”
Meanwhile, these same systems help those with power “stay up” in those positions.
Several other low-income respondents across race and gender said similar things.
Although this deeply-cynical view—that social welfare programs intentionally “keep
[people] down” or “quiet them up”—was not that of the majority of low-income
respondents, the sentiment of distrust and suspicion of government motives in programs
ostensibly designed to help the poor was widespread.
Feeling unheard and unseen: “We should have a say so in what they're doing, but
we don’t”
Compounding the sentiment I heard from low-income respondents like Jeremy—
that government is not concerned about their lives or their struggles—was a widespread
perception that people like themselves had little power to change things in government.
These people are in charge of us, they’re the ones making all the big money
decisions. They’re spending our money. We should have a say so in what they’re
doing, but we don’t, even though they tell us it’s a democracy.
Jeremy saw the government not only as corrupted by money and power, but also as a
corrupting force. Even someone well-intentioned, he argued, who had “walked” a “hard
road … to get” to their position in politics would eventually become “content” as their
pay increased and would start ignoring the voices of the poor.
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They give you all the promises in the world until they get into office. … Once
they get into office, they become content. … Then you forget. You're in this
office to help the people. [Instead,] you're just up there making bogus promises.
To Jeremy and other low-income respondents, the publicly-visible ease in the lives of
politicians—when contrasted with these respondents’ own everyday struggles—
confirmed that rather than working “for the American people” they were protecting their
own interests.
The government is what it is. We elect them, allegedly, right? We elect them and
that's their job, so why don't, when the budgets in crisis, why don't their pay
decrease? Their pay don't decrease. “Oh, we gotta do something, but we're gonna
cut this program, that program, this program.” No, cut your pay because you did a
terrible job spending our money, you know? They don't do that. If they're making,
say, whatever, say they're making, $200,000 a year. They still get their 200,000
while our budget keeps going in the hole. You didn't do nothing to deserve that.
Jeremy looks around and sees no evidence of politicians being responsive to the needs of
people like him—quite the opposite, in fact. Thus, he saw no point in trying to change the
system—and no mechanism through which he had any hope of doings so. People like
him, Jeremy said, “Don't have no control over it and we can't do nothing about it.”
We're not heard. I see people protesting. They can protest until they turn pink,
blue, purple, fall down in the street, they're not heard. [People] say “Oh, why you
don't protest?” For what?
Jeremy felt totally subjugated by a system that he was powerless to change. He saw a
completely non-porous boundary between himself and the government. While he had to
keep “jumping through hoops,” to try to find gainful employment he said, those with
coveted government jobs “keep passing [them] down” to their own kids even though “I
might be more qualified.” “I don't mind jumping through hoops,” he said, but “we're all
supposed to be treated equal and it's not happening.”
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Kelly (LIBW)
Background
Kelly’s support for redistribution came in the form of her feelings that the rich
had more money than they needed (and therefore, that they could afford to give much of
it away) and that people who were poor (like her) needed help in order to get out of
poverty. At the same time, her experiences of scarcity and her strong belief in
individualism made her reluctant to take from the rich. This reluctance was magnified by
her distrust of government. She saw the government not just as inefficient and wasteful,
but also as part of a system of social control that worked to oppress people who are poor
and/or Black. Kelly struggled to reconcile these competing sentiments even as she
struggled to make it through each month with insufficient resources.
We met and heard from Kelly in Chapter 3. She was 38 years old and a single
mother of three (two school-aged and one in her early twenties), working for Yale as part
of a community outreach partnership, and also taking classes toward her bachelor’s
degree on the side. Her income was $36,000 a year (“I don't think they think that's
poverty but it's poverty, yeah”) and she was in a constant state of financial struggle. Her
pay had recently been cut, costing her $220 a month and “throwing a monkey wrench
into my whole life.” As she explained this recent pay cut “due to some policy changes”
she said, “even just talking to you right now I just feel like crying.”
Mixed feelings about rich and poor, government and redistribution: “I couldn’t
figure out what stance to jump to”
Kelly had sympathy and antipathy for both the rich and the poor and this gave her
very muddled feelings about redistribution. Like many low-income respondents, she
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believed strongly in personal responsibility. There was a palpable tension, throughout our
interview, between her belief in this dominant American narrative (manifested in her
blaming herself and her economic peers for their own hardships) and her beliefs in
systemic inequalities based in her lived experience (manifested as arguments that
government and corporations deliberately harmed the poor).
Like other low-income respondents, Kelly’s sympathy for the poor came from her
own experience of poverty and economic hardship. When we spoke, Kelly was
scrambling to deal with the recent cut to her pay. Between food, utilities, transportation,
and childcare, she was not able to make ends meet. For example, we did our second
interview at the house of one of her friends because, she explained, “I can’t afford to turn
my gas on.” Kelly’s situation challenged her belief in meritocracy. Recall her despairing
comments from earlier:
You can work so hard and not have nothing. Did I lie to [my son] today? Yes, I
did. I told him if he was a good boy, if he does the right thing, his outcome is
nice. But I was no criminal. I went to school. I graduated high school. I went to
work. I went to college. I didn't mooch off the system.
Kelly wanted to believe that she and others could work their way out of their economic
hardships, but she also felt that her own hard work had not resulted in financial security
and she wasn’t sure that it ever would. She didn’t know where to place the blame for her
situation and she vacillated between self-critique (“absolutely it is my fault because I
know better”) and blaming the government for its failure to improve the lives of the poor.
Like many low-income respondents, Kelly believed government assistance was
necessary to help some people (including herself) meet their basic needs and improve
their circumstances. And she wanted to see the rich and corporations give more money
away, do more for their lowest paid workers, and stop practices that “take advantage” of
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people. However, she was quite ambivalent about both of these sentiments—regularly
expressing strong viewpoints on both sides.
For example, she railed against private tax preparation companies that “take
advantage” of the “desperate” poor and argued for increased government regulation of
such businesses “to hold them accountable to what they’re doing.”53 At the same time,
she expressed sympathy for the rich, defending CEOs who make “billions of dollars” as
“deserving” and empathizing with a desire to pay less in taxes. Then again, Kelly argued
that “even the poorest is contributing” to the CEO’s wealth and that, therefore, rich
executives should “give that money away right now.” Like Darrell and others, Kelly felt
that the rich should be making voluntary contributions to improve the lives of the poor,
but she was reluctant to mandate those contributions through taxation.
Kelly also expressed mixed feelings about government-run programs to help the
poor (echoing the sentiments of many low-income respondents)—feelings that gave her
additional pause about taxing the rich. On the one hand, she felt that government supports
were “so needed” to help some people meet their basic needs. At the same time, she felt
that the structure and inflexibility of these programs failed to lift people out of poverty—
and worse, seemed to her to be designed to keep poor people poor.
The rich have enough to share: “They’re living a beeea—uuu—tiful life”
Unlike other low-income respondents, Kelly didn’t express resentment toward the
rich—for example, not generally blaming the rich for the hardships of the poor—but she

53. Kelly’s complaint about private tax preparation companies taking advantage of poor filers is backed up
by research showing “a pattern of exploitation” by national tax preparation chains that target low-income
communities and charge excessive fees for EITC filing (Weinstein and Patten 2016; White 2016).
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did see the rich and corporations as having a capacity and a responsibility to help the poor
that she felt was insufficiently mobilized.
Kelly was unusual among my respondents in expressing no qualms with executive
pay and generally feeling that those incomes were the result of some sort of merit. Recall
her comments from an earlier chapter:
If I went to school … and work my way up to become a CEO or COO, or if I just
came from a well-to-do family and I worked my way up to be—because I don't
think they just give out that position—damn it, why I can't get paid?
Getting into such a position requires effort, Kelly implies (“I don’t think they just give
out that position”), and therefore, she felt, the rewards are earned. Also, she seemed to
express, like Darrell, empathy through her experiences of scarcity. Her recent loss of
income outside of her control might have underscored her empathetic “damn it, why I
can’t get paid?”
At the same time, she also believed that “hard work and education” were
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for someone to become “super rich.” “Hard work
will get you into a different economic status,” but to become “wealthy is sheer luck.”
Like other respondents, Kelly made comments about the particular privilege and power
of the rich to hold onto their resources, but she was less animated about this than others—
even disinterested.
Isn’t there— I don’t follow that, but there's certain types of situations set up for
them to keep their money. I heard they pay less taxes. I heard they get all these
cutbacks because they're rich.
Kelly’s distancing language here is distinct from other respondents who were often angry
at the rich for what those respondents perceived as an abuse of power used to rig the
system in their own favor (and from what other researchers suggest is a widespread
American resentment toward the rich - e.g., Piston 2018).
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Even though she didn’t see the rich as having made their gains through nefarious
means (as did many of her peers)—Kelly nevertheless imagined the lives of the rich as
luxurious enough to have plenty to share with those who had much less, and she
criticized them for failing to give away more of their holdings during their lifetimes (as
opposed to after their deaths). For example, she talked about “Mark Zuckerman [sic],
Facebook founder and CEO” and his wife pledging to donate most of their Facebook
shares after their deaths.
Think about it, right? … They're living a beeea--uuu---tiful life. … they're going
to live wonderfully together and they're not going to use that money when they
die. So, the gesture is great, right? The gesture is beautiful. But who's to use that
money? And if you are a billionaire, so if you just leave 1% of that to your kids,
they're still well off. Like Bill Gates [saying], “I'm only leaving 7% to my kids”.
Okay, yeah, $56 Billion. So, it don't even make sense … it sound good in theory,
but it don't even make sense. Give some of that— give that money away right
now. Because you know how much it costs you to live, so give the majority of
that away right now.
Like other respondents (both high and low income), Kelly argues that the rich have more
than they need and, therefore, have enough to live well, pass something onto their kids,
and still give away “the majority” of their wealth. She also suggested that the companies
headed by such executives (“paying the CEO billions of dollars”) could afford to “put
money aside” and furthermore “should have programs … to help those employees” who
are economically struggling. “If,” she added “you’re not going to pay them more, if
there’s no union and stuff like that.” She thus suggested that the economic hardship faced
by the workers in such companies is not simply a problem the companies should feel an
obligation to ameliorate, but might have been caused by company policy (i.e., low wages)
in the first place. Although she briefly worried about the impacts of her suggested
changes (“I hate to hurt the infrastructure of their business”) she decided, “they are not
hurting. … What is hurting is the people are getting poorer.”
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Resistance to government and taxation: “I don’t know if I [would] want to pay all
those taxes.”
I followed up on Kelly’s comment to ask what this meant for her feelings about
taxing the rich, expecting that the feelings she expressed here might translate into some
demand for redistributive taxation. Instead, her doubts about both the intentions and
efficacy of government spending to support the poor seemed to immediately eclipse her
demands against the holdings of the rich. This kind of empathetic response to the rich in
the face of taxation was one I heard from several low-income respondents.
I don't know. I still don't know. Because if I had a million dollars, damn it … I
don't know if I want to pay all those taxes. I'll be finding loopholes like a mo'er,
right? But then, I do want to help. I do feel that—a very real obligation to help.
But then who do I help? Do I help the people who just - who apply for social
security early? Oh, like there’s one girl I know…
Kelly then described an encounter she had with an acquaintance who she saw walking
around downtown one day.
She was like… ‘I’m on disability ‘cause I hurt my foot.’ But damn it … I see her
walk from Dunkin Donuts every day—she’s just fine. But she got disability
[benefits]. She's less than 50 years old. And I'm just like - girl get a job as a
secretary, if your foot's hurting! Like, I don't even understand it, so no, I don't
want to pay extra taxes to help someone like her … But, if I found someone like
me, I would want to help, you know. So, I don't know.”
Like some other low-income respondents, Kelly pairs her defense of the rich with a
critique of the poor, both underscored by a lack of faith in government. Kelly’s hesitation
about tax expenditures to help the poor sounds a lot like what I heard from other
respondents—that these programs allocated money and benefits inefficiently, helping
people who don’t really need it while neglecting the needs of those who do. And like
other respondents who expressed this criticism, Kelly, too, seemed to argue that this
inefficiency was rooted, in part, in the failure of government to understand the lives of
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the poor. She explained using the example of a talk she had recently attended as part of
her job—about financial management among the poor.
I'm that person that those numbers are supposed to represent. And they're off. …
When they compile all this data, they don't come where we come from, so when
they're there looking at the data … they also have to figure out why it's such …
because they have no contact [context?].54 Sitting in someone's family room for
two hours really doesn't put you in touch with what's going on. So, I think they
get assumptions from the data, but the data is wrong in the first place.
Kelly thinks that the government could help people more effectively if they better
understood people’s lives, looked at what’s “really going on.” “The government needs to
step up and … really come out into the community.” Like many low-income respondents,
Kelly argued that a more intimate understanding of the lives of the poor would mean
government programs could more efficiently serve those people who really needed help.
Government does not help people out of poverty: “It just further sinks them down”
Kelly argued that the structure of government anti-poverty programs, rather than
helping people out of poverty, served to keep people in a position of interminable
dependence on government support. In her own life, she felt that government assistance
programs’ unreasonable and inflexible rules seemed designed to trap her in poverty rather
than to provide a path out. For example, she was frustrated that the state childcare
assistance program (which helped her pay for childcare while she was at work) wouldn’t
help her pay for childcare while she attended her college classes in pursuit of a bachelor’s
degree. She explained her situation by recounting what she wrote in a letter to the
administrator of the childcare program:
In a couple of years, I will no longer even qualify for your program if you do this
[subsidize childcare while she’s in class]. But if I stay right here, I'm stagnant and
I'll be using your program for the next so many years.
54. It was hard to discern, even listening back multiple times, what she said here.
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If the government really wanted her to become financially independent, Kelly argued, it
would support her pursuit of a bachelor’s degree so she could increase her earnings and
would no longer need assistance to pay for childcare. But, she explained, she was told
“no … they can't bend that rule.” This refusal was particularly frustrating to Kelly
because, she said, the state would have paid for childcare if she were in a certificate
program for something like CNA training, which she thought of as a generally dead-end
job where “you're never going to see any raises.”
Giving them a CNA class or truck driving class was not an out. It was not opening
up, it just further sinks them down. So, the government needs to step up and really
get some programs together.
Thus, Kelly saw government expenditures to support the poor as inappropriately
allocated—spent on programs that don’t actually help get people out of poverty while
unavailable for programs and activities that she thought would help people improve their
circumstances.
In addition to failing to provide a means of exit from poverty, Kelly was also
frustrated that government anti-poverty programs seemed disconnected from the
humanity of the people that the programs were supposed to be helping. It was as if they
had been designed to “strip your dignity” rather than to enable economic mobility. As an
example, Kelly recounted talking to a representative of a state assistance program as she
tried to figure out how to absorb the recent cut to her hours and pay.
This lady at the state told me to get a roommate. Well, how am I going to get a
roommate with two children, right? Because then they can bring anybody they
want into the house and, next thing I know, somebody trying to sleep with my son
or daughter. You'd be thinking, when something's on the news, they'd be saying,
what kind of mother did they have? They wouldn't be figuring, what was the
mother's income, what was the household composition? Why'd she have to make
this choice, right? Things like that. And that's stressful.
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It was “stressful” to Kelly that the person who was supposed to be helping her was
suggesting an option that Kelly felt was unreasonable—and furthermore, that Kelly
thought she would be blamed for (“what kind of mother did they have” who would make
such a choice?). This latter fear was justifiable, given widely promulgated stereotypes of
Black motherhood. Worse, she said, taking the route the social service worker proposed
had the potential to be condemned and subject to still further surveillance by the state.
By any means necessary, you have to feed your kids, right? So, you have to move
somebody else—that man or that woman—into your house. And you can't tell the
state what you're doing because, oh does he work part time? Then you don't get
any food stamps. You have to sublet your room and if they find out you're doing
it, their income is [counted as] a part of yours.
People trying to get help from the government were stuck between desperate
circumstances and inflexible rules, Kelly suggested. Her experiences led her to feel that
government benefits did more to keep the poor impoverished than to help them make
their way toward financial stability. Other low-income respondents who encountered the
state through means-tested assistance such as SSI (supplemental security income) made
similar arguments—for example, saying that the structure of the aid they received
(including the way the benefits were reduced based on income and savings) made it
nearly impossible to save and also made it hard to transition into work (because the
penalty to their assistance would cancel out any gains from minimum-wage level
employment).
Designed to keep people down: “They knew what they were doing”
Kelly blamed government for not only failing to help people out of poverty, but
for creating some of the problems of poverty in the first place. This was a double-strike
against government in her mind: evidence of government failing to help people move out
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of the circumstances that she felt it was partly responsible for putting them in in the first
place. “They have a big responsibility” for the problems of poverty, she said.
They’ve been giving out state dollars for generations, for years. They don't put a
cap on how long you can live inside public housing, so they created some of this
mess. So, they really need to clean it up.
From Kelly’s perspective—as from the perspective of some other Black respondents—
this was not simply benign neglect, but rather an intentional effort to marginalize and
suppress.
They set up projects for us. … They set up the welfare system and so forth. And
… I want to say, they knew what they were doing. If you set up to just give
people money monthly … for 10 years, then they have their daughter and they do
it. Then they have their daughter ... but you didn't give them any way to come out
of that. So you seen a person had a need. You gave them money. Of course they're
going to be okay with that.
If someone give you lunch money every single day, [are you] going to say ‘oh,
bing! let me just make my own lunch?’ No. … you're going to start filling up that
time with other stuff and it's not making your own lunch. So that's what they did.
They gave you money and they give you food stamps every month. “Oh, I don't
need to go hard and try to be self-sufficient because this person is promising me
to do it every month! … I'm not even going to try—let me just stay right here so I
won't fail.” Yeah, that's their [the government’s] fault.
Despite her earlier comment about taxation that appeared to blame her impoverished
peers for mis-using the system (“I don’t want to pay extra taxes to help someone like
her”), here, Kelly pushes back against the stereotype of the lazy poor person who wastes
taxpayer money. Instead of blaming the recipients of these programs, Kelly squarely
blames the government for setting up a system that “didn’t give [people] any way to
come out of” poverty and instead fostered dependence on the state. Kelly suggests that
most people stuck in similar circumstances might make the same choices—to “stay right
here” taking “money and … food stamps every month” rather than risk “fail[ure].”
Government traps people in these circumstances, Kelly suggests, not because of
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carelessness or oversight, but through deliberate action. “They knew what they were
doing.”
Many low-income respondents shared some version of the view that government
programs were more effective at keeping people impoverished than at lifting them out of
poverty, but Kelly’s argument—that government run social welfare programs were part
of a deliberate effort to trap people in poverty (especially people of color)—seemed more
common among Black respondents (including some who were high-income).
Government help is needed: “They left people essentially starving”
Despite her criticism, Kelly was not interested in doing away with governmentfunded social welfare supports (“God knows, it’s so needed”). In fact, her grievances
against government-run social welfare programs included a sharp criticism of the way
some supports were eliminated or reduced as a result of the Clinton-era welfare
reforms.55
They didn't put anything in place. And then literally - you know how a waiter just
pulls the cloth on the table and everything remains the same? It seem like they
thought that they was going to do that—pull the money up and people were just
going to figure out to manage some way. But it's not the case.
All that was offered, Kelly said, were options like CNA training that “diminish your body
and soul” without paying the bills. She argued that the government should have focused
on things like housing “the people who need housing” and getting childcare “if you
choose to go to school.” Of course, she said, in the latter case, “they would have to
validate if they’re getting the grades,” but even people who were “not cutting the grade”

55. 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.
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would get “a warning” and “a chance” before the program would “reduce your benefits.”
Instead, Kelly said,
They just … took [the benefits] away. They didn't do it right. … They left people
essentially starving. Yeah, of course you're starving if you don't have what you
need, right?
Just as she condemned the government for fostering dependence by “just giv[ing] people
money” without providing “any way to come out” of their circumstances, Kelly is equally
critical of the way she saw the 1996 welfare reform as simply taking those same supports
away rather than putting in place programs that would help people improve their lives.
She continued to emphasize her belief in individual agency and meritocracy, noting that
she “would want to monitor these people” who were receiving government benefits—to
make sure people were not simply taking advantage of the system. At the same time, she
noted, “the system doesn't give you so much to be milking, I guess. … You know, it's like
beating a dead horse.”
Kelly’s blame of the government for exacerbating, if not creating, what she
considers to be a problem of dependence and generational poverty simultaneously
bolsters her support for government action (“they created some of this mess. So, they
really need to clean it up.”) and undermines her faith in the efficacy of such action (“they
didn’t do it right”; “they knew what they were doing”). These mixed sentiments were
common among my respondents.

Conclusion
Low-income respondents supported redistribution, but distrusted the systems
designed to carry it out. They felt their own efforts and struggles to be unfairly dismissed
by society and by the government programs that simultaneously treated them as
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underserving and failed to help them. As mechanisms for redistribution, these programs
were seen as deeply flawed—inefficient and ineffective or worse, part of a government
design to keep poor people down.
The common grievances between White and Black low-income respondents were
notable, as were the ways some White respondents interpreted these common grievances
as being to the benefit of people of color and at the expense of Whites.
Gendered experiences framed respondents’ perspectives on the government.
Women more likely to use examples from their attempts to access social safety net
programs and men somewhat more likely to focus on wages and employment. But they
shared numerous critiques based on these different experiences.
Across race and gender, low-income respondents were counterintuitively
empathetic with the desires of the rich to avoid downward redistribution. Low-income
respondents often felt a lack of control—over their employment, their pay, their taxes,
their schedules, their purchasing decisions—and their frustration with this lack of
autonomy translated into a strong loss-aversion that seemed to give them empathy for
anyone who didn’t want to be forced to give up some of what they had.
At the same time, these respondents felt resentful of the rich and wanted to see
them (voluntarily) pay more—or at least their “fair share”—but these respondents had
little hope that increased taxes on the rich would actually improve their own lives. Their
interactions with state assistance programs led them to feel that the government did not
care about them, or worse, wanted to curtail their economic mobility. This perception was
only reinforced by the predominance of the wealthy among lawmakers (Carnes 2013),
leading many low-income respondents to feel that the money that otherwise would be
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used to help people like them is either pocketed by corrupt politicians or re-directed to
serve the interests of governmental elites.
These respondents were painfully aware that their voices carry less weight in the
American political system (which is backed up by data, e.g., Bartels 2016; Gilens 2012;
Page and Gilens 2017) and generally felt that the concerns of people like them were far
from the minds of those who controlled government resources. What was most visible to
them—punitive and degrading public assistance programs, blight and neglect in their
neighborhoods, their children’s struggling schools, slower responses from emergency and
other public services, unequal treatment in the legal system—made them feel that
government statements of concern for the poor were lies made by self-serving politicians
who were under the sway of the rich and powerful.
This distrust of government made any policy solution feel implausible if not
impossible. Rather than failing to understand their own position (e.g., the poor have been
accused of protecting the rich under the false impression that they, too, might be rich
someday), it was their awareness of the durability of their own position that seemed to
lead to a kind of disempowered cynicism.

***
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CHAPTER 5
SYMPATHY AND ITS LIMITS: RECONCILING MORAL WORTH AND
MORAL OBLIGATION (HIGH INCOME POLICY VIEWS)

Like Hochschild, I find that higher income respondents’ sentiments about
economic inequality allow them to simultaneously benefit from privilege and condemn it.
Hochschild argued that her respondents struggled to reconcile competing norms and
beliefs and found that none of the available policy options or socially available narratives
could harmonize their discordant sentiments. Thus, overwhelmingly, they acquiesced to
the status quo – dissatisfied with the current state of affairs but seeing no satisfying
alternative. Acquiescence allowed them to express moral outrage over the state of
economic inequality, but ultimately to throw up their hands and feel there was nothing to
be done, leaving their own economically privileged positions intact (Hochschild 1981).
In my interviews, high income respondents came to a position similar to
Hochschild’s high-income interviewees, but they arrived there through a somewhat
different path. The availability of a socially-identified villain that arrived on the scene in
the intervening decades since Hochschild’s study—the One Percent—allowed the highincome people I interviewed to largely factor themselves out of the equation of
culpability for the current state of economic inequality. Compared to the One Percent,
most respondents either did not feel implicated in the creation or upholding of inequitable
economic systems or they felt they had little power to change those systems. The
combination of feeling sympathy for the poor, resentment for the (richer than them) rich,
and a willingness to sacrifice as part of the solution allowed high-income respondents to
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feel morally righteous without actually addressing their own role in upholding inequality
or creating a sense of moral obligation to act.
A note about the respondents in this chapter
High income respondents had a range of incomes and expressed a range of
sentiments. I’ve captured here some of the views of some of these respondents. This is
not a representative sample—these four respondents were among those with incomes in
the upper half of the distribution among the high-income people I interviewed. I
deliberately focus on this upper end of the spectrum in part to maximize the contrast
between this group and the low-income group, and also because the opinions of this
group often remain under-examined. I’ve also selected these respondents for their
demographic diversity—there are two women and two men, two Black and two White
respondents.
Uneasy reconciliation: personal privilege and concern about economic inequality
The respondents whose views I capture in this chapter generally acknowledged
the relative social and economic advantages of their positions compared to those of the
poor. They were sympathetic to the poor and upset by economic inequality. They all
acknowledged, directly or indirectly, that American economic and social systems boosted
their own interests over those of people with fewer resources—and some articulated an
understanding that such a boost came at the expense of the interests of the poor. Unlike
some of the respondents in the lower half of the high-income group, all of these
respondents thought of their incomes as sufficient, even abundant. They all supported
redistribution, including an increase in their own taxes.
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Although they all seemed comfortable talking about their own advantages—or the
relative ease of their lives—compared to the poor, these respondents all struggled to
reconcile their understandings of their own economic position with their understandings
of economic inequality. They all saw themselves as beneficiaries of a system stacked
against the poor and in favor of the rich, but they didn’t see themselves as having agency
within that system. They all expressed a willingness to pay more in taxes as a way of
investing in equalizing opportunities for the poor. But, often, they didn’t see the
mechanisms of the “submerged state” that reduced their tax burdens at the expense of
programs that might create those kinds of opportunities. They were more comfortable
talking about themselves as part of the solution rather than part of the problem.
Where they did attend to government spending, these respondents were often
frustrated that such spending did not seem to be improving the lives of the poor. Or they
felt that the government was mired in disagreement that made change feel unattainable.
They did not feel completely disregarded by the political process, as did lower-income
respondents, but neither did they feel agentic. When I asked them to think about these
issues, they obliged, but soon returned to their busy lives where, among other things, they
worked to pass on their own class status to their children.

“If you just continue to tax me and [the CEO] … you could maybe stop taxing
them” – Deborah (HIWW)
Deborah worked as a surgeon at the Yale New Haven Hospital. She was in her
late 40s when we spoke, married with two teenaged children and living in a single-family
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home in one of New Haven’s higher-income neighborhoods. Her annual household
income was over $400,000.56
Deborah used the social and economic hierarchy at the hospital as a way of
understanding and critiquing American economic inequality. She expressed sympathy for
patients (who were sometimes also co-workers) whose incomes she saw as “too low” to
allow them to take care of their health. She railed against what she saw as the excessive
income of the hospital CEO. And she struggled to understand her own moral position
between those two groups. She considered her own salary to be “inflated,” but also noted
that “we have trouble living on it.”
Support for redistribution: Contrasting bottom and top; uncertainty about middle
Deborah felt that the excesses of some were linked to the insufficiencies of others
and this fueled her support for some form of redistribution. To her, the injustice of
economic inequality was not poverty or wealth itself, but the contrast and coexistence of
the two. She, like many high-income respondents, saw herself in the middle of this
situation—recognizing that she had more than others, and willing to sacrifice some of
what she had, but frustrated that those who had much more abundant resources weren’t
doing more. She would have liked to see executives give up some of their salaries—
which she implied were excessive—so that the people at the bottom had enough to meet
their basic needs. Instead, she saw the rich gaining or at least maintaining their positions
at the expense of the poor. For example, she talked about the insufficiency of the
minimum wage and the differential impacts such a wage had for workers vs. owners.

56. This is an estimate based on contextual details Deborah provided during our interview. Unlike with
other respondents, I did not get Deborah’s self-reported salary in our first interview and I was unsuccessful
at trying to schedule a second interview with her. This estimate aligns with data on average surgeon salaries
listed on various websites like ziprecruiter.com and salary.com.
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I think minimum wage for a long time has been way too low. It's not a livable
amount and it really does— it allows the owner of the business to therefore profit
disproportionately to the worker— To even survive, [it] is not enough to live on.
Like most respondents, Deborah was not against profit, nor did she support the
equalization of incomes. But she thought it was “not fair at all” that owners could make
“disproportionate” profit while failing to pay their workers “enough to live on.”
In her own workplace, she said, hospital executives were “always” threatening
cuts—things that would make workers’ lives harder—while seeming to be unwilling to
give up anything themselves. They were “always saying, ‘Oh, we're going to cut back.
There's going to be less this and thats. There's going to be lack of pay.’” Deborah argued,
if the CEO “just gave part of her salary back … they wouldn't have to do it like that.”
Instead, she explained,
They ask people from all over the community to actually donate money, to give
back out of their paycheck. … Myself and everybody else … I find that amazing.
… It’s like really? I want to know why [the CEO has] not given like $500,000.
Like other high-income respondents, Deborah sees herself literally and figuratively in the
middle of a situation whose primary players are above and below her. She is frustrated to
be asked to “give back”—although she is willing to do so—because she locates the
source of the problem in the people above her on the economic ladder. It is their
disproportionate share, she suggests, that leaves too little for the people at the bottom.
But, despite being upset at this situation, she sees no clear path for someone like her to
make change.
No one really wants to hear that [the CEO] should give back 10% of her pay and
let it trickle down to the lower-level employees. … That’s radical [exaggerated
tone]. … No, I don’t think the corporate structure would want to hear that.
Deborah does not consider herself to be “radical” and, in fact, described herself as “a
pretty apolitical person.” Although she is clearly upset by the inequities she describes,
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she does not see herself as having the influence or knowledge to make change other than
in the realm of her own personal life. When we started our interview, she commented that
she “thought it was a little weird to interview me” because,
I'm a pretty apolitical person. I don't actually listen to the news very much
because I find it depressing, so I don't really give it a lot of thought. I just kind of
get up and do my job and come home and try to be with my kids. … I mean I
know it exists and it's pretty sad and I see it every day in my work and I know
how it has a trickle-down effect for everybody in terms of their health—if they
can't buy good food, they are going to be unhealthy and so forth and so on.
Deborah’s observations about economic inequality at her workplace suggest that her
claim to not “give it a lot of thought” might be an attempt to reconcile her observations
about inequities that she finds upsetting with her uncertainty about her own role in those
inequities and her power to change the structures and systems that hold them in place.
Part of the solution: Personally willing but not personally implicated
Deborah struggled to navigate her competing feelings about her own potential
role in mitigating the impacts of economic inequality. She, like most high-income
respondents, talked about her willingness to contribute to initiatives (governmental or
otherwise) that might increase opportunities and improve the lives and prospects of the
poor. At the same time, she was rare among high-income respondents in the way she
raised questions about her own hesitation—and that of economically similar others—in
the face of concrete opportunities to contribute to the kinds of change she supported.
Deborah was surprisingly willing to turn her lens on herself as we talked about the
prospect of reducing economic inequality. For example, when I asked her if she thought
the government had a responsibility for changing the way pay is distributed (after our
discussion of her patient whose pay she described as “too low”), she said:
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It's hard to imagine that the government would be able to legislate down to that
level. But they could do things like see that minimum wage starts higher and they
could say that someone who makes x amount of money pays no taxes. And
someone who makes a lot of money pays an enormous amount of tax.
It wasn’t clear where she fit into this tax scheme, but then she went on,
And if we look at the recent tax bracket … the taxes cap out. So, for example, if
you're going to pay Medicare tax, it stops at like a hundred, 150 thousand dollars.
And then you don't have to pay any more Medicare tax after that. So, someone
like myself can stop paying Medicare tax, like over the summer, starting in
January. And then for six months out of the year I’m not paying any Medicare
tax. Whereas someone who never makes it to $100,000 is paying that tax all year.
Where, if you just continue to tax me and [the CEO] all the time, you could
maybe stop taxing them.57
Unlike the ways she separated herself from her CEO elsewhere in our conversation, here,
Deborah put herself in the same category (“if you just continue to tax me and [the
CEO]…”), suggesting that she and the CEO were both benefitting at the expense of
lower-income Americans. She argues that lifting the cap on this payroll tax is one
example of how the government could begin to tackle economic inequality.
With this suggestion, she demonstrated her awareness of her own advantaged
position and also implied that she was willing to be taxed more in the interest of
contributing to a more equitable future. But she stopped short of advocating for this
change directly. When I asked her if she would be comfortable with such a change in tax
policy, she said “I think there's no way to prevent inequity unless you have something
like that.” In other words, it seemed, she was wrestling with competing discomforts—the
discomfort of knowing she was participating in and contributing to an inequitable system
and the discomfort of making a personal sacrifice.

57. Of the two payroll taxes (Medicare and Social Security), it is the Social Security tax that has a cap, the
“maximum taxable earnings,” beyond which earnings are not subject to Social Security tax. Nevertheless,
the principle of Deborah’s argument still applies. For reference, the maximum taxable earnings cap was
$118,500 when I interviewed Deborah in late 2015. In 2020, it was $137,700.

289

Chapter 5

The place where Deborah most directly confronted this tension was when she
thought about philanthropy. She brought this up after I asked her why, if she thought “we
could make it better,” we didn’t do so. “Probably,” she said, “some sort of—you know,
some greed.” To explain, rather than returning to the example of the CEO, which I
anticipated, she instead turned her own record of charitable donations. She had been
donating $1000 each year to a major charity through a program at the hospital (“they take
it out of my paycheck before I see my paycheck and so it's cleanly pre-tax”). Recently,
she explained, she had been contacted by a hospital representative about raising her
donation to $1,500 in order to secure a matching gift from the hospital. The
representative told her, Deborah recounted,
In our department, of 25 physicians, I've been the leader in how much I gave.
Nobody else gave as much. The whole entire department of 50 people, together,
gave $7000. So, if I gave $1000 … everybody else together gave $6000. That's
pretty profound.
Against this backdrop, she described her response:
And I said, “oh that sounds interesting.” But I haven't done it yet, because I'm like
wow … first of all, where does it end? Next year they'll have it again and again
and again and so it's like... part of me is like, well, I don't have a 529 that's flush
for my son yet. So, again, that's greed. I could give more. I may not even feel it.
But what's holding me back from just clicking that box? … it's probably greed.
When you get right down to it. 58
Just as she did when she was making sense of her own educational opportunities in
Chapter 2, in this example Deborah revealed a range of sentiments that she struggled to
reconcile. Even though, earlier, she had been talking about ways the government could
create more equity by taxing people like her more heavily, here, she runs through two tax
breaks that overwhelmingly benefit high income earners like her (tax deductions for

58. A 529 Plan is a “tax-advantaged savings plan designed to encourage saving for future education costs”
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2018).
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philanthropy and tax-advantaged educational savings accounts) without a comment about
those tax advantages. She seems torn between positioning herself, individually, as
someone who is being generous (“the leader in how much I gave”), and as someone who
“could give more” and who “may not even feel it.” She condemns her own “greed” for
not increasing her donation but moderates that self-condemnation by invoking her child’s
needs (saving for her son’s college education)—the kind of spending that is often
considered more morally legitimate than spending on self (Sherman 2017). Focused at
the individual level, Deborah feels faced with difficult choices that leave her struggling to
understand her own sense of personal implication and personal empowerment to make
change.
This individual-level focus, that Deborah shared with many respondents left her
feeling neither influential nor hopeful about systemic change. For example, when I asked
her what she thought about support programs for people who are low-income, she said
there were programs in New Haven that she thought were making a difference in the lives
of people who hadn’t had the kinds of opportunities she had, but that they were “too
limited” because “we can’t fund them all right now.” She went on to name programs run
by non-profits—and typically funded by donations—not government safety net
programs:
Like the United Way … or … like Squash Haven and New Heights, where they
teach a kid a sport and do academic support for homework in an after-school
program. So, they are giving them team building skills, homework help, all this
other stuff. So, yeah, that's important because then, those kids have different role
models and have different opportunities.
Even as Deborah worried about the lack of funding for these programs that she believed
in, she didn’t seem to have considered a more collective version of funding. So, I asked
her directly if she thought the funding model for such programs ought to be changed,
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from gathering funding from individual donors to perhaps being funded through the
government. She immediately responded in the affirmative: “Make the government pay
for it. Yeah, I think that would be helpful because then otherwise it's too limited. We
don't have enough of it.” After saying this, Deborah immediately moved on to present
other ideas for change (e.g., offering better salaries and “really good support services” to
teachers of “inner city kids”), not dwelling on the complications or possibilities of
government funding—or her role in contributing to or bringing about such funding. The
possibility that the government could “pay for it,” seems to move her out of the
uncomfortable position of questioning her own accountability.
Ultimately, Deborah goes about her life, feeling a tug of moral outrage, but
neither feeling personally implicated nor personally empowered to make change. She is
discouraged and upset by the situation of her coworkers and patients but doesn’t know
what she can do about it. She finds the news “depressing” and so doesn’t “really give it a
lot of thought.” So, she goes about her busy life (“I have so much to do”) and hopes that
someone else will do something to change things.
Justifying inaction
Despite her animated discontent as she contrasted the suffering of her colleagues
or patients with the extravagance of her CEO—and as she grappled with her own role and
obligations within the system of economic inequality she described—Deborah ultimately
capitulated to the status quo, accepting the forces that uphold inequality as “human
nature.” Thus, as Hochschild argued, Deborah, like other high-income respondents,
“justifies personal inaction” on the grounds that the forces upholding “the unfair status
quo” are “immutable,” and therefore, that “one would simply be whistling into the wind
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to endorse major changes” (Hochschild 2016:246). Holding onto her genuine discontent
with the current state of economic inequality and the hardships of the poor, Deborah
could see herself as “empathetic with the poor…without feeling responsible to seek
greater equality.” She could simultaneously “retain [her] privileged status and …
condemn privilege” (Hochschild 2016:246).
When I asked her why she thought there was the kind of income and race
stratification she described at her workplace, Deborah’s response had an air of
inevitability. “I think it's all the way society has evolved,” she said. As an example, she
compared herself to a hypothetical person “from the projects.” That person might have
attended “the same school” as Deborah, but likely “didn't have the same opportunities.”
“The guidance counselor probably didn't tell him to do this or that, or maybe his grades
weren't any good because he didn't have someone pushing him at home.” His parents,
maybe “didn't care or were too tired to worry.”
So, I don’t know. What happens is, that guy is going to get a job cleaning the
floors in the hospital and I'm going to get a job being a doctor in the hospital.
So then, how do you go from there? You know? And so, it all starts where it
started. It started when we formed this country, right? So, we had the slave
owners and the … slaves. So, it's just how it started. That's not any different from
Rome or anything else. … So, part of it is, probably, some level of human nature.
There are always haves and have nots, it's just that, as we become a more
intelligent society, you'd think we'd be able to sort of sort that out. We could make
it better.
Deborah explained the root causes of the inequality she sees around her with a tone of
resignation. As with Hochschild’s respondents, she “may sincerely wish things were
otherwise,” but she understood the forces at play to be beyond her influence, making her
resignation reasonable rather than irresponsible. For example, she explained the gap
between her own circumstances and someone like the hospital custodian as the result of a
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set of unchangeable forces linked to “human nature.” Even as she referenced the history
of American slavery as potential context for current inequality, she did so in passivevoice language (“it’s just how it started”) that obscured the beneficiaries of that system
and suggested its inevitability (“there are always haves and have nots”). By arguing that
the forces that upheld inequality were outside of anyone’s control—she expressed
sympathy for the poor while distancing herself from personal responsibility.
Disengagement
JS: Is it uncomfortable in a place like New Haven to make more money than other
people?
Deborah: “Well no, because you're not living directly next door to these people, right?
So, you don't have to feel their pain.”
Deborah is pretty unique, in our class-segregated society, as a high-income
person—and especially as a White person—in the relationships she has with low-income
people through her clinical practice. Her window into their lives motivates her sympathy
and her willingness to increase her own taxes in order to reduce theirs (and perhaps her
recognition of the linkages between the two). But, ultimately, she feels politically
ineffective—either to convince the wealthy executives at her own hospital to give up
some of their pay or to convince others like her to fund programs that she thinks would
make a difference in the lives of her less-fortunate neighbors. So, like some of
Hochschild’s high-income respondents, she disengages, calling herself “apolitical” and
focusing her attention on the private affairs of her own nuclear family.
The consequences of her disengagement are minimal for Deborah and others in
her position. When she is upset about the plight of her patients, she can turn her anger
against her millionaire CEO. Although she does not actively advocate for the kind of
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taxation she thinks would create more economic equity, she can feel satisfied that she
supports the idea. The tension she feels about saving for her son’s college education
instead of contributing more to charity is somewhat assuaged by her knowledge that she
is the top contributor in her department.
Americans with incomes like Deborah’s are in a tough position. Although much
popular and academic attention has been paid to the top 1% of income earners (e.g., Saez
and Zucman 2019), some—like Reeves (2018)—argue that those in the top 20% have
also been the “beneficiaries” of growing inequality over the past several decades and
need to be held to account. At the same time, researchers like Jacob Hacker (Hacker
2019) have argued that even families with high incomes face increasing income
instability and insecurity. These trends complicate the position of high-income
respondents like Deborah and brings to light how closer-to-home insecurities might
receive more attention than issues of economic inequality that ultimately land in their
favor.

“I’m not greedy or ruthless or anything like that” – Gene (HIBM)
We met Gene (HIBM) in an earlier chapter. He was the highest income
respondent in my sample with a household income over $800,000 a year (what he
described as “real money”). He described himself as an entrepreneur who “trained as a
banker.” He owned a home, where he lived with his wife, two kids, and “three cars.” In
his words: “I mean, you know, I'm doing okay.”
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Supporting redistribution: sympathy for the poor
Despite his elevated economic position, Gene was sympathetic toward the poor
and surprisingly supportive of redistribution. He argued that the country had a moral
obligation to make sure that people with the fewest resources can meet their basic needs,
even if it meant people like him having “a little less.”
If we have excess as a country, we're morally obligated to take care of— so
people just get taken care of. It may not make you feel great, but it's good for all
of us. Fundamentally, I believe in the greatest good for the greatest number of
people to a degree. … There should be some cooperation around that. I may have
a little less. I'd still get more, but I don't have to have so much more that other
people have nothing. That doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me.
Gene makes clear that he—like nearly every person I interviewed—continued to believe
in economic differentiation (“I’d still get more”), but that such differentiation needed to
have limits. The litmus test for how much differentiation to allow, for Gene, as for other
respondents, was how little the people at the bottom had. No one should be left with
“nothing.”
For Gene, this sentiment was reinforced by a personal connection to people living
in poverty. As I noted in Chapter 3, cross class exposure was more common among highincome Black respondents than similar income White respondents. Recall his comments
from that chapter about how having “poor people in my family” shaped his opinion:
I live the impact of what it means to be poor and not want to be poor… it’s
happening to really good people who come from good families with great
values… that just didn’t have some of the opportunities that I did. So, because of
that, I feel it. I can’t hide from it. It’s in my face.
Based on this intimate view, Gene argues that poverty is not an individual or moral
failure, but a lack of opportunity. He was like many high-income respondents in crediting
his inherited circumstances—in combination with his own individual effort or skill—with
setting his economic path. Raised by parents who “stayed together… got graduate
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degrees…had good jobs…[and] moved to the suburbs,” Gene said, “circumstantially, I
was in a place where I could” focus on values such as “do[ing] well in school” and
“where people around me were supportive of it. … everybody else was doing that [too].
That's the difference.”
While Gene’s circumstances rewarded his efforts to work hard, he saw the
difficult circumstances of people like those in his extended family leaving them
discouraged and hopeless—something also echoed in the sentiments of the low-income
respondents captured in the previous chapter. Gene described his relatives as:
People who try to work hard, didn't get ahead, and stopped trying hard. And then
they turn to other things. … So, they're good people kind of turned bad based on
circumstance.
Like other respondents, both high- and low-income, Gene argued that inherited
circumstances played an outsized role in shaping people’s economic trajectories. Poverty
and wealth were more often about “luck” or “circumstance” and only “sometimes it’s
hard work.” “Good people” are born into difficult circumstances such that even those
who “work hard, didn’t get ahead.” “They try,” he said—pushing back against societal
narratives of the lazy poor—”but there's no safety net.” As a consequence, “things
happen. You turn to drugs, you know. You turn to crime. You give up.” It’s only the rare
exception, “a small minority of people,” Gene said, who can “find a way out.”
According to Gene, common judgements of the poor were based on things that
“wealthy people don't understand about poor people.” People who are poor, he said,
“ultimately … care about the same things [as everyone else]. I don’t think their values are
any different.” Recall this quote from Chapter 3:
Poor people in some ways are using all of their energy to simply survive, right?
So, they don't get a chance to think about how to make that next dollar beyond the
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survival. They're literally just trying to eat and be healthy and take care of their
family.
Rich people— when you make a billion dollars— It doesn't have to be that much.
When you make a lot of money, they have the freedom to think. To slow down
and literally think and strategize and schmooze and figure out how to get their
kids in a better [situation]… that's what I think wealthy people don't understand
about poor people: … They care about the exact same thing, but they don't have
the freedom to think about it. … or the resources to do anything about it.
Gene’s intimate connection to both poverty and wealth gives him a unique perspective.
He can trace the ways material resources shape access to immaterial resources and how
both types of resources can constrain or broaden the choices that are available to people.
Notably, even as Gene expresses his sympathy toward the poor here, his language
also distances himself from the rich. These descriptions of having time, energy, and
resources likely apply to his own life, as well, given that—elsewhere in the interview—
he referred to himself as having “real money.” But here, when criticizing the rich for
what they “don’t understand about poor people,” he referred to the rich using third-person
pronouns (“they have the freedom to think”, “their kids”) and starts off with an example
income an order of magnitude larger than his own (although he immediately adjusts).
This distancing from the rich was a general pattern I saw among high income respondents
(discussed in Chapter 2), but Gene’s race and his familiarity with the poverty of his own
relatives likely also contributed to his perception and portrayal of separation between
himself and the rich.
Support for redistribution: government fails the people
How did things come to be this way? Gene argued that government laws and
policy established economic inequality at the founding of the country and continue to
uphold it. “Our fore founders were very thoughtful about how … we set this up.” Recall,
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from an earlier chapter, his tracing of current economic and racialized inequality back to
an initial “land grab” when the powerful put “laws in place” that said, “you could own”
what had been acquired by “taking” and “that you could use those goods as a form of
wealth.” The rest unfolded from there, according to Gene:
The ownership laws then work in your favor. Even though you took [what you
now claimed to own], right? Even though nobody owned it. And then, over
generations, right, there's laws that say that you can bequeath those assets to
people who are beneficiaries of that particular land grab.
Thus, Gene argued, the country was “built on the premise that there are some people that
aren't going to be able to participate in the economic system.” “That is a certain
agreement that is woven into our constitution.” While past laws and policies established
these inequalities, Gene said, current laws and policies reinforce and uphold them.
So, what's causing the widening gap? … I think it's policy. There's policies that
reward the rich and I think that punish the poor. … There's tax policies that say,
you know, look, you pay a very low tax rate if you take risk with your money. If
you invest in assets, you know, you get depreciation, which reduces your net
income. … So, you may make a huge wage but, because you invested in a
building, or have a mortgage and own property, you save more of your money. If
you're poor, you don't have that.
As someone who self-described as being in “the top 2% of American earnings, probably”
and someone with a history in banking, Gene is more specific than most respondents in
describing the way he sees tax policy currently benefitting the rich. Gene saw such
policies as places where “government fails the people” and he argued for a government
responsibility to regulate the excesses of the rich and corporations even as he defended
capitalism.
I think that capitalism honestly solves particular issues. This idea that you can
work as hard as you want, be as thoughtful as you can in order to create new
goods and services that benefit more people, capitalism is the engine that makes
that happen. I fundamentally believe that. It will solve basic problems, but not to
the extent that it is so unregulated that certain people don't get a chance to
participate or are so far on the outside that you have India or South Africa. You
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have really these human rights horrors taking place right under your nose as you
have extremely wealthy people going about their business. … We cannot let
business get so big that it exploits people.
In the face of corporations and the rich “exploiting marginalized citizens,” Gene argued,
“the government needs to step up. I think they could do a better job.” Unlike other
respondents, Gene placed very little blame at the feet of the rich, who, he argued were
“just doing what was allowed.” Instead, he insisted, it was the responsibility of “the
government… to come in and take a stance.” Although, he said, “I’m fiscally
conservative. I’m more of a capitalist,” nevertheless, “I also believe that capitalism
doesn't solve all problems.”
On issues like education, poverty, inequality, the government has to come in and
take a stance. I personally am willing to pay a price to make that better. I don't
mind paying higher taxes. I feel like it's my responsibility if I … make a little bit
more to make sure that more people who look like me have some opportunity.
Even though I understand the argument on the other side very well and actually
ascribe to it. Ethically, I believe … is it fair for me to access a right to healthcare
and 18 million or 30 million other human beings not have a right to healthcare? I
think that's a problem.
Despite his strong capitalist identity, Gene ultimately feels that he has a moral
“responsibility” to contribute to creating opportunity and access for people who have
much less than he does—and in particular, given his understanding of historical racial
inequities, for “people who look like me.”
Gene seemed frustrated that while he was “personally willing to pay a price to
make [things] better,” politicians and politics prevented “government intervention” that
might “balance the playing field” for “certain people here in America that just really
didn't get a chance to participate in whatever we had the opportunity to participate in.”
This lack of action, according to Gene, was a failure of leadership:
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You have this problem where politicians, that's what I'm saying, the policies and
the politicians say things to their people to get votes, but they're selling stuff that's
not good for them. Leadership is failing them.
To put such policies in place, Gene argued, required a kind of elusive political agreement.
I believe, if we can agree that I don't need to make a certain amount of money and
I can give up 3% so that it goes to people who can kind of help strengthen our
middle class, I'm willing to do that. But that's an agreement. Like do we agree on
that? And we don't. I don't think as politicians, we don't agree that I'm willing to
give up a little bit so that other people can do a little bit better.
Like many high-income respondents, Gene seemed frustrated that policies he would have
liked to see put in place—and that he said was willing to contribute to—were things that
had little political traction. He argued that redistributive policies weren’t simply about
“I’m giving up something in order to help others,” which often were seen as “sacrifices
that wealthy people, taxpayers are unwilling to accept.” Instead, he said, ensuring “that
the inequality gap is not so wide” could be “good for everybody.”
I can sell more goods and services. I can actually become more wealthy. But that's
actually a good thing because you have more people who are part of the system.
Gene lays out a vision for a more equitable future where people like him continue to be
wealthy, but others are not so poor that there is “unrest” and “people begin to buck the
system” as a way of “saying, ‘I’ve got nothing left.’”
Personal willingness vs. personal implication
Gene emphasized his personal willingness to contribute to improving the lives of
people left out of the American economic system and his sense of moral obligation to do
so—but notably absent from his commentary was a sense of personal implication in the
problem of economic inequality in the first place. Although Gene noted, earlier that
“policies that reward the rich and … punish the poor” were “causing the widening gap”
in economic inequality, unlike many respondents, he didn’t see the gains of the rich as
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necessarily tied to the losses of the poor. One example of this is our discussion of CEO
pay, which he said was “probably not” correlated with “people being poor.” I asked if he
thought, as others did, that excessive CEO pay contributed to economic inequality.
I think it's a little bit of a red herring. I think the fact that CEOs make a lot of
money has very little to do with why people are poor. I just really believe that.
Yes, do they make too much money? Maybe, but is there any correlation between
them making too much money and people being poor? I would say probably not.
When I asked him to explain further, he seemed to struggle to find his argument. “It
becomes political,” he said. “You have to tie your cause to something,” so people look
around and say:
There’s excess. We don’t have enough and then there’s excess. The bank is
exploiting marginalized citizens or less advantaged citizens through the mortgage
crisis … these “elite” is enriching themselves on the backs of poor people.
Yes, people were saying that, I confirmed. Did he not think this was the case?
What I'm saying is it's legal. There are some gray areas, you know, and there's
some egregious tactics that sort of walk a fine line or are slick, but it's fairly legal.
… It's easy to say these people … decided to get rich by exploiting us, but …
What they're saying on the other side is I'm just doing my job. I happen to work in
an industry where I can get rich doing that.
Now, what makes people upset is there's a whole lobby behind it to keep the rules
in place and to change the game and all that kind of stuff. But I don't think it's ...
There's no CEO sitting in a room with a master plan that's saying we can go make
money on those people over there, okay?
Gene starts out defending the rich—even those using “egregious tactics”—as people who
are “just doing [their] job.” His implication seemed to be that politics and the government
were to blame for allowing such tactics to be “legal,” and not the executives or those who
got rich using such tactics. But then, he drew a connection between those two realms,
noting that people were “upset” by efforts (presumably by the rich) to “lobby…to keep
the rules in place.” Notably, he stated, but then ignored, something that most respondents
emphasized: the power of the rich in terms of lobbying for rules in their favor. Having
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undercut his own defense of the rich, Gene pivoted, turning the conversation from one
about tactics and unequal outcomes to one about intentions. In the end, he seemed to
argue that the lack of malicious intent (“no CEO stating in a room with a master plan”)
made corporate actions at least morally neutral.
Many respondents, as we’ve seen in earlier chapters, saw the rich as morally
suspect—if not morally corrupt—and it seemed as if Gene was responding to this implicit
criticism—arguing for the moral credibility of people in his economic position. Although
he felt that people in his position could and perhaps should “give up” some of their
holdings to provide more balanced economic opportunities, he argued strongly against
the idea that people like him were somehow responsible for causing the economic
suffering he hoped to alleviate.
Instead, Gene blamed the government. We ended our conversation about CEO
pay with him explaining how popular narratives about the mortgage crisis of 2007–2010
were wrong to blame banks and bankers when “the failure is on the government. That's
my problem and not the people exploiting it.” The details are “really, really complicated”
Gene said, but basically, the government set the rules about what was legal, the banks
followed those rules, “then they get rich. Then, when the bottom falls out of it, the people
begin to say it's the banks. Then the bankers are saying I'm just doing what was allowed.”
Gene used a similar moral argument when I asked him, at another point in the
interview, about whether or not he thought his income was fair. “Yeah,” he said,
Because … I work really hard and, me personally, I donate money when I can.
And I'm not in pursuit of money for the sake of money, so, you know, I'm not
greedy or ruthless or anything like that. So, I mean, from that perspective—and I
obtained it legally. So, from that perspective, it's fair.

303

Chapter 5

Gene based his assessment of the fairness of his income almost entirely in personal moral
or merit terms that seem separate from our discussions of the role of circumstance in his
economic trajectory, the economic gap between the rich and the poor, or any ethical
obligations between those groups. I might have received a different response from him
and others had I used a term other than “fair,” which many people took issue with.
Nevertheless, like nearly all other high-income respondents, in this response—and
throughout the interview—Gene does not see his own economic access translating into
someone else’s economic exclusion.

“No one deserves to be worth $40 billion” – Josh (HIWM)
Josh worked in communications at a non-profit foundation and his household
income was about $200,000 a year. He lived with his wife and kids in a home they
owned. We met Josh in an earlier chapter—recall that he had described his family as one
where “back to the 1600s … every generation has been able to pass property to the next
generation.” Also, he talked about being “surrounded by fairly like-minded…people
among the same incomes” in New Haven and so not being directly “confronted” by
poverty or economic inequality, but at the same time seeing it all around him “mostly
indirectly.” “I live in New Haven, so I'm next to it.”
Like many respondents, Josh felt that both the wealth of the rich and the poverty
of the poor were strongly influenced by people’s inherited circumstances, more so than
their effort, skill, or talent. He believed in income differentiation—that some people
could and should make more than others—but felt that some people had more wealth than
was deserved or reasonable and that those private holdings detracted from a possible
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greater public good. He was distressed by both the circumstances and the societal
treatment of the poor, feeling that many people who lacked economic resources were
stuck in situations that were not only harmful to those individuals, but to society more
broadly. The combination of these sentiments led Josh to support redistributive policy.
Like many, he advocated for higher taxes on the rich and for that money to be spent
supporting the poor.
Illegitimate Inequality: Unearned advantages and disadvantages; redistribution
Josh, like many respondents, felt that the luck of inherited circumstances played
an outsized role in shaping the economic trajectories of both the rich and the poor—that
skill and hard work were necessary, but not sufficient for someone to be economically
successful. He made this point at the very beginning of our interview, explaining why he
felt “the economic system is not fair.”
Two people could be equally skilled, but their compensation is really dependent
on circumstance and fortune, good luck. …I mean, people's wealth, it really is
more dependent on who they know rather than what they can do.
He went on, adding that skill and intelligence mattered, but that the impact of those
factors, in terms of “access to wealth” was “contingent” on connections and
circumstances:
If you're … highly skilled, highly intelligent and know the right people, then your
chances are much better off than if you don't know the same people. So, I mean,
to me, your access to wealth is really contingent on your— what family you came
from … how well off they were and so really the circumstances you were born
into, I think.
Based on this sentiment—that circumstances outside of individuals’ control drove
people’s paths to wealth or poverty—Josh was distressed about the hardships faced by
the poor, especially in a context where he saw “plenty of people” with “excess capital.”
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Josh felt that it was a “roll of the dice” that determined who would be “unlucky to be
born into a poor family.” In such a situation, Josh argued,
We have a moral responsibility to use the excess capital that our system has
created to give people just the basic living wage, to just have the dignity to buy
food and have a house without having to sell drugs or prostitute themselves,
which is what the lower class does in our city and all across the country.
It was not only that the gap between the excess of some and the impoverishment of others
felt morally untenable to Josh. The “moral responsibility” came from more than a sense
of charity or shared humanity. He argued that the extreme wealth of a few relied on the
contributions of many. “The super billions in the hands of one or two people… represents
a collective energy and collective resources.”
For example, Josh said, “everybody’s labor” contributed to the success of
someone like (Facebook founder and CEO) Mark Zuckerberg, but the “rewards” go to
“private individuals” like Zuckerberg who “wants to create a foundation where he's not
even going to have to pay taxes on that money and [he can] direct how that money is
being used.” Instead, Josh argued, “I think there should be more public discussion over
how those resources are used.”
Despite his arguments in favor of collective decision making about wealth
generated through private companies, Josh emphasized that he believed “in the market”
and in income differentiation. “I don't think it's a problem for people to be rewarded and
be rewarded more than others,” he said. At the same time, “I do think it's a problem when
125 families are donating most of the money to the elections.” The political inequality
under a system with the current magnitude of income and wealth disparities, Josh argued,
meant that policies like the “progressive tax system” that “is how we got out of the Great
Depression” could be “rolled back through a really organized strategy begun among the
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very wealthy.” Thus, the concentration of wealth in a few private hands “takes resources
out of our system that could be used to just allow people to have basic dignity in their
lives.” Systems to provide this kind of “basic dignity,” Josh argued, “should be” built “on
the backs of our collective wealth” rather than through philanthropy directed by the
decisions of private wealthy individuals.
Sympathy for the poor
Josh expressed a deep sympathy for the poor and a distress about the hardships
faced by that group and he advocated for more direct redistribution that would put “more
dollars…directly into the pocket of the poor” rather than into programs that focus on
“managing…how that poor person is living or what they're supposed to do.”
Josh was most upset by what he considered to be a lack of access, among the
poor, to “basic dignity.” He pushed back against prominent stereotypes of the poor,
saying “most poor people are working hard and …they just don't make enough to get by.”
Being poor, he said, is not about “something flawed in their character … I think it's
entirely circumstances.” Many programs set up to help the poor, he argued, actually
“make it hard to be poor,” structuring “interventions” based on “so much judgement.” He
was frustrated by programs that “punished” and denied “basic freedom” to people who
“for whatever reason… can’t [work].” He included, among those programs, the prison
system, which he argued kept “people entrapped in poverty,” creating “barriers” that kept
them from “advancing.” He argued for a different approach to “our public safety net.”
I don't think we need to fix people. I just think we need to treat them with
dignity, and I think we should start there…because the lack of dignity is even—
to me, is like the worst problem. … Why are 15-year-olds killing each other over
something somebody said? Well, they don't feel like they have— there's a lack of
humanity that they feel. So that to me is like, you know, just like at least … like
trying to restore dignity would be my goal if I had a magic wand.
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Although it was common for respondents—especially low-income respondents—to argue
that assistance programs for the poor were demeaning and punitive, Josh’s argument
about not needing “to fix people” was fairly unique. He expressed a less-individualistic
perspective than many others. Restoring dignity, according to Josh, would involve
helping people who were struggling to get “a roof and food and clothing without having
to go prove to someone, to some case worker that they're getting their life together.” He
advocated for “a cash supplement” that “everyone can access” for a time, whether
working or not.
It would be like the dole in England. I mean, I don't know how they do it there
but … it's something that, because everyone can access it at a time, like even
…English, middle class kids access it. That's one of the reasons why I think it
works, because everyone has—everyone knows someone who's used it and so
they've benefitted. Whereas our welfare system here, it's only “those poor
people” that have used it and so that's why I don't like it because, you know, it
doesn't affect me, or it wouldn't affect me because I would never use it.
The universality of such a program would remove stigma, Josh argued, and could be paid
for by having “a much more progressive tax system.” Such a program, he said, would
also mean “you could do away with a lot of government programs” that he felt were not
actually “helping move people on in their life.” Even as Josh criticized existing programs,
he made clear that, like most others, “I don't want to say that we should … cut services,”
but he felt there could be “a better way of delivering [those] service[s].”
So many of our resources right now go to programs that employ people [as
service providers] but I mean, I don't see them moving people - I don't see them
…helping move people on in their life. It's just more of like a box that they check.
It's a hurdle they have to go over in order to move on with their life.
He used his own experience as an example. He had been on unemployment twice, he
said, and “it was a great benefit.” “I knew I could get another job,” he said, but he had
gone to the service providers because it was required in order to “get the unemployment
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check.” What he saw, he argued, was that people there had much deeper needs than could
be met with the services offered.
And people there that would struggle to get a job, there's no way that the services
that are offered there are going to get them any kind of leg up in getting a job. To
me, it's just a bunch of waste … Any numbers that they have for who they're
getting employed, they're people that don't need the help, you know? They can
get jobs on their own. So [the service is] getting credit for, you know, something
that they're not doing. And the people that do need to help, they're not helping. I
don't know if they can help them.
Josh argued that “more dollars … go[ing] directly into the pocket of the poor person”
would make a better contribution to creating the conditions for “dignity” than the current
systems of “fragmented” social services that seemed to him to be designed “in ways that
are convenient for the service provider but not for the people that we're serving.” He went
on to articulate a number of other strong redistributive policy preferences, including an
argument that “we should collectivize the money that's used for public education and
distribute the money based on the need.”
What you want to happen is the schools in inner city New Haven, they would get
more resources and become great schools and then maybe more people would
move into that neighborhood that - so it's not just poor people moving into that
neighborhood. Or at the very least, they have an opportunity that - because you
need more resources for some— for kids that have more— you just need more
teachers or more, you know, people helping those kids.
“Less money” would go to schools in “a wealthy suburb” under this scheme, Josh said,
and that would be fine by him. This was already the case at the school his kids attended
“our school is less funded than the inner-city schools.”
Yes, I would [be comfortable with that]. Because what do parents do in those
communities? … They put their money into the public school. I mean … parents
in our school did.
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Undeserving rich
Like other respondents, Josh’s argument for redistribution was based in his
sympathy for the poor and his perception that the rich had “excess capital.” It was
supported by his belief that an individual’s economic prospects are strongly shaped by
factors outside of their control. Despite this strong support—wanting to see the rich pay
much higher taxes and using that money to ease hardship in the lives of the poor—Josh
was not antipathetic to the rich. Like many high-income respondents, he considered some
people in his social network to be among the rich—including classmates with whom he
had graduated from college. Josh did not characterize the rich as exploitative or
malicious, but nevertheless felt they had too much—more than they, or anyone, deserved.
That excess did not rightfully belong to any individual, he argued, because it was the
result of “everyone’s” efforts and should, instead, be considered “collective wealth” to be
used to make sure everyone had access to “basic dignity.”
No one deserves to be worth $40 billion. … and so even, you know, Bill Gates,
brilliant man … I don't think he's entitled to that much wealth. I just think that
that’s— you know, that should be collectivized. And I don't think that removes
incentives away, you know, so you can make $2 million a year. I think that's still
an incentive. I don't think that, you know, you need the super billions in the
hands of one or two people. That money … that represents a collective energy and
collective resources.
To Josh, individual brilliance was not enough to lead people to economic success and
thus, economic rewards should not be held “in the hands of one or two people.” “No idea
exists only in one person’s head,” he said. Even someone who is “clearly brilliant” is
“refining other people's ideas and … working in groups.” Maybe “they were the leaders,”
he said, but they also needed luck, resources, and connections to get to their position. For
example, he said, someone like Steve Jobs might have “dropped out of college,” but he
“had connections” and “resources.” “He was calling up, you know, the founder of
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Hewlett-Packard when he was in high school, went over to his house and you know,
getting little transistors to work on.” Although Josh didn’t seem to resent people like Jobs
or Gates, he did feel that society gave the rich too much credit.
I think our society kind of has an inflated sense of who they are. … They're just
human beings, again, just like everybody else. They had a good idea; they were at
the right place at the right time. You know, there's a lot of luck that's involved in
being in the right place at the right time. … We glorify them too much. … We
give them more credit sometimes than they deserve, you know? … I don't know if
I want to say that's not fair, but it's not deserved, the glory isn’t.
The result of this undeserved glory, according to Josh, was a system that “socializes risk
and rewards private individuals, exorbitantly so.” To counteract this, Josh argued, “we
need a far more progressive tax system.”
Because then … what can’t— I mean, at least in this area, what couldn't you do
on $200,000 a year? Very little. I mean … that's a very good income. But there's,
you know, plenty of people making above that. I'm not saying scale everyone's
income back to $200,000 but, you know, we need a far more progressive tax
system. And what— to me, the damage of disparities is that it— it takes
resources out of our system that could be used to just allow people to have basic
dignity in their lives. I'm not saying that people should have handouts, but just so
that they can have dignity and then would be able to, you know, have the mental
health to be able to get up out - you know, get out of bed in the morning without
just wanting to use drugs or you know.
Whether it’s the $2 million he allowed to Bill Gates or the $200,000 for someone in his
area, Josh argued that redistribution of income made sense because, to him, “plenty of
people” have more than they need while others had less than what was necessary to meet
their most basic needs. Many high- and low-income respondents made a variety of this
argument—that the gap between the excess of some and the impoverishment of others
was morally untenable. Josh was frustrated and disappointed that more of the rich didn’t
advocate for this position.
I went to college with kids that are … really rich now and you know, we were
basically the same in classes, you know, so I don't see them as that different from
me in terms of - I mean, I see them different in their values, like that they— I
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guess if they— well, it's hard to say. I mean, I don't know. I don't know what - I
mean, I don't want to - I can't - it's hard for me to judge anybody based on - you
know, they made a lot of money so … they are accruing the benefits of the
system, you know, good for them. I wish they would advocate to have that money
taxed like - you know, like a Warren Buffet.
There is a defeated and confused quality to Josh’s frustration as he considers his peers
who are “accruing the benefits of the system” he just criticized. He had made a case that
people in such a position are “tak[ing] resources out of our system” that could be used to
reduce what he considered the unnecessary hardship in the lives of the poor. The
implication—although never explicitly stated— is that the rich are morally in the wrong.
At the same time, Josh does not want to be seen to “judge” individuals. Just as he saw
the profits of successful companies as part of a “collective wealth,” he seemed to see the
individuals holding onto those profits as part of a societal, not an individual, problem.
Facing that problem, he feels disempowered, reduced to “wish[ing]” the situation were
different.
Defending Moral Worth
Like many high-income respondents, Josh morally positioned himself in the
middle—between the poor, who he saw as unfairly “punished” by society and the rich,
who he saw as reaping both undeserved rewards and “glory.” He was pained by the
suffering of the former, but felt disempowered relative to the latter—leaving him
distressed, but ultimately acquiescing to the existing system, feeling powerless to change
it. Josh spoke passionately about the hardships of the poor—with what seemed to be a
deep and genuine sympathy and distress, and he also talked about the moral obligations
of the “super rich” straightforwardly. But, when our discussion moved closer to his own
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economic circumstances, he struggled a bit more to make sense of his own position
relative to those two groups.
When making his case for progressive taxation, Josh framed his own position—
whether consciously or unconsciously—in the middle, suggesting that the real struggle
for resources was between those above him and those below him. He suggested that, “at
least in this area,” $200,000 a year was “a very good income.” He didn’t, then, point out
that this was his household income (I learned that later, at the end of the interview), but
his choice was notable. By choosing his own income, he simultaneously framed himself
as privileged compared to some (“What couldn't you do on $200,000 a year?”), but also
as reasonable, and even virtuous compared to the “plenty of people making above that.”
Placing himself in this middle ground, Josh essentially removes himself from the
equation of economic inequality. He reinforced this later, suggesting that the progressive
taxation he argued for would hardly impact his life in economic terms, he said.
It [would] have zero effect on my life. Well, here's how it would affect my life. If
we had a more progressive tax system that enabled more people to live with
dignity, it would improve New Haven and that would improve my life. … I
wouldn't be as concerned about, say, like having my kids ride their bikes …
through an impoverished neighborhood where they might get mugged now
because they're filled with, you know, poor people where, you know, you're more
likely to have crime for people mugging someone, because they need money. So,
in that way, it would improve my life. But in terms of my own circumstances,
you know, a more progressive tax system would raise my taxes marginally, you
know? And I would be happy to pay it.
Throughout our interview, Josh sought this middle ground, moving between
acknowledging the advantages of his birth circumstances and sometimes minimizing
them at the same time as he grappled with his own moral positioning. For example,
describing the circumstances in which he was raised, he said, “I didn’t live in, you know,
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great wealth but … we had more money than probably most of the people in the town
that I grew up in.” When I asked him to describe his current social class status, he said,
I would say it’s— well … it's above average income, you know? … it may even
be more than… than twice [the average] actually, I don't know … But it’s—
among my peers, it's— we're probably right in the middle.59
He notes that his income is “above average,” briefly acknowledging his position relative
to those below him (“may even be more than … twice [the average]”), but immediately
turns his lens upward, comparing himself to his “peers,” among whom he places himself
“in the middle.” Josh described some of these peers, including those with whom he
graduated from college, as “really rich now.”
So, among peers that I graduated with, there are some— some people just
dropped, you know, $1.5 million on an apartment in New York. I'm not like that.
One of the reasons why I like living in New Haven is because it's very affordable.
He continued,
But you know, it's … there's disparity, you know… there's tremendous disparity
in New Haven. But to me, the disparity is really between like New Haven and
Greenwich, you know? … That's the big disparity. And to me … that kind of—
that's a disparity that … just creates … wealth. It's just not being used efficiently
for … bettering people's lives.
Acknowledging that “there’s tremendous disparity in New Haven,” Josh nods to the gap
between someone like him (who finds New Haven “very affordable”) and someone like
Julie (LIWW—who argued that for her, affording housing in New Haven is “not quite
Boston or New York or San Francisco bad,” but nevertheless, “a real crush”). But, just as
he turns the lens upward in naming his social class status, here too, he turns from the
disparity between him and someone below him to focus his attention on the gap between
him and those above him, arguing that the “big disparity” is between people like him and

59. Only about 9% of the households in the U.S. have income greater than $200,000, and they have almost
45% of all pre-tax income (Tax Policy Center 2018).
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people who live in Greenwich (a Connecticut town south of New Haven long known as a
wealthy enclave and consistently ranked among the wealthiest US cities).
Josh did, throughout the interview, straightforwardly discuss his advantages, as
when he argued that having a family with economic resources provided a “safety net”
that others didn’t have access to.
Why should we have a safety net for … disadvantaged people? Well … because
people like me and others like me, we have a safety net and it's called our family
and our family has the income for a— you know, I can screw up. I can not
work— I can not work for a year and you know, have the support of my family
members.
Josh explained that he had only “woken up … recently” to his “easier opportunity” that
came from his “White privilege and being a man.” He could more readily describe the
economic advantages he had compared to someone with a different family background,
but when doing that, he struggled to reconcile those advantages with his sense of moral
worthiness—illustrating the complexity of facing economic inequality for someone in his
circumstances. This extended quote provides an example of his attempts to deal with this
complexity. I asked him if he thought he had had an easier or harder time than others—in
terms of economic opportunity. In his response, he rambled a bit, tracing his path and
trying to make sense of his own thoughts:
I had great opportunities. … I had … a great college education and I didn't know
what I want to do after I graduated from college. … I graduated at the same time
that the internet was starting and so for my— for people in my kind of generation,
you know, it was really easy to go to an internet company and get a good-paying
job. … Anybody with a college education could, it felt like. … Then I didn't want
to do that, but I made enough money doing that so that I could … take time off
and I started getting into writing. I wanted to become a journalist, so I just started
… submitting articles and … got them published and so … then I became a
newspaper writer. …
Now those jobs were very competitive … and so I had to really work to get them.
I mean I didn’t— I wasn't just handed— you know, I had to work on my writing
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and … that was something that was emphasized all the way through my
schooling.
He went on, taking stock:
So, did I get an unfair advantage? For the journalism, no. No. Like that to me
was— I mean, to the extent that it was unfair that I was from a family of means
and I got— they paid for my college education. I didn't have any debt when I
graduated. That was a big advantage. So, I was able to save money instead of
paying off college debt. So that when my wife and I moved here, I could buy a
house, you know? And I didn't have to—I could take a really low-paying
journalism job and still have a house, you know, we had an apartment in it, so
with extra income. So, I mean, I don't think I got— I mean, I was never like—
was I ever like given anything? You know, one summer, because of a family
connection, I got a job in New York. But everything else, I've had to like, you
know, apply, interview.
Josh didn’t know how to—or perhaps didn’t want to—answer his own question of
whether or not he had “an unfair advantage.” He was torn between his growing
realization of the impact of his inherited circumstances on his economic trajectory (“I
was able to save money instead of paying of college debt”) and his desire to feel morally
worthy of this position—a desire to have his effort validated (“I had to really work to get
[those jobs]”). Josh had said earlier “the biggest luck … the roll of the dice … is … what
family are you born into?” As he tried to compare his own opportunities to those of
others, the rippling and compounding ramifications of that dice roll were hard for him to
grapple with.60
Disempowerment
Feeling that power rested primarily in those above him on the economic latter,
Josh felt disempowered to change the systems that distressed him, but that ultimately

60. As noted earlier, behavioral economists tell us that barriers or “headwinds” are much more
psychologically available to us than “tailwinds” that invisibly help us along the way (Davidai and Gilovich
2016). Given that—and despite his struggle to do so—it’s notable that Josh was able to trace as many
“tailwinds” as he did throughout the interview.
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only impacted his life “indirectly.” Like other high-income respondents, he was
simultaneously upset—even sometimes angry—by societal treatment of the poor, but also
resigned to the status quo. Although he believed that the responsibility for change rested
with “the people,” he didn’t feel particularly empowered—or maybe responsible?—to
make those changes. Like many respondents, Josh didn’t feel represented by government
decisions, “because the superrich have their lobbyists writing our laws right now.” In this
sentiment, which he shared with many high- and low-income respondents, he repeated
the upward-looking tendency I saw among the high-income. He focused, like other highincome respondents, on his relatively low political power compared to the “superrich”
rather than his relatively high political power compared to the poor.
These feelings of disempowerment and uncertainty about his own role seemed to
lead Josh to frame the problems he saw with economic inequality in ways that suggested
inevitability. Recall his comment about his “really rich” peers and Josh’s “wish” that
“they would advocate to have that money taxed,” but his resistance to “judge anyone” for
not doing so. Similarly, although he expressed his belief “in the market,” he described the
problems it created for people struggling to find gainful employment, but without
questioning the forces behind it.
It's very confusing times. …The market has become so … efficient. It's found
cheap labor sources outside of our country and there are— you know, there are
not enough paying jobs for people to do.
Josh argued that this, “structural unemployment or structural underemployment” created
a “moral responsibility” to make sure that people could meet their basic needs without
work—redistribution he supported—but, like Hochschild’s high-income respondents, he
didn’t challenge the “immutable forces” of the market. Similarly, near the beginning of
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our interview, when I asked Josh for his initial thoughts about the gap in income and
wealth between the rich and poor, he said “I do think about it quite a bit.”
I think that … in our system and really in our society— in Western society that
we have inherited for the past, you know, millennia, there's a hierarchy and there's
a class-based hierarchy and even though we have a democracy, we inherited the
hierarchy with the aspirational qualities of our democracy so that people everyone can have— should have access. … But no one ever talks about
eliminating the hierarchy, they always talk about moving up the ladder. So that is
so endemic to our system that I don't see— I mean, as a hierarchy— is hierarchy a
problem? I think it's hard to say that it is because it's just— it's the way that
humans organize themselves.
There’s a resigned inevitability to this—although we might aspire to a democracy where
“everyone can have— should have access” hierarchy is “just the way that humans
organize themselves.”
“I should pay taxes. Wealthy people should pay taxes” – Sandra (HIBW)
We met Sandra in earlier chapters. She was one of the few African-American
faculty members at Yale (about 3-4% of faculty). When I interviewed her, her annual
household income was about $275,000, which, to her, felt “like tons of money” given that
she “grew up… in a very different world” where “the majority of people were poor.” A
connection to and awareness of this “different world” shaped her perspective on wealth
and poverty as she moved along in her education and career trajectory. She was frustrated
that luck of birth was a “determining factor” in “how we live our lives.” Everybody, she
argued, should “be able to live with humanity and dignity and with health care and
enough food to feed your family. That should not be something that the wealthy have a
monopoly over.”
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Support for redistribution - illegitimacy of inequality
Sandra was strongly in favor of redistribution, sympathetic to the poor (who
“work hard” but “just don’t get rewarded”), and critical of the rich for keeping a
“monopoly” over resources that could otherwise be used to “create … a social system
that actually works” for everyone. Like other respondents, she saw existing economic
inequality as illegitimate, believing that birth circumstances mattered more than effort or
merit in shaping people’s economic trajectories. She agreed with many respondents—
especially the low income—that “the system is, in some ways, stacked against people
who are poor.” Pushing back against a common narrative, she said “no, I don't think if
you work hard, you'll get ahead.”
I think there are some people who work really hard and the get paid shit, right?
So, it doesn't really matter how hard you work … if you're cleaning toilets all day,
that's hard labor if you ask me, but you may not be getting paid very much and
you don't have health insurance and so you're going to go in debt if your kid has
to go to the hospital. Or if you're doing childcare as a nanny, you don't have
health insurance. You don't get sick days. You might get paid—you're working
hard, trust me, I know you're working hard—but you may not be getting ahead. …
Particularly, I think it matters where you … come in. So, like, if you're born into a
family that's poor … you're going to have to work twice as hard to get ahead,
because you're … working out of a ditch, right? If you come into a middle-class
family— you know, you might not actually have to work so hard to get ahead,
right? You're already ahead, just because of the nature of where you were born.
Some people are born “already ahead” regardless of their work or effort, Sandra argued,
and the current economic system exacerbated that inequality. “The system is not set up in
a way to help those who have less. It’s actually set up for the people who have the most
to have more.” The idea that “everybody has equal opportunity,” is a “kind of
mythology.” People’s economic trajectories, she explained, depended heavily on their
starting circumstances which, themselves, had been established through exploitation and
injustice.
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Everybody has this kind of mythology that everybody has equal opportunity and
equal access. And if that was the case, then maybe things would look very
different. But the reality is that people don't have equal opportunity or equal
access. Yes, we were a country that … has deep roots in democracy and a
discourse of equality. … But it's also a country that's built on slavery, where, you
know, people got wealthy exploiting other people's labor. … based on
dehumanizing people and not seeing people as of value or worth beyond… the
wealth that their labor can produce.
Sandra—like other high-income Black respondents—applied both a relational and a
historical lens to economic inequality and saw racial inequality as integral to those
discussions. Her support for redistribution explicitly included this framing.
I believe in reparations. Like, give people some money, like you know, for
ancestors of slavery, for people who were in Japanese internment, Native
Americans who had their land stripped. Not just some casino… like how do you
invest, economically and strategically in those communities?
Even history aside (and she didn’t think it should be set aside), Sandra argued that current
disparities were large enough to justify redistribution from those who “have too much” to
those who “don’t have enough.”
We live in a world where people don't have enough, and people have too much. I
think if there are people with too much, then we take it and we give it to the
people who don't have enough. That just, to me, ethically seems right. And, so
yeah, they worked hard for it and maybe we shouldn't take it, but I don't want to
live in a world where people who actually work hard don't get enough. So, I
believe: Take it. Tax 'em.
Sandra argued that downward redistribution is “ethically” justified by the gap between
the rich and poor, regardless of the legitimacy of the holdings of those who have the most
resources. Like other respondents, she found the disparity, itself, to be morally untenable.
She nodded to the counter argument that “maybe we shouldn’t take it” because “they
worked hard for it,” but ultimately seemed to feel that the injustice of “a world where
people who actually work hard don’t get enough” was greater than that of taking money
from someone who may have “worked hard for it” but, nevertheless, has “too much.”
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Many other respondents struggled to reconcile these two values, potentially due to
a stronger sense of individualism. They valued an individual’s right to keep what they
had “worked hard for,” but then didn’t know what to do about those other individuals
who also “work hard” but “don’t get enough.” Sandra, in contrast, argued that societal
well-being justified a collective responsibility, “we all have to be committed to making
sure people have enough.”
Although she targeted the rich as she argued for redistribution, she did not exempt
herself from responsibility. “Yeah, I feel like the wealthy should be - like I should pay
taxes, wealthy people should pay taxes. I think there should be a death tax, like all of
those things [laughs].” Such taxation would mean “that we have more money,” Sandra
argued, to work toward creating “a system that works for everybody.”
Views of the rich - not paying a fair share
Sandra argued that people in her own economic position shared a responsibility to
contribute to creating a system that is more “fair” because their own economic success
was not the result of being more “deserving” but rather because they had been “more
lucky than other people.” She criticized “our kind of capitalist model” for allowing the
rich to shirk this responsibility by “figur[ing] out how not to pay taxes.”
I don't think it's fair how people are taxed … who can get around the taxes. People
who tend to have more money tend to have access to tax lawyers or accountants
who can help them figure out how not to pay taxes. And poor people, who don't
have access to accountants, you know, pay their taxes to the fullest, right?
Here, as elsewhere, Sandra frames her argument in terms of systems—contrasting the
“access” of the rich and poor to resources rather than focusing on their behaviors as
individuals. Like Sandra, many respondents criticized systemic problems with the tax
structure (e.g., “loopholes”) that allowed the rich to lower, or eliminate, their tax bills.
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But, unlike Sandra, many respondents also characterized the tax avoidance of the rich as
a problem of behavior, rather than distribution. Rachel Sherman (2017) argues that such
a focus on “what people do and how they feel, not what they have” creates a sense that
there is a “legitimate” way to inhabit wealth, which “draws attention away from
institutions and social processes such as the systematic unequal distribution of resources”
(Sherman 2017:233). Many high-income respondents wrestled with reconciling these
different claims to moral legitimacy—like Josh, not wanting to “judge” the rich for what
they have, and so, instead “wish[ing]” they would take different actions.
Sandra, instead, seemed to focus more on distributions of resources and less on
individual behaviors. She felt that individuals were just as undeserving of being poor as
they were of being rich. “It's nobody's fault it you're born poor or you're born Black or
you're born rich and wealthy right?” The “common sense” question, given that situation,
is “how do you make things fair?” She argued that allowing the rich to circumvent
taxation not only undermined societal efforts toward distributional fairness, but also
reinforced the social and economic power of the rich (including by creating a perception
of “legitimate entitlement” through their behavior). She held up philanthropy as a
particularly egregious example of this process.
I just don't think people should be like really really really really really rich … I
guess one of my biggest critiques about our kind of capitalist model is that, you
know, wealthy people are expected to be - do philanthropy. And so, it's like out of
the goodness of their heart, they're going to give money to the less fortunate and
the needy - and I'm like no, just take the money! [laughs] Tax them! … Because
actually the fact is, a lot of people are giving philanthropy because they're trying
to avoid taxes, right?
The benefits of such a system to the rich compound, Sandra argues, because, not only are
they “avoid[ing] taxes” and seen to be doing something morally good, but they also get to
make private decisions about how that money gets spent (they “get to pick and choose
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who they want to benefit”) rather than being subject to the kind of collective decision
making that happens around tax revenues. Thus, instead of “creating a society where
people have equal opportunity” Sandra argues, such a system means that “people who are
… lucky enough to be born [with resources]” will help out “a few people” who are born
without such resources “instead of saying, well how can we make sure all the [poor]
people have access right?”
If you're really committed to these ideals of democracy and equality, then how do
you do that in a way that is systematic? And philanthropy isn't the way to do that.
It's like, you actually need to pay taxes. And then, as a community, we can decide
how those taxes should be used and … who's going to benefit from this, that
there's a common pot that this is going into and some people actually should pay
more. Because I think it's just unethical for some people to have— for the 1% to
have all the money that they have.
Sandra was less concerned about government intervention than she was about living in a
system where some people had to do without “the basics,” just because they were
“unlucky” to be born into a poor family. She returns to her distributional argument
here—regardless of how much the rich give away through philanthropy, “it’s just
unethical” for them “to have all the money that they have.”
Personalized perspective: A life of luxury
Sandra had a unique perspective among my respondents in that her current
economic position was dramatically different from how she had grown up. Such a
dramatic change in economic position was not the case for most respondents—and is not
the case for most Americans (e.g., Chetty et al. 2017). Although a few other high-income
respondents had grown up in low-income families, the gap between Sandra’s current
financial circumstances and those in which she grew up seemed larger than for most
respondents. This combination of reference points seemed to draw her attention to the
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privileges of her current life, rather than—as we saw for other high-income
respondents—to her relative lack of resources compared to those with greater incomes.
One example of the way this shaped her perspective came as she described her perception
of the economic gap in the U.S. She started with the “1%,” but then quickly turned to
reflect on her own experience.
Definitely there's a gap [laughs] between the haves and the have nots or the top
1% and everybody else. … I don't know what the pie is, but whenever I see that
pie chart of how much accumulated wealth the top 1% has compared to
everybody else, I'm shocked and horrified [laughs]. … I mean it's clear to me …
because … I grew up in a poor household, but now I'm like— it's hard for me to
think, “oh my god. I'm in like the up—” like my husband and I we were talking to
our kids … My son said, “oh we're middle class” and we looked at each other and
we're like, I actually think we're probably like upper middle class [snorts/laughs]
right?
Although she differentiated herself from the “top 1%” in her shock and horror at their
“accumulated wealth,” Sandra turned quickly to place herself alongside them—among
the “haves” relative to her own background—even as she found herself uncomfortable
with that class status in such a way that made it hard for her to “think” or even name it.
Grounded in her reflections on her own upbringing, the benefits of her current access to
resources were very visible to her. She went on, framing the gap between “the haves and
the have nots” in terms of her own childhood experiences versus those of her children.
And I can see the differences in terms of quality of life. … Yes, it's real. … Does
it matter? Yes, I think it matters in terms of the way people are able to live their
lives with stress or without stress. So, when I think about my life now and what
my kids have to worry about … or what I had to do without … versus what they
have to do without. It's very clear to me that, like quality of life, your health, your
mental health is all affected by whether you're in the haves or the have nots. In
terms of what kinds of education you get, where do you actually get to live … the
kind of job that you have … whether you can have childcare that is going to be
useful and helpful for your kids.
Comparing her own experiences to those of her children provided Sandra with a very
tangible anchor for understanding the benefits to her own “quality of life” by virtue of
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being among “the haves.” She repeatedly took this perspective during the interview:
counting her own economic blessings. For example, when I asked her if her income
allowed her to live the kind of life she wanted, she said “Oh, I do, I live that way.” She
went on to explain that her husband’s income, alone, was “three times the median family
income.”
I'm like, “we're rich.” {laughter} But I grew up … in a very different world. I
don't need to make more money. … The biggest thing about our income, for us,
means that we actually live in a neighborhood where we don't have to send our
kids to private school. That's huge … our real estate taxes are expensive—a huge
chunk of our income basically goes to being able to live in a neighborhood where
we both can walk to work, and our kids can go to public schools. And it's richly
diverse. And we're like, that's what we feel like is our luxury that we spend all of
our money on. We could live in the suburbs and have to have 2 cars … our kids
would be the only brown kids out there, but we don't want to be in that world.
Sandra readily acknowledged the ease she had in her life as a result of her income (and,
once again, integrated her commentary about race and class). She did not, as did other
high-income respondents, emphasize her own individual merit or effort as a way of
staking a claim to being morally worthy of her income. In fact, she did the opposite,
pointing out the ways she had been “lucky” compared to others, despite being born into
“a poor family.” She noted that her story could be seen as “the American story …
You're Black and you're female and you were poor, and look, you made it. Is that
something particular about me that I made it, or does it say something particular
about the people who don't make it?
Her answer to both questions was no. “People fail and succeed for a host of
reasons,” she said, but “fate and luck dictate a lot … and they’re … out of our control.”
She explained, contrasting her own experience growing up “poor in the South” with her
cousins “in the north.”
I grew up in a small town and there were certain things that my parents didn't
have to worry about. So, I do think that region and environment matters in the
sense that like, I went to a school where the majority of people graduated from
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high school even if they didn't go to college. … There was a kind of culture of
okay, you finish high school. … But I think, in some places, where I had cousins
who grew up in the north, there were other ways to acquire wealth and status that
wasn't linked to finishing school or high school.
Sandra went on to explain that she was “one of the lucky ones… who was able to make
my way in” to the advanced placement courses rather than being “tracked” with the other
“Black kids” out of the “advanced classes.” She was born into a family where some of
her relatives had “gone to college … so that was something we could see as a possibility”
compared to somebody “in a family where nobody’s done that.” Sandra described her
path as bolstered by “fate and chance and happenstance” and argued that “it shouldn’t be
that way.” “There should be a formula,” she said, “a path that’s available to everybody”
so that “it’s not just hit and miss, and it’s not just the one exceptional story.”
Reconciling Privilege
Sandra acknowledges her own “exceptional story” and continues—throughout the
interview—to express sympathy for the undeserved hardships of the poor. She advocates
for redistributive taxation (including of people like her) to contribute to making
something like her own path “available to everybody.” However, like most high-income
respondents, while she readily contrasts her own circumstances with those of the poor,
she doesn’t seem to link her own position (as someone living with “luxury”) to that of
someone struggling to “live with humanity and dignity.”
Absences are hard to capture, but one of Sandra’s responses, early on in our first
interview (about 15 minutes in), caught my attention because she directly juxtaposed her
own standard for an acceptable minimum income with that of someone to whom she was
directly connected—her child’s daycare provider—without reflecting on the economic
relationship between herself and that worker.
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When you start trying to look at people who are kind of working poor or working
class— what they think about as getting ahead … it's not always the same as how
middle class or wealthy people think about getting ahead. … I'm now in the
middle class where there's a threshold where I couldn't imagine making less than,
but then I know people who, like their threshold of what they could imagine
making is like so low. I think, “oh my god” [whispers] “oh my god.” Like, when I
think about the people who work in the daycare where my kid goes. I'm like,
really, you just make $25,000 a year and you don't have health insurance? Or you
don't have a retirement plan? But that's my— what I know as possible, so that's
what I've been striving for, but for them, it's like, “Well I have a 9 to 5. I'm
making over $20,000.” Like, you know, what their getting ahead looks like is
very different from what I think getting ahead is.
It was an odd moment where Sandra openly acknowledges that the income of her child’s
daycare provider is shockingly low to her, but she doesn’t seem to link that person’s
poverty to her own prosperity. She went on to talk about how difficult it was for lowincome people to find jobs that paid enough, were stable, offered health insurance, and
offered raises or promotions that would keep people from “being stuck” and “falling
behind.” She seemed to take the same tack as she had when talking about tax avoidance,
characterizing it as a systemic, rather than an individual issue that needed to be tackled by
putting money into a “common pot.” And, later in the interview, she made clear that she
believed in taxing people like her in order to improve the prospects of people like the
childcare workers she mentions.
At the same time, I would have expected her to make an explicit link, at some
point, between her economic situation and that of the working poor for whom she
expressed so much sympathy. She was critical of the rich for holding a “monopoly” on
the resources that might otherwise allow people “to live with humanity and dignity and
with health care and enough food to feed your family.” She commented on policies
“shoring up people who were already economically stable, at the expense of poor
people.” She argued that current capitalist systems worked in such a way that:
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People can only win big if somebody else loses ... Winning big means lots of
people have to lose ... To be able to dominate the market … means that people
have to be exploited, labor has to be exploited.
In other words, Sandra did make arguments that linked the winning of some to the
losing of others, but, like other high-income respondents, she didn’t seem to see herself
as part of that equation. It was in this unspoken way that she separated herself from the
rich. She did not see herself among those “winning big,” nor as one of the holders of
“monopoly.” She, and other high-income respondents, are, in some ways backed up on
this position by data. For example, Saez and Zucman (2019) argue that “the main fault
line” in terms of income in America “is between the 1% and everybody else” (Saez and
Zucman 2019:6). But others, notably Reeves (2018), argue that “the upper middle class
has been having it pretty good” and passing their good fortune onto their children with
“the greatest class persistence … at the top” of the income spectrum (Reeves 2018:4,11).
The “obsession with the upper class” Reeves argues, has allowed the upper middle class
“to convince ourselves we are in the same boat as the rest of America: but it is not true”
(Reeves 2018:4).
As a Black woman, Sandra’s omission of herself from among those “winning big”
is understandable. Despite her economic privilege, she continued to face discrimination
based on her race and gender. Recall her story, in Chapter 3, about being profiled and
followed around grocery stores, where “people assume … that I’m going to steal
something.” She also talked about the difference in the salary offers she and her (White)
husband received. Despite similar academic backgrounds and accomplishments, he
repeatedly “got paid more money than me.” “Race and gender matter,” she said, “in
terms of how people make decisions about how people are gonna get paid, and who's
valued and who's not valued.” Recent research has also reinforced the importance of
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acknowledging that being wealthy and Black is still very different from being wealthy
and White. As noted in Chapter 2, research by Chetty et al. (2020) shows the far greater
likelihood of downward economic mobility across generations in Black families than in
White—even among the highest income and among those from similar neighborhoods.
America’s long history of both legally and extra-legally denying Black Americans
opportunities to build wealth means that wealth, itself, is a major dividing line between
even high-income White and Black folks. Sandra considered herself, now, to be among
the “haves,” but she was in a very different situation from Josh, for example, whose
family wealth stretched back over generations.
In other words, Sandra had justifiable reasons to separate herself from among the
societal “winners” in terms of economic inequality. At the same time, her explicit
acknowledgement of her own economic advantages and her sympathy for the poor made
it somewhat surprising that she didn’t see herself as part of the equation between the low
pay of her child’s caregiver and the excesses of the rich. She didn’t express concern—as I
might have expected her to—about her role in that caregiver’s economic experience. For
example, she didn’t talk about paying more for childcare or about what might be
happening with those careworkers’ own children. She drew my attention to this absence
when, a few minutes later, she recounted telling her son about how “lucky” and
“privileged” he was to have help from his parents in doing his homework.
I said, you know, you're very lucky because actually, I have a job where I can
come home and help you prepare for your project and help you study. But like the
majority of people … your friends, their parents work till 5 o'clock, some of them
work till 7 o'clock and they can't afford to pay somebody to come and sit with
their kid from 5-7 and help tutor them with homework. So, I said you're very
lucky and you're very privileged.
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As Sandra invokes a hypothetical other person who might be paid to care for her
child, I was reminded of the childcare workers she mentioned earlier and about how they
might be in the position she is describing to her son: perhaps leaving their own child
because their need for income necessitates that they spend that time helping someone
else’s child. Sandra doesn’t seem to make this connection, although she is careful, again,
to acknowledge her (and her son’s) privileged position. This was particularly interesting
because she went on to contrast her son’s position to her own when she was a child,
offering the perspective of someone without that privilege.
When I was a kid, nobody helped me with my homework. My parents were at
work and there was no tutor that was going to get paid. So, it made a difference in
terms of my grades. So, it makes a difference if your parents can afford to have
support, right? If your parents can't, it affects your grades long term. It affects
what people think you're capable of, whether it's true or not, right?
Sandra recounts her own experience in a household where her parents couldn’t
afford the kinds of services she implies she might be able to afford for her son—and she
notes the long-term consequences (“it affects what people think you’re capable of”), but
even if she considers that might also be the story of the children of people she employs to
care for her child, she doesn’t seem to see herself in a role that might influence that
situation.
Like other high-income respondents, Sandra expressed an understanding that she
was “lucky” compared with others and, therefore, had a responsibility to contribute to
improving the situations of those who had less. Also like other high-income respondents,
she acknowledged this responsibility without acknowledging or perhaps without thinking
about the ways that her own privilege might be creating or upholding the disadvantages
of others. In this way, Sandra was not unusual, although she did stand out in other ways.
In addition to her unique economic trajectory, she was also the only respondent to
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consider her own status as “rich, probably.” She also offered some of the most clear and
unequivocal support of redistribution among my respondents, including implicating
herself as someone who had an ethical responsibility.
Sandra seemed among the most likely to acknowledge her own role in
perpetuating economic inequality and that of people like her. Her not doing so suggests
less about her than about the general lack of public discussion regarding the
responsibility of the upper middle class in terms of upholding and counteracting
economic inequality. This is not surprising, Reeves (2018) argues, because “the upper
middle class also has a huge influence on public discourse, counting among its members
most journalists, think tank scholars, TV editors, professors, and pundits in the land”
(Reeves 2018:9–10). Thus, they are in a much more powerful position to advocate for
redistribution than are the people at the bottom, but they first have to recognize—and
then to fight against—the mechanisms through which they benefit at others’ expense.

Conclusions: Sympathy without responsibility
“There's a reason why we've made the least progress when it comes to civil rights in
terms of housing and schools. And that is because that is civil rights made personal. This
is not whether or not you can go to a restaurant or not, but it's who's going to live next to
you and whose kids are going to sit in the classroom with your own kids.” Nikole
Hannah-Jones on Code Switch podcast (Gutierrez et al. 2018)
“We can’t have it both ways. Nice white parents can’t grab every advantage for our own
children and also maintain our identities as good citizens who believe in equitable
schools. …We can choose to hoard resources and segregate ourselves and flee the
moment things feel uncomfortable. Or we can choose to be the people we say we are. But
we can’t have both. We can choose to remember the goal of public schools is not to cater
only to us, to keep us happy, but to serve every child. We’ve never had that school system.
But we could. We could demand it. We might not. But we should know it’s within our
power to help create it.”
Chana Joffe-Walt, Nice White Parents podcast (Snyder and Joffe-Walt 2020)
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Despite their support for redistributive taxation as a way of tackling economic
inequality, high income respondents generally seemed to acquiesce or capitulate to the
status quo. Most argued in favor of higher rates of taxation on people like themselves and
on the rich—with revenues targeted to improve the lives of the poor—but it is unclear
how, if at all, they translated those sentiments into action. For example, I didn’t ask, but
none of the high-income respondents volunteered that they had done any particular
advocacy on this issue (e.g., calling their representatives). Instead, our conversations
suggested that—notwithstanding what seemed like genuine and strongly-held beliefs—
these respondents were resigned to things staying as they were. They were not happy
about it, but the reality was that—despite the emotional toll it seemed to take—economic
inequality did little harm to their immediate lives. Thus, these issues were not necessarily
at the forefront of their minds when they were not being interviewed about them.
Even those who did think regularly about issues of economic inequality seemed to
feel disempowered by a sense of individual isolation or a perception of their lack of
political power compared to the rich. They didn’t seem to feel that they were part of a
group that would share their beliefs, which likely made the barrier between sentiment and
action feel even larger. For example, Josh talked about how some of his peers were rich
and how he wished they would advocate for progressive taxation—but assumed they did
not. He was also frustrated that “the superrich have their lobbyists writing our laws right
now.” Likewise, Deborah’s discovery that she was the largest contributor to her unit’s
charity fundraising seemed to discourage, rather than encourage her, to give more. And
she argued that “no one really wants to hear that [the CEO] should give back 10% of her
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pay and let it trickle down to the lower-level employees.” She considered her idea to be
“a radical statement.”
Deborah’s case also highlights something else about this sense of isolation: while
these respondents seemed willing to contribute or “give up more”—they wanted that
commitment to be part of a collective action where there would be an “agreement”
(Gene) about using “collective resources” (Josh) that “we can decide” how to use “as a
community” (Sandra). Leaving it up to individuals, they seemed to argue, would be
ineffective not only because the scale of the problem required the kind of resources only
available at a governmental level, but also because it would be hard for anyone,
individually, to choose to give more to a collective good when, for example, they hadn’t
finished filling their child’s college-savings account.
The necessity of spending money to shore up their children’s future status was a
repeated theme among high-income respondents—one that often animated their feelings
of financial constraint and their implicit or explicit legitimation for inaction related to
economic inequality. While spending or saving money for oneself in the face of upsetting
levels of economic inequality might feel morally illegitimate, spending for one’s “family”
or children does not have the same moral baggage (Sherman 2017). Indeed, quite the
opposite. Sherman found that, among her wealthy interviewees, the needs of children and
the invocation of family were categories that bestowed moral legitimacy on expenditures.
Although most of my respondents had fewer financial resources than did Sherman’s,
they, too used the needs of their children and families to justify or legitimate their actions
or expenditures.
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Like their low-income counterparts, high-income respondents all took issue with
various forms of government spending. At the same time, high-income respondents
nearly all also felt that some sort of government action was necessary to tackle a problem
of the scale and magnitude of current economic inequality. Most emphasized their
willingness to contribute to those government efforts despite their hesitations about
government expenditures.
High income respondents were also more likely to say they felt represented by
government than were low-income respondents, but many still focused on their lack of
political voice compared to the rich rather than their greater political voice compared to
the poor. Few articulated an awareness that people like themselves, with incomes above
$100,000, have substantially more influence on the decisions of their elected
representatives than do people with lower incomes (Bartels 2016). The focus of many on
individuals and individual choices—rather than social or collective action—also left them
doubting their own influence and not feeling particularly hopeful about systemic change.
Ultimately, high income respondents did not see themselves as personally
implicated in upholding economic inequality. They saw themselves as beneficiaries of a
system that favored those who “have more” over those who “have less,” but not
necessarily as contributors or perpetuators of that system. The problem, they seemed to
argue, was a system that distributed resources unfairly—one that many argued was
controlled by the very rich. Perhaps they were, as Patrick said, “on the upside of the
unfair scale,” but they seemed to see themselves as passive or ancillary beneficiaries of a
skewed system set up by others to primarily benefit those others—and certainly not as
responsible for holding that system in place.

334

Chapter 5

Instead, where most high-income respondents saw their role in this system was as
part of the solution. They spoke strongly about redistribution—and about their
willingness to personally pay more. Many spoke about a moral or ethical obligation they
felt to improve the lives of the poor. Supporting such ideas seemed to help these
respondents reconcile their deeply-felt concerns about the unjust hardships faced by the
poor with their recognition of the contrasting ease in their own lives. These high-income
respondents seemed to be in a similar conundrum to Hochschild’s respondents who felt
“torn between what ought to be and what apparently must be” (Hochschild 1981:242) and
turned to a similar solution.
For the wealthy, the gap between facts and values usually justifies personal
inaction even in the face of an unfair status quo. They can see themselves as
empathetic with the poor, even ‘socialistic,’ without feeling responsible to seek
greater equality. This is not hypocrisy; they may sincerely wish things were
otherwise, but because the market, or human nature, or political corruption are
immutable forces, one would simply be whistling into the wind to endorse major
changes. Maintaining tension between real world judgements of fact and utopian
values permits them both to retain their privileged status and to condemn
privilege.
My respondents, too, seemed to “sincerely wish things were otherwise,” and, like
Hochschild’s respondents, they also felt they would be “whistling into the wind” to try to
push back against the interests of the One Percent. The perceived “immutable forces” had
changed—a new villain was available to blame—but not the end result: personal inaction.
Thus, the high-income respondents in my project ended up in a similar position to those
Hochschild interviewed—able “both to retain their privileged status and condemn
privilege” at the same time.
But, as Chana Joffe-Walt argued in a podcast about the power of “Nice White
Parents” in America’s public-school systems, these respondents “can’t have it both
ways.” It is not that the high-income respondents I spoke with were wrong in perceiving
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that they have less power than the One Percent. Their misperception was in their
imagining of their own lack of power as a collective—both to contribute to worsening
economic inequality and to ameliorating it.

***
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CONCLUSION
“Not everything that is faced can be changed. But nothing can be changed until it is
faced.” —James Baldwin
Why has economic inequality in the U.S. continued to grow despite widespread
and strong public opinion in favor of reducing it? In this dissertation, I argue that
Americans are upset by current levels of economic inequality and support downward
redistribution as a means to reduce it. At the same time, many have hesitations about or
resistance to the mechanisms through which such redistribution might be carried out. The
patterns of hesitation and resistance I found varied across class, race, and gender groups
and were linked to patterns of visibility rooted in existing inequalities. Although
misperceptions about inequality—that grew out of these patterns of visibility and
invisibility—among less powerful groups (including the low-income and people of color)
have often been the focus of attention among elite commentators, the misperceptions
among the more powerful groups in my project were equally, if not more, striking. In
both cases, Americans’ desire for change seemed stymied by a landscape of visibility and
invisibility that serves the interests of the most economically powerful.
Across class, race, and gender, the people I interviewed were upset by economic
inequality and supported downward redistribution as a means to reduce it. That is, they
wanted to see the rich give up more of their holdings and they wanted to see those
resources used to improve the lives of the poor. Although they generally supported some
amount of income and wealth inequality, they saw current levels as illegitimate. These
inequalities, they argued, contradicted American ideals of meritocracy (ideals they all
seemed to implicitly support). Economic rewards flowed to those who had been born into
fortunate circumstances, they argued—compounding rather than ameliorating inequalities
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over which individuals had little control. Respondents felt that systems were stacked
against people born without economic or social resources, whose efforts or merit often
went under- or unrewarded. Furthermore, they argued, current U.S. social and economic
structures and systems exacerbate rather than ameliorate these inequalities—allowing
them to build, accumulate, and compound within and across generations.
Opinions about class groups featured prominently in my interviews, across
respondent incomes. Respondents often discussed economic inequality using moral
discourse about class groups (specifically the rich and the poor). They regularly depicted
material inequalities as moral relationships or moral contrasts between the rich and the
poor. As Piston (2018) has argued, their views of the poor were generally sympathetic
and those of the rich were often antipathetic, contrary to widespread “reigning myths”
that suggest otherwise. Respondents also used these moral understandings of the rich and
the poor to define and elevate their own moral positions—particularly to draw boundaries
between themselves and the rich (who they portrayed as morally corrupt) and to connect
themselves to the poor (who they portrayed as morally righteous).
Race and racial inequality were also common themes in my interviews and
revealed divergent patterns of belief and discourse between Black and White respondents.
Although most respondents saw racial and economic inequality as intertwined, White and
Black respondents expressed very different understandings of that entanglement. For
most Black respondents, racial inequality was a prominent, if not the defining feature of
American economic inequality—the two topics were very much part of the same
conversation. White respondents were more likely to separate or compartmentalize
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conversations about racialized economic inequality—often mentioning it unprompted,
but rarely discussing it in any depth without my probing.
White and Black respondents also had very different levels of knowledge about
American racial history. In particular, White respondents expressed much less awareness
of the linkages between that history and current racialized economic inequality than did
Black respondents. Many White respondents’ understandings reflected dominant
American narratives. They pointed to slavery as an evil of the past, then often skipped
from emancipation to the present day—sometimes pausing at the civil rights movement
of the 1960s—arguing implicitly and sometimes explicitly that racism was no longer a
driving force behind present-day inequality. This blind spot or negligence or denial
protected White respondents’ sense of moral legitimacy even as it undermined their
support for the kinds of redistributive policy that would otherwise have been aligned with
their expressed values favoring increased equality (Kraus et al. 2019, 2017). 2020
brought a real shift in terms of widespread social narratives about race and “racial
progress”—and I imagine the opinions of many of these respondents may have likewise
shifted, as I will discuss later.
When our conversations turned to what to do about economic inequality, two
major patterns emerged. First, support for downward economic redistribution, broadly
conceived, was widespread. Respondents generally wanted to see the rich contribute
more to improving the lives and circumstances of the poor. Second, and at the same time,
most respondents—either explicitly or implicitly—also resisted redistribution.
Nearly all respondents thought more should be done to support the poor—and
there was widespread agreement on what areas needed improvement: access to education,
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housing, healthcare and meaningful and gainful employment. Most wanted to see the rich
give up some of their holdings in order to improve the lives of the poor in these areas.
These sentiments reflect what both Piston (2018) and McCall (2016) have argued: that
Americans are interested in redistribution that is transparent about who will pay (the rich)
and who will benefit (the poor). The transparency is key, both argue. McCall gives the
example of state-level measures that raised taxes on high-income households “in order to
fund popular services, such as education, health care, and public safety” (McCall
2016:432). They key to passing these measures, according to McCall, was making
“explicit” the “tradeoff between raising taxes—only on the affluent—and funding
opportunity-enhancing programs” (McCall 2016:432). Without this explicitness, such
policies face “a fairly severe transparency problem”:
Exactly how are higher taxes on the rich going to translate into greater
educational and job opportunities for the rest of the population? On the basis of
what history are Americans to put their trust in taxing the rich as the solution to
declining opportunities? (McCall 2016:431)
My respondents voiced these very concerns—validating Piston and McCall’s arguments
for the importance of transparency. McCall argues that “opportunity-enhancing policies”
are more popular than the programs that are more traditionally associated with— and
more visible to the public as—government redistribution such as cash assistance.
However, although they might seem “commonsensical,” she notes, they are rare. As I
will discuss later, the rarity of these policies—despite their popularity—might reflect a
demonstrated lack of responsiveness among political elites to the needs of the noneconomically powerful.
At the same time as they supported redistribution, most respondents also had
hesitations or resistance—both implicit and explicit—about the mechanisms by which
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such redistribution might be carried out. Respondents found reasons—despite their
frustration with existing inequalities—to resist redistribution and morally justify inaction.
Resistance manifested in distinct ways between the two income groups based on
divergent experiences in lives socially and spatially segregated by class and race. Their
judgements and legitimations—of themselves and of others—were influenced by what
was visible to them in these separate spaces (Phillips et al. 2020). Some policies and their
impacts were more visible to one or the other group. Likewise, respondents had
differential access and exposure to the lives of the rich and poor and relationships
between the two. These different experiences shaped respondents’ moral judgements and
legitimations of themselves and of others—and, in turn, shaped their views of what
should be done and who should be held responsible.
Low-income respondents’ resistance was characterized by a distrust of the
government and an unexpected empathy for the rich. These respondents had little real
exposure to the lives of people in the top 20% of U.S. income or wealth, and they had
plenty of experiences with scarcity and lack of control in their own economic lives
(including in their interactions with government-funded support programs). This
combination seemed to lead many to resist the idea of taking from anyone—including the
rich—against their will. This was despite the fact that low-income respondents, like most
respondents, felt the rich were not contributing enough to improve the lives of the poor.
This resistance was further fueled by a widespread distrust of the government, which
many saw as beholden to the rich and a perpetuator of inequality.
The resistance of high-income respondents to redistributive policy was less overt,
but arguably more powerful than that of low-income respondents—given the greater
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political, economic, and social pull of this group. They were critical of the rich and also
more familiar with the excesses of that group than were low-income respondents. As
people who saw their own lives as “comfortable,” high income respondents argued that
those above them on the economic ladder had more than enough to share. Thus, these
respondents were more willing than some low-income respondents to demand that the
rich give up some of their holdings. They also generally expressed their own willingness
to contribute to downward redistribution, but they seemed unaware or uncomfortable
with the reality of their own complicity in current upwardly redistributive policies.
Focused on the relatively greater political, economic, and social power of the rich, highincome respondents often failed to recognize their own relative power compared to that
of the poor. In this way, they continued to benefit from an economic status quo they
railed against but took little action to change.
Reflections on J. Hochschild – 40 years later
“It is extraordinarily difficult to decide whether a respondent ‘really’ supports
redistribution or not—and may be the most important finding on this subject.
Respondents cannot make up their minds because redistribution pulls them in equal, but
opposite, directions. … most respondents certainly do not support the redistribution of
wealth, but they also do not exactly oppose it. They do both and therefore neither.”
(Hochschild 1981:186)
“I conclude merely by pointing out that the raw materials of opposition exist at least
among some residents of one city. Many of the poor and a surprising number of the rich
do not seek redistribution, but are so ambivalent about their own distributive beliefs that
they do not oppose redistribution as much as they fail to support any system of
distributive justice very fully. They sometimes seek equality; at other times, they seek
differentiation; too often, they do not know what they want or even how to decide what
the possibilities are.” (Hochschild 1981:283)
I began this project, in part, as a “revisit” to an investigation of American
opinions about economic inequality and with a qualitative design similar to that
undertaken by Jennifer Hochschild in the second half of the 1970s. The four decades
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between her study and mine saw a major divergence in the fortunes of people at the top
of the income ladder and those in the bottom half.
One way to encapsulate the “metamorphosis of the US economy” (Saez and
Zucman 2019) between the time of Hochschild’s study and that of my own is through a
figure comparing the share of national income going to the top 1% and the bottom 50%
(see Figure 1):
Figure 1: Share of total income 1967-2019, bottom 50% and top 1% (World
Inequality Database 2020)

Economists Saez and Zucman describe this “metamorphosis” this way:
In 1980, the top 1% earned a bit more than 10% of the nation’s income… while
the bottom 50% share was around 20%. Today, it’s almost the opposite: the top
1% captures more than 20% of national income and the working class barely
12%. In other words, the 1% earns almost twice as much income as the entire
working-class population, a group 50 times larger demographically. And the
increase in the share of the pie going to 2.4 million adults has been similar in
magnitude to the loss suffered by more than 100 million Americans. (Saez and
Zucman 2019:6, emphasis added)
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This major change in economic fortunes served as the backdrop against which I sought to
see how, if at all, American opinions about economic inequality and redistributive policy
had changed.
Another important difference in context between my study and Hochschild’s was
the demographics of New Haven and of our samples. About a third of New Haveners
were Black when both Hochschild and I conducted our interviews. However, the
population of White residents decreased from almost 60% (U.S. Census Bureau 1981) at
the time of Hochschild’s interviews to 30% when I conducted mine (another 30% were
Latinx). While Hochschild deliberately limited her sample to White respondents “to keep
the focus on economic and social, not racial, differences” (Hochschild 1981:316), I
structured my study to include Black as well as White respondents to better understand
how race intersected with class and gender in shaping opinions about economic
inequality. In Hochschild’s analysis, neither race nor gender was prominent (although she
deeply engaged with race her future work), whereas I found that race and opinions about
race and racism were deeply implicated in opinions about economic inequality.
Supporting redistribution
Given these dramatic changes in context, my findings were remarkably similar to
Hochschild’s in many ways, reinforcing the argument made by some that opinions about
economic inequality are generally decoupled from the magnitude of inequality itself
(McCall 2013) and suggesting the durability of the patterns Hochschild uncovered. Like
Hochschild’s respondents, the people I spoke with were conflicted, pulled “in equal, but
opposite, directions” (Hochschild 1981:186) by their dissatisfaction with the current state
of affairs and their hesitations about existing forms of redistribution. Respondents in my
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project also expressed many sentiments similar to those in Hochschild’s project: they
were unhappy with economic inequality, upset that the rich didn’t pay more in taxes,
sympathetic to the poor, distrustful of the government.
However, on the critical subject of downward redistribution, my respondents’
opinions differed significantly from Hochschild’s. Among Hochschild’s key findings was
the profound ambivalence respondents expressed about their own distributive beliefs.
They “certainly do not support the redistribution of wealth” she wrote, “but they also do
not exactly oppose it” (Hochschild 1981:186). They “are so ambivalent about their own
distributive beliefs that they do not oppose redistribution as much as they fail to support
any system of distributive justice very fully” (Hochschild 1981:283). In contrast to
Hochschild’s respondents’ profound ambivalence, the people I spoke with were
overwhelmingly (although not universally) in favor of some sort of downward
redistribution. Yes, they had hesitations and resistance that mitigated their full-throated
support, but over the 122 hours of interviews I analyzed for this project, what I heard
over and over again was a desire for some sort of downward redistribution of income and
wealth.
I argue that, for the most part, the people I spoke with did support redistribution,
but they also had hesitations about it. The end result seems similar to what Hochschild
found—frustration and discouragement among the low income and ambivalence and
acquiescence among the high income—but this subtle distinction has important
implications for policy. In particular, I argue that ambivalence is not the primary force
undermining Americans’ support for redistribution, but rather that their hesitation and
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resistance is fueled by a lack of transparency and visibility regarding the mechanisms of
redistribution and the groups that reap the benefits and pay the costs.
The rise of the 1%
Many things might explain this shift of opinions in favor of redistribution. One
factor of particular relevance is the rise of the 1% not just as an income group, but as
figures in the public imagination. The growing share of national income going to this
group has become a topic of increased public attention since the divide between—and the
terminology of—the 1% and the 99% was thrust into public view by the Occupy Wall
Street movement in 2010. With the 1% on the scene, both high- and low-income
respondents in my project had a common villain and were united in their calls to
redistribute the holdings of that group.
The pulling away of the 1% also meant that, in relative terms, my respondents
were further down the economic ladder than they would have been at the time when
Hochschild conducted her interviews (adjusting their incomes for inflation, of course).
For example, all of Hochschild’s high-income respondents had household incomes in the
top 5% of income receivers at the time of her interviews. But, with those same incomes
(adjusted for inflation), half of her high-income respondents would have fallen out of the
top 5% by the time of my interviews, not because of a change in their incomes, but
because of a change in the distribution—namely the growth in incomes at the very top.
Thus, despite similar absolute incomes (adjusted for inflation) to Hochschild’s
respondents, the respondents in my study (both high- and low-income) were further down
the relative economic ladder, mostly because the people at the top of the ladder had
pulled away from everyone else so dramatically.
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Awareness of this slippage in relative position among my respondents—both lowand high-income—shaped their opinions about economic inequality and redistributive
policy. Among low-income respondents, this awareness showed up in their identification
as poor (as opposed to middle class) and their descriptions of their ideals of middle-class
life as increasingly out of reach. They blamed the rich for upholding systems that made
the lives of the poor harder.
For high-income respondents, the stretching out at the top of the distribution
moved people in their own economic positions toward the middle of the distribution—
and their self-perceptions seemed to align with this shift. Notably, these respondents were
not all in the same economic boat as one another—with incomes that ranged from the
lower limit of the top 20% of Americans to some easily within the top 5%. Neither of
these categories would seem to be how many people would define the “middle” of a
range, but several factors seemed to solidify this group’s perception of middle-ness. The
public visibility of the 1% and the related call to solidarity among the “99%” was one
such factor. An awareness of the slippage in their relative positions combined with
growing economic insecurity among highly educated professionals in the context of a
“hyperdynamic, free-agent economy” (Hacker 2019) likely also solidified their selfperceptions as being in the “middle.” A key consequence of this self-perception was a
tendency to focus away from people in their own economic positions when thinking
about responsibility, accountability, or power to change or interrupt systems that
perpetuate and augment economic inequality.
It is easy to imagine that, for high-income respondents, decreased attention on
people in their own position and increased attention on the 1% would perhaps lead them
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to feel more supportive of redistributive policy. Many of these respondents talked about
their own willingness—and even sense of obligation—to pay more in taxes to improve
the lives of the poor, but most emphasized the contributions that would need to be made
by people at the top. Their sentiments reflect those of Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson:
“the real economic schism separates the overwhelming majority of Americans, including
most highly educated ones, from the tiny slice that has reaped the lion’s share of
economic growth” (Hacker and Pierson 2010:290).
This group of respondents might then understandably struggle to make sense of
their own economic and political position. Even though they have been experiencing
decreasing fortunes relative to the top income receivers, they nevertheless continue to be
in a position of greater power and privilege compared to people in the bottom 50%. Saez
and Zucman reflected this in-between position when they characterized the “upper
middle class (the top 10% excluding the top 1%)” in their argument for a new system of
progressive taxation targeting top income receivers. “It’s important to distinguish” that
group, they wrote, from “the rich (the top 1%).” They are “in entirely different leagues”
(Saez and Zucman 2019:5). At the same time, they note, people in the “upper middle
class”—which they estimated to be about 22 million adults in 2019—are “certainly not to
be pitied.”
With an average income of $220,000 and everything that goes with it—spacious
suburban houses, expensive private schools for their children, well-funded
pensions, and good health insurance—they are not struggling. But as a group they
do not have much in common with the 1% (the 2.4 million richest Americans),
whose members make $1.5 million in income a year on average. (Saez and
Zucman 2019:5)
Given the pattern of skyrocketing growth in the incomes of the people in the top 1% over
the past several decades, Hochschild’s high-income respondents might have felt that they
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had—and likely actually did have—more “in common” with people “at the top of the
income pyramid” than did my high-income respondents. This reality likely contributed to
the differences in our findings in support for downward redistribution. However, the rise
of the 1%—and the increased public attention to that group—also seemed to have a
countervailing effect on my high-income respondents. Even as they increasingly saw the
concentration of income, wealth, and power among the rich as problematic and wanted to
see it curtailed through policy—they seemed to increasingly discount their own power to
push for those sorts of policy changes.
Implications
“The catch-22 of winner-take-all politics is that the only viable and defensible route to
fixing our broken political system runs through our broken political system.”
—Winner-Take-All Politics (Hacker and Pierson 2010:289)

I began this project seeking to capture a sense of how Americans understand
economic inequality in the U.S. I hoped that the insights I gained might shed light on the
longstanding puzzle of why, in the face of growing inequality that continues to benefit a
tiny slice of the population over all others, Americans did not demand change—despite
abundant evidence of their dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. What I learned
compliments, extends, and informs the existing body of research on these topics.
My findings suggest that we might better understand the opinions of the American
public related to economic inequality if we attend not only to the ways public opinion
shapes political and social contexts, but also to the ways those opinions are shaped by
that context. Such a shift in perspective might mean pairing our questions about why the
American public does not take action in their own best interests with questions about the
forces in our political systems that keep those systems from responding to a widespread
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public desire to see reductions in economic inequality. Likewise, we might ask how
existing political systems and structures influence public opinion by shaping what is
visible and understandable to the public versus what is invisible or obfuscated.
In this last section, I reflect on a few areas of this interchange between people’s
opinions about economic inequality and the political and social context in which they
form those opinions—focusing on those areas that emerged as particularly relevant in this
project.
Political Representation
One answer to the question of why Americans fail to implement downwardly
redistributive policy that might reduce the economic inequality they decry is that they are
not being well represented by the people and systems charged with responding to their
interests.
I emerge from this analysis with a new understanding of the questions I originally
asked. I began this project seeking to learn how to change the minds of Americans who
were upset with economic inequality—and on the losing end of policies that uphold it—
and yet failed to support policies that would favor both their ideological position and their
pocketbooks. What I learned is that Americans do favor downwardly redistributive policy
and generally think that taking from the rich and giving to the poor is a good idea. What
holds them back from acting on those beliefs has less to do with their support for
redistribution and more to do with how the American political system responds. The fact
of growing economic inequality, in the face of widespread public desire to reverse it,
fueled my respondents’ existing distrust of the government—particularly, their beliefs
that the political system was beholden to the rich and powerful. Thus, an underlying
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contributor to many respondents’ reluctance toward redistributive policy was their feeling
that the very people who benefit from inequality controlled the mechanisms that might be
used to ameliorate it. These feelings are not unreasonable.
Respondents’ perceptions that growing inequality was both a consequence and a
cause of inequitable political representation was based in fact. Plenty of research (both
old and new) on political representation suggests that—where politicians are responding
to public sentiment at all—the interests of the highest income groups tend to be best
represented (e.g., Bartels 2016; Gilens 2012; Page and Gilens 2017; Piston 2018; Wilson
1999). Furthermore, most political actors come from among the wealthy themselves
(Carnes 2013). Respondents’ awareness of this representational inequity fed a selfreinforcing loop wherein the more they perceived the concentration of economic and
political power among the rich, the angrier and more frustrated they felt, but also the
more disillusioned and discouraged they felt about the possibility that their experiences or
even actions mattered for making change. Although most told me they voted (I was
interviewing them in a presidential election year), both high- and low-income
respondents seemed to retreat from any deeper political engagement—frustrated by a
system that they perceived as getting worse and moving farther from their ideals.
Policy Feedback
Inequitable political representation also deserves closer examination as a cause of
misperceptions about redistributive policy in cases where Americans have actually
appeared to vote against their own self-interest.
Piston (2018) argues that one reason we do not see more downwardly
redistributive policy, despite widespread public support for such policy, is that politicians
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face strong incentives to serve the interests of the wealthy (who are generally not in favor
of downward redistribution) without losing “votes from the public” who generally favor
such policies (Piston 2018:138). They solve this dilemma, Piston argues, by framing
policies in ways that “downplay class considerations,” seeking to “mollify the public” by
distracting from and obscuring the distributive consequences of these policies (Piston
2018:124,138). Although much of the public supports distributing resources to the poor
and taking them from the rich, the absence of “clear cues” about how the poor or the rich
will benefit or be harmed by a given policy makes it difficult for them to apply those
sentiments to their political decisions. Thus, Piston argues, although there is clear
evidence that class group attitudes of sympathy toward the poor and resentment toward
the rich are widespread and that they “bolster support for downward redistribution,”
Elites can disrupt the connection between class group attitudes and political
preferences by keeping the public confused and in the dark. In turn, this lets
public officials off the hook—free to pursue policies that do little to diminish the
growing gap between the richest and the rest. (Piston 2018:142)
Scholars of “policy feedback” agree, and argue that part of what keeps “the public
confused and in the dark” is the design of policies themselves, and not just the messaging
that surrounds them. Policies “carry embedded messages” in their design that often
include “mechanisms that deceive, block or divert citizens’ ability to understand and
participate in politics” (Schneider and Ingram 2019:211). These design mechanisms
allow elected officials to continue to channel benefits to the powerful while avoiding
“consequences damaging to re-election” (Schneider and Ingram 2019:210). For example,
upwardly redistributive benefits are hidden in a complex tax code—and require no
special application process—making them hard for the public to see and understand and
fostering the perception that they are not “expenditures” of taxpayer money (Mettler

352

Conclusion

2011). Meanwhile, some benefits targeted to the poor—and particularly to women—are
made difficult to access because the processes have been structured to be punitive and
surveillance-filled, making them far more visible to the public and fostering the
perception that these benefits are “expenditures” and even drains on taxpayer coffers.
Indeed, while all of my respondents were aware of highly visible, direct assistance
government programs to help the poor (e.g., “welfare” programs such as SNAP and
TANF), neither high- nor low-income respondents seemed aware of the benefits they
each might receive through the tax code. The result was that their sentiments in favor of
downward redistribution were muted by the hidden nature of the government assistance
they received.
For example—although most tax expenditures go to the affluent—one benefit to
poor Americans in the tax code is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). It is possibly
the “largest cash transfer to the poor” (Sykes et al. 2015) and is regarded by advocates as
“the most effective anti-poverty policy existing today” (Shanks‐Booth and Mettler
2019:319). Yet, the EITC went almost entirely unmentioned among my respondents of
either income group. Its position in the tax code “shrouds government’s role in aiding
people” such that even those who are helped by the EITC “benefit from government but
are not aware of it” (Shanks‐Booth and Mettler 2019:319). In this way, despite the
increase in EITC benefits over recent decades it “fails to mitigate recipients’ frustrations
with government” (Shanks‐Booth and Mettler 2019:319).61 Had this benefit been more

61. What are probably more visible to low-income tax filers than the benefits of the EITC are the audits
conducted of those who file for it—something likely to further sour opinion about government. As Herd &
Moynihan report “about 500,000 Earned Income Tax Credit audits take place each year, primarily by mail,
with approximately four of five benefit disallowances a result of undelivered mail, nonresponse, or
insufficient response, rather than evidence of wrongdoing. The long-term cost is that 30–40 percent of
those audited do not claim the benefit in later years, despite their eligibility” (Herd and Moynihan 2020:4).
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visible to them, low-income respondents might have increased their trust in
government—and thus, in the possibility of downwardly redistributive policy. 62
High-income respondents seemed similarly unaware of the array of benefits they
received through the tax code and—as with low-income respondents—this lack of
awareness muted what might have been stronger redistributive sentiments among this
group. One such benefit that has received particular attention as economic inequality has
worsened is the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID). Almost all of the highincome respondents “owned” homes and likely had mortgages. Yet none mentioned the
way they might benefit from this “enormous entitlement in the tax code”—the biggest
chunk of a collection of federal homeowner subsidies that overwhelmingly benefit the
wealthy and the upper middle class and that Matthew Desmond has called “the engine of
American inequality” (Desmond 2017). The way the MID is strategically hidden in the
tax code thus allowed high-income respondents to remain unaware of a mechanism by
which they were siphoning off the very tax dollars they said they were willing to
contribute toward alleviating the inequality they decried. Although “the mortgage-interest
deduction overwhelmingly benefits the sorts of upper-middle-class voters who make up
the donor base of both parties” Desmond notes, those voters “generally fail to
acknowledge themselves to be beneficiaries of federal largess.” This combination of the
invisibility of their own gains through tax policy and of their own political power kept
high-income respondents from being stronger advocates for the kinds of downwardly
redistributive policy they seemed to support.

62. In contrast to the relative invisibility of the EITC to many low-income respondents, for-profit tax
preparation companies are well aware of the size of the EITC benefit and often target low-income
communities. There, they charge excessive fees that effectively channel as much as 20% of a family’s
benefit away from the family and into the company’s own profits (White 2016).
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In general, the hidden nature of government assistance through the tax code
muted what might have been stronger redistributive sentiments among my respondents.
Low-income respondents might have increased their trust in government had the federal
government’s support of the poor through the EITC been more visible to them. Highincome respondents might have seen the tax breaks they received as unnecessary supports
to their already comfortable lives and as contrary to their stated desires for a more
downwardly redistributive tax code.
These kinds of impacts on political engagement through “policy feedback” are
“designed to be self-reinforcing,” giving “advantaged populations ... positive experiences
and views of government” that encourage mobilization and participation in politics while
treating disadvantaged populations with “neglect,” “punishments and burdens” that
encourage them to “withdraw, accepting what is allocated to them without much
mobilization or participation” (Schneider and Ingram 2019:229). I saw these patterns
among my respondents. Although all, as I have noted, expressed frustration and
discouragement about the responsiveness of government to their desires for more
equitable economic distributions, higher-income respondents were more likely than lowincome respondents to express positive sentiments about government and to say that they
thought their voices, opinions, and political participation mattered. Low-income
respondents were more likely than high-income respondents to express disillusionment
with the political process. This sense of disillusionment overlapped with a generalized
distrust of government born out of repeated encounters with the most visible governmentfunded programs that were widely regarded not only as insufficient, but as controlling,
punitive, and degrading.
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In other words, my respondents felt understandably frustrated and disenfranchised
by the very thing that researchers highlight—the disconnect between widespread public
support for downward redistribution and the policies enacted by political elites that
maintain current levels of inequality or even exacerbate them. Unfortunately, this led
many to disengage. Low-income respondents generally felt that their opinions and lives
were disregarded (treated as “expendable,” as one respondent put it) by political elites.
High-income respondents felt less disenfranchised, but many seemed convinced that their
voices, too, counted for little compared with those of the rich.
Counteracting distraction and mollification
Piston suggests that academics and activists might work to counteract the
distraction and mollification of the public by exposing the distributive consequences of
policies—specifically, by talking about class rather than obscuring it. To start, he argues,
those who want change can reject “one of the defining myths of our time”—”the belief
that most Americans do not support downward economic distribution” (Piston 2018:56).
Activists interested in more economic equity would “do well to view the American public
not as an inevitable enemy but as a potential ally” (Piston 2018:151).
Daylighting the distributive consequences of policies might have the additional
benefit of helping high-income Americans see the ways they benefit from current policy
at the expense of the poor. Richard Reeves (2018) argues that, despite their “huge
influence on public discourse” and their desire for reduced inequality, members of the top
20% fail to be stronger advocates for redistributive policy because they misperceive the
power of their own positions. For example, many high-income respondents expressed a
desire to see more opportunities available to the poor, but they rarely expressed a
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recognition that those opportunities might be unavailable for their lower-income
neighbors because higher-income people like themselves have captured those
opportunities for themselves and their kin.
Focusing on the increasing difference between themselves and the top 1%, Reeves
argues, has allowed the upper middle class “to convince ourselves we are in the same
boat as the rest of America; but it is not true” (2018:4). The feelings and experiences of
increasing insecurity among upper-middle-class Americans (highlighted, for example, by
Hacker 2019), relative to the rich, incentivizes behavior that worsens inequality. The
larger the gap in quality of life and outcomes between the top 20% of income earners and
the bottom 80%, Reeves suggests, the greater the incentive for those in the top 20% to
invest in their own children to keep them from slipping down the class ladder. This
creates a “vicious cycle” where parents in the top 20%—afraid of the consequences for
their children of a “fall out of the upper middle class”—contribute to increasing
inequality by “doing whatever we can, including hoarding opportunities, to reduce their
[children’s] risk of being downwardly mobile” (Reeves 2018:76).
If we succeed, there will be more class persistence at the top. And as we become
more confident of success, we will feel less inclined to pay for redistributive
measures. This means, in turn, an increase in inequality (Reeves 2018:76).
Many high-income respondents in my study talked about the efforts they made to secure
their children’s futures—from shoring up tax-free college savings accounts to paying for
private schools to buying houses as inheritance investments. Most did not talk about these
efforts as potential contributors to inequality—seeming unaware, or perhaps in denial
about, the broader consequences of “dream hoarding” (to borrow Reeve’s term). Reeves
suggests that an alternative approach upper-middle-class parents might take to securing
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their children’s futures would be to invest in redistribution such that downward class
mobility would not be so devastating nor the “fall” so “precipitous.”
My intuition is that upper middle-class adults would be more supportive of
redistributive policies and institutions if they were less certain where their own
children—and by extension, grandchildren—were going to end up. If those at the
top believe their children are at real risk of downward social mobility, maybe they
will be more open to policies that ensure a softer landing for those who do fall
(Reeves 2018:74).
Making the distributive consequences of policies more visible might help higher-income
Americans better see this “vicious cycle” and their own contributions to it—including the
power they have to advocate for
change.
Advancing Economic Equity—Intersections of class, race, and gender inequality
“In a diverse society, how do you enact politics that may advance racial equality without
reinforcing racial divisions that are counterproductive and hurt you politically?”
—Omar Wasow (in Powell 2020)
The issues of visibility and obfuscation that keep “the public confused and in the
dark” about economic policy also shape and are shaped by American perceptions and
misperceptions about how racial, gender, and economic inequalities intersect. Americans’
relationship with race and gender complicates their understandings of economic
inequality. My data suggest that action to reduce or counteract economic inequality is
hindered by a lack of understanding—particularly among White and men respondents—
about the ways that economic inequality (and their own place within it) is inextricably
bound up with racial and gender inequality.
In this context, policies with an explicit focus on racial and gender equity—rather
than being seen as “universal”—might be perceived by the general public as pitting the
interests of the targeted groups against the interests of others in a zero-sum conflict. This
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has led some commentators to suggest that, given these beliefs, pursuing racial economic
equity might be more effectively done by promoting policies that are not explicitly
targeted to disadvantaged groups, but nevertheless, disproportionately help them. At the
same time, demands to surface and address White supremacy and patriarchy directly have
gained momentum in recent years.
My findings provide some support to both paths. My respondents were most
unified (across race, class, and gender groups) in their calls for downwardly redistributive
policy when it was framed in the most universal terms. However, the divisions between
these groups in their opinions about more targeted policy seemed to emerge from the
forces I’ve noted that obscure the intersections between racialized, gendered, and
economic inequality. Together, these findings raise questions about the path forward in
terms of reducing economic inequalities across groups: whether to propose universal
policies that might be more politically palatable given current realities or to address the
resistance to targeted policies more directly—through a more head-on reckoning with the
intersectional nature of race, gender, and class inequality.
“Race-neutral” Policies
Generating much “productive controversy,” William Julius Wilson argued some
time ago that, racial equity for the “truly disadvantaged” might better be served through
ostensibly “nonracial solutions” that “address the substantive inequality that exists” and
has accumulated and compounded over generations—rather than through policies that
focus only on reducing current discrimination without addressing the gap in resources
created through historical inequity (Wilson 1987). Such a “hidden agenda”—as Wilson
called it—would “improve the life chances of truly disadvantaged groups” by making
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“universal programs … the dominant and most visible aspects” of reforms, thus
“emphasizing programs to which the more advantaged groups of all races and class
backgrounds can positively relate” (Wilson 1987). Wilson later revised this view, arguing
“we should not shy away from an explicit discussion of the specific issues of race and
poverty” but instead should frame policy in a way that would “facilitate a frank
discussion” of those issues and the “urgent need to address them.”
The framing … should not only generate a sense of fairness and justice to combat
inequality, but should also make people aware that our country would be better
off if these problems were seriously addressed and eradicated (Wilson 2011).
Wilson’s arguments resurfaced as commentators made sense of the results of the 2020
national election in the U.S.—at the end of a tumultuous year where longstanding
inequalities across race, gender, and class became starkly visible to many. Supporting
Wilson’s arguments for foregrounding “universal” policies, New York Times opinion
columnist David Leonhardt argued that electoral results like the repeated defeat of
affirmative action suggest that attempts to reduce racial inequity might be better served
by policies that are “economically populist and race-neutral on their face while
disproportionately helping Black and Latino Americans” (Leonhardt 2020). He lists
Medicaid expansion and “baby bonds” as examples.63 Another such policy—one that saw
support in the November 2020 election—is an increase in the minimum wage. Given the
popularity of minimum wage increases and the fact that they disproportionately benefit
women and people of color (Huizar and Gebreselassie 2016; Tomaskovic-Devey et al.
2020), Matthew Yglesias argues, “it’s not clear that” supporting such “race-neutral”

63. Baby bonds are federal grants for children, recently advocated and popularized by Senator Cory Booker
of New Jersey.
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policies present “an actual tradeoff in terms of achieving more racial equity” (Yglesias
2020).
More universal policies targeted to decreasing economic inequality might have
the added benefit of fostering a recognition of the impacts of class, race, and gender
inequalities in society as a whole, not just among the populations who are seen to be the
targets of specific oppressive systems and structures. Misperceptions that there are some
people who are not impacted by these inequalities facilitate feelings of separation rather
than solidarity. For example, high-income respondents were angry and frustrated, but
ultimately felt their lives were little impacted by the economic inequalities they
declaimed. White respondents expressed a minimal understanding of racialized
inequality—and, although they expressed concern, they demonstrated almost no
understanding of the implications of that inequality for their own lives. Men sometimes
recognized gendered economic inequality (for example, in pay), but—as in these other
instances—saw it as a problem that was not their own.
Misperceptions like these suggest avenues for potential advocacy to foster a
recognition of the impacts of these inequalities on American society as a whole. For
example, a recent report by the corporate consulting firm McKinsey & Company argued
that closing the racial wealth gap in the U.S. would boost the overall American economy
(Noel et al. 2019). The COVID 19 pandemic of 2020 revealed how much American
society relies on “essential” workers who tend to be low-income, women, and people of
color—and thus how protecting and supporting those groups supports American society
and the U.S. economy as a whole (Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2020).
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In other words, promoting the widespread benefits to addressing racial, economic,
and gender injustice is not as deceptive as the language of a “hidden agenda” might
imply. Instead, this framing could be seen as a correction to the pervasive idea that the
economic well-being of Americans in the bottom 99% of incomes are in competition with
one another.
Reckoning with racial history
“If we're going to change the attitudes of the judges who are making sentencing
decisions, and police officers who are unfairly suspecting young men of color, and
employers and educators who are suspending and expelling kids of color at
disproportionately high rates, if we're going to make a difference in overcoming the
implicit bias that we all have, we're going to have to deal honestly with this history and
have to consciously work on freeing ourselves from this history.”
Bryan Stevenson (in Johnson 2015)
It was clear in my analysis that a widespread ignorance or denial of the impact of
American racial history on present-day inequality—particularly among White
respondents—prevented respondents from understanding and feeling committed to
addressing economic inequality. The events of 2020 have left me wondering where this
work of reckoning with America’s racial history meets the strategy of fostering support
for economic justice through an emphasis on race- or gender- “neutral” policy.
In the months leading up to the 2020 presidential election, many commentators
suggested that Americans were on the cusp of an historic reckoning with their country’s
racial history. The seemingly-sudden racial awakening among many White Americans in
the summer of 2020—responding to the killing of George Floyd and the protests that
followed—led simultaneously to puzzlement (NPR’s Code Switch podcast asked, “Why
now, white people?”) and hope that the surge of support for racial justice would be “a
movement, not a moment.” Mainstream institutions as high up as the Federal Reserve
(that would normally shy away from such commentary) nodded to “issues of racial
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equity”—in the Fed’s case, by proposing new rules for the Community Reinvestment Act
that explicitly acknowledge “systemic inequities in credit access” (Cheung 2020).
The social upheaval of a raging pandemic, massive economic distress, and a hotly
contested election, Jennifer A. Richeson wrote, burned through the “gauzy nostalgia” and
“willful ignorance” that characterized the views of many Americans about racial
inequality, making it difficult for them to “avoid seeing the chasm between myth and
reality” (Richeson 2020). The overtly racialized tactics and rhetoric of the Trump
administration, Ibram X. Kendi argued, “held up a mirror to” the racism of American
society in a way that made it “too blatant for Americans to” continue “to ignore or deny”
(Kendi 2020). George Packer argued that “The country is at a low point. But we may be
on the cusp of an era of radical reform.” “Our collapse is so complete that the field lies
open—the philosophical questions brought on by despair allow us to reimagine what kind
of country we can be” (Packer 2020).
The results of the 2020 election suggest that this opening, if there is one, is a
small crack rather than a wide portal—and that conversations, even in this window of
opportunity, will need to turn toward building a sense of commonality and solidarity. The
tightness of the presidential race highlighted partisan divisions and polarization that
overshadow the many points of commonality—including in opinions about many issues
related to economic and racial inequality. At the same time, national conversations about
race—at least among a subset of Americans—have shifted. I imagine that if I were to
interview the same respondents again now, I might hear White respondents drawing a
clearer connection between historical racial inequity and current economic inequalities.
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The invisibility of gendered inequities
I do not feel the same confidence that the intersections of gender inequality with
racial and economic inequality would be more visible or salient to respondents now than
they were at the time of my interviews. In those interviews, the overlap between gender
inequality and racial and class inequality seemed particularly invisible to respondents.
Women were more likely to comment on and describe current gendered discrimination
and inequities—especially in terms of pay—than were men (although there was some
variation among women by race and class). But even among women, few expressed an
understanding of the history of gendered inequities that had been systematically built into
laws and policies and the ways those reverberate into the present moment.
Men respondents independently acknowledged gendered economic inequality
even less frequently than White respondents independently acknowledged racialized
economic inequality. While most White respondents at least minimally acknowledged the
potential intersections of racial and economic inequality without my prompting, this was
not the case among men respondents, who rarely acknowledged gendered inequities
without prompting.
Why was gender inequality and its intersections relatively invisible to my
respondents? One possible answer comes from the social psychology of the way
successful “exemplars” from historically marginalized groups are interpreted as evidence
of reduced structural barriers facing members of those groups. One set of researchers
(Georgeac and Rattan 2019b) found that when Americans perceive growing
representation of women in top leadership positions (e.g., as Fortune 500 CEOs or board
members), they tend to “overgeneralize the extent to which women have access to equal
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opportunities, which then decreases their concern with gender inequality in pay and other
domains.” The authors note that women’s representation in top leadership positions has
received much attention as a central “indicator of gender equality in the workplace, as
well as a key policy objective” (Georgeac and Rattan 2019a:2). Thus, moderate changes
in the gender composition of U.S. corporate leadership over the past several decades have
been heavily publicized. Georgeac and Rattan’s experimental work demonstrates that, in
this kind of context where there appears to be progress toward gender equity at top levels,
Americans express less concern about facts presented to them about persisting gender
inequities in a variety of domains. This reduction in concern about gender-based
inequities occurred even as respondents maintained their level of concern about “genderunrelated wealth inequality in the U.S.”
Another likely contributor to the lack of attention among my respondents to
gendered economic inequality relates to policy feedback and visibility. Among the ways
gendered inequities have been perpetuated are through the social and legal restriction of
women to labor in the realm of “private life” (where work is both unpaid and socially
unacknowledged) or—particularly in the case of women of color—to occupations that
have been deliberately hidden from public view (e.g., Branch 2011; Glenn 2002). As
such, “the fact that the country’s shittiest, lowest-paying jobs are held by women” (as
journalist Lisa Miller put it in early 2020) is something that seems to remain hidden in
plain sight (Miller 2020). As with racial inequities that have long been part of American
society, but suddenly gained attention in the upheavals of 2020, commentators have
argued that the COVID-19 “pandemic is underscoring generations of inequitable social
policy” as it relates to gender as well (Kashen, Glynn, and Novello 2020).
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This blow to the economy will not be felt equally but rather will fall most heavily
on women of color. U.S. policies and norms have long pushed women of color
into the workforce—into jobs that pay less and purposefully have fewer
workplace protections—while setting up barriers, and in some cases supports, to
keep white women out of the workforce. The choices made by policymakers—
primarily white men of means—have deliberately failed to establish a robust care
infrastructure and family-supporting workplace policies and have not addressed
the nation’s outdated mismatch between school and work schedules. All of these
factors contribute to the vicious cycle of racism and sexism, whereby not having
good childcare and workplace policies in place is both a cause and effect of
discriminatory cultural norms and the gender and racial imbalance in resources
and formal positions of power. (P. 15)
Part of what upholds this “vicious cycle” is not only the invisibility of policies that
perpetuate this “gender and racial imbalance in resources and formal positions of power,”
but also the invisibility of the ways that those inequalities harm society more broadly.
Regarding the latter, researchers have underscored moral and normative arguments for
greater equity by noting the ways gendered and racial inequalities harm countries’
economies (e.g., Kashen et al. 2020; Noel et al. 2019; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2020;
Wodon and de la Brière 2018). Lost potential due to inequality can be literally invisible.
Writing as a Black scientist and advocate for climate justice in the months after George
Floyd was killed by a White police officer, Ayana Elizabeth Johnson captured some of
this lost potential as she described how “racism is hurting my work.” She built on Toni
Morrison’s assertion that distraction is “the very serious function of racism.”
Even at its most benign, racism is incredibly time-consuming. Black people don't
want to be protesting for our basic rights to live and breathe. We don't want to be
constantly justifying our existence. Racism, injustice and police brutality are
awful on their own, but they are additionally pernicious because of the brain
power and creative hours they steal from us. I think of one black friend of mine
who wanted to be an astronomer but gave up that dream because organizing for
social justice was more pressing. Consider the discoveries not made, the books
not written, the ecosystems not protected, the art not created, the gardens not
tended (Johnson 2020).

366

Conclusion

Creating Visibility
“Invisibility makes privilege powerful.” (Phillips and Lowery 2020)

My respondents strongly supported downward redistribution and also resisted it.
Among the broadest conclusions I draw from this research is that respondents’ resistance
to downwardly redistributive policy was grounded in what was visible or invisible to
them. And those people and entities with the most power to shape what is visible to
Americans are also those who are most served by the kind of obfuscation that upholds the
status quo. This conundrum is one of the fundamental challenges to tackling economic
inequality that emerged from my data.
It seems that people might process cues and information about economic
inequality in ways that are akin to the ways they process literally (not just
metaphorically) visual information (Jachimowicz et al. 2020; Phillips et al. 2020). My
research suggests that differential visibility of a variety of cues and differential access to
information needed to understand those cues served to uphold the inequitable economic
status quo—despite public sentiment against it. In my findings, people’s opinions were
influenced by the visibility of cues about class, racial and gendered inequality, the lives
of the rich or the poor, the work of the government, policies themselves, and respondents’
own relative privilege and disadvantage. And the visibility of each of those things was, in
turn, shaped by inequitable systems including social, physical, and informational
segregation by race, class, and gender—systems that served to obscure rather than clarify.
However, obfuscatory systems periodically crack—allowing the public to briefly
gaze into “the chasm between myth and reality” (Richeson 2020) that theretofore, many
had been unable or unwilling to see. The “financial crisis” of 2007–2008 might have been
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one such moment when the public gained a glimpse of the predatory actions of financial
institutions and the dire consequences for the people on whom they preyed. Out of that
moment of crisis—and in that moment of visibility—came a wave of reform. A new
federal agency with broad power to protect consumers (the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, CFPB) was created. The rules later released by the CFBP reflected an
understanding that obfuscation and a lack of transparency served the interests of the
powerful—creating profits for those who already had access to resources at the expense
of those who did not. The new rules amended the Truth in Lending Act—requiring that
banks issuing mortgages or credit cards make clear to their customers what the costs to
those customers would be.
I am concluding this project in 2020, at what many consider to be another such
moment. In this case a confluence of forces created cracks in the veneer of American
equality myths—and particularly in myths about racial equality—large enough that many
Americans could no longer fail to see those myths for what they were. One thing my
project underscores is that American denial of the fundamentally intertwined nature of
economic, racial, and gendered inequality in the U.S. serves to uphold policies that
perpetuate or worsen economic inequality. The upheavals of 2020 posed the most
significant challenges to that denial in generations. Perhaps we will begin to face what
needs to be changed.
***
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